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Arthur Cools and Vivian Liska 
Kafka and the Universal: Introduction
Jean-Paul Sartre’s saying that “Kafka’s testimony is all the more universal as it 
is profoundly singular”1 is indicative of a key paradox in the reception of Kafka 
during the twentieth century, a paradox that has wide-reaching implications 
for our understanding of the interface between literature and philosophy. It is 
characteristic of the philosophical reception of Kafka’s work that it is repeatedly 
invoked in the context of attempts to escape from universal notions that have 
been inherited from a modern foundational thinking; these notions include the 
subject, thinking, and existence. Of paramount importance in this context is the 
concept of singularity, which is at odds with philosophy’s ambitions, which have 
traditionally been expressed in terms of the universal and the essential. Philo-
sophical attempts to counter this tradition frequently turn to modern literature 
in search of an experience of singularity that involves a sense of alienation that 
cannot be encapsulated by concepts. The striking frequency of references to Kafka 
in this endeavor (more so even than to other modernist writers such as Beckett, 
Mallarmé, Proust, or Joyce) is surprising, given that Kafka’s prose is characterized 
by rather indeterminate spatio-temporal representations and seemingly uninter-
rupted realistic descriptions. His writing has thus been widely praised for its ren-
dering of a universal condition humaine. Kafka is indeed often regarded as the 
ultimate witness to the human condition in the twentieth century and, like Dante, 
Shakespeare, and Goethe in their times, is attributed universal significance. Why 
is it, then, that Kafka can nevertheless be considered to have given the ultimate 
voice to the experience of the singular? 
The paradox between the universal significance attributed to Kafka’s work 
and the references to it as a paradigmatic expression of a singularity that cannot 
be subsumed under any generalization engenders questions not only regarding 
Kafka’s specificity, but also about philosophy’s approach to his work. These ques-
tions require attention to how Kafka’s writings introduce singularity at both the 
semantic and the formal level in a radically inconspicuous manner, and to philos-
ophy’s “double bind,” especially as concerns philosophy’s attempt to articulate 
the singular while inevitably resorting to its traditional tendency of conceptual-
izing its object of investigation. The contributions to this volume address, in a 
1 Jean-Paul Sartre, “La Demilitarisation de la culture” (“The Demilitarization of Culture”), ex-
cerpted in Situations VII, Gallimard, Paris 1962, 322–331, 326.
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variety of ways, the interplay between literature and philosophy that is at stake 
in this paradox.
An interdisciplinary approach is essential for a volume dedicated to clari-
fying the ways in which philosophy and literature are related to each other in 
Kafka. The contributions to this volume approach the paradox of the universal 
and the singular from a variety of perspectives and points of departure. While 
some treat the topic in straightforward philosophical terms and regard the uni-
versal in an ontological, epistemological, or phenomenological sense, others 
focus on it through more cultural and religious terms. The latter is particularly 
true for those essays in which Kafka’s Jewishness, and Judaism more generally, 
plays a central role. Some of the essays in this volume are devoted to showing a 
philosophical position or clarification of concepts in Kafka’s writings and their 
reception; others explore individual literary stories in order to show how they 
challenge pre-established concepts of the universal and invite us to reconsider 
the meanings of the universal. We did not wish to separate these two approaches 
into different sections, as this would suggest a dichotomy between a philosoph-
ical and a literary approach to the paradox of the universal and the singular in 
Kafka. Such a clear demarcation would resolve the paradox rather than expose 
it. Instead, we opted to structure the volume according to recurrent themes in the 
contributions: these include ambiguity as a tool of deconstructing the pre-estab-
lished philosophical meanings of the universal, the concept of the law as a major 
symbol for the universal meaning of Kafka’s writings, the presence of animals 
which, in Kafka’s scenes and stories, blurs the divide between the singular and 
the universal, the modernist mode of writing as challenge of philosophical con-
cepts of the universal, and the social and political meaning of the universal in 
contemporary Kafka reception. These themes constitute the five sections of the 
volume. In each, the interplay between philosophy and literature is illuminated 
in light of new approaches to the question of the universal.
In the first section, entitled “The Ambiguity of the Singular,” the meaning of 
Kafka’s literary work is reconsidered in relation to the philosophical discourse on 
the universal. The opening chapter, Stanley Corngold’s “The Singular Accident in 
a Universe of Risk: An Approach to Kafka and the Paradox of the Universal,” for-
mulates concisely the main problem of the universal and the singular in relation 
to the work of Kafka: in short, do we submit this work to philosophical exami-
nation if we attribute to it a universal meaning or, on the contrary, do we read 
Kafka’s writings and learn from this reading in order to reconsider the meaning 
of the universal? In the former case, we apply pre-established concepts of the 
universal and the singular to Kafka’s work; in the latter we discover in Kafka’s 
writings new meanings of the singular and the universal. Corngold shows that 
one cannot separate these two directions of research and explains why: Kafka, 
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on several occasions, refers to a philosophical legacy of the universal, especially 
to “the pure, the true, the immutable.”2 Hence, Corngold initiates an inquiry on 
the philosophical in Kafka’s work while simultaneously declaring the primacy of 
his fiction for the confessional. Consequently, Corngold’s approach combines a 
clarification of the philosophical legacy in Kafka with a particular attention to the 
specific linguistic features and images of Kafka’s sentences.
In his “Philosophy and Ambiguity in Benjamin’s Kafka,” Brendan Moran 
examines the role of ambiguity in the manifestation of the paradox. He argues 
that not paradox but ambiguity is the philosophical element in literature. The 
paradox creates a straightforward opposition to the mythical, whereas philoso-
phy reveals the intrusion of ambiguity in myth and opens a dimension of polyva-
lence (Mehrdeutigkeit). Moran focuses on ambiguity in Walter Benjamin’s inter-
pretation of Kafka’s writings and shows that Benjamin implicitly regards Kafka’s 
literary work as “a victory over Kierkegaard’s paradox,”3 according to which the 
individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute. 
Starting from a remark by Theodor Adorno on Benjamin’s approach to Kafka, 
Søren Rosendal brings to the fore an astonishing relation between Kafka and 
Hegel in his contribution, “The Logic of the ‘Swamp World’: Hegel with Kafka 
on the Contradiction of Freedom.” In a traditional interpretation, this relation 
has been described as a radical opposition: Kafka expresses the singular expe-
rience of the individual exposed to and victimized by a universal, impenetrable 
system. Hegel, in contrast, develops a systematic logic in which the experience of 
the individual disappears. Rosendal, however, points to an intersection between 
Hegel and Kafka, which is the inescapability of contradiction within the structure 
of freedom: the possibility of a free act depends on the outer, objective space of 
action which is not empty but a “swamp world.” In order to demonstrate that 
Kafka and Hegel share a secret affinity, the author is particularly attentive both to 
the movement and fluidity in Hegel’s logic of contradiction and to the ambiguous 
ways of describing the protagonist’s actions in Kafka’s writings. 
In the third chapter of this section, “The Necessary Revision of the Concept 
of the Universal: Kafka’s ‘Singularity,’” Arnaud Villani presents Kafka’s work as 
the starting point of a new thinking that facilitates questioning the ontological 
tradition of philosophy as a whole. In this tradition, the universal is thought con-
ceptually by separating (abstracting) the meaning of all things from any marks of 
2 Franz Kafka, The Diaries 1910–1923, ed. Max Brod, trans. Joseph Kresh and Martin Greenberg 
with cooperation of Hannah Arendt, Schocken Books, New York 1976, 387.
3 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften [Collected Writings], Vol. II:3, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and 
Hermann Schweppenhauser, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1977, 1268.
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the singular event from which it arises. The power of this thought results from the 
possibility to grasp (be-greifen, con-cipere) the essence of things. Kafka, however, 
restores the resistance of the singular via a thought that the author calls “abrupt,” 
because it cannot separate the specificity of each singular phenomenon from the 
presence of the whole. A thick, detailed, unstable writing that is able to undo 
evident conceptual relations or to realize unexpected conceptual cross-overs 
follows from this transformation of thought. 
The volume’s second section, entitled “Before the Law,” collects three origi-
nal approaches to the parable “Before the Law.” It is interesting to note that this 
text remains a major reference in reflection on the universal in Kafka, not least 
because of the concept and the figuration of law that it implies. In this short 
parable, which constitutes one of the central literary texts of modernity, the uni-
versal meets the singular in a paradoxical way. As noted in the story, “the law 
should be accessible for everyone at any time”; nevertheless the door through 
which one could gain admittance to the law is “only intended for you.” This 
contradiction, involving the concise settings of the law, challenges the reader to 
interpret the narrative’s most minute signs and details. 
In “Am-ha’aretz: The Law of the Singular. Kafka’s Hidden Knowledge,” Eli 
Schonfeld finds in a Talmudic passage the source that may have inspired Kafka for 
this short story. The protagonist of the story, the man from the country who comes 
to the doorkeeper and requests admittance to the law, is, according to Schonfeld, 
the Talmudic figure of the am-ha’retz, who was associated in rabbinic literature 
with those who were ignorant of the law and opposed to the talmid chacham, 
the scholar of the law. From this starting point, the author recalls Benjamin’s 
distinction between law and Lehre and Benjamin’s preference, in his reflections 
on Kafka, for the latter. Interpreting the doorkeeper in the story as a figure of 
the talmid chacham, Schonfeld shows how Benjamin’s distinction functions in 
“Before the Law” and argues that this story reveals the place before the law as 
the place of predilection with regard to the law. This is contrary to contemporary 
interpretations according to which Kafka’s story expresses the idea of a fulfilment 
of the law – an access to the law – or the idea of a suspension or difference of the 
law.
From a different perspective, Arthur Cools, in his contribution, “Desire and 
Responsibility: The Case of K.,” joins in his interpretation of Kafka’s parable the 
idea that “before the law” is the law. However, his main focus is the protago-
nist Josef K. of The Trial, the novel in which the parable of “Before the Law” is 
told. Cools argues that the story “Before the Law” can be understood as a kind 
of abstract symbol of the narrative of The Trial, but he searches in the singular 
chain of images in this narrative for the signs that can reveal something about 
the nature of the law and the demand of having access to the law. In order to 
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approach the enigmatic meanings of Kafka’s parable, the author examines 
whether, how, and to what extent it is possible to embed the narrative of The Trial 
into the Greek legacy of the tragic model. The opening scene of the tragic model 
is indeed the problem of being chosen or accused by a demand that is addressed 
only to the individual and to which she or he has no access, as is the case in The 
Trial. However, the examination reveals fundamental differences, in particular as 
concerns the concept of law: in Greek tragedy, the law is clear, but in default; in 
The Trial, however, the law is omnipresent, but not transparent. As such, Cools 
argues (against Zygmunt Bauman’s interpretation, according to which Kafka’s 
parable calls for a new approach to justice and responsibility) that the law in 
Kafka’s narrative is not the expression of a universal idea of justice, responsibil-
ity, or freedom according to which the protagonist claims his innocence. In inter-
preting the chain of images in The Trial, he shows that the reverse is the case: the 
law and the demand to have access to the law are the expression of and are bound 
by the ambiguities of the protagonist’s erotic desires.
Michal Ben-Naftali’s contribution, “Derrida-Reads-Kafka,” deals with the 
presence of Kafka’s “Before the Law” in Derrida’s readings. She shows how the 
transcendence of the law, as figured in Kafka’s parable and which Derrida avoids 
identifying in Jewish terms of the Tora, is a basic structure in Derrida’s thought 
and operates in his reflections on the fictional moment of foundation, whether it 
is political, as is the case of his essay “Force de Loi: le ‘fondement mystique de 
l’autorité’” (“Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’”),4 or moral, 
as for instance in his interpretation of Freud’s account of the origin of moral law. 
This basic structure is revealed in Derrida’s approach to literature, in particular 
in what he calls the Biblical origins of literature. The main figure of this origin 
is Abraham, who keeps his secret and remains silent when he commences to 
prepare the sacrifice of his son Isaac. This secret and this silence delineates a 
scene and a space where the law remains inaccessible, where father and son are 
related to each other through the secret of the father, and where the son witnesses 
the silence of the father. In this way, Ben-Naftali points at an astonishing conti-
nuity in Derrida’s readings of literary texts which relates the Biblical narrative of 
Abraham to Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” through a reading of Kafka’s “Letter 
to His Father.” In light of this continuity, she argues, Kafka’s parable “Before the 
Law” becomes a kind of symbol for the nature of the literary work as such. 
The animal is the central issue in the volume’s third section, entitled 
“Animals.” There are unquestionably many animal figures in Kafka’s writing. 
They seem to express each time an experience of singularity par excellence not 
4 Jacques Derrida, “Force de Loi: le ‘fondement mystique de l’autorité,’” Galilé, Paris 2005.
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only because they do not fit into the concepts and categories of human existence, 
but moreover because they are related to an experience of a unique event, as is 
the case in the story of the giant mole and in “The Metamorphosis.” However, 
in Kafka’s narratives, these events influence human interactions and disturb the 
apparently evident concepts of human understandings. 
Rodolphe Gasché’s contribution, “Of Mammoth Smallness: Franz Kafka’s 
‘The Village Schoolmaster,’” is a close reading of Kafka’s story “The Village 
Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole]” and a fascinating examination of the struggle 
in this story between the schoolmaster of the country and the narrator, the busi-
nessman of the city. Gasché brings to the fore the meanings of the giant mole 
as a key element of his interpretation of this narration although the presence of 
the mole is most elusive in the story. In establishing a surprising similarity with 
the structure of the singular and the universal in the story “Before the Law,” the 
author carefully shows how the unique (in)significance of the giant mole deter-
mines the protagonists’ interactions and transforms the traditional concepts of 
the universal. In this way, he demonstrates why a widespread assumption in 
Kafka scholarship – that Kafka’s heroes are the victims of an oppressive bureau-
cratic system – is in fact mistaken.
In his contribution, “Irreducible Pluralities: The Jewish Legacy of Franz 
Kafka,” David Suchoff addresses the question of the universal from a different 
perspective, that of Kafka’s humour. Laughter is the capacity of obtaining pleas-
ure from the failure of matching universal categories. Kafka, according to Suchoff, 
finds a specific Jewish way to express this capacity. Suchoff thus addresses par-
ticular attention to Kafka’s multiple languages: his interest in Yiddish theatre, his 
rewritings of the story of Abraham, his attitude towards the German language. 
In this reflection, the presence of the animal figures in Kafka’s writings, as is the 
case in “Report to an Academy” and “Investigations of a Dog,” plays a major role 
because the animals encourage one to de-identify with the German language or 
to undermine the authority of the relation to the father or to discover the gaps in 
the legacy of the past. In this way, Kafka invites us to the experience of laughter, 
“that animal in us all.”
Kafka’s bestiary is the central core of Anna Glazova’s original approach in 
her contribution, “Kafka’s Cat-Lamb: The Hybridization of Genesis and Taxon-
omy.” Glazova is interested in the phenomenon of hybridization in Kafka’s writ-
ings which undermines and resists conceptualization. In her approach, this phe-
nomenon is not limited to the imagination of the figure of a hybrid, but includes 
a linguistic aspect: a cross-over between proper names and animal figures. In 
this respect, hybridization transforms the signifying function of general terms. 
Glazova examines in particular the hybrid figure of the cat-lamb in Kafka’s story 
“A Crossbred,” showing a genealogy from two conflicting names from Kafka’s 
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paternal and maternal bloodlines: Kafka means “jackdaw” in Czech; Loewy 
derives from “Löwe,” or “lion.” Being a child of both means to be a bird and a 
cat, a prey and a predator. In a fascinating deepening of Kafka’s Jewish taxonomy 
of animals, Glazova shows that the hybridization is not just a linguistic tool to 
express the singular: in fact, it still conceals a logic, the logic of sacrifice, as in the 
story of Abraham and Isaac.
The chapters of the fourth section, entitled “Modernism,” resituate and 
reconsider certain features of modernism in Kafka’s work in light of the ques-
tion of the universal. How does the attention to the specific conditions of liter-
ary production concern and transform the universalist concept of literature that 
is traditionally based upon the ethical function attributed to literature? This is 
the central question in Jean-Michel Rabaté’s contribution, “Kafka’s Anti-Epiph-
anies.” He calls attention to Kafka’s aphorisms, especially the Zürau aphorisms, 
which are, according to the author, the ultimate expressive form of Kafka’s mod-
ernism. In order to understand how this fragmentary form mediates between the 
universal and the particular, Rabaté compares Kafkan aphorism to the Joycean 
epiphanies. He details an interesting similarity between them with regard to the 
concept of truth, which is not destroyed but plays a role as a decentering tool in 
discourse. Yet he also mentions an important difference: whereas Kafka contin-
ues to refer to the Jewish framework of messianic promise, Joyce contents himself 
with the promise of a text to come.
In “Modernism’s Particulars, Oscillating Universals, and Josefine’s Singular 
Singing,” Lorraine Markotic situates Kafka’s modernism into the broader field of 
modernity. Focussing on Kafka’s short narratives, she analyses different stylis-
tic and semantic strategies that Kafka invents in order to destabilize the dialec-
tic connection between the universal and the particular: the universal loses its 
function of comprehension and is neutralized as something meaninglessness; 
the particular is not temporally located or individualized but is instead perme-
ated by abstract, undefinable power relations. Kafka did not intend, the author 
concludes, to grasp the universal through the particular; on the contrary, in his 
writings they become indistinguishable. Markotic shows how this is at stake in 
Kafka’s short story “Josefine, the Singer.” Commenting on Derrida’s reflections on 
the gift and the reciprocity that follows from it, she notes that in Kafka’s story one 
cannot even be certain about who is giving and who is receiving. In this respect, 
the story does not afford any means to clarify whether Josefine’s singing can be 
considered as something particular or as something universal.
The last chapter of this section, Galili Shahar’s “The Alarm Clock: The Times 
of Gregor Samsa,” is devoted to the different dimensions of temporality in Kafka’s 
story “The Metamorphosis.” Shahar examines the complex time structures of the 
modernist narrative. Here, the universal is represented by the mechanical time of 
8   Arthur Cools and Vivian Liska 
the alarm clock in Samsa’s room, which introduces the mechanization of human 
existence and the return of the creaturely body with its gestures, noises, and cries. 
Shahar confronts this mechanical time with another time in the story, one that is 
revealed by the writing desk in Samsa’s room, namely, the time of the student 
and the years of childhood, the time of writing. This time escapes the mechanized 
time of the alarm clock, because it is a condensed time. The author describes the 
tensions, inversions, and distortions of these time structures in order to define 
the event of literary writing. 
A volume dedicated to Kafka and the universal must contend with contem-
porary Kafka reception and assess in particular the social and political meanings 
that Kafka’s work evokes. The contributions collected in the final section, entitled 
“After Kafka,” discuss three main positions in the Kafka reception. In “Reading 
Kafka: A Personal Story,” Shimon Sandbank retraces his readings of Kafka from 
Walter Benjamin to Gilles Deleuze to Jacques Derrida. At the beginning and the 
end of this line of explication, the author refers to what he calls Kafka’s “cancel-
lation technique”: the different linguistic modalities of retreating and negating 
what has just been said. This technique destabilizes the establishment of any 
fixed general meaning. Benjamin’s distinction between doctrine and fiction was 
an eye-opener for the elusive traces of transcendence yet it was unable to account 
for the singular negativity in Kafka’s writings. This also applies to Deleuze and 
Guattari: they were the first to state the immanence of law, which is, however, 
incompatible with Kafka’s negativity. For this reason, Derrida replaced the others: 
deconstruction, according to Sandbank, is quite close to Kafka’s cancellation 
technique. However, Sandbank underscores an important difference: whereas 
the deferral of meaning is an effect of language, according to Derrida, in Kafka it 
is not language but the writer who doubts, negates assumptions, and undermines 
the meanings of what has been written. 
In “Kafka, Pro and Contra: Günther Anders’s Holocaust Book,” Kata Gellen 
traces a completely different position in the reception of Kafka, that of Günther 
Anders. Anders was sharply critical of Kafka. He considered that Kafka helped 
to absolve a generation of Nazi sympathizers from their guilt through his having 
invented a world in which guilt and punishment are uncoupled. Gellen draws 
particular attention to Anders’s interpretation of Kafka’s Jewishness, which he 
claimed was infected by a secular, universalist theology that is actually Chris-
tian. For this reason, Anders considers that Kafka’s view of guilt is not Jewish, 
since it is based upon a conception of original sin and redemption. In this respect, 
one understands better the central core of Anders’s critique – that Kafka betrays 
his Jewishness – and Anders’s diagnosis of the resurgence of interest in Kafka 
in post-war Germany. Gellen does not hesitate to discuss the main problems of 
Anders’s position in the contemporary reception of Kafka. However, for her, the 
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importance of Anders’s Kafka book lies in the possibility to reread Kafka in rela-
tion to the Holocaust without ascribing to Kafka’s descriptions of suffering and 
loss a predictive value. 
“The position in which thought finds itself after 1945 forces Hannah Arendt 
to leave the realm of philosophy and turn to literature [to Kafka]”: this sentence, 
at the beginning of the final contribution, Birgit R. Erdle’s “Dis/Placing Thought: 
Franz Kafka and Hannah Arendt,” summarizes one of the central ideas to which 
this volume is dedicated. For Arendt, who refers to the fragments “He” in Kafka’s 
journals, the grounds of reality (der Boden der Tatsachen) have changed and 
this change is marked by the fact that thinking and reality are no longer linked 
with one another. It immediately reveals the philosophical condition of the sig-
nificance of Kafka’s work to which Arendt refers in order to shed light on this 
gap between thinking and reality, which is also a “gap between past and future.” 
According to Arendt’s readings, Kafka enables a prolongation of the struggle 
between the two extremes of the gap without searching to bridge the abyss or 
to jump into the timeless sphere of metaphysics. According to Erdle, however, 
Arendt is too much in search for a metaphor in Kafka’s “He” fragments to name 
the new place of thinking. Erdle detects yet another meaning in these fragments, 
namely, that of the outside of the law and the specific Jewish experience of time.
This volume is the result of a fruitful collaboration, not only between the 
editors but also among many colleagues, primarily the participants of two dif-
ferent conferences, one on “Kafka and His Readers,” held at the Hebrew Univer-
sity of Jerusalem in 2012, the other on “Kafka and the Paradox of the Universal,” 
organized at the University of Antwerp in 2013. We invited several scholars to 
write additional papers for the volume. We thank them for accepting this invita-
tion and enriching the scope of this book, and the participants of the two confer-
ences for lively and enlightening discussions and for their contributions to this 
volume. The publication of this book would not have been possible without the 
support of a number of people and institutions: the Institute of Jewish Studies at 
the University of Antwerp, the Ministry of Education of the Flemish Community, 
the FWO (Fonds for Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, Flanders), and the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. We thank Jeremy Schreiber for his careful editing of the 
manuscript; his attentiveness to the nuances of the English language greatly 
improved the volume. We are deeply grateful to Manuela Gerlof of De Gruyter 
for her encouragement throughout the production of this book, and last but not 
least to Irene Kacandes, the editor of the series “Interdisciplinary German Cul-
tural Studies,” for her inspiring guidance. We hope the readers of this book will 
share our sense that this volume participates in important ways in exploring the 
interface between literature and philosophy and Kafka’s role in this relationship.

Section 1: The Ambiguity of the Singular

Stanley Corngold 
The Singular Accident in a Universe of Risk: 
An Approach to Kafka and the Paradox of the 
Universal
Kafka’s testimony is all the more universal as it is profoundly singular.
– Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Demilitarization of Culture”
The subject qua “self-consciousness” […] participates in the universal precisely and only in 
so far as his identity is truncated, marked by a lack; in so far as he is not fully “what he is.”
– Slavoj Žižek, Metastases of Enjoyment
The more authentic the works, the more they follow what is objectively required, the object’s 
consistency, and this is always universal.
– Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory 
I mean of course my mother whose image, blunted for some time past, was beginning now 
to harrow me again.
– Samuel Beckett, Molloy
This golden Hades is no place to be blowing one another to bits. It’s a place to come and 
think, […] to study the molten vignettes in mirages.
– Paul West, The Very Rich Hours of Count von Stauffenberg
This essay examines Kafka’s works in the perspective of disciplinary philosophy, 
a perspective that immediately involves “the paradox of the universal.” For what 
Kafka and philosophy have in common is the effort to represent what is univer-
sally the case (“truth”) in propositions that are irreducibly singular – singular in 
the sense of being linguistically specific, constrained by their materiality (their 
sound-look) and the contingent connotation of their diction. (I exempt symbolic 
and formal logic.) 
Kafka’s plangent appeal strengthens this idea: “I can still get fleeting satis-
faction from works like ‘A Country Doctor’ […]. But happiness only in case I can 
raise the world into purity, truth, immutability.”1 Das Reine, Wahre, Unveränder-
liche – purity, truth, immutability – is a good enough indicator of what we might 
1 Franz Kafka, diary entry of 25 September 1917, in Kafka’s Selected Stories: New Translations, 
Backgrounds and Contexts, Criticism, ed. and trans. Stanley Corngold, Norton Critical Edition, 
Norton, New York 2007, 205. (“Zeitweilige Befriedigung kann ich von Arbeiten wie ‘Landarzt’ 
noch haben, […] Glück aber nur, falls ich die Welt ins Reine, Wahre, Unveränderliche heben 
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call “the universal” – and hence an ideal that prima facie can never be more than 
approximated by the sentences we write, which are specific and singular by virtue 
of their rhetorical and material character. For Jean-Paul Sartre, however, this 
ideal is realized to an exemplary degree in Kafka’s stories and fictions, “Kafka’s 
testimony [being] all the more universal as it is profoundly singular.”2 
Such universalist intentions are not strange to other modernist writers con-
temporary with Kafka: they inform the specifically anchored aperçus of Marcel, 
the fictive narrator in Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu [In Search of 
Lost Time]; and James Joyce is said to have remarked, about his insistent focus on 
the city of Dublin,  “In the particular is contained the universal.” True, Joyce had 
a special idea of “universality” when he made the singular heart of Dublin the 
heart of “all the cities in the world.”3 It might be interesting to substitute Prague 
for Dublin in Joyce’s formula, narrowing Kafka’s singularity to a focus on Prague 
and concluding that the outcome of this focus is also the universality of “all the 
cities in the world.” This claim actually figures in a popular text, broadcast by 
Radio Bremen in 2010: 
Only a few writers are so persistently identified with a city as Franz Kafka with Prague. 
Almost his entire life ran its course here, and this city on the Moldau left conspicuous traces 
in his work. From the perspective of the Altstädter Ring, the historical center of Prague, 
Kafka himself once said, “Here was my high school, there the university, and a bit further to 
the left my office. My entire life is confined to this circle.”4
Yet, on reflection, Kafka’s singularity requires more than this focus, although it is 
by no means irrelevant, ex negativo, to his deepest concerns. Near the end of his 
kann.” See Franz Kafka, Tagebücher in der Fassung der Handschrift [Diary in the Manuscript Ver-
sion], ed. Michael Müller, S. Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1990, 838.) 
2 Jean-Paul Sartre, “La Démilitarisation de la culture” (“The Demilitarization of Culture”), ex-
cerpted in Situations VII, Gallimard, Paris 1962, 322–331, 326.
3 Richard Ellmann, James Joyce, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1959, 505. Ellmann is citing 
Arthur Power, From the Old Waterford House: Recollections of a Soldier and Artist, Ballylough 
Books, London 1940, 64.
4 Radio Bremen, “Porträt: Franz Kafka: Auf Spurensuche in Prag” (“Portrait: Franz Kafka: 
Searching for Traces in Prague”), 7 July 2010, http://www.radiobremen.de/kultur/portraets/
kafka/kafka108.html. My translation. (Original German transcript: “Nur wenige Schriftsteller 
werden so nachhaltig mit einer Stadt identifiziert wie Franz Kafka mit Prag. Fast sein gesamtes 
Leben hat sich hier abgespielt und in seinem Werk hat die Stadt an der Moldau unübersehbare 
Spuren hinterlassen. Aus dem Blickwinkel des Altstädter Rings, dem historischen Zentrum 
Prags, hat Kafka selbst einmal gesagt: ‘Hier war mein Gymnasium, dort die Universität und ein 
Stückchen weiter links mein Büro. In diesem kleinen Kreis ist mein ganzes Leben eingeschlos-
sen.’”)
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short life Kafka spoke to Dora Diamant about his sordid immersion in Prague and 
hence of the disposability of all his works from before 1923, owing to their having 
been written in a condition of unfreedom.5 The essence of Prague was, for Kafka, 
not at all universal; Berlin, for one thing, was freer. 
The writer Louis Begley, in his rather nasty little monograph on Kafka, scolds 
Kafka for knowing so little of such modernist literature as Joyce’s Dubliners.6 Let 
it be agreed for the moment that additional immersion in the life of a provincial 
city, represented in a style of what Joyce called “scrupulous meanness,” would 
have neither enriched Kafka’s focus nor excited his interest in getting to the heart 
of all the cities in the world. Kafka’s singularity lies, at least on the surface, in 
taking for his heroes creatures never before seen on earth (or on the seas), such 
as the metamorphosed Gregor Samsa, or Odradek, or Josephine the songstress, 
or Poseidon the marine bureaucrat; these images have the peculiar singularity of 
dreams, in that they are at once exceedingly vivid in detail (apollinisch, or “Apol-
lonian,” according to Nietzsche) yet are also touched by a mood, an aura chiefly 
troubling, and hence are like nightmares or disturbing hallucinations. These 
images do not actually envisage anything one ordinarily experiences in the day-
light of cities (leaving aside the Satanic light of the media circus). They belong to 
another order of the world – or, one could say, “cosmos,” in the spirit of Walter 
Benjamin’s injunction to himself as a critic of Kafka: “Den Funken zwischen Prag 
und dem Kosmos überspringen lassen” – “Have the spark jump over, between 
Prague and the cosmos.”7 
Gregor Samsa will occupy this discussion in due course. For now, I will 
proceed to literature’s handmaiden, philosophy, keeping in mind Roberto Cal-
asso’s caveat from his afterward to an English translation of Kafka’s Zürau aph-
orisms: “If there is a theology [and a philosophy, I would add] in Kafka, [the col-
lection of Zürau aphorisms] is the only place where he himself comes close to 
declaring it. But even in these aphorisms abstraction is rarely permitted to break 
free of the image to live its own life, as if it has to serve time [read: be incarcerated] 
for having been autonomous and capricious for too long, in that remote and reck-
less age where philosophers and theologians still existed.”8
5 Nicholas Murray, Kafka, Yale University Press, New Haven 2004, 371–372.
6 Louis Begley, The Tremendous World I Have Inside My Head: Franz Kafka: A Biographical 
Essay, Atlas & Co., New York 2008.
7 Walter Benjamin, Benjamin über Kafka [Benjamin on Kafka], ed. Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1981, 157. My translation.
8 Roberto Calasso, “Veiled Splendor” (Afterward), trans. Geoffrey Brock, in Franz Kafka, The 
Zurau [sic] Aphorisms, trans. Michael Hofmann, ed. Roberto Calasso, Schocken Books, New York 
2006, 109–134, 119.
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We do not have the privilege, however, of disregarding this fabulous “remote 
and reckless age where philosophers and theologians still existed” – for this age 
is once again our own. Peter Thompson, a scholar of Ernst Bloch, offers a sober 
comment in this matter: “Religion and Kafka have come back as themes precisely 
because we are once again living in an eschatological and apocalyptic era in 
which it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine a different 
and better one.”9 
The concurrence of singular and universal that Joyce speaks of, and which I 
will impute to Kafka as his intention, is also the goal of the “extraordinarily excit-
ing power” of philosophy – this is provable in at least one special modern case. 
This power is found in the work of Jacques Derrida, whose prowess, according 
to Jonathan Culler, consists in his “reading texts in their singularity […] while 
also identifying ubiquitous logics on which they relied and pervasive systems 
to which they contributed.”10 It is hardly surprising that even when philosoph-
ical discourse addresses the singular objects of its concern (for example, when 
Derrida addresses Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” (“Vor dem Gesetz”), he notes 
the guard’s abundant nasal hair and that in psychoanalytic circles ante portas – 
literally, “before the gates” – means premature ejaculation), philosophy aims to 
produce results of universal validity.11 Philosophy, as deconstruction, may there-
after proceed to identify the “logics” that these results employ, the “pervasive 
system” to which they contribute, with a view to putting the claim to such uni-
versally valid templates “under erasure.” (Note, though, that Derrida’s erasure of 
the claim to a logic having universal validity is meant to be universally valid only 
so long as the action of erasure goes on and on.) But more suggestive than the 
singularity of its objects, as in this mention of Derrida’s thought and the texts he 
reads with unusual acuity, is the singularity of much modern philosophical dis-
course as such: I am referring to Derrida’s own story of the “white mythology,” the 
unique pattern of subcutaneous images and tropes and story elements informing 
this discourse in each individual case. Such patterns are altogether vivid in Der-
rida’s essays, as well as in the work of other modern philosophers, such as Hei-
degger, Wittgenstein, and Žižek – a singularity evident in their distinctive styles.
9 Peter Thompson, “Kafka, Bloch, Religion and the Metaphysics of Contingency,” in Kafka, 
Religion, and Modernity, Oxford Kafka Studies III, eds. Manfred Engel and Ritchie Robertson, 
Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg 2014, 177–187, 178.
10 Jonathan Culler, “Forum: The Legacy of Jacques Derrida,” in PMLA 120.2 (2005): 472–473, 472.
11 Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law” (“Devant la loi”), trans. Avital Ronell and Christine Roul-
ston, in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, Routledge, New York and London 1992, 183–220.
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Nonetheless, having invoked the mutuality of Kafka’s literature, and phi-
losophy, I will insist on the former’s distinctive charm  – its Zauber (“magic”) 
leaving aside its Logik (“logic”)  – and treat this charm as an incentive to our 
friendship with Franz Kafka.12 Roland Barthes wrote, “All criticism is affection-
ate. […] This should be carried even further, almost to the postulation of a theory 
of affect as the motive force of criticism.”13 It is such affection that now guides 
our thought-adventure – a “friendship,” too, that, like any ship, needs to know 
where it is heading. And so we must reflect: Are we to study Kafka with the tools 
of a philosophically well-grounded position on the universal and the singular – 
in a word, submit Kafka to philosophical examination? Then the aim would be to 
see how well Kafka’s work conforms to that position, and to this end we would 
employ tools such as, say, Hegel’s analysis that “the being as such of finite things 
is to have the germ of this transgression in their in-itselfness: the hour of their 
birth is the hour of their death.”14 The accumulation of mere particulars – such 
finite things – leads, as in Hegel’s Logik, not to “das Ganze” (“the whole”) but to 
a “schlechte Unendlichkeit” (“bad infinity”). Proceeding in this way, and thereby 
addressing Kafka’s conformity with – or calculable disparity from – Hegel’s (or 
some other’s) philosophical position, we would then try to discern how Kafka’s 
work negates, nuances, or enlarges that position – and then, with such riches in 
tow, return sail to a port in the Empire of Philosophy. That is one way to navigate. 
Or ought we to have the opposite direction in mind, such that the intention is to 
perform an epoché – that is, to bracket everything that might have been learned 
from philosophy about the singular and universal, and then, affecting naïveté, 
sail anew into these strange seas of thought, our progress fueled only by the 
warmth of our friendship with Kafka and whatever has been learned from him, 
as if nous avions “lu tous les livres” [et maintenant] “ô mon coeur, entend[on]s le 
12 The full title of Thomas Mann’s great novel reads: Doctor Faustus: The Life of the German 
Composer Adrian Leverkühn, As Told By a Friend [Doktor Faustus: Das Leben des deutschen Ton-
setzers Adrian Leverkühn, erzählt von einem Freunde] and it is this introit that I want to apply. 
(Mann, who greatly admired Kafka, would not object, I think, nor would Kafka, who greatly ad-
mired Mann.) For “Zauber” and “Logik,” see Dieter Hasselblatt, Zauber und Logik. Eine Kafka 
Studie [Magic and Logic: A Kafka Study], Wissenschaft und Politik, Wiesbaden 1964. 
13 Roland Barthes, The Grain of the Voice: Interviews 1962–1980, trans. Linda Coverdale, Hill 
and Wang, New York 1985, 331. 
14 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic, ed. and trans. George di Giovanni, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, 101. (“[D]as Sein der endlichen Dinge, [welches] als 
solches ist, den Keim des Vergehens als ihr Insichsein zu haben; die Stunde ihrer Geburt ist die 
Stunde ihres Todes.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, I:1:1:2:B.c “Die End-
lichkeit” (“The Finitude”), Hofenberg, Berlin 2013, 99.) 
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chant des matelots!” – of sailor Gracchus (“we have ‘read all the books’ [and now] 
‘oh my heart, hear the song of the sailors’”).15
At first glance, the first direction seems obviously the more persuasive: we 
wish to submit Kafka’s work to a philosophical examination based on pre-estab-
lished concepts of singularity and universality – or, to put such concepts into more 
cogent literary terms: to address Kafka with intuitions as to image and law. The 
second, opposite direction would seem rather limited and abstruse: to address a 
problem embedded in the philosophical tradition, from the standpoint of what 
has been learned uniquely from our friendship with Kafka. And yet it is bemusing 
to realize that the latter approach is exactly what has been done, for decades 
and the world over, under the heading of the “Kafkaesque.” For when learned 
judges speak of the “Kafkaesque” character of the cases before them, they are, of 
course, doing the philosophy of law as inspired by their understanding of Kafka – 
and in many instances it is an impressively accurate understanding. In particular 
cases, culled from the online casebook Westlaw, the sufferings of the accused 
appear to have leapt from the pages of The Trial [Der Process] and are identified 
as such. There have been trials in American courts conducted in a language that 
the accused literally could not understand; in others, the condemned was not 
present when his sentence was read. In one such case, counsel alludes plainly to 
the penultimate paragraph of The Trial, which includes the sentence “Where was 
the Judge whom he had never seen?”16 Similarly, the case of O’Brien v. Henderson, 
heard before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, in 1973, 
presents a scenario I find poignantly relevant to life at American universities in 
the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (read: political correctness):
the petitioner claimed that the Board of Parole had violated his due process rights by 
revoking his parole without the proper explanation that was constitutionally required […] 
Commenting on the unusual volume and vagueness of the petitioner’s pleadings, Circuit 
Judge Edenfield noted “that not even the most skilled of counsel, finding himself in the 
Kafkaesque situation of being deprived of his liberty by a tribunal which will adduce no 
reasons for its decision, can complain concisely and clearly of his objections to such a deci-
sion […] [Such a situation] leaves the prisoner no recourse but to approach the court with 
an attempted rebuttal of all real, feared, or imagined justifications for his confinement.”17
15 My translation.
16 Franz Kafka, The Trial, in The Penguin Complete Novels of Franz Kafka, trans. Willa and 
Edwin Muir, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth 1983, 5–176, 172. (“Wo war der Richter, den er nie 
gesehen hatte?” Franz Kafka, Der Proceß, ed. Malcom Pasley, S. Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1990, 312.)
17 Cited in Amanda Torres, “Kafka and the Common Law: The Roots of the ‘Kafkaesque’ in The 
Trial,” an unpublished seminar paper for the conference “Kafka and the Law,” held at the Co-
lumbia Law School (7 May 2007), 10–11. 
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And so one sees Joseph K., in The Trial, offering the Court police his bicycle 
license in an attempt to excuse his imagined offense. 
In this matter of doing the philosophy of the singular and the universal when-
ever the term “Kafkaesque” is applied to some set of affairs, we might consider 
another sort of litigious example. In Woody Allen’s film Annie Hall, the character 
Pam says to Alvy (played by Allen), “Sex with you is really a Kafkaesque experi-
ence.” Then, realizing that her lover is upset by this remark, she hastens to add: “I 
mean that as a compliment.”18 What she is saying, for our purposes, is that these 
dimensions of lived experience – sex, a universal – with Alvy – a singular self – 
having concurred under a Kafkan coverlet, so to speak, are a fortuitous event, a 
happy thing. This is a fact that would actually encourage us to sail, per the second 
proposed mode of navigating Kafka, away from him and towards that philosophy 
which means to situate the great world of real contingencies by placing it under 
categories of universal law. Like so many other investigators these past decades, 
the character Pam  – not unlike Judge Edenfield  – is doing philosophy  – here, 
the philosophy of sex – with its fabled concurrence of a universal drive and its 
particular concretion – as she sails under Kafkan skies. One might compliment 
her with the phrase that Goethe used to describe the optimal sort of procedure in 
classifying singular phenomena under general ideas – for she is, after all, practic-
ing, with undercover Kafkaesque guidance, just such a zarte Empirie, or “tender 
empiricism.” 
It merits noting that Allen has staged here a genuine Lacanian tableau. In 
Lacan’s profiling of Freud, the psychoanalytic situation is not the familiar one of 
the anguished, repressed homme moyen sensuel who is required to read a paper 
on the paradox of the universal in the works of an obscure Prague writer while 
secretly, unconsciously fantasizing a midsummer night of sex. No, as Žižek, 
would say, no!: the real psychoanalytic situation deals with our homme moyen 
intellectuel who, in the sexual embrace of his beloved, fantasizes cracking open 
the pages of a crisp, new volume from De Gruyter devoted to discussion of the 
singular and universal in the works of Franz Kafka… “and so on.”19
At this point, even having carefully considered the alternative route (involv-
ing Judge Edenfield and Pam), I will reverse course and tack more directly toward 
my thesis to read Kafka philosophically, though with the same Goethean caveat 
18 Annie Hall. Dir. Woody Allen. United Artists, 1977.
19 The mention of Slavoj Žižek is not, I think, mal apropos, since, along with Mladen Dolar, he 
is the leading representative of the Slovenian school of literary and psychoanalytical criticism, 
which has produced eye-opening and altogether respectful Lacanian studies of Kafka, frequently 
concentrating on the concept of the undead. 
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in mind: to handle him with care, so as to leave him – he who is more than the 
object of study, he who is our friend – in a state no more tormented than the one 
we found him in, that is, to leave him neither wriggling upon a pin nor twisted to 
our purposes, but instead accompanied by a sisterly shape, so to speak, a concep-
tual model (of the concurrence in his work of aspects both singular and universal) 
having the same genetic structure. 
Where, then, are the necessary guides to the philosophical reading of Kafka? 
I will take first directions from a book that, though written by a young professor 
of philosophy a half-century ago, has shaped this field of study immeasurably: 
Arthur Danto’s 1965 book Nietzsche as Philosopher, which established Nietzsche, 
for the first time in America (at least, in the years following the Second World 
War), as a source of analytic philosophical inquiry. To do this, Danto had to 
conjure – under the heading of “the main philosophical tradition”20 – the kinds of 
questions to which a source-author allegedly suited to philosophical inquiry pro-
vides answers; such questions that include: What is the self? What can we know? 
What can we will? There is not a question of this type that does not involve a 
concurrence of the two dimensions under scrutiny here: a radical singularity and 
a principal universal intelligibility.21 Our task is to narrow the field of inquiry to 
the phenomena in Kafka’s story-world that display this concurrence most clearly. 
It is tempting to focus on the question of the self, for this self-thing is at once 
an ontic singularity and an ontological universal22; and it recommends itself 
especially to the Kafkan perspective as a meeting place of law (superego) and 
image (ego).23 Kafka’s confessional writings contribute abundantly to this topic – 
despite his occasional disavowal of it, as in the familiar refrain first articulated 
20 Arthur Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, Columbia University Press, New 
York 1965, 22.
21 Add to this Robert Conquest’s poem “Philosophy Department,” which begins:
  Such knotty problems! Check your lists:
  How come the universe exists?
  How does consciousness, free will,
  Match up with brain cells? – Harder still […].
 See: http://bookhaven.stanford.edu/2009/11/conquest/.
22 Consider “das Selbst” – “the self” – of Heidegger’s Being and Time [Sein und Zeit], a funda-
mental structure of so-called Existentialien (“existentials”).
23 This is where a good deal of the current interest in Kafka lies, to judge from a recent paper by 
Matthew T. Powell, who writes: “In his use of animal protagonists, Kafka locates an opportunity 
to explore the tension between human and non-human – the same tension that exists between 
self and other. By playing off this tension between what is ‘the self’ and what is ‘not the self,’ 
Kafka is able to explore the ontology of otherness. He enlists animal stories in order to clarify 
the space between self and other that is critical to maintaining notions of identity.” See Matthew 
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 in his meditation on his Jewish identity: “What have I in common with Jews? I 
have hardly anything in common with myself […].”24 The poet W.H. Auden, who 
afforded Kafka a sublime status in the history of great poets, whose ranks include 
Shakespeare and Dante, titled his finest essay on Kafka “The I Without a Self.”25 
But the question of the self – oneself! – is not so easily set aside; and so we 
have Kafka’s more refined discussion of self-abnegation in the crucial distinction 
“Not shaking off the self, but consuming the self,”26 a burning off of all the par-
ticular hurts, longings, opaque places of the self for the sake of the work of art 
and its feint toward universality: we recall Kafka’s imagined happiness “only in 
case I can raise the world into purity, truth, immutability.”27 It is evident that the 
concurrence of singular and universal that is imputed to Kafka is the very thing 
he sought as his chief predilection, as his goal. And here, in a critical enterprise, 
I will promptly assert the primacy of Kafka’s fiction to the confessional, to the 
diary entry, which always means to invoke the god or demon of fiction, by whom 
Kafka wishes to be possessed.28 “In German,” he noted, “the word sein stands 
both for the verb to be and for the possessive pronoun his.”29 A Schriftstellersein 
(“the being-of-a-writer”) that wrote while unpossessed would be the great, sur-
viving shame if such work were ever published. 
A number of striking correlations between the three philosophical ques-
tions mentioned earlier and the dominant strain of individual works of Kafka are 
evident. Think: What is the self? The Metamorphosis [Die Verwandlung]. What 
T. Powell, “Bestial Representations of Otherness: Kafka’s Animal Stories,” in Journal of Modern 
Literature 32.1 (2008): 129–142, 129.
24 Franz Kafka, diary entry of 8 January 1914, in The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1914–1923, ed. Max 
Brod, trans. Martin Greenberg (with the assistance of Hannah Arendt), Schocken Books, New 
York 1949, 11. (“Was habe ich mit Juden gemeinsam? Ich habe kaum etwas mit mir gemeinsam 
[…].” Kafka, Tagebücher, 622.)
25 W.H. Auden, “The I Without a Self,” in The Dyer’s Hand and Other Essays, Vintage, New York 
1989, 159–167.
26 Franz Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, ed. Max Brod, 
Cambridge, Exact Change 1991, 39. (“Nicht Selbstabschüttelung sondern Selbstaufzehrung.” 
Franz Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II [Posthumous Writings and Fragments II], 
ed. Jost Schillemeit, S. Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1992, 77.)
27 See footnote 1.
28 To abide by these concerns, however, requires that a particular methodological point be 
made clear: that this is not a combing of Kafka’s notebooks for propositions of a philosophical 
character (as tempting as they might be, as helpful to our task they may be, by simplifying it).
29 Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 90. (“Das wort sein bedeutet im Deutschen beides: Dasein 
und Ihm-gehören.” Franz Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente I [Posthumous Writings 
and Fragments I], ed. Malcolm Pasley, S. Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1990, 123.)
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can I know? The Trial: “The Scriptures are unalterable and the comments often 
enough merely express the commentator’s bewilderment.”30 What can I will (on 
the strength of what do I desire)? The Castle [Das Schloss].31 
1  Image and Law32
I want to consider the concurrence of the singular and the universal in Kafka’s 
stories as the meeting of image and law. I hardly need to note that the word “law” 
(Gesetz) in Kafka’s writings is many-sided to a fault. What this means for Gershom 
Scholem, say, is not what it means for Jacques Derrida, for one; indeed, the very 
opacity of Kafka’s emphasis on the law prompted Walter Benjamin to write to 
Scholem that “I do not wish to go into explicit detail on this concept.”33
So, in evoking Kafka’s law, one must speak of a single, distinctive sense of the 
concept. The law, as it comes to the fore in Kafka’s stories, is the law of the unfold-
ing of a beginning image, and it is to this law that the main character is subject. 
In this light, the law, for Kafka – being (viz. Derrida) neither a natural thing nor 
an institution – is “literature” in its active unfolding.34 At the end of a day in 1910, 
having written nothing, Kafka noted in his diaries: “What excuse do I have for not 
yet having written anything today? None. […] An invocation sounds continually 
in my ear, ‘If you would come, invisible judge [Gericht: also, ‘court’]!”35 The iden-
tification of law and literature in Kafka’s universe was never plainer. Derrida’s 
30 Kafka, The Trial, 164. (“[Denn] die Schrift ist unveränderlich und die Meinungen sind oft nur 
ein Ausdruck der Verzweiflung darüber.” Kafka, Der Proceß, 298.)
31 See my “Ritardando in Das Schloß,” in From Kafka to Sebald: Modernism and Narrative Form, 
ed. Sabine Wilke, Continuum, London 2012, 11–26.
32 Section II of this essay is extracted, with some changes and additions, from my article “Kaf-
ka’s Law in a Universe of Risk,” in The American Reader 1.3 (2013): 110–119.
33 Walter Benjamin and Gerhard Scholem, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and Ger-
shom Scholem, 1932–1940, trans. Gary Smith and Andre Lefever, ed. Gershom Scholem, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge 1992, 136. (“Mit diesem Begriff will ich mich in der Tat explizit nicht 
einlassen.” Benjamin, Benjamin über Kafka, 79.)
34 In her article “Doing Justice to Kafka’s The Trial: Literature and Jurisprudential Innovation,” 
Jill Scott reiterates a point that has often been made: for Kafka, the law is “literature.” She stress-
es the claim in Derrida’s commentary on “Before the Law” that the law is neither natural nor an 
institution. See http://www.queensu.ca/german/undergraduate/courseinfo/ints/322/Doing_Jus-
tice_To_Kafkas_The_Trial_Jill_Scott_2011.pdf.
35 Kafka, diary entry of 20 December 1910, in Kafka’s Selected Stories, 194. (“Womit entschuldige 
ich, daß ich heute noch nichts geschrieben habe? Mit nichts. […] Ich habe immerfort eine Anru-
fung im Ohr: Kämest du doch, unsichtbares Gericht!” Kafka, Tagebücher, 135.)
 The Singular Accident in a Universe of Risk   23
exclusions – the law being neither nature nor a positive institution – are helpful, 
as far as they go.36 But I will attempt to give the law a local – a fictional – habita-
tion as the concrete realization of the possibilities of literature in every individual 
case. In his 2005 Nobel Prize Lecture, Harold Pinter remarks of one of his plays: 
“I allow a whole range of options to operate in a dense forest of possibility before 
finally focusing on an act of subjugation.”37 This is the sort of effortful focusing 
set in motion by Kafka’s beginning images, a focusing which, in media res, aims 
to guide his protagonists through a series of what Beatrice Sandberg has termed 
“hypothetical alternatives, relativizations, and constrictions toward a solution.”38 
On this matter of the constriction, the subjugation to law of narrative possibili-
ties, Nietzsche, Kafka’s best dialogist, is informative: “Every artist knows how far 
from any feeling of letting himself go his ‘most natural’ state is – the free order-
ing, placing, disposing, giving form in the moment of ‘inspiration’  – and how 
strictly and subtly he obeys thousandfold laws precisely then, laws that precisely 
on account of their hardness and determination defy all formulation through con-
cepts.39 Or, if one prefers, Proust: “Writers, when they are bound hand and foot by 
the tyranny of a monarch or a school of poetry, by the constraints of prosodic laws 
or of a state religion, often attain a power of concentration from which they would 
have been dispensed under a system of political liberty or literary anarchy.”40
Kafka’s major works begin with a striking, capacious image; these images are 
“initiofugal,” and the law – better: “a” law – comes to light as its narrative unfold-
ing. The singularity of the opening image of K. in The Trial is to his “process” what 
Kafka’s singularity is to Kafka’s universality: Kafka’s opening image is the nucleus 
of Kafka’s law. Roberto Calasso has detected the same movement in Kafka’s Zürau 
36 And yet a critic as incisive as Erich Heller, addressing the question of the meaning of The 
Trial, throws up his hands in the end, asking: “What is [K.’s] guilt? What is the Law?” See Erich 
Heller, Franz Kafka, The Viking Press, New York 1974, 82. 
37 Harold Pinter, “Nobel Lecture 2005: Art, Truth & Politics,” in PMLA 121.3 (2006): 811–818, 812.
38 See Beatrice Sandberg, “Starting in the Middle? Complications of Narrative Beginnings and 
Progression in Kafka,” in Franz Kafka: Narration, Rhetoric, and Reading, eds. Jakob Lothe, Bea-
trice Sandberg, and Ronald Speirs, The Ohio State University Press, Columbus 2011, 123–148, 136.
39 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future [Jenseits 
von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft] (1886), Aphorism 188. See http://www.
thenietzschechannel.com/works-pub/bge/bge5-dual.htm. (“Jeder Künstler weiss, wie fern vom 
Gefühl des Sichgehen-lassens sein ‘natürlichster’ Zustand ist, das freie Ordnen, Setzen, Verfü-
gen, Gestalten in den Augenblicken der ‘Inspiration,’ – und wie streng und fein er gerade da 
tausendfältigen Gesetzen gehorcht, die aller Formulirung durch Begriffe gerade auf Grund ihrer 
Härte und Bestimmtheit spotten.”)
40 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff, T. Kilmartin, and D.J. En-
right, Modern Library, New York 2003, 491.
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aphorisms: “Each of those sentences presents itself as if the greatest possible 
generality were intrinsic to it. And at the same time each seems to emerge from 
vast deposits of dark matter.”41 
The law of the subject/self is unfolded from the dark matter of the unge-
heueres Ungeziefer – the monstrous vermin – of The Metamorphosis; the law gov-
erning possible cognition is unfolded from the dark matter of Joseph K.’s arrest 
in his bed; the law governing desire – and the will to enact desire – unfolds from 
the dark matter of the scheinbare Leere, or illusory emptiness, of The Castle…42 
There are countless other such correlations throughout Kafka’s oeuvre. The Trial, 
for one, describes just that, a trial as a process, where, as the priest explains, “The 
verdict is not so suddenly arrived at, the proceedings only gradually merge into 
the verdict.”43 The verdict that retroactively proves the effectiveness of the law is 
produced by the Verfahren – the process set in motion with Joseph K.’s arrest. The 
verdict proves the effectiveness of the law, though it neither posits nor identifies 
the law, which remains implicit in the proceedings.
The concept of universality is commonly cast in terms of an intensive and 
extensive totality. The first is a claim of totality based on a single principle or 
property distinctive for its depth (or altitude or intensity): Theodor Adorno, for 
example, asserts that Kafka’s universe is a hermetically sealed representation 
of the substance of late capitalism and its attendant mood of alienation, that 
of being in grosser Verlegenheit, or “completely at a loss.”44 Verlegenheit is the 
state of mind (read: absence of mind) that makes the subject most vulnerable to 
damage.45 
41 Calasso, Franz Kafka, The Zurau [sic] Aphorisms, 123.
42 Franz Kafka, Das Schloß, ed. Malcolm Pasley, S. Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1982, 7. 
43 Kafka, The Trial, 160. (“‘Das Urteil kommt nicht plötzlich, das Verfahren geht allmählich ins 
Urteil über.’” Kafka, Der Proceß, 289.) 
44 Theodor W. Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka” (“Notes on Kafka”), in Gesammelte Schriften 
[Collected Works] 10.1, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 2003, 254–287, 265.
45 This phrase opens Kafka’s “A Country Doctor” (“Ein Landarzt”): “I was completely at a loss” 
(“Ich war in grosser Verlegenheit”). “See Franz Kafka, “A Country Doctor,” in Kafka’s Selected 
Stories, 60–69, 60; and Franz Kafka, “Ein Landarzt,” in Drucke zu Lebzeiten [Works Published 
During His Lifetime], eds. Wolf Kittler, Hans-Gerd Koch, and Gerhard Neumann S. Fischer, Frank-
furt/M. 1994, 252–261, 252. This phrase appears in more than one crucial place in Kafka’s pub-
lished work: for example, the officer from “In the Penal Colony” (“In der Strafkolonie”), who, 
while recalling the radiance on the prisoner’s face as the latter endured his sixth hour of tor-
ment, “had evidently forgotten who was standing before him; he had embraced the traveler and 
laid his head on his shoulder. The traveler was completely at a loss” [“hatte offenbar vergessen, 
wer vor ihm stand; er hatte den Reisenden umarmt und den Kopf auf seine Schulter gelegt. Der 
Reisende war in großer Verlegenheit”]. See Franz Kafka, “In the Penal Colony,” in Kafka’s Select-
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This is the essential mood of the beginnings of Kafka’s narratives; it is a mood 
of risk, the felt exposure to damage, the affective anticipation of a law whose 
violation is at stake. As the famous deleted passage from the beginning of The 
Trial has it: “That is why the moment of waking up was the riskiest moment of 
the day.”46 In this light, Kafka’s work exhibits a universally intelligible immersion 
in anxiety.47
My aim is to bring Kafka’s signature anxiety, his existential anxiety, to bear on 
his task as a writer: I am concerned with the specific anxiety of narration, where 
a false decision risks violating the law immanent to the opening image. Here, 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric is perfectly apt; according to Aristotle, in the words of the sage 
Peter Thompson, “the unavoidable and potentially unmanageable presence of 
multiple possibilities – or the complex nature of decisions – creates and invites 
rhetoric.”48 
I am alluding to the anxiety that might be dispelled by writing – or, better, 
displaced by writing – and there is also the very anxiety of writing, where one 
could err badly. According to Max Brod, Kafka “often spoke of the ‘false hands 
that reach out toward you in the midst of writing’” [“die falschen Hände, die sich 
einem während des Schreibens entgegenstrecken”].49 At other times Kafka said 
ed Stories, 35–60, 48; and Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 226. The artist in “A Dream” (“Ein Traum”) 
is at one point completely at a loss; his distress unnerves the hero, Joseph K. (Kafka, Drucke zu 
Lebzeiten, 297). 
46 Franz Kafka, The Trial, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, Schocken, New York 1968, 257–258. 
(“Darum sei auch der Augenblick des Erwachens der riskanteste Augenblick im Tag.” Franz 
Kafka, Der Proceß. Apparatband, ed. Malcolm Pasley, S. Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1990, 168.)
47 “All his books,” wrote Milena, “depict the horrors of mysterious misunderstandings and of 
undeserved human guilt. He was a man and a writer with such a sensitive conscience that he 
heard things where others were deaf and felt safe.” See Jana Cerna, Kafka’s Milena, trans. A.G. 
Brain, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1993, 180. “Alle seine Bücher schildern das Grau-
en geheimnisvollen Unverständnisses, unverschuldeter Schuld unter den Menschen. Er war ein 
Künstler und Mensch von derart feinfühligem Gewissen, daß er auch dorthin hörte, wo andere, 
taub, sich in Sicherheit wähnten.” Milena Jesenská, “Nekrolog auf Franz Kafka,” in Franz Kafka, 
Briefe an Milena [Letters to Milena], eds. Jürgen Born and Michael Müller, S. Fischer, Frank-
furt/M. 1991, 379.
48 Thompson, “Kafka, Bloch, Religion and the Metaphysics of Contingency,” 183. In this matter 
of the relation of the rhetoric of narration to law, of the rhetoric of narration as law, in the Jewish 
tradition, as exemplified by Kafka, readers will profit from Vivian Liska’s article “‘Before the Law 
stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper comes a man…’: Kafka, Narrative and the Law,” in Na-
haraim 6/2 (June 2013): 175–194. Also see my “On Scholem’s Gnostically-Minded View of Kafka,” 
in Kafka, Religion, and Modernity, 135–153.
49 Cited in Kafka’s Selected Stories, 213. German text cited in Franz Kafka, Über das Schreiben 
[Franz Kafka, On Writing], eds. Erich Heller and Joachim Beug, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1983, 160.
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that what he had written  – and especially what he had published  – had “led 
him astray” (beirrten) in his attempt to write new things. Kafka’s final, brief diary 
entry begins: “More and more fearful as I write. It is understandable. Every word 
twisted in the hand of the spirits – this twist of the hand is their characteristic 
gesture – becomes a spear turned against the speaker.”50 
With this distribution of anxiety, I am turning away from an intensive totality 
of Kafka’s work (and personality) to an extensive totality, even while retaining 
the concept of anxiety in relation to a law. For anxiety always exists in relation to 
an unspecified law as the risk of its violation. I once tried to render this relation 
in terms of space and text: Kafka “is the writer who brings to light a depth or hid-
denness of background – the irreducible strangeness of that other law. His dialog-
ical partner Nietzsche responds to this matter: ‘Can it be,’ he wrote, ‘that all our 
so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, 
perhaps unknowable, but felt text?’”51 This so-called consciousness is a neces-
sarily anxious consciousness, haunted by a sense of bad faith, of being “dans 
l’erreur.” In this light, Kafka’s stories comprise a “more or less fantastic” com-
mentary on the text of the law. Kafka’s object as a writer is the felt text supporting 
the phantasmagoric singularity of its surface, like the truth that Benjamin saw 
not as spread out in a fan but as lodged in its folds. Kafka’s writing means to strip 
away the phenomenal skin of the living letter of the law. His great parable reads: 
Before setting foot in the Holiest of Holies, you must take off your shoes, but not only your 
shoes but everything, traveling clothes and luggage, and under that, your nakedness and 
everything that is under the nakedness and everything that hides beneath that, and then 
the core and the core of the core, then the remainder and then the residue and then even the 
gleam of the imperishable fire. Only the fire itself is absorbed by the Holiest of Holies and 
lets itself be absorbed by it; neither can resist the other.52 
50 Kafka, diary entry of 12 June 1923, in Kafka’s Selected Stories, 212–213. (“Immer ängstlicher 
im Niederschreiben. Es ist begreiflich. Jedes Wort, gewendet in der Hand der Geister – dieser 
Schwung der Hand ist ihre charakteristische Bewegung – wird zum Spieß, gekehrt gegen den 
Sprecher.” Kafka, Tagebücher, 926.) 
51 Stanley Corngold, Franz Kafka: The Necessity of Form, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1988, 
4. For the Nietzsche reference, see Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenröte, Kritische Studienausgabe 
[Dawn, Critical Study Edition], eds. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, dtv/De Gruyter, Munich 
1988, 113.
52 Kafka, Notebook “G,” in Kafka’s Selected Stories, 213. (“Vor dem Betreten des Allerheiligsten 
mußt Du die Schuhe ausziehn, aber nicht nur die Schuhe, sondern alles, Reisekleid und Gepäck, 
und darunter die Nacktheit, und alles, was unter der Nacktheit ist, und alles, was sich unter 
diesem verbirgt, und dann den Kern und den Kern des Kerns, dann das Übrige und dann den 
Rest und dann noch den Schein des unvergänglichen Feuers. Erst das Feuer selbst wird vom 
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What I am stressing now, apropos of Kafka’s work, is this wider distribution of 
this anxiety, its lodgement in many folds. While anxiety always exists in relation 
to one “nameless” law, this law acquires many facets, however phantasmal, by 
virtue of the responses to it – the plurality of its felt implications: its history, the 
narrative of its precedents. Like the text (Schrift: scripture, writing) of the parable 
“Before the Law,” “the scriptures are unalterable and the comments often enough 
merely express the commentator’s bewilderment” (“die Schrift ist unveränderlich 
und die Meinungen [aber] sind oft nur ein Ausdruck der Verzweiflung darüber”).53 
The anxiety of the literary genius is productive of such commentary. And the com-
mentator’s work, to borrow Benjamin’s image for Goethe’s Dichtung (poem) Elec-
tive Affinities [Die Wahlverwandtschaften], “remains turned toward the interior in 
the veiled light refracted through multi-colored panes.”54 
And so the model of Kafka’s universality is an extensive totality, based finally 
on Kafka’s own experience of (and devotion to) – and here is the jump – princi-
ples of actuarial insurance: a worldly perspective on anxiety, or risk. Kafka’s “uni-
verse” – what lends his images and scenes a universal reference – is the actuarial 
totality of the risk of damage and the attendant assignation of fault, which is to 
say, too, that the law of the unfolding of the initial image, initiofugal, is intelligi-
ble only through an extensive totality of interpretations, both inside and outside 
the text, each of which, in falling short, is to some degree at fault and responsible 
for damages done to the immutable text of the law. As the prison chaplain states 
to Joseph K., “You have not enough respect for the written word.”55 This written 
word (Schrift) is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s previously noted “unknown, perhaps 
unknowable, but felt text” (“ungewußter, vielleicht unwißbarer, aber gefühlter 
Text”). The parties who are responsible, each one at risk, constitute an insur-
ance community – what François Ewald calls “l’état providence” (“the welfare 
state”)56: they include the author, the narrator, the afflicted hero, and their 
readers, all “choristers of lies” – in which, according to Kafka, a possible truth 
Allerheiligsten aufgesogen und läßt sich von ihm aufsaugen, keines von beiden kann dem wider-
stehen.” Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften II, 77.)
53 Kafka, The Trial, 164; Kafka, Der Proceß, 298.
54 Walter Benjamin, “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” (“Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften”), in Select-
ed Writings, Volume 1: 1913–1926, eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael Jennings, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge 1996, 297–360, 352. (“[B]leibt dem Innenraum im verschleierten Lichte zuge-
wendet, das in bunten Scheiben sich bricht.” Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften [Collected 
Works], eds. Rolf Tiedemannn and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1990, 
123–201, 195.)
55 Kafka, The Trial, 163. (“Du hast nicht genug Achtung vor der Schrift.” Kafka, Der Proceß, 295.)
56 François Ewald, L’état providence, Édition Grasset & Fasquelle, Paris 1986.
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is contained, for “mitteilen kann man nur das was man nicht ist, also die Lüge. 
Erst im Chor mag eine gewisse Wahrheit liegen” – “one can communicate only 
what one is not, ergo: the lie. It is only in the chorus that a certain truth might be 
found.”57 Each chorister is a fold in the fan, as it were. 
Kafka’s heroes, and no less their author and their interpreters, run the gamut 
of risky situations, a project not unfamiliar to the risk assessor. One can see 
Kafka’s entire literature as a widening outward of the focus he employed in the 
Workmen’s Accident Insurance Institute of the Kingdom of Bohemia in Prague. 
Danger confronts the heroes at every turn: Karl Rossmann, who is cast adrift 
in rough America; Joseph K., who opens doors only to find himself embedded 
in scenes of perversity, abjection, and horror (in the case of his visit to Titorelli 
the artist, he finds himself literally “embedded” in such a scene); and K., in 
The Castle, is continually repulsed, threatened, and insulted, though he is the 
bravest – or perhaps least prudent – of the lot. These dangers are objective cor-
relatives, the concretions, of Kafka’s anxiety. The law of the story illuminates the 
world of things and concerns that come to light for a hero concretized in an initial 
image of a man or woman or animal in grosser Verlegenheit, completely at a loss, 
absent of mind.
Added to this gamut of embodied risks, as suggested earlier, is the risk every 
interpreter takes in proposing his or her own inevitably inadequate and mislead-
ing interpretation. The truth lies in the work – but will never be evident as a total-
izing proposition – such as the judgment Sei gerecht – be just. (Note how that 
proposition fails to become inscribed in the body of the officer in “In the Penal 
Colony.”) In the material life it represents, the literary work bundles together as 
concrete damages the risk of pure loss, factored as the loss of hope, of posses-
sions, of love, of life. What compensation is there for so much loss? Answer: The 
truth of the work, which no hero – or reader – attains to. But the risk of the failure 
of interpretation is compensated for by the supportive totality of interpretations – 
the chorus of valuable lies. 
Consider the steady denuding, the steady impoverishment, of the heroes of 
Kafka’s three novels, whose correlative is the steady denuding, the disturbing 
impoverishment, of narrative opportunities. This process of unfolding is rarely a 
march toward the combustion of anxiety in a perfect contact with the law; I say 
“rarely,” and not “never,” because Kafka felt such an ecstasy at the conclusion of 
writing “The Judgment” (“Das Urteil”), though this was an ecstasy he would never 
again realize, a moment “im Litterarischen” (“in the literary field”) “in which I 
57 Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften II, 348. My translation.
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dwelled completely in every idea but also fulfilled every idea and in which I not 
only felt myself at my boundaries but at the boundaries of the human as such.”58
2  A Model Case59
In concluding, I want to point to the wide gamut of interpretative possibilities – 
the riskiest interpretations – of The Metamorphosis. In doing so, let us keep in 
mind a chief aspect of the image that assails Kafka at the outset: “When Gregor 
Samsa woke up one morning from unsettling dreams, he found himself changed 
in his bed into a monstrous vermin.”60 This poetry of rich beginnings is dense, 
compact, pregnant with possibility. It contains literally endless possibilities of 
story development. 
“How everything can be risked, how great a fire is ready for everything, for the 
strangest inspirations,” Kafka wrote, “and they disappear in this fire and rise up 
again.”61 Images that leap out, even from dreams or somnambulistic states, can 
be immersed in the destructive element – the process, writing, that Walter Benja-
min called the “burning of the dream” (“die Verbrennung des Traumes”).62 In the 
course of the story, they unfold according to an “unknown, perhaps unknowable 
but felt” law, and there they survive.63 
58 Kafka, diary entry of 28 March 1911, in Kafka’s Selected Stories, 195. (“[I]n welchen ich ganz 
und gar in jedem Einfall wohnte, aber jeden Einfall auch erfüllte und in welchen ich mich nicht 
nur an meinen Grenzen fühlte, sondern an den Grenzen des Menschlichen überhaupt.” Kafka, 
Tagebücher, 34.)
59 This section (III) of this essay is extracted, with some changes and additions, from the in-
troduction to Franz Kafka, The Metamorphosis, trans. and ed. Stanley Corngold, The Modern 
Library, New York 2013, v–xliii, xxvi–xxxv.
60 Franz Kafka, The Metamorphosis: Translation, Background and Contexts, Criticism, trans. and 
ed. Stanley Corngold, Norton Critical Edition, Norton, New York 1996, 3. (“Als Gregor Samsa eines 
Morgens aus unruhigen Träumen erwachte, fand er sich in seinem Bett zu einem ungeheueren 
Ungeziefer verwandelt.” Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 115.)
61 Kafka, diary entry of 23 September 1912, in Kafka’s Selected Stories, 197. (“Wie alles gewagt 
werden kann, wie für alle, für die fremdesten Einfälle ein großes Feuer bereitet ist, in dem sie 
vergehn und auferstehn.” Kafka, Tagebücher, 460.)
62 Walter Benjamin, One-Way Street and Other Writings, trans. J.A. Underwood, Penguin, Lon-
don 2009, 47; Walter Benjamin, Einbahnstraße, Rowohlt, Berlin,1928, 6.
63 It was soon after writing this and other sublime diary entries that Kafka wrote The Meta-
morphosis, the “süße Seiten” (“sweet pages”) of which he liked well enough but which finally 
dissatisfied him on account of what he considered its botched ending. He made this judgment 
in a letter to Felice Bauer written (presumably) around midnight of 5–6 September 1912. It is 
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In allowing his stories to develop in just one way, has Kafka wasted the power 
of his dream, drained it of creative possibilities – condemned it, “subjugated” it, 
to a bad singularity?64
Consider, then, in this perspective, The Metamorphosis and how the story 
unfolds. After the initial shock, Gregor struggles to regain his equilibrium. The 
family, failing to call either a locksmith or a doctor, open their door to the office 
manager. Grete Samsa assumes the care of her unfortunate brother, but then, 
growing bored, becomes bratty and impatient. His father, who abhors his son, 
takes revenge, bombarding him with small apples. Gregor crawls back into his 
room and meekly, tenderly, dies, whereupon the family celebrates their liberation 
by going on a picnic.
Every single such plot element actually realized implies the death of other 
possibilities. And this narrowing down of narrative choices does not occur simply 
or innocently. Gregor’s speech sputters; his eyesight grows dim; we hear of his 
deprivation with dismay; it will crush the life chances of this almost-human 
being. We read on, with fading hope, perhaps, that Gregor might be rescued, lib-
erated; like Gregor, we are “eager to see how today’s fantasy would gradually fade 
away” (“gespannt, wie sich seine heutigen Vorstellungen allmählich auflösen 
würden”),65 and yet we must suffer his depletion all along – and hence the whole 
story’s depletion  – for this is Gregor’s story only, narrated from a standpoint 
virtually congruent with Gregor’s own. His world of misery is the Samsas’ only 
world.66 
At the same time, this dwindling away of Gregor’s life chances does not 
exclude a richness that we readers can realize. It is like a consolation for the 
lost variety of plot possibilities: the “variousness and complexity” of interpreta-
suggestive that Kafka criticized the ending of the story but never its beginning – that first rush 
of images – which leads one to think that he was quite satisfied with his initial impulse until a 
business trip prevented him from developing to the end its fullest implications.
64 “The tremendous world,” he wrote, “that I have inside my head. But how free myself and free 
it without being torn to pieces. And a thousand times rather be torn to pieces than retain it in 
me or bury it. That is why I am here, that is quite clear to me.” Franz Kafka, The Diaries of Franz 
Kafka, 1910–1913, ed. Max Brod, trans. Joseph Kresh, Schocken, New York 1948, 288. (“Die unge-
heuere Welt die ich im Kopfe habe. Aber wie mich befreien und sie befreien ohne zu zerreißen. 
Und tausendmal lieber zerreißen, als sie in mir zurückhalten oder begraben. Dazu bin ich ja hier, 
das ist mir ganz klar.” Kafka, Tagebücher, 562.) The tremendous world – the “worlds” he had 
inside his head – this extensive totality, this universal. 
65 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 6; Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 121.
66 This narrowing-down has a spatial, an architectural, correlative: the narrow room, the door 
slammed shut, then opened just a chink.
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tions we can bring to bear on the one storyline we have.67 Every single sentence 
marches in a line, a straight line, leading through Gregor’s steady diminishment 
to his starving away to death. But each of these so-to-speak discrete or confined 
moments on the plotline is trembling with virtual lunacy. This is what we feel; 
and it invites our lunacy or, let us say, our widest imagination of interpretation 
of that moment. And so the loss of extravagant plot possibilities is compensated 
for by the richness of interpretation that the reading collective has produced over 
the years.
This is Kafka’s genius: from his openings he conjures the one storyline that 
will invite interpretation through all the discourses of his time and times to come. 
For Gershom Scholem, an eminent reader of his work, nothing compares with the 
attraction of working out an incisive interpretation of a text. But here the word 
“attraction” is too casual, certainly, in Adorno’s view. The reader’s attempt at an 
incisive interpretation is not optional. Kafka’s sentences come at us with the force 
of an onrushing locomotive: “Through the power with which Kafka commands 
interpretation, he collapses aesthetic distance. He demands a desperate effort 
from the allegedly ‘disinterested’ spectator of an earlier time, overwhelms you, 
suggesting that far more than your intellectual equilibrium depends on whether 
you truly understand; life and death are at stake.”68
Explanatory religious concepts (Christian, Jewish, mystic, other) might come 
to help. Kafka’s contemporary William Butler Yeats wrote a story entitled “The 
Crucifixion of the Outcast,” a phrase that casts a suggestive light on Gregor. Con-
sider his cruciform position at the end of Part I, when he is being tormented, with 
his father’s willing cooperation: 
[…] Gregor forced himself – come what may – into the doorway. One side of his body rose 
up, he lay lop-sided in the opening, one of his flanks was scraped raw, ugly blotches marred 
the white door, soon he got stuck and could not have budged anymore by himself, his little 
legs on one side dangled tremblingly in midair, those on the other were painfully crushed 
against the floor – when from behind his father gave him a hard shove, which was truly his 
67 This phrase is from Lionel Trilling’s The Liberal Imagination, viz. “[…] literature is the human 
activity that takes the fullest and most precise account of variousness, possibility, complexity, 
and difficulty.” See Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society, 
Viking, New York 1950, xii.
68 Theodor W. Adorno, “Notes on Kafka,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber, 
Spearman, London 1967, 243–271, 246. (“Durch die Gewalt, mit der Kafka Deutung gebietet, zieht 
er die ästhetische Distanz ein. Er mutet dem angeblich interesselosen Betrachter von einst ver-
zweifelte Anstrengung zu, springt ihn an und suggeriert ihm, daß weit mehr als sein geistiges 
Gleichgewicht davon abhänge, ob er richtig versteht, Leben oder Tod.” Adorno, “Aufzeichnun-
gen zu Kafka,” 256.)
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salvation, and bleeding profusely, he flew far into his room. The door was slammed shut 
with the cane, then at last everything was quiet. [Emphasis added.]69 
Such is Gregor’s crucifixion, as it were. Consider, too, his manner of dying: “He 
remained in this state of empty and peaceful reflection until the tower clock 
struck three in the morning. He still saw that outside the window everything was 
beginning to grow light. Then, without his consent, his head sank down to the 
floor, and from his nostrils streamed his last weak breath.”70 
This image recalls the Gospel of John (19:30) – “When Jesus therefore had 
received the vinegar, he said, It is finished: and he bowed his head, and gave up 
the ghost.” The three o’ clock may have been suggested by the Gospel of Matthew 
(27:40), where the scoffing multitude says, “Thou that destroyest the temple, and 
buildest it in three days, save thyself. If thou be the Son of God, come down from 
the cross,” or by the last three hours of the agony: “Now from the sixth hour there 
was darkness over all the land unto the ninth hour” (Matthew 27:45).71 
One scholar, Kurt Weinberg, writing in an adventurous Jewish tradition, 
interprets Gregor’s early failure to catch the five o’clock train as an allegory of 
spiritual failure, for Kafka has coded into the five o’clock train (recall the Five 
Books of Moses) the train of redemption, the train of the sacramental time that 
brings the Jewish Messiah: Gregor is thus literally the stiff-necked unbeliever.72 
For the aforementioned Gershom Scholem, it is the very gloomy dereliction of 
the scene, the radical absence of divine justice, that, by an effort of the concep-
69 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 15. (“Gregor drängte sich – geschehe was wolle – in die Tür. Die 
eine Seite seines Körpers hob sich, er lag schief in der Türöffnung, seine eine Flanke war ganz 
wundgerieben, an der weißen Tür blieben häßliche Flecken, bald steckte er fest und hätte sich 
allein nicht mehr rühren können, die Beinchen auf der einen Seite hingen zitternd oben in der 
Luft, die auf der anderen waren schmerzhaft zu Boden gedrückt – da gab ihm der Vater von hint-
en einen jetzt wahrhaftig erlösenden starken Stoß, und er flog, heftig blutend, weit in sein Zimmer 
hinein. Die Tür wurde noch mit dem Stock zugeschlagen, dann war es endlich still” (emphasis 
added). Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 142.) 
70 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 39. (“In diesem Zustand leeren und friedlichen Nachdenkens 
blieb er, bis die Turmuhr die dritte Morgenstunde schlug. Den Anfang des allgemeinen Hellerw-
erdens draußen vor dem Fenster erlebte er noch. Dann sank sein Kopf ohne seinen Willen gän-
zlich nieder, und aus seinen Nüstern strömte sein letzter Atem schwach hervor.” Kafka, Drucke 
zu Lebzeiten, 193.) 
71 Gregor’s death is nevertheless unlike Christ’s, according to Mark (15:37) or Luke (23:46), since 
Gregor’s last moment is silent and painless. 
72 Kurt Weinberg, Kafkas Dichtungen: Die Travestien des Mythos [Kafka’s Fictions: The Travesties 
of Myth], Francke, Berne 1963.
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tual will called “dialectical theology,” affirms the necessary existence of a higher 
order that promises redemption.
Then there is the Eastern mystic reader, who connects Samsa’s transubstanti-
ation to an esoteric tradition called, in Sanskrit, “saṃsāra,” “[which] refers to the 
cycle of reincarnation or rebirth in Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism and 
[…] related religions.”73 Since the word “Verwandlung” also means “transfigura-
tion,” we see that the gates to every sort of religious reading are open – leaving 
only the question of whether that gate leads to an apprehension of what Kafka 
called “the imperishable fire” (“den Schein des unvergänglichen Feuers”) – the 
light of the law that fashions this story.74
Such is the discourse of religion. Closely following is the discourse of eco-
nomics, which the story takes no pains to hide and which has produced an abun-
dance of critical essays all more or less titled “Marx and Metamorphosis.” Gre-
gor’s parents are indebted to Gregor’s employer – debts that Gregor feels obliged 
to repay. The German word for these debts, “Schulden,” also refers to one’s guilt. 
Can we speculate that Gregor’s horrible appearance is the external expression of 
the guilt he bears, a dream-like, symptomatic expression of the unclean relation 
to the debts he has assumed, to something falsely messianic in his nature? 
There is a second, striking metamorphosis of the economy of money and 
music in this story. From the description of Gregor’s pre-metamorphic years, we 
learn two important facts about his money and his musical culture. On one hand, 
owing to his parents’ debts (his decision to pay off the debts accumulated by his 
ancestors!), Gregor needs to earn money – a lot of money! How everyone rejoiced 
when “his successes on the job were transformed, by means of commission, into 
hard cash that could be plunked down on the table at home in front his aston-
ished and delighted family” (“[seine] Arbeitserfolge sich sofort in Form der Pro-
vision zu Bargeld verwandelten, das der erstaunten und beglückten Familie zu 
Hause auf den Tisch gelegt werden konnte”).75 But being made of more sensitive 
metal, Gregor is interested in something finer, something that money can buy: a 
ticket of admission for his sister to enter the conservatory of music. So, at the end 
of the rainbow, there is something more than an escape from poverty and social 
disgrace for his family; Gregor harbors a notion of cultural improvement – and, 
hence, of implicit social advancement for his family – though his enjoyment of 
actual music is only vicarious: for, “it was his secret plan that she, who, unlike 
73 See Michael J. Ryan, “Samsa and saṃsāra: Suffering, Death, and Rebirth in ‘The Metamor-
phosis,’” in German Quarterly 72.2 (1999): 133–152.
74 Kafka, Notebook “G,” in Kafka’s Selected Stories, 213; Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften II, 77.
75 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 20; Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 152.
34   Stanley Corngold 
him, loved music and could play the violin movingly, should be sent next year 
to the Conservatory” (“es war sein geheimer Plan, sie, die zum Unterschied von 
Gregor Musik sehr liebte und rührend Violine zu spielen verstand, nächstes Jahr 
[…] auf das Konservatorium zu schicken”).76 The exact definition of this cultural 
attitude, which seeks to acquire social distinction by publicly trafficking in the 
institutions of art, is philistinism. As long as Gregor is at work earning money, he 
is this philistine. But something interesting happens to him after his metamor-
phosis, which, in the economic sense, means becoming unemployable. Gregor 
becomes enthralled by the music of his sister’s violin, so enthralled, it turns out, 
that he risks – and loses – his life for it. “Was he an animal, that music could 
move him so?” (“War er ein Tier, da ihn Musik so ergriff?”) the narrator asks.77 
At this point we will conjure a rival to the economist-reader – the sentimen-
talist reader, who interprets Gregor’s question as a mere rhetorical question, 
meaning, “Oh, of course he cannot be an animal. Look how fine his responses 
are!” Gregor’s newfound love of music, the sentimentalist-reader thinks, signals 
his ascent to a higher plane of aesthetic enjoyment. He is on his way to acquiring 
the dignity of a higher kind, in the sense of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. But our 
economist-reader disagrees and will not read Gregor’s question as a mere rhetori-
cal one. He considers the question to be a real question and supplies an informed 
answer. “Was Gregor an animal?” Of course, he is. He is unemployable! He stands 
outside the society of market exchange, what Kafka calls the world of “property 
and its connections” (“Besitz und seine Beziehungen”).78 
As a consequence of the music Gregor hears, he never ceases to be at least 
animal-like: fiddle playing strikes a licentious chord in him. It conjures his sis-
ter’s naked neck, which he means to kiss after making certain, by hissing and 
spitting at intruders, that henceforth she will play her music for him alone. Our 
economist’s point is that we may understand the metamorphosis as inverting Gre-
gor’s relation to capital: with money, as a man, he is a philistine; without money, 
as a “vermin,” he is a music lover of sorts – or, more accurately, the debased lover 
of a musician. Here, some readers may suddenly understand the moment as a 
wild parody of the final scene of Thomas Mann’s story “Wälsungenblut” (1905) 
76 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 20; Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 152.
77 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 36; Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 185.
78 Nachgelassene Schriften II, 59. I agree with the answer of our economist-reader, and I will risk 
offering a personal proof of the correctness of this position. I do not judge Gregor’s fascination 
with sound to be a mark of his higher nature; I consider him to be in the same league with my 
wife’s brother-in-law’s Siamese cat Nino, who is so captivated by my wife’s voice, it seems, that 
he springs for the telephone receiver and bites it and moans whenever she is on the phone. (My 
wife’s explanation: “He wants to stay in touch.”) 
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(translated into English as The Blood of the Walsungs), which tells of incestuous 
lovemaking between brother and sister after they have been enthralled by the 
music of Wagner’s “The Valkyrie” (“Die Walküre”).79 
Readers alert to the gutter ideologies of Kafka’s time will not fail to recognize 
the racist, biopolitical dimension of Gregor’s metamorphosis: Austro-Hungarian 
cranks and crackpots were eager to attack their Jewish neighbors by vilifying 
them with low comparisons; and the dictionary of anti-Semitic insults included 
qualities that are found, by analogy, in Gregor’s appearance and in his behavior. 
It is unpleasant to repeat such epithets: he is “a parasite,” he is “low,” he “scut-
tles” about on his business, he is unmusical, he is licentious, etc. But soon the 
79 Mann’s story was composed in 1905 and due for publication that year in the Neue Rundschau. 
It was already typeset when Mann suddenly withdrew it, realizing that its anti-Semitic tenor 
would give grievous offense to his wife and her Jewish family. He finally published it privately 
in 1921. How, then, can Kafka have known of it? In 1906, Mann had sent copies of the story to 
Arthur Schnitzler and Jakob Wassermann, among others. The story then circulated in samizdat, 
and news of the scandal was bruited about in Vienna and thereafter, it might well be supposed, 
in Prague. Kafka was a devoted reader of the Neue Rundschau and of the works of Schnitzler 
and Wassermann and would have perked up at any mention of writings coming from their desk. 
(Wassermann was one of the several authors whom Kafka declares he was “thinking of” apropos 
of writing “The Judgment.” See Kafka, diary entry of 12 September 1912, in Kafka’s Selected Sto-
ries, 197; Kafka, Tagebücher, 461.) 
 One benefit as to method arises at this point, where one may have noticed how hard it is 
to stay within the boundaries of any single interpretative framework. We can think of Kafka’s 
stories as constructions of a sort – like monads (they are self-enclosed). Like the scripture in the 
Cathedral scene in The Trial, these stories are, as the priest says, “unalterable” (unveränderlich). 
At the same time, these stories are equipped with windows; they are “windowed monads,” so to 
speak (with apologies to Leibniz – and thanks to Whitehead), built of scintillating perspectives, 
which take in the light of interpretative minds and give out that light at an angle of refraction. 
 Hence, no such window is entirely transparent; the gaze of no spectator, no reader, is fo-
cused enough not to glance off its glassy surface. And because each of Kafka’s stories has many 
windows, a glance at one will communicate with another. The windows catch one another’s 
light: perspectives scintillate. 
 This conceit is Kafka’s, who was not able to see the gaze as a single ray of light. “One can 
disintegrate the world by means of very strong light” – “Mit stärkstem Licht kann man die Welt 
auflösen” – he wrote, meaning by “auflösen” to “break its hold.” For the word “world” (Welt) in 
our context write: “the world of the story” – the world of The Metamorphosis. However, Kafka 
continues, “For weak eyes the world becomes solid, for still weaker eyes it seems to develop fists, 
for eyes weaker still it becomes shamefaced and smashes anyone who dares to gaze upon it.” 
Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 91. (“Vor schwachen Augen wird sie fest, vor noch schwächer-
en bekommt sie Fäuste, vor noch schwächeren wird sie schamhaft und zerschmettert den, der 
sie anzuschauen wagt.” Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II, 125.) Never mind. We will 
dare to approach a few more windows onto The Metamorphosis. The one I now have in mind is 
a dirty window.
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 comparison breaks off, and its truth-value is compromised, for Gregor also enjoys 
an acrobatic lightness of being and dies with the desire to please his family  – 
almost. Kafka also takes pains to write that “[Gregor’s] conviction that he would 
have to disappear was, if possible, even firmer than his sister’s” (“seine Meinung 
darüber, daß er verschwinden müsse, war womöglich noch entschiedener, als 
die seiner Schwester”),80 which makes her the agent of his disappearance and 
leaves him as something less than saintly leper – though a good deal more than 
abject scum. What Gregor is, is not readily answerable except as the distillation 
of the totality of answers that has been posed and will continue to be posed to the 
question of his being.
Are there other readings? Indeed there are. There is the medicinal: Gregor’s 
predicament is a replica of Kafka’s intuitive forecast of his own tuberculosis, 
which would lay him low. “Of course Gregor had to admit,” we recall, “that he 
would not be able to keep up even this running for long, for whenever his father 
took one step, Gregor had to execute countless movements. He was already begin-
ning to feel winded, just as in the old days he had not had very reliable lungs.”81 
There is the biographical reading: Gregor is the family invalid; he punishes 
the family with his odium by assuming a cripple’s or pariah’s existence. True, 
he is himself punished by his sick body and by his dependency, but he thereby 
achieves the covert, doubly aggressive expressiveness of the tyrant invalid and 
the family idiot. 
Another biographical reading summons the plight of the artist, the writer, 
who, in Kafka’s family, is a changeling, a negative miracle, an outsider. For one 
moment we have plain evidence of Kafka’s taste for such semi-private games. As 
the narrator explains: “Well, in a pinch Gregor could do without the chest, but 
the [writing] desk had to stay” (“Nun, den Kasten konnte Gregor im Notfall noch 
entbehren, aber schon der Schreibtisch mußte bleiben”).82 Here Samsa becomes 
an alias of Kafka, a notion given support in an (unfortunately) unreliable book by 
a young friend of Kafka’s, Gustav Janouch. He claims to recall one of their conver-
sations, which now borders on the cryptogrammatic:
80 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 39; Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 193.
81 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 28. (“Allerdings mußte sich Gregor sagen, daß er sogar dieses 
Laufen nicht lange aushalten würde, denn während der Vater einen Schritt machte, mußte er 
eine Unzahl von Bewegungen ausführen. Atemnot begann sich schon bemerkbar zu machen, 
wie er ja auch in seiner früheren Zeit keine ganz vertrauenswürdige Lunge besessen hatte.” 
Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 170.)
82 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 25; Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 163.
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“The hero of the story is called Samsa,” I [Janouch] said. “It sounds like a cryptogram for 
Kafka. Five letters in each word. The S in the word Samsa has the same position as the K in 
the word Kafka. The A…” 
Kafka interrupted me. 
“It is not a cryptogram. Samsa is not merely Kafka, and nothing else. The Metamorphosis 
is not a confession, although it is – in a certain sense – an indiscretion.” 
“I know nothing about that.” 
“Is it perhaps delicate and discreet to talk about the bugs [Wanzen] in one’s own fami-
ly?”83 
There is the etymological reading, which I have discussed in detail elsewhere and 
to which I am partial: Gregor, in the lines of his being, is a distorted metaphor.84 
But this etymological reading should not be confused with the entomological 
reading, which will briefly occupy us. Vladimir Nabokov, who greatly admired 
the story, considered it, as did Elias Canetti, a literary work that nothing could 
surpass  – one of the few great, perfect poetic works of the twentieth century. 
Nabokov believed that Gregor’s melancholy and feelings of alienation might be 
cured with a bit of scientific enlightenment. He could have been spared all his 
desolation, Nabokov wrote, if only he had recognized that he is “a domed beetle, 
a scarab beetle with wing-sheaths.” His promise of happiness lies in his flying out 
the window and joining all “the other happy dung beetles rolling the dung balls 
on rural paths.”85
But there is a good objection to this reading. Interestingly, the phrase “dung 
beetle” – Mistkäfer – does appear in the story, quite as if Kafka had been fore-
warned about Nabokov’s reading of his hero’s predicament. “Come over here for 
a minute, you old dung beetle!” (“Komm mal herüber, alter Mistkäfer!”) says the 
gigantic, bony cleaning woman, who presides over Gregor’s end. But then, sig-
nificantly, we read: “To forms of address like these Gregor would not respond 
but remained immobile where he was, as if the door had not been opened” (“Auf 
solche Ansprachen antwortete Gregor mit nichts, sondern blieb unbeweglich auf 
seinem Platz, als sei die Tür gar nicht geöffnet worden”).86 He is not a dung beetle; 
he is “a monstrous vermin” – a proper English epithet that has an exact precedent 
in the language of a pamphlet written in 1581 by an English Protestant, Walter 
83 Gustave Janouch, Conversations with Kafka, trans. Goronwy Rees, New Directions, New York 
1971, 32.
84 Corngold, Franz Kafka: The Necessity of Form, 47–89.
85 Alfred Appel Jr., “An Interview with Vladimir Nabokov,” in Nabokov: The Man and His Work, 
ed. L.S. Dembo, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1967, 19–44, 43. 
86 Kafka, The Metamorphosis, 33; Kafka, Drucke zu Lebzeiten, 179.
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Haddon, against the Portuguese bishop Jerome Osorio de Fonseca, in a theolog-
ical dispute about papal authority: “O monstruous vermine: did I ever speake 
or think any such matter?”87 Gregor is a “monstruous vermine” – an ungeheures 
Ungeziefer – and not an insect of a specifiable kind. Moreover, it may not be irrel-
evant that the modifying word ungeheuer, which Kafka chose, traces to a Middle 
High German word (Latin: infamiliaris) meaning a creature having no place at 
the hearth, a creature outside all human family; and that the word for vermin, 
Ungeziefer, goes back to a Middle High German word meaning a creature unac-
ceptable as sacrifice to the gods and hence outside the world order altogether. 
(Kafka studied Middle High German at his university before taking his degree in 
law.) At this point, we might recall our economic reading, where the post-meta-
morphic – hence unemployable Gregor – has become unsuited to sacrifice to the 
gods of capitalism. 
There appears to be no end to these discussions, which have taken the place 
of theological dispute, often retaining the same angry language. But the language 
of this discussion can also be of the whimsical sort; and so, we have Philip Roth 
imagining Kafka, despite Kafka’s real death in 1924, fleeing the Central European 
concentration camp of the 1930s and surfacing in Newark as a Hebrew teacher and 
romancer of the young Philip’s Aunt Rhoda.88 “In poetry,” writes John Coetzee, 
“the metaphoric spark is always one jump ahead of the decoding function: […] 
another unforeseen reading is always possible.”89 
With respect, then, to our original question as to the power of Kafka’s images: 
we now know that these images are surreal (brilliantly incisive, but contrary to 
fact); more than that, they are superreal. Once they have originated a plot, they 
87 “Perhaps the most famous religious dispute of the latter half of the sixteenth century was 
that between Walter Haddon (1516–1572), the distinguished English Latinist, and Jerome Osorio 
de Fonseca (1506–1580), Portuguese bishop and eminent Ciceronian. […] Though neither partic-
ipant was primarily a theologian, the affair attracted a great deal of attention in its time because 
of the commanding reputations of both men as Latin stylists. By his fellow Englishmen, Haddon 
was regarded as the best Latin orator, poet, and epistolist of his generation; and on the Continent 
Osorio was widely admired not only for his skill in Scriptural studies but also for his excellent 
Ciceronianism. […]
 “The result was Contra Hieron. Osorium … Responsio Apologetica (1577), dedicated to Sebas-
tian, King of Portugal. […] In the prefatory epistle, Haddon expresses regret at having to re-enter 
the controversy in such sharp language as Osorio had forced him to employ.” Lawrence V. Ryan, 
“The Haddon–Osorio Controversy (1563–1583),” in Church History 22.2 (1953): 142–154, 142, 151. 
88 Philip Roth, “‘I Always Wanted You to Admire My Fasting’; or, Looking at Kafka,” in Reading 
Myself and Others, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 1975, 247–270. 
89 John Coetzee, Diary of a Bad Year, Viking Adult, New York 2007, 23.
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invite a seemingly endless variety of perspectives, types of explanation, which 
draw on all the conceptual resources of Kafka’s time – and all times to come. 
And here the word “invite” is too casual – at least, we recall, in the view of 
Theodor Adorno. For Adorno, the reader’s appeal to one or more of these dis-
courses or types of explanation (to which, on reflection, we can add the bureau-
cratic, the cinematic, the fantastic, the familial) is not optional: Kafka’s sentences, 
Adorno writes, come at the reader with the force of an onrushing locomotive: 
each sentence of Kafka’s says “interpret me”: “Through the power with which 
Kafka commands interpretation, he collapses aesthetic distance. He demands 
a desperate effort from the allegedly ‘disinterested’ spectator of an earlier time, 
overwhelms you, suggesting that far more than your intellectual equilibrium 
depends on whether you truly understand; life and death are at stake.”90 Kafka’s 
work demands interpretation: it is the desperate demand of the incisive image, 
the individual sentence – laid on a “chorus” of readers – to raise their singularity 
into a probable universe of “purity, truth, and immutability.”91 
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Brendan Moran
Philosophy and Ambiguity in Benjamin’s 
Kafka
We are sinful, not only because we have eaten of the Tree of Knowledge, but also because we 
have not yet eaten of the Tree of Life. 
– Franz Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks1
For Walter Benjamin, there is a complementary relationship of art and philoso-
phy. Philosophy exercises a persistence of discourse against any ostensibly con-
cluded gesture of an artwork. Philosophy is not a fragment to be treated as invio-
lably apart; nor can it treat anything else – including the artwork – as inviolably 
apart. There is no final gesture. The gestural element remains, nonetheless, inte-
gral to philosophy; the gestural element openly performs beyond the discursive – 
beyond the denotative (and any connoted denotations). In the encounter with art-
works, philosophy is kept attentive to the resistance of particularity to discursive 
rendering. Such unyielding is the philosophic element in the artwork. Attentive-
ness to this element of the artwork is integral to the possibility of criticism being 
philosophy. The alliance with literature is distinct from any view of philosophy 
as that which ultimately overcomes the particularity conveyed by literature. As a 
discourse about truth, philosophy is indeed distinct from the emphatic particu-
larity of literature. Yet the artwork, in conveying particularity as inexpungible 
from life, offers philosophy a truth that the latter might be inclined to disregard. 
This attentiveness to particularity can be more philosophic than can a “philoso-
phy” devoted to eliminating particularity.2 
For Benjamin, the philosophic – whether it happens in an exercise of phi-
losophy per se, in an artwork, or somewhere else  – is a disruption of closure. 
He characterizes closure as “myth” and develops the philosophic as an ongoing 
exercise of engaging life against discernibly mythic efforts to contain it.
It might seem to follow that the philosophic is an exercise of rendering clo-
sures ambiguous. This will indeed be a claim of the following essay; however, 
1 Franz Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, ed. Max Brod, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, 
Exact Change, Cambridge 2004, 37. The German reads: “Wir sind nicht nur deshalb sündig weil 
wir vom Baum der Erkenntnis gegessen haben, sondern auch deshalb weil wir vom Baum des 
Lebens noch nicht gegessen haben.” See Franz Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente 
II [Unpublished Writings and Fragments II], ed. Jost Schillemeit, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1992, 72. 
2 For more extensive discussion of this topic, see Brendan Moran, “An Inhumanly Wise Shame,” 
in Philosophy as a Literary Art, ed. Costica Bradatan, Routledge, London 2014, 63–75.
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this claim is made somewhat counter to Benjamin’s tendency to present the phil-
osophic as simply an exercise of creating paradox rather than ambiguity. Benja-
min does not present a sustained treatment of philosophy as paradox, although 
he occasionally mentions the topic. Not far from Benjamin’s outlook in this 
respect is Gilles Deleuze, who claims that philosophy “is revealed not by good 
sense but by paradox. Paradox is the pathos or the passion of philosophy.” Philo-
sophic paradox is opposed to the “complementary forms of orthodoxy – namely, 
good sense and common sense.”3 Karl Kraus remarks more broadly: “A paradox 
originates when a knowledge developed prematurely collides with the hogwash 
[Unsinn] of its time.”4 Benjamin is close to these conceptions of paradox, and he 
regards such paradoxes as specifically philosophic. The following essay will be an 
endeavour to indicate that ambiguity can be a philosophical element in paradox. 
Literature can, moreover, particularly accentuate this philosophic ambiguity, 
which is in turn articulated in philosophic criticism. This essay will provide an 
indication, principally on the basis of Benjamin’s writings on Franz Kafka, of this 
dynamic of literature and philosophy. Towards the close of the essay, an outline 
will accordingly be provided of how ambiguity might be integral to Benjamin’s 
own expressly Kafkan objection to Søren Kierkegaard’s absolute paradox.
1  A Challenge
An obvious challenge faces this essay. At various points in his works, Benjamin 
associates, if not identifies, ambiguity with myth. Careful readers have some-
times followed him in this respect or even stated the association more emphat-
ically. What is this ambiguity of myth? For Benjamin, it is above all that myth 
simultaneously has a claim or presumption to encompass or reassure but cannot 
actually fulfil this claim or presumption. A formulation of this ambiguity is given 
in Benjamin’s The Origin of the German Mourning Play [Ursprung des deutschen 
Trauerspiels] (rejected in 1925 as a habilitation thesis; published in 1928). The 
anti-mythic, philosophic tendency both recovered and exercised in the Trauer-
spiel book is to turn the ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) into paradox – to show that 
the exercise of control by myth (“the demonic world-order”) involves simulta-
3 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, Columbia University Press, New 
York 1994, 227; Gilles Deleuze, Différence et repetition, Universitaires de France, Paris 1968, 293.
4 Karl Kraus, Aphorismen [Aphorisms], Schriften [Writings], Vol. 8, ed. Christian Wagenknecht, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1986, 164. Cited (somewhat differently) in Paul North, The Problem of 
Distraction, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2012, 144.
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neously an experience of resistance to this control.5 Benjamin’s preference for 
“paradox” over ambiguity seems to arise from a sense that the word “paradox” 
better conveys contradiction to prevailing opinion (doxa); there is a para-dox.6 
The paradox is to transform the ambiguity – bring it “to decline [Absterben]” – 
so that there is something other than “fate” (Schicksal), something other than 
an alleged necessity requiring submission and “retribution” (Sühne). There can 
thus be a “sacrifice” (Opfer), which – while suffering defeat by the old order – 
also contributes, even if the sacrifice is fatal, to a “victory” of the residual, “his-
torico-philosophic [geschichtsphilosophische] signature” that prophesies the 
decline of the order.7 The historico-philosophic impetus, the impetus para-dox-
ical rather than mythic in history, can contribute to the decline of an order that 
has only an ambiguous claim to commandeer history. The historico-philosophic 
impetus brings to decline the not entirely credible – and therefore ambiguous – 
claim or presumption of this order to control or reassure.
There are other such passages in Benjamin’s writings, and some of these 
will be discussed below. Somewhat against the grain of such passages, however, 
an argument of this essay will be that the aforementioned historico-philosophic 
paradox always remains ambiguous, for it too arises from a condition in which 
any contradiction against myth will itself be imbued with mythic closures, con-
scious or not. The historico-philosophic paradox will, moreover, be an opening 
to another ambiguity, a philosophic ambiguity that must be respected in all phil-
osophic momentum: this is the ambiguity that may summarily be characterized 
as “Mehrdeutigkeit,” a condition open to various readings.
This opening beyond closed interpretation is a corrective to much that goes 
by the name “philosophy.” Even traditional “philosophic” paradoxes are subject 
to this correction. No paradox eliminates ambiguity entirely. The correction can 
involve consideration of words not just in light of predicates associated with them 
5 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne, Verso, London, 
1977 (translation modified), 109; Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften [Collected Writings], 
Vol. I:1, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1974, 
288. 
6 Although it does not refer to relevant texts by Benjamin, a helpful account of this notion of par-
adox (from Heraclitus to the twentieth century) is David Schur, The Way of Oblivion. Heraclitus 
and Kafka, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1998.
7 Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, 109 (translation modified); Benjamin, Ges-
ammelte Schriften, Vol. I:1, 288. For justification of the usage of the term “myth” here, where it is 
not actually used by Benjamin, see the description of death in the Trauerspiel as, in contrast with 
death in tragedy, signifying historically “the end of myth” (Benjamin, The Origin of the German 
Tragic Drama, 135; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I:1, 315). 
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but also in concern for the linguistic element that is independent of predication. 
Benjamin thus criticizes Bertrand Russell for determining paradox entirely on the 
basis of predicates for the words used. For Benjamin, Russell neglects that words 
have “meaning” (Bedeutung) and give “indication” (Bezeichnung) in ways that 
are not identifiable as predicates.8 With regard to the so-called Cretan paradox 
(Epimenides the Cretan says all Cretans are liars), Benjamin insists that the state-
ment be taken beyond the logic in which its paradox is obvious (if Epimenides is 
being truthful, he is lying; if he is lying, he is being truthful). On an “ontological” 
level, the statement might not be “meaningless [unsinnig] or nonsensical [wid-
ersinnig] in itself. This outlook frees up the paradox from its logical contradic-
tion.” For instance, the statement is contradictory if uttered by the person to whom 
it applies. Yet if it is said of anyone else that every judgement made by the latter 
person predicates the opposite of truth, the statement does not have “contradic-
tory results.” Accordingly, the statement “is not a contradiction in every sense.” 
In “metaphysics,” it is recognized that the logical contradiction of the Cretan’s 
statement is dependent on the “I-form of the judgment.” “Its logical semblance 
is constituted in its subjectivity,” which creates the “anti-logical” condition of 
the proposition. In Benjamin’s view, a metaphysical rather than strictly logical 
approach is thus needed to examine the paradox. In short, “[m]etaphysics” is 
needed to “ground” (begründen) the statement.9 With regard to Benjamin’s dis-
cussion, it has been noted that the Cretan paradox has an untidiness by virtue of 
the commencement of the paradox by a specific figure – in this case, Epimenides. 
Unlike W.V. Quine and others, who restate the paradox in less personal terms (“I 
am lying” or, even more impersonally, “This sentence is false”), Benjamin does 
not seek to eradicate this untidiness. He brings the untidy condition to the fore.10 
In one of his texts dealing with Russell, Benjamin suggests that confinement of 
meaning to logical tidiness neglects the “linguistic” element in which words are 
beyond such confinement.11
8 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VI, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schwep-
penhäuser, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1985, 9–11. For criticism of Benjamin’s reading of Russell, 
see Alexei Procyshyn, “Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy of Language,” in Philosophy Compass 9.6 
(2014), 368–381.
9 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913–1926, eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. 
Jennings, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1996, 210–212 (translation 
modified); Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VI, 57–59.
10 James F. McFarland, Constellation. Friedrich Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin in the Now-Time 
of History, Fordham University Press, New York 2013, 103–107. See W.V. Quine, The Ways of Para-
dox and Other Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1976 [revised edition], 6–7. 
11 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VI, 10–11.
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Benjamin stresses this in his 1916 essay on language (as well as elsewhere). 
Linguistic being cannot be reduced to spiritual being (meaning circumscribed 
by humans). Nonetheless, “the deep and incomparable paradox” of identifying 
spiritual being and linguistic being has an important and warranted application. 
This paradox and its justifiable application is expressed in “the ambiguity [Dop-
pelsinn],” the double meaning, “of the word ‘logos.’” The word “logos” serves to 
keep spiritual being and linguistic being from conflation into one another, and 
yet also presupposes their contact (admittedly, an indeterminate contact) with 
one another. The paradox of the contact – the paradox of the identity – of spiritual 
being and linguistic being is a solution in “the centre” of linguistic theory but 
“remains a paradox, and insoluble, if placed at the beginning.”12 To begin with 
the distinction of spiritual being and linguistic being – the distinction making 
philosophical method an exercise of always beginning anew – is to emphasize 
that there is communication in, not through, language. It is to emphasize that 
linguistic being does not let itself be used exhaustively by humanly conceived 
meaning. The spiritual being communicated is neither demarcation nor delimi-
tation of linguistic being. “Spiritual being communicates itself in a language and 
not through a language – that is to say: it is not outwardly [von aussen] identi-
cal with linguistic being.”13 Into the paradox of identifying spiritual being and 
linguistic being, there comes the ambiguity, the Doppelsinn, of logos that keeps 
language free from complete identification with spiritual being and yet maintains 
their fluctuating contact with one another.
This ambiguity entails an independence of words from meanings given to 
them; it also entails a constant contact of words and such meanings. Ambigu-
ity ensues for paradoxes, perhaps in a jarring way for paradoxes dependent on 
highly insistent conceptions of meaning in them. It would be unphilosophic, a 
denial of logos and its dynamic of language and meaning, if the ambiguity in 
the contact of language and meaning were unacknowledged. In the aforemen-
tioned myth (discussed in the Trauerspiel book), the ambiguity  – the lack of 
control or certainty accompanying any notion of control – is actually denied, dis-
regarded, or suppressed. This denial, disregard, or suppression is pierced by the 
philosophic motion that exposes the ambiguity. Along with this first philosophic 
12 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 63; Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:1, 
eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1977, 141–142.
13 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 63 (translation modified); Benjamin, Gesammelte 
Schriften, Vol. II:1, 142. Also see: under “Fortsetzungsnotizen zu Arbeit über die Sprache” (“Fol-
low-up Notes to Work on Language”), in Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. VII:2, eds. 
Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1989, 786–788.
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movement that does not quite let myth deny, disregard, or suppress the ambi-
guity (its claim or presumption versus its lack of credibility), there is a second 
correlative philosophic ambiguity that is (in German) “Mehrdeutigkeit,” which 
has also long been lexically established as one meaning of the previously noted 
term “Zweideutigkeit” (ambiguity) and which obviously pertains to a possibility 
for multiple interpretations. 
2  Mythic Ambiguity and Philosophic Ambiguity
Benjamin’s writings on Kafka include motifs in which the two aforementioned 
ambiguities come into mutual play. The first ambiguity may be called mythic 
ambiguity. It arises when there is a claim to control or to encompass that can 
be shown to be fraudulent. The work of the philosophic in Kafka’s literature, 
and in Benjamin’s criticism, is to show this ambiguity that is otherwise denied 
by its perpetrators. Philosophy thereby becomes a momentum of paradox in the 
sense outlined at the outset of this essay: it opposes doxa that claims to be truth. 
The philosophic momentum of paradox is not, however, entirely independent 
of ambiguity. First of all, it emerges from contexts that are themselves always 
imbued with mythic ambiguity (devices and orders exercised as though they are 
true); it does not completely transcend all such contexts, even if it is impelled 
by an impetus to do so. Second, the philosophic momentum opens to another 
ambiguity, the one inherent in the contact of language and meaning; this is the 
ambiguity referred to previously as “Mehrdeutigkeit.” Kafka’s literature keeps 
Benjamin’s philosophic criticism attentive to all these fluctuations of ambiguity; 
Benjamin’s criticism responds accordingly. As a discourse about truth, philoso-
phy distinguishes itself from the accent placed by literature on particularity. The 
philosophic in literature, and in turn in criticism, prevents literature from simply 
absolutizing  – mythifying  – its particularities, as perhaps do some versions of 
religion. In conveying ambiguous particularity as inexpungible from life, the 
artwork is philosophic in presenting to philosophy a pervasive ambiguity (in all 
the foregoing senses of “ambiguity”) that philosophic discourse may otherwise 
be inclined to disregard. This attentiveness to ambiguity can be more philosophic 
than is a “philosophy” claiming to eliminate ambiguity entirely. The latter claim 
exposes itself to the risk of becoming myth in denial of ambiguity.
Although the association of ambiguity with philosophy may seem unique, 
there have been other attempts to relate ambiguity with the philosophic. Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty bases the phenomenology of perception significantly on “ambig-
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uous life” (la vie ambiguë).14 Simone de Beauvoir offers an ethics (morale) of 
ambiguity, in which she indicts the tendency of most “philosophers” to mask the 
ambiguity of the human condition.15 As intimated already, moreover, the etymol-
ogy of “Zweideutigkeit” is not entirely unfavourable to an association of ambigu-
ity and the philosophic.
The term zweideutig (ambiguous) developed in the seventeenth century as a 
translation of the Latin aequivocus, meaning doppelsinnig (ambiguous) or mehr-
deutig (ambiguous, equivocal, conducive to a plurality of interpretations). In the 
eighteenth century, however, zweideutig indeed came to mean absichtlich unklar 
(purposely unclear), which pertains of course to the mythic ambiguity that Ben-
jamin has been shown above to describe. Even so, this “purposely unclear” could 
refer to a denial, disregard, or suppression of Doppelsinnigkeit or Mehrdeutigkeit. 
At the very least, the (admittedly quite incomplete) etymology given here sug-
gests that the term zweideutig is mehrdeutig.16 This Mehrdeutigkeit – indeed, any 
Mehrdeutigkeit – is, moreover, not necessarily indicative of a mythic swindle, a 
wilful or semi-conscious unclarity that serves a dominating purpose.17
14 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes, Routledge, 
London 2013, 382; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception, Gallimard, Paris 
1945, 418. 
15 Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman, The Citadel Press, 
New York 1964, 7; Simone de Beauvoir, Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté, Gallimard, Paris 1947, 12.
16 For very succinctly given detail on zweideutig, see under “deuten” in Das Herkunftswörter-
buch, Etymologie der deutschen Sprache [The Dictionary of Provenance: Etymology of the German 
Language], Dudenverlag, Mannheim 2001, 142. The Grimm brothers more elaborately address 
“zwiedeutig” and “Zweideutigkeit” in a quite similar way, but many of the meanings given are 
the mentioned or other pejorative senses. Exceptions are the first recorded meanings of “zwei-
deutig” and “Zweideutigkeit,” which are somewhat more neutral, pertaining to the simple possi-
bility that words or sense-contexts may have double, often antagonistic, meanings. Such notions 
of “zweideutig” and “Zweideutigkeit” do, nonetheless, persist. Also noteworthy is that under 
“Zweideutigkeit” the Grimm brothers include reference to “the undecided double possibility” to 
which “philosophic language” might refer (see Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, reworked by Gustav 
Rosenhagen and others, Deutsches Wörterbuch [German Dictionary], Vol. 16, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 
Leipzig 1954, 984–988). 
17 There are, of course, other meanings of “zweideutig” and “Zweideutigkeit,” that could very 
well seem relevant to Kafka’s writings and Benjamin’s reading of them. These include the char-
acterizations schlüpfrig (slippery, suggestive, lewd, risqué) or zotig (dirty, filthy, smutty) (Das 
Herkunftswörterbuch, 142; Deutsches Wörterbuch, Vol. 16, 985, 987) – meanings that could easily 
be used to characterize some of what Benjamin detects in writings by Kafka, although it might 
not always be clear whether the lewdness and smuttiness is reinforcing the mythic or pointing 
to deviance from it.
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Nevertheless, careful readers have contended that ambiguity is strictly 
opposed in Benjamin’s readings of Kafka.18 This claim may seem to find corrob-
oration in Benjamin’s Kafka essay, as well as in an earlier, related passage of his 
“Towards the Critique of Violence” (“Zur Kritik der Gewalt”). In the latter essay, 
which appeared in 1921, Benjamin discusses the ancient notion of a “retribution” 
that is provoked by an offense against “unwritten and unknown [unbekannten] 
law.” He explains that the occurrence of such retribution is – “in the sense of the 
law” (im Sinne des Rechts) – “not coincidence, but fate [Schicksal] showing itself 
once again in its deliberate ambiguity [seiner planvollen Zweideutigkeit].”19 In his 
Kafka essay of 1934, Benjamin writes something quite similar, albeit with refer-
ence to unwritten and unknown laws in Kafka’s works: he notes that the human 
being can “unsuspectingly transgress” those laws and “thus become subject to 
retribution. But no matter how hard the retribution may hit the unsuspecting, the 
retribution in the sense of the law is not coincidence but fate that presents itself 
here in its ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit].”20 
Noteworthy right away is that Benjamin is referring in these passages to “its” 
ambiguity – the ambiguity of fateful necessity in law. In other words, there could 
conceivably be other kinds of ambiguity. This will be discussed shortly.
What is the fateful ambiguity that is mentioned in both the essay on violence 
and the essay on Kafka? In the former essay, Benjamin – using terminology close 
to the previously mentioned passage from the Trauerspiel book – comments on 
the “demonic-ambiguous way [dämonisch-zweideutige Weise]” in which all are 
treated as “‘equal’” before the law, so that, for instance, poor and rich alike are 
prohibited from sleeping under bridges. He surmises that such “mythic ambiguity 
of laws […] may not be ‘infringed’ [übertreten].”21 It may not be broken or violated 
18 Rodolphe Gasché, “Kafka’s Law: In the Field of Forces Between Judaism and Hellenism,” 
in The Stelliferous Fold. Toward a Virtual Law of Literature’s Self-Formation, 269–297, 279; and 
Dimitris Vardoulakis, The Doppelgänger: Literature’s Philosophy, Fordham University Press, New 
York 2011, 209.
19 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 249 (translation modified); Benjamin, Gesammelte 
Schriften, Vol. II:1, 199. Italics added.
20 Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2: 1931–1934, eds. Michael W. Jennings, Howard 
Eiland, and Gary Smith, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1999, 797 
(translation modified); Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:2, 412. 
21 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 249; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:1, 198. 
Benjamin’s example is borrowed from Anatole France’s Le Lys rouge [The Red Lily], in which a 
character remarks on how the poor must “support and […] conserve the rich in their power and 
their idleness. They must work […] before the majestic equality of the law that prohibits rich 
and poor alike from sleeping under bridges, begging in the streets, and stealing bread” (Anatole 
France, Le Lys rouge, Éditions Gallimard, Paris 1992, 129).
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(übertreten). The mythic ambiguity is that the law must be heeded as though it is 
necessity itself and equal for all, even though it is not fate and patently involves 
inequality: the rich are less likely than the poor to need shelter under bridges.
Even for these passages from the essay on Kafka and the essay on violence, 
however, the ambiguity exists in myth and yet is basically ignored or denied by 
myth. If the ambiguity were instead explored, it could become a variation of the 
historico-philosophic paradox mentioned in the Trauerspiel book: an ambiguity 
in which domination or indeed justice is presumed or claimed but demonstrably 
unaccomplished. The paradox and detection of ambiguity are complementary 
rather than opposed. Recognition of the ambiguity leads the ambiguity into a 
paradox – a scene of conflict rather than complacency and denial.
Such ambiguity recurs (and is never transcended entirely by paradox), 
however, for mythic closure does not desist even if a specific mythic closure is 
overcome. No specific exercise of the philosophic rises above all mythic ambigu-
ity; it too emerges from life that is inundated by such taken-for-granted closures. 
In his essay on violence, Benjamin – in a paraphrasing of Georges Sorel – remarks 
that the prerogative of the mighty ensures, for instance, the following: any offer 
of rights accorded in law by the mighty will simply ensure – “in a demonically 
ambiguous way” – that these “‘equal’ rights” are mythic.22 More broadly, mythic 
ambiguity will persist as long as there is no entirely open-ended exploration of 
it. It is difficult to imagine that a human life could sustain such exploration; sur-
vival alone depends on living with certain closures in and about life, and, indeed, 
living them as though they are true, which – philosophically considered – they 
are not. Beyond the imperative of survival, moreover, all sorts of expediencies 
require that the ambiguities in our lived truths not be addressed as such.
Pressure for the open-ended exploration is, nonetheless, the conceivably 
ongoing motion of, and for, philosophic acknowledgement of mythic ambiguity. 
The expressly philosophic in Benjamin’s readings of Kafka accordingly includes 
presentations of ambiguity that myth – closure – ignores. Despite their starkly 
contradictory statements about the Vorwelt (statements that have been examined 
in detail elsewhere), Benjamin’s analyses of Kafka include remarks for which the 
Vorwelt (literally, “pre-world,” often translated as “prehistory”) is a realm with-
standing myth, a realm always preceding and disturbing mythic containment.23 
22 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 249; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:1, 198.
23 A rudimentary analysis may be found in Brendan Moran, “The ‘Forgotten’ as Epic Vorwelt,” 
in Layering: Rethinking Contact, Historicity and Critique Across the Humanities, eds. Maria Marga-
roni, Apostolos Lampropoulos, and Christos Hadjichristos, Lexington Books, Lanham forthcom-
ing. This essay was written several years ago, and has been extensively revised and corrected as 
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The containment is ambiguous; its claims may be exposed by philosophic scru-
tiny to be belied by history that does not let itself be contained. The Vorwelt is, 
therefore, “Kafka’s secret present [geheime Gegenwart]” that – as “historico-phil-
osophical index [der geschichtsphilosophische Index]” – facilitates shame, for 
instance, about any measures indicating presumption somehow to overcome 
entirely the Vorwelt.24 This emergence of the philosophic presents an ambigu-
ity – that the claim to containment is belied by uncontainable history. This is an 
ambiguity that myth perpetrates, or simply embodies, but does not acknowledge. 
This initial conflict of philosophic impetus and mythic closure exemplifies 
the first of the two kinds of ambiguity mentioned earlier. In notes towards a revi-
sion of the 1934 essay on Kafka (and touching on this first ambiguity), Benjamin 
refers to how Kafka’s gestures are affected by tendencies towards both liberation 
and subordination. Benjamin claims: “There is no gesture in Kafka’s works that 
is not affected [betroffen] by this ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit] before [moral-legal] 
decision.”25 “The gesture thereby acquires something enormously dramatic.”26 In 
the 1934 essay, Benjamin states: “Each gesture is an event – one might even say a 
drama – in itself.”27 If there is no gesture unaffected by this drama of ambiguity 
(this drama of liberation and subordination in the face of moral-legal decision), 
the historico-philosophic gesture of shame about myth – the gesture that Benja-
min considers prevalent in Kafka’s work – is not independent of the drama.28 This 
gesture is simply integral to the ambiguity becoming philosophically dramatic. It 
shows the ambiguity in which there is a claim to closure and the closure is not 
chapter 13 of Brendan Moran, Philosophy as Renegade. Benjamin’s “Kafkan” Politics (forthcom-
ing).
24 Walter Benjamin, letter of 11 August 1934, in The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, eds. 
Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn M. Jacobson, 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1994, 453; Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Briefe [Collected 
Letters], Vol. IV, eds. Christoph Gödde and Henri Lonitz, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1998, 478. To 
get a sense of the variegated references by Benjamin to “Vorwelt,” see Benjamin, Selected Writ-
ings, Volume 2, 797, 807, 809; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:2, 412, 426–427, 429; Walter 
Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3: 1935–1938, eds. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2002, 326; Walter Benjamin, Gesam-
melte Briefe, Vol. VI, eds. Christoph Gödde and Henri Lonitz, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 2000, 112; 
Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1165, 1213, 1246. 
25 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften Vol. II:3, 1261, 1263.
26 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1263.
27 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2, 802; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:2, 419.
28 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2, 808–815; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:2, 
428–437; Benjamin, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 453; Benjamin, Gesammelte Briefe, 
Vol. IV, 478.
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complete. The gesture could conceivably break complacency about any claim or 
presumption to dominate or contain. It can do this, however, by underscoring 
ambiguity, not by claiming to transcend or escape it entirely. In an apparent objec-
tion to the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice 
Blanchot remarks on the ambiguity that is accompanied by a “subterfuge” seizing 
“the shifting, changing truth.”29 In elaborating on Kafka, Blanchot states that 
“Literature is language turning into ambiguity [ambiguïté].”30 For Benjamin, it 
seems the ambiguity of literature – the ambiguity of Kafka’s literature – arises 
so that what myth conceals may be exposed: myth conceals its ambiguity; litera-
ture – in its philosophic impetus – exposes the ambiguity in order to exercise the 
paradox, the conflict between the philosophic and the mythic. Philosophic crit-
icism makes explicit both this exposure of ambiguity and the ensuing paradox. 
Unlike Sartre and Beauvoir (as Blanchot depicts them), Benjamin’s Kafka 
usually does not claim to seize truth, though his characters sometimes do. Benja-
min’s Kafka is concerned above all with the failure of such seizing.31 In this Kafka, 
the drama of ambiguity – the drama of liberatory and submissive tendencies – 
is mostly inherent in the philosophic gesture. Even if the philosophic impetus 
opposes a specific ambiguity by letting a liberatory element prevail against a sub-
ordinate one, there will be no shortage of further such ambiguities that permeate 
our mythic lives. The Kafkan drama is indeed the para-doxical confrontation of 
philosophic impulse and mythic life, but precisely the philosophic must admit 
the continued ambiguity of liberation: it must acknowledge the ambiguities – not 
always conscious – whereby we live our lives according to semblances of truth 
that are, after all, no more than semblances. Any specific philosophic liberation 
does not annul all such ambiguities, even if Benjamin’s writings – including his 
writings on Kafka – involve a messianism that might seem oriented to eventual 
elimination of such ambiguities.32
29 Maurice Blanchot, “Reading Kafka,” in The Work of Fire, trans. Charlotte Mandell, Stanford 
University Press, 1995, 1–11, 5; Maurice Blanchot, “La lecture de Kafka,” in La Part du Feu, Galli-
mard, Paris 1949, 9–19, 13. 
30 Maurice Blanchot, “Literature and the Right to Death,” trans. Lydia Davis, in The Work of Fire, 
300–344, 341; Maurice Blanchot, “La littérature et le droit à la mort,” in La Part du Feu, 291–331, 
328. Blanchot refers to “an ultimate ambiguity whose strange effect is to attract literature to an 
unstable point where it can indiscriminately change both its meaning and its sign” (342/329). 
31 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2, 804, 808; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:2, 
422, 427–428; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1249; letter of 12 November 1934 to Wer-
ner Kraft, in Benjamin, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 463; Benjamin, Gesammelte 
Briefe, Vol. IV, 525–526.
32 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2, 811; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:2, 432.
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This brings us again to the second ambiguity, the philosophic ambiguity as 
distinct from the mythic ambiguity that is exposed by the philosophic impetus in 
art and by philosophic criticism. The second ambiguity, the strictly philosophic 
ambiguity, is that to which the philosophic opens (at least until the Messiah 
comes). This philosophic ambiguity is the ambiguity that is Mehrdeutigkeit. It is 
not, however, a celebration of all uncertainty of interpretation. In his essay on vio-
lence, Benjamin refers to the condition, particularly prevalent in “democracies,” 
whereby policing is facilitated not simply as an exercise in application of the law 
but as an exploitation of a power that enables police authorities to administer 
even where there is no clear guideline. Benjamin suggests that this is especially a 
problem in democracies, for the leeway given to police to exploit such “formless 
[gestaltlos],” ungraspable, yet pervasive power is greater in democracies than in 
states where absolute monarchy unites legislative and executive supremacy in 
the ruler.33 The ambiguity in “democratic” police power is mythic ambiguity, for 
the police exercise power that is (falsely) treated as though it is sanctioned legally. 
Philosophic scrutiny can show this ambiguity in policing. Philosophy also opens, 
however, the second ambiguity – the philosophic ambiguity of Mehrdeutigkeit. 
It does so, for instance, against the policing that would assert its interpretation 
against any possibility for Mehrdeutigkeit.
In Benjamin’s writings on Kafka (as in his reflections on violence), the ambi-
guity as Mehrdeutigkeit is already suggested by the historico-philosophic or crit-
ical approach to an ultimate lack in myth of a certain kind of Mehrdeutigkeit. 
Perhaps particularly the latter ambiguity, which prevents mythic identifications, 
makes questionable the view that ambiguity is fairly straightforwardly supposed 
to be overcome or transcended (not simply by the Messiah but already) by Ben-
jamin’s philosophic critique.34 In his writings and notes on Kafka, he refers to an 
unlocking of the ambiguity that is Mehrdeutigkeit – in Benjamin’s words, a “folie 
d’interpretation,”35 a potential for “reflections [Überlegungen] that reach no 
33 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 242–243; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 
II:1,189–190.
34 For this view that Benjamin conceives of philosophy as transcending ambiguity, see Eli Fried-
lander, Walter Benjamin: A Philosophical Portrait, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2012, 
21–22, 117–120. As noted above, Benjamin sometimes encourages this view of philosophy; even 
so, it seems a confusion to consider all multiplicity of meaning as something that Benjamin al-
ways identifies with mythic ambiguity. See Friedlander, but also Alison Ross, “The Distinction 
between Mythic Violence and Divine Violence: Walter Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’ from the 
Perspective of ‘Goethe’s Elective Affinities,’” in New German Critique 41.1 (2014): 93–120, 112, 113, 
118, 120.
35 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1229 Ms. 297,
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end.”36 In a preparatory note towards his Kafka essay, Benjamin writes in point 
form: “The gestural/ambiguity [Vieldeutigkeit]/renunciation of rationalizabili-
ty.”37 For instance, when he considers shame to be the prevailing historico-phil-
osophic gesture of Kafka’s writings, it is shame about myth and its would-be 
resolutions – rationalizations – of life. The latter sort of resolution is conveyed 
in the Elective Affinities essay, which includes not just reference to ambiguity 
(Doppelsinn, Zweideutigkeit) that mythically seals against philosophic investi-
gation,38 but also an identification of the mythic spell as panarchic – as a claim 
to all-encompassing authority.39 Philosophic ambiguity renders such panarchism 
questionable, and Benjamin’s Kafka presents such potential for questioning, as 
does in turn Benjamin’s criticism.
In this context, Kafka’s “ambiguity” (Zweideutigkeit) of gesture becomes 
important, as Theodor Adorno recognizes in his first response to Benjamin’s 
Kafka essay of 1934. For Adorno, the “ambiguity” (Zweideutigkeit) is between, on 
one hand, “sinking into muteness” and, on the other, sound – “music.” Kafka’s 
expression does not rise entirely above the sinking into muteness that indicates 
“the destruction of language” in modernity.40 Adorno’s terminology is not entirely 
Benjaminian, and it is concerned simply with the tension of an antithetically 
twofold pressure (the conflict of muteness and sound), but it might also indicate 
Adorno’s sense that ambiguity of a sort is central to Benjamin’s reading of Kafka 
and to Kafka’s writings themselves. This ambiguity – this conflict of muteness and 
the will to expression – is not simply mythic. The mythic would end or somehow 
cloak the conflict; to emphasize the ambiguous conflict would be philosophic.
At least for those aspects of Benjamin’s work that have been stressed here, 
to claim to accomplish something entirely beyond ambiguity would be a forced 
closure; it would be mythic. As indicated in the previous remarks on mythic 
ambiguity, the latter serves to cloak or to assert dominance. There is the first kind 
of ambiguity mentioned previously: a myth seeks to enclose but cannot; it may 
even, in specific cases, find itself well opposed by philosophic momentum. Inte-
36 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2, 802 (translation modified); Benjamin, Gesammelte 
Schriften, Vol. II:2, 420.
37 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1207.
38 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 314, 335; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I:1, 
147, 174–175.
39 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 1, 317; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:1, 151.
40 Theodor W. Adorno, letter of 17 December 1934, in Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benja-
min, The Complete Correspondence 1928–1940, trans. Nicholas Walker, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge 1999, 70; Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, Briefwechsel 1928–1940 [Corre-
spondence 1928–1940], ed. Henri Lonitz, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1994, 95.
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gral to this historico-philosophic – anti-mythic – momentum must be, however, 
that it not presume to transcend all ambiguity. To do so would be to succumb to 
the kind of resolution that Benjamin identifies as mythic. It would be to succumb 
to the kind of resolution that Benjamin criticizes in certain “‘theological’” out-
looks, such as Max Brod’s, regarding Kafka’s writings: outlooks in which Kafka 
is portrayed as terribly certain, to the point that Benjamin refers to the attempt 
to cast Kafka’s works into a “Weltanschauung.”41 The philosophic is no Weltan-
schauung. Part of the ongoing crisis of philosophy is the ongoing ambiguity of 
life – including the Mehrdeutigkeit of life – in its confrontation with the court that 
would deny, disregard, or suppress such ambiguity.
The ambiguity is twofold, and philosophy is an exercise in showing this. First, 
there is the ambiguity of myth: myth asserts control, or all-encompassing truth, 
but this assertion is more ambiguous than is admitted. Philosophy exposes this 
ambiguity of myth; it makes clear that myth’s self-acclamations are practices of 
concealment. Second, there is the ambiguity that is philosophic: the “Mehrdeu-
tigkeit” that myth discounts or denies. The philosophic impetus demonstrates 
that myth is not all-encompassing (this is the first presented ambiguity); the 
impetus thereby opens the situation to Mehrdeutigkeit (the second ambiguity). 
Although Benjamin does not always concede this, the second ambiguity persists 
even where – in the name of philosophy or something else – it is thought that a 
paradox, a straightforward opposition to the mythic, has been attained. In his 
writings on Kafka, Benjamin seems close to admitting the intrusion of ambiguity 
upon paradox. 
3  Ambiguity Intrudes upon Absolute Paradox 
There are many different kinds of paradox, and it may not be claimed that ambi-
guity in paradox always works in the manner stated here. In Benjamin’s work, 
however, at least some paradoxes are addressed along these lines. In the Trau-
erspiel book, he discusses the theological “paradox” of the “unity of the sensory 
41 Walter Benjamin, review of Brod’s Franz Kafka, in Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 
317–319; Walter Benjamin, Kritiken und Rezensionen [Criticism and Reviews], ed. Heinrich Kau-
len, Volume 13 of Werke und Nachlaß, Kritische Gesamtausgabe [Works and Posthumous Writ-
ings, Critical Edition], eds. Christoph Gödde and Henri Lonitz with the Walter Benjamin Archive, 
Suhrkamp, Berlin 2011, 569–573. See too: letter of 12 June 1938 to Scholem, in Benjamin, The 
Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 560–566; Benjamin, Gesammelte Briefe, Vol. VI, 106–114.
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and the supersensory object,”42 but even this unity entails ambiguity. Whereas 
Hermann Cohen is scandalized by ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit and Mehrdeutigkeit 
alike) in baroque allegory, Benjamin opposes Cohen’s expectation of “‘purity and 
unity of meaning.’”43 In Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book and other writings, there 
are other references to paradox, which likely have many different implications. 
These references cannot all be addressed here. No paradox figures, however, 
as explicitly in Benjamin’s material on Kafka as does Kierkegaard’s absolute 
paradox. Thus, at least aspects of the topic of ambiguity in paradox may perhaps 
be illustrated by discussing some of Benjamin’s reservations about Kierkegaard’s 
absolute paradox. 
The confluence of the absolute (God) and the particular is an absolute paradox 
for Kierkegaard. If one “is to receive any true knowledge about the Unknown (the 
God),” Kierkegaard claims, one “must be made to know that it is unlike” oneself, 
“absolutely unlike” oneself. True knowledge requires knowing the Unknown as 
absolutely different from anything one knows.44 The paradox is that “the individ-
ual as particular can,” nonetheless, “stand in an absolute relation to the abso-
lute.”45
In response, one version of Benjamin’s Kafka essay includes the claim that 
each of Kafka’s novels and stories is “a victory over Kierkegaard’s paradox.”46 
In a draft, Benjamin refers simply to “[t]he victory over paradox.”47 In part this 
claim is based on Benjamin’s Adorno-inspired rejection of the “mythological” 
substrates in Kierkegaard’s paradox.48 These substrates enable Kierkegaard to 
envision, and to urge, an unmediated relation with the absolute. Benjamin finds 
in Kafka’s writings a tacit rebuttal of Kierkegaard’s quest. Part of this rebuttal 
involves discussion of Abraham in much more profane terms than is proposed in 
42 Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, 160 (translation modified); Benjamin, 
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I:1, 336.
43 Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, 176–177; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, 
Vol. I:1, 353. Cf. Hermann Cohen, Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls [Aesthetics of Pure Feeling], Vol. 2, 
eds. Hermann-Cohen-Archiv under Helmut Holzhey, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim 1982, 305. 
44 Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments [Philosophiske Smuler eller En Smule Philosophi], 
trans. David Swenson and Howard V. Hong, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1974, 57. 
45 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling [Frygt og Bæven], trans. Alastair Hannay, Penguin Books, 
London 1985, 137.
46 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1268.
47 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1210.
48 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1268.
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the bible or by Kierkegaard.49 An attempt has been made elsewhere to examine 
this.50 The following discussion will therefore simply outline ways in which Ben-
jamin’s “Kafkan” critique of Kierkegaard’s paradox takes impetus from Adorno 
but transforms this impetus into quite distinct conceptions of ambiguity and 
paradox, and thereby into quite distinct conceptions of literature and philosophy.
In Adorno’s book on Kierkegaard (published in 1931), which influenced Ben-
jamin’s views on Kierkegaard, it is argued that Kierkegaard’s paradox is “ambig-
uous” (zweideutig). Ambiguous nature is not redeemed or transcended but is 
always intruding.51 Adorno adds that “truth becomes ambiguous [zweideutig] 
as the quintessence [Inbegriff] of the dialectical movement without becoming 
its measure [Maß].”52 As is known, Adorno greatly wished that Benjamin would 
write in a more thoroughly dialectical way.53 For some of Benjamin’s writing, 
the absolute and the non-absolute exist, in relation to each other, in thorough 
ambiguity; this may render ambiguity even more a measure in philosophy than 
Adorno would concede.54 For Benjamin, this possibility is conveyed in Kafka’s 
literature and articulated in Benjamin’s own philosophic criticism. 
49 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1268–1269; Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2, 
807–808; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:2, 427. See Franz Kafka, Briefe. 1902–1924 [Let-
ters. 1902–1924], ed. Max Brod, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1983, 333–334.
50 For remarks on Abraham in relation to Kafka, Kierkegaard, and Benjamin, see Brendan 
Moran, “Anxiety and Attention,” in Philosophy and Kafka, eds. Brendan Moran and Carlo Salza-
ni, Lexington Books, Lanham 2013, 201–227, especially 208–213. 
51 Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1989, 72–73; Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Kon-
struktion des Ästhetischen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1974, 130–133. 
52 Adorno, Kierkegaaard, 73/132.
53 Adorno, letter of 17 December 1934, in The Complete Correspondence, 69; Adorno, Briefwech-
sel, 93. This is a variation of a criticism of Benjamin’s writings that Adorno continued to make 
for decades after Benjamin’s death. See: Theodor W. Adorno, “Introduction to Benjamin’s Schrif-
ten,” trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, in On Walter Benjamin. Critical Essays and Recollections, ed. 
Gary Smith, The MIT Press, Cambridge 1988, 7; Theodor W. Adorno, Über Walter Benjamin, ed. 
Rolf Tiedemann, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1990, 39. Also see Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialec-
tics, trans. E.B. Ashton, Continuum, New York 1973, 53; Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1966, 62.
54 Even Adorno remarks on the paradox of Benjamin’s impossible quest to have enlightenment 
and mysticism entirely unite. This impossibility leads to an immersion in multiplicity: “It was 
nothing other than the explication and elucidation of this paradox, with the only means which 
philosophy has at its disposal, concepts, that drove Benjamin to immerse himself without re-
serve in multiplicity [ins Mannigfalte]” (Theodor W. Adorno, “A Portrait of Walter Benjamin” 
[1950], in Prisms: Cultural Criticism and Society, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber, The MIT Press, 
 Philosophy and Ambiguity in Benjamin’s Kafka   59
In his Kafka essay of 1934, Benjamin takes issue with various Kierkegaard-
ian readings of Kafka. Willy Haas claims that “the upper power, the realm of 
grace” is depicted by Kafka in The Castle [Das Schloss], and that “the power 
below, the realm of the court and of damnation” is addressed in The Trial. In 
Amerika (now known as The Missing Person), Kafka tries to convey “[t]he earth 
between the two, […] earthly fate and its arduous demands.” Haas contends that 
Kafka’s writings are fundamentally religious, and that works such as The Castle 
are concerned with God’s “awful” playing with the human being. For Haas, the 
latter motif is a Kierkegaardian-Pascalian one in which the human is somehow 
generically “always wrong” before an ultimately benign “God.”55 Benjamin 
thinks Max Brod is the spur for such a reading. Also following this Brodian train 
of thought, he contends, is Bernard Rang, who refers to the Castle as “the seat 
of grace” making “the vain efforts and attempts mean, theologically speaking, 
that God’s grace cannot be attained or forced by the human willfully and delib-
erately. Unrest and impatience only impede and confound the exalted stillness of 
the divine.”56 Expressly against Haas’s theological reading, however, Benjamin 
stresses that The Castle provides no indication of a forgiving, omnipotent author-
ity; rather, The Castle suggests the lack of such authority. “‘For is an individual 
official capable of granting pardon?’ we read in The Castle. ‘At most this might 
be a matter for the administration as a whole, but even it can probably not grant 
forgiveness, but only judge.’”57 These judgements are ambiguous in the mythic – 
the first – sense outlined above: their claims to all-encompassing authority are 
patently questionable. In the context of Kierkegaard’s paradox, it might be said 
that the particulars do not imply a stillness of the divine to which the particulars 
can open. Permeating the paradox – permeating the opposition to the prevailing 
doxa  – is, moreover, the second ambiguity, the Mehrdeutigkeit, that cannot be 
expunged from experience.
In a preparatory note, Benjamin writes that Kafka’s “monstrosities” have 
their “origin” in “ambiguous [(z)weideutige] connections,” which emerge in “the 
forgotten” (das Vergessene).58 This “forgotten” is not simply something we forgot 
Cambridge 1997, 227–241 241; Theodor W. Adorno, “Charakteristik Walter Benjamins,” in Prismen. 
Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1987, 248–249). 
55 Willy Haas, Gestalten der Zeit [Figures of the Age], Kiepenheuer, Berlin 1930, 175–177.
56 Bernard Rang, “Franz Kafka. Versuch eines Hinweises” (“Franz Kafka. Attempt at a Sugges-
tion”), in Die Schildgenossen 12 (1932): 115–116, 107–119.
57 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2, 806–807; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:1, 
425–426. See Franz Kafka, The Castle, trans. Mark Harman, Schocken Books, New York 1998, 216; 
Franz Kafka, Das Schloß, ed. Malcolm Pasley, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 2002, 339–340.
58 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1240.
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and could conceivably remember; rather, it is above all something that can be 
remembered only as forgotten, as irretrievable for consciousness. This element 
in Benjamin’s reading of Kafka has provoked many conflicting accounts, and 
(as noted) attempts have been made to elaborate why (notwithstanding Benja-
min’s own contradictory statements about it) there is at least occasional basis 
in Benjamin’s writings on Kafka for reading “the forgotten” as an epic Vorwelt 
that pierces, prevails over, and remains unsubmissive to the world-encompass-
ing claims of myth.59 This Vorwelt is with us but eludes us; it offers no panarchy. 
It renders ambiguous everything we might perceive or conceive about anything. 
Kafka’s monstrosities emerging from ambiguity are not anathema to the philo-
sophic in literature; instead, they indicate what is essential for it. They demon-
strate that myth is not all-encompassing (the first ambiguity), and they thereby 
open to Mehrdeutigkeit (the second ambiguity).
There is no opening by freedom to a divine Nothing (Kierkegaard’s God). This 
element in Kierkegaard’s absolute paradox is especially refused by Benjamin. In 
a note to the 1934 essay, he even claims that the word “God” does not appear 
in Kafka’s writings60 – an exaggeration, of course.61 Benjamin does not consider 
anxiety in Kafka’s texts to be the Kierkegaardian catalyst to fearless freedom 
for the divine. He acknowledges that Kafkan anxiety is not, like fear, simply “a 
reaction.” He also refers, however, to the Doppelgesichtigkeit, the ambivalence 
or two-sidedness, of “the Kafkan anxiety.” This might suggest that the Kafkan 
anxiety is not quite able to be transformed into Kierkegaardian anxiety, which 
potentially opens to resolute freedom from aesthetic-sensuous or moral con-
straints.62 The two-sidedness of Kafkan anxiety seems to be that it may have moti-
59 See note 23 above. 
60 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1214.
61 In “The Metamorphosis” (“Die Verwandlung”), for instance, Gregor’s father greets the news 
that Gregor is dead with the remark: “Now […] we can thank God” (Franz Kafka, The Metamor-
phosis, trans. and ed. Stanley Corngold, Norton Critical Edition, Norton, New York 1996, 40; 
Franz Kafka, “Die Verwandlung,” in Drucke zu Lebzeiten [Works Published During His Lifetime], 
eds. Wolf Kittler, Hans-Gerd Koch, and Gerhard Neumann, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 2002, 113–200, 
195). In the writings by Kafka that Benjamin had read, there are various such references to God.
62 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1196. For this view of the two-sidedness of anxiety, 
Benjamin claims to be following Willy Haas’s interpretation of the Kafkan anxiety. Benjamin 
wrote for Die Literarische Welt, which Haas edited, so perhaps he is referring to a conversation 
with Haas, whom he saw regularly in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Howard Eiland and Michael 
W. Jennings, Walter Benjamin. A Critical Life, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2014, 323, 
368). There is, however, no such characterization of Kafka’s Angst in Haas’s Gestalten der Zeit, 
which is the work by Haas mentioned in Benjamin’s writings and notes on Kafka. See Haas, Ge-
stalten der Zeit, 172–199, where Haas – as noted – interprets Kafka through Kierkegaard. The only 
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vation to such freedom yet simultaneously may be somewhat embroiled in fears 
associated with demands of the senses and of the moral order.63 In Benjamin’s 
Kafka, there tends indeed to be anxiety on behalf of the nothing that eludes but 
also constitutes all particulars; however, this anxiety is so intermingled with very 
particular fears that it remains insurmountably ambiguous. For instance, Kafka 
expresses the wish to unite mundane activity – such as hammering – with the 
nothing that is the possibility for something to be useful. This wish is portrayed 
by Kafka, and in turn by Benjamin, as “‘only a defense, an embourgeoisement of 
the nothing, an air of cheerfulness [Munterkeit], that he wants to give the noth-
ing.’”64 For Kierkegaard, too, the “relation of anxiety to its object, to something 
that is nothing […] is altogether ambiguous.”65 Anxiety does not, as unambigu-
ous freedom might, entirely surmount pressures of physicality, customs, laws, 
and morals.66 Yet this anxiety can, for Kierkegaard, awaken us to unambiguous 
freedom, to “freedom’s possibility.”67 In contrast, Benjamin’s Kafkan anxiety is 
so ambiguous that it does not open to freedom entirely transcending physicality 
or legal-moral influences.68 The interpenetration of absolute and particular – the 
other work by Haas mentioned in Benjamin’s Kafka materials is a contribution to a Festschrift for 
Max Brod’s fiftieth birthday; the contribution is a discussion of the friendship between Brod and 
Kafka, and does not address Angst (Willy Haas, “Auslegung eines Aktes der Freundschaft” (“In-
terpretation of an Act of Friendship”), in Dichter, Denker, Helfer: Max Brod zum 50. Geburtstag 
[Poet, Thinker, Helper: On the Occasion of Max Brod’s Fiftieth Birthday], ed. Felix Weltsch, Verlag 
von Julius Kittls Nachfolger, Keller & Co., Mähr.-Ostrau 1934, 67–73). In a short “Bibliography on 
Kafka,” Benjamin informally lists this essay by Haas (Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 
1247).
63 For elaboration, see Brendan Moran, “Anxiety and Attention,” 201–227.
64 Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 2, 813–814; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:2, 
434–436; Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. II:3, 1243. Quoting Franz Kafka, Tagebücher [Dia-
ries], eds. Hans-Gerd Koch, Michael Müller, and Malcolm Pasley, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1992, 855. 
Concerning the role of “the nothing” in Benjamin’s Kafka writings, see the section on “Use of 
nothing” in Brendan Moran, “Foolish Wisdom in Benjamin’s Kafka,” in Lachen – Ost und West / 
Laughter – Eastern and Western Philosophies, eds. Hans-Georg Möller and Günter Wohlfart, Ver-
lag Karl Alber, Freiburg and Munich 2010, 175–192, 183–187.
65 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety [Begrebet Angest], trans. and ed. Reider Thomte 
with Albert B. Anderson, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1981, 42–43.
66 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 109; Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death [Syg-
dommen til Døden], trans. Alistair Hannay, Penguin Books, London 1989, 60. 
67 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 42–43.
68 For elaboration, see Moran, “Anxiety and Attention.”
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Nothing and the something – is such that Kafka enters into ambiguity that under-
mines the absolute paradox.69
This interpenetration is a philosophic movement of the two ambiguities: it 
shows mythic claims to transcendence to be ambiguous (in not accomplishing 
what they claim), and thereby unlocks ambiguity as Mehrdeutigkeit. In many 
respects, Benjamin’s work is an effort to revitalize this philosophic motion, this 
complementarity of literature and philosophy. In this complementarity, literature 
provides openly singular cases that break through mythic denial of ambiguity. 
Literature shows myth unable to conceal the ambiguity whereby its claims to 
closure and resolution are rebuffed. With this rebuffing of closure and resolution 
comes an opening to another ambiguity: the Mehrdeutigkeit that figures so prom-
inently in Kafka. In the reception of the literary work, philosophy revitalizes this 
two-fold engagement with ambiguity and is itself reminded of the inextinguisha-
ble singularity that literature brings to the fore.
4  Concluding Words
Against aspects of Benjamin’s outlook, and in disagreement with some of his 
readers, this essay has drawn upon features of his work to note a distinct comple-
mentarity of ambiguity and the philosophic. As opposition to prevailing opinion 
(doxa), Benjaminian philosophic paradox involves at least two kinds of ambi-
guity: it points to life as embroiled in myths that have only ambiguous claims to 
closure or transcendence; and it opens to the ensuing ambiguity as Mehrdeutig-
keit – the lack of a credibly all-encompassing interpretation. This two-fold ambi-
guity seems to be a basis for Benjamin’s disagreement with Kierkegaard’s abso-
lute paradox. And this disagreement may extend further. Perhaps other kinds of 
paradox, including some of Benjamin’s own, are permeated by the two kinds of 
ambiguity discussed in this essay. At least as the confrontation of the universal – 
that is, philosophic – impetus with myth itself, philosophy involves a paradox – a 
69 Several decades ago, Heinz Politzer remarked that Kafka’s works may be full of paradoxes of 
many sorts, but precisely these often depend on an “abundance” of ambiguities (Heinz Politzer, 
Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox, Cornell University Press, Cornell 1966, 22). In an essay from 
the 1970s in American Imago, Stanley Hopper provides an assessment that might be even closer 
to Benjamin’s: “Kierkegaard wants to resolve […] ambiguity by way of […] the Great Contradiction, 
or ‘Paradox,’” “whereas Kafka leads us into the place where we see that everything that lies 
before us is ambiguous” (Stanley Romaine Hopper, “Kafka and Kierkegaard: The Function of 
Ambiguity,” in American Imago 35:1/2 (1978): 92–105, 102).
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para-dox – that, on one hand, reveals the ambiguity unacknowledged by myth: 
the ambiguity of a claim to all-encompassing truth, the ambiguity that shows 
this claim not to be all-encompassing. On the other hand, the paradox – as con-
frontation that would be an assertion of universality against mythic constraint – 
finds itself confronted with the second ambiguity: the Mehrdeutigkeit that cannot 
be entirely expunged from the attempt at paradox. In a way, the Mehrdeutigkeit 
recalls the oblique singularity that no claim to universality can entirely eradicate. 
Philosophy must acknowledge, and thereby recognize, its own literary character: 
the singularity that rebuffs mythic containment by recognizing the ambiguity of 
such containment, and that thereby conveys life as mehrdeutig.
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Søren Rosendal
The Logic of the “Swamp World”:  
Hegel with Kafka on the Contradiction of 
Freedom
1  Introduction: A Shared Contradiction
What could Hegel and Kafka possibly have in common except for the fact that 
they have nothing in common? Is Kafka not the literary custodian of the last 
dying breaths of the singular subject faced with an impenetrable and inhuman 
system; and is not Hegel exactly the philosophical architect who composes this 
impenetrable and inhuman system whose rigid universality always threatens to 
“swallow up” the singular subject? I want to argue, in the course of this article, 
that nothing could be further from the truth.
In a highly enthusiastic letter to Walter Benjamin dated 11 December 1934 
Theodor Adorno comments at length on Benjamin’s reading of Kafka. Within 
a surprising parenthesis Adorno notes: “though you are probably not aware of 
it, there are some astonishingly close connections between Hegel and this work 
[Benjamin’s manuscript on Franz Kafka].”1 This is – to my knowledge – one of 
the only places where Hegel and Kafka have been uttered positively in the same 
passage. But even here the connection is, as Adorno notes, not consciously made.
In the present text I will try to bring the connection between Kafka and Hegel 
out of the dark. Of course, many connections cannot be drawn here or explored 
in full,2 so I will limit myself to some notes on the point where they intersect. 
1 Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, The Complete Correspondence 1928–1940, ed. Henri 
Lonitz, trans. Nicholas Walker, Polity Press, Cambridge 1999, 68.
2 I hope to have the occasion to remedy this in a planned future monograph tentatively and 
allusively called Hegel with Kafka.
I would like to thank Frank Ruda for his many sharp comments and helpful suggestions for this 
article. Unfortunately, I could do justice to only some of his comments; otherwise the article 
would have been at least twice as long. Also many thanks to the Antwerp editors – Professor 
Vivian Liska and Jeremy Schreiber – for their careful reading of the draft of the article. Last but 
not least thanks to the organizers and participants of the wonderful 2012 conference Kafka 
and the Paradox of the Universal at the University of Antwerp for all the comments on a much 
different and earlier manuscript of this article that I presented there. The comments by Stanley 
Corngold and Vivian Liska on Kafka especially echoed in my mind while writing this article.
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The point of what could be called their “underground” affinity is, maybe sur-
prisingly, the problem of freedom. This affinity takes the form of a contradiction 
around which this text will revolve. Of course, on their respective textual sur-
faces the style and temperament of each offer little common ground, but para-
doxically what they share is also indicative of their difference. Kafka is to Hegel as 
the inside of a mask is to the face of the mask: the face within looks nothing like 
the one outside, and there are hardly any recognizable features; yet without this 
“distorted” negative interior the positive exterior would not be able to show itself. 
Formulated otherwise: what seems like a distortion, i.e., the inside of the mask, is 
also the very possibility of the face of the mask. 
I will approach the question of freedom in a “phenomenological” way, using 
this word in its strict Hegelian sense, meaning to unfold the experience of a nec-
essary logic or structure of possibility via negativa, i.e., by its absence or distor-
tion or breakdown. Hegel himself often used literary allusions, from Sophocles to 
Diderot to the Romantics, to show how these negative moments are played out; 
thus, drawing on Kafka is more in Hegel’s spirit than it might prima facie appear. 
For Hegel the positive emerges from the negative. Hegel’s way to show how some-
thing is possible is to show informative failed attempts of realizing this possibil-
ity. The same approach could be applied to Kafka: despite initial appearances, his 
aporetic worlds do not end in nothing, but, perhaps not evident to Kafka himself, 
they negatively outline a logic of possibility. However, this logic remains in a state 
of perpetual tension as a kind of irresolvable contradiction. This is where Hegel 
enters the scene, since his logic exactly endeavors to hold fast to contradiction, 
and by holding it fast he thereby extrapolates the necessity at the heart of the 
contradiction. This happens by the “sublation” (Aufhebung) of contradiction, 
meaning to surpass, to preserve, and to bring our comprehension of the contra-
diction to a new level. In short: to see the contradiction as productive. It means 
that the negative contradiction is itself a positive structure of reality. In Kafka, 
as mentioned, these contradictions are held in suspense; they are not sublated 
but perpetuated. The point of the inherent inescapability of the contradiction is 
where Kafka and Hegel intersect, and this will therefore be our point of departure. 
What is needed for the transition from Kafka to Hegel is to see in impossibility the 
(negatively traced) outline of a possibility.3
3 This kind of formulation is reminiscent of (and indebted to) Derrida’s notion of conditions of 
possibility as conditions of impossibility. What distinguishes my approach from the Derridean 
one is that I reject the ideal of purity implied with the “impossibility.” Instead, all possibility 
is double-edged: the structure that makes X possible also depends on non-X (instead of: what 
makes X possible also makes X [as pure, ideal, in itself] impossible). The Hegelian approach is 
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Simply stated, the contradiction is that the structure of freedom is the same 
as the structure of non-freedom. What will be presented here is the same virtual 
structure,4 but seen simultaneously from both the perspective of its negative 
expression in Kafka and its more positive expression in Hegel. Stating the matter 
in the most simple way we can say that the fault line in this contradiction is 
between the subject and the object, where the object is the space of actions and 
the subject the agent. It is a contradiction because the subject is only a subject if 
it is also an object; it is also what it is not.5 The meaning of this “is” and “is not” 
will be the topic of this article.
The structure of the free subject includes the “space” wherein she is and acts. 
There is no subjectivity without an objective space (“objective” here does not 
necessarily mean true, but simply what is the opposite of the subject – includ-
ing other subjects). These two sides cannot be held in abstract separation. They 
co-emerge, so to speak, but irreducibly so, neither completely embedded in nor 
completely isolated from each other. Any action is not just an action exclusively 
because of the agent, but equally because of the space of action. The world where 
the subject finds herself is more than an empty space inhabited by objects and 
other subjects. It is a space of possible and impossible actions, a space that 
“responds,” and the status of an action depends on this “response.” This space 
is both necessary for the production of any action and also the possibility of the 
destruction of any action. In Kafka, this space is never clearly structured, and the 
objective side of the action is never symmetrical to its subjective agent. The sym-
metry between inner (subjective) and outer (objective) is constantly suspended 
and distorted, and yet it is by this very distortion and tension that we see their 
mutual and original connection. 
I have termed the negative side of this tension, via Benjamin, the “swamp 
world.” But it must be remembered that this negative side is also the condition for 
to think the irreducible interpenetration of X and non-X without abstraction (or negatively: to 
show the collapse of abstraction into concretion, i.e. interpenetration). There is no impossible 
transcendent ideal, only the real immanent tension. The impossible ideal is an ideology pro-
duced by adherence to a purist idée fixe that this interpenetration is a compromise of a pure 
transcendent X-in-itself.
4 I borrow this term from Gilles Deleuze’s 1967 text “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?” (“À 
quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme”) in Desert Islands and Other Texts 1953–1974 [L’ile deserte 
et autres texts, textes et entretiens], ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina, Semiotext(e), 
Los Angeles 2004, 170–192.
5 Note that for Hegel this is only a contradiction within the discourse of what he calls Verstand 
(understanding) whereas the discourse of Vernunft (reason) is precisely characterized by the fea-
ture that it can think through apparent contradictions.
 The Logic of the “Swamp World”: Hegel with Kafka on the Contradiction of Freedom    69
the positive side. This is the main argument presented here. In his “Franz Kafka: 
On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death” (“Franz Kafka: Zur zehnten Wiederkehr 
seines Todestages”) – the essay that Adorno had read with such enthusiasm – 
Benjamin notes that
Kafka did not consider the age in which he lived as an advance over the beginnings of time. 
His novels are set in a swamp world. […] The fact that it is now forgotten does not mean that 
it does not extend into the present. On the contrary: it is actual by virtue of this very obliv-
ion. An experience deeper than that of an average person can make contact with it. “I have 
experience,” we read in one of Kafka’s earliest notes, “and I am not joking when I say that it 
is a seasickness on dry land.”6 (Emphasis added.)
In the present text I hope to bring to light and out of forgetfulness the logic of 
the “swamp world” from “the beginnings of time” as something that outlines 
the negative structure of freedom, and as something that is, as Benjamin says, 
hidden in its very actualization.
There is also a “swamp world” in Hegel, a primordial natural world whose 
fundamental concepts extend to the present world. It is a world where both the 
preservation and destruction of an enduring discontinuous “shape” of a living 
being depends on the continuity or “fluidity” of this shape with its environment. 
The argument I present will be that the move from Kafka to Hegel requires only 
a slight shift in perspective, and that performing this shift will illuminate essen-
tial aspects of each figure that are otherwise easily overlooked. In reading Hegel, 
there is often excessive emphasis on the “resolution” of contradiction, such that 
it is forgotten that in the “resolution” the contradiction is preserved (remember-
ing the threefold meaning of “sublation”). Conversely, readings of Kafka typically 
overemphasize the aporetic “absurdity” of irresolvable contradictions. The Kafka 
presented in this article is not “absurd”; rather, he systematically outlines a logic, 
sometimes inadvertently, that Hegel can help extract. Kafka also brings out the 
precariousness or fragility inherent in the contradictory structure of Hegel’s con-
ceptions of freedom. It is not a matter of a dot-connecting comparison but rather 
of the effect of disclosure that both figures can exert on each other. 
Starting from the level of the swamp world, I argue against the stale opposi-
tion between Hegel as a representative of universality and Kafka as a representa-
tive of singularity. In the swamp, the universal grows into and out of the singular, 
and the singular into and out of the universal.
6 Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death,” in Illuminations, ed. 
Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, Schocken Books, New York 1968, 111–140, 130.
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A final semantic clarification before entering the main text: when “freedom” 
is juxtaposed with “un-freedom,” the latter is not equivalent with imprisonment, 
incarceration, confinement, slavery, etc. I take the relation between un-freedom 
and freedom to mean the same as the relation between inhuman and human, or 
unheimlich and heimlich, or undead and dead. “Un-freedom” is defined as the 
negative that is immanent to freedom as the very condition for actualizing pos-
itive freedom. Un-freedom is the distorted internal side of the mask, an under-
ground without depth; freedom is the external side, the surface that hides the 
underground in its actualization.
2  Shape and Fluidity: The Hegelian Swamp World
Before what is arguably the most famous part of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit 
[Phänomenologie des Geistes] – namely, the section on lordship and bondage – 
there are some strange pages that initially seem difficult to place. The overall 
chapter, the fourth of the book, is titled “The Truth of Self-Certainty” and is 
divided into two parts7; after the heading and before the first part proper begins, 
one finds some seemingly obscure preliminary pages. These pages describe 
what I will term the Hegelian Swamp World, for they concern a pre-human 
natural world reduced to its most basic constituents,8 what Hegel calls “shapes” 
(Gestalten) and “flux” or “fluidity” (Flüssigkeit or Fluidität). These concepts are 
repeated in various guises throughout Hegel’s work; in more logical terms, they 
represent important aspects of individuality or singularity (Einzelheit) and of 
universality (Allgemeinheit), respectively. Shape and fluidity are also reminiscent 
of Bataille’s distinction, in his seminal conceptualization of the erotic, between 
the discontinuous and the continuous.9 In reviewing this intersection in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology I wish to keep in mind both the logical and the erotic aspects 
while foreshadowing their relevance for reading Kafka. In short, this chapter of 
7 Part A is called “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bond-
age” and part B is called “Freedom of Self-Consciousness: Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Unhap-
py Consciousness.” 
8 Indeed, this corresponds roughly to what – in a much more unfolded version – will be He-
gel’s philosophy of nature, especially the part on organic nature (see Hegel’s Enzyklopädie der 
philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse II: Die Philosophie der Natur, §§ 337–376, Werke 
in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 9; G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Nature, Vol. I–III, trans. M.J. Petry, Unwin 
Brothers Limited, London 1970).
9 George Bataille, Eroticism [ L’Erotisme], trans. Mary Dalwood, Penguin Modern Classics, Lon-
don 2012. 
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the Phenomenology, and arguably a large part of the overall work, addresses the 
difficulty of establishing a self.10 A recurring trope of Hegel’s examination is the 
following: when the “self” experiences a loss of self (because its discontinuity 
has in some way been breached, and so has become fluid, relational, infected, 
penetrated by otherness, etc.), it is actually experiencing a necessary structure of 
its selfhood. What the “self” misperceives as a negative impediment is actually 
also11 a positive condition of it being itself.12 
Let us turn to the text. In this intersection what is staged is the difficulty of 
establishing a self within the framework of organic nature. Hegel does not start 
with individuality as a given fact; instead, he recounts its emergence from this 
primordial “idealized”13 swamp world.
Perceived most broadly, organic life can be conceptualized as that which 
Hegel calls “universal fluidity.” Everything is devouring everything: a spectacle 
of an endless circular orgiastic motion of pure continuity that breaks down any 
discrete shape into an amorphous flux of excessive life into death and death into 
life (an organism stays alive by eating another, etc.). It is “the supersession of all 
distinctions, the pure movement of axial rotation, its self-repose being an abso-
lutely restless infinity.”14 In this sense there is no enduring individual shape in 
organic nature but only a continuous destruction of shapes. Life is the flux of life. 
It is a world where no shape can assume a lasting shape, because every shape is 
superseded by another at all times. This is the flux aspect. But how do individual 
shapes come about if they are constantly “liquidated”? The answer is already in 
the question: there can be no continuous flux if there are no distinct shapes. The 
flux is thus a flux of distinctive shapes breaking down other distinctive shapes, 
wherefore flux necessarily implies its apparent opposite, namely distinctions or 
differences: “The differences, however, are just as much present as differences in 
this simple universal medium; for this universal flux has its negative nature only 
in being the supersession of them; but it cannot supersede the different moments 
10 This is of course but one aspect of the Phenomenology and cannot be reduced to this summa-
tion. It is also at the same time a “ladder” to Hegel’s philosophy proper, namely, the Logic and 
the Encyclopedia.
11 This “also” is very important, as will hopefully become clear in the remainder of the article.
12 In my thesis I have called this the logic of irreducible complicity. I cannot expand upon it here, 
due to space considerations, yet this logic is ubiquitous in the present article.
13 “Idealized” here not in an evaluative sense, but a reduction of a broad range of phenomena 
to its fundamental structural constituents and dynamics, in short: its essence. 
14 G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 3, Suhrkampf Ver-
lag, Frankfurt/M. 1970, 140; G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford 1971, 106.
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if they do not have an enduring existence [Bestehen].”15 There is no universal flux 
if there are no individual shapes by which the flux flows. If nothing endures, then 
nothing breaks down. What seemed an opposition is actually part of a more com-
plicated whole that makes both sides of the opposition (namely, flux and distinct 
shape) possible. 
The same is also true from the other side: the singular or individual shapes 
are not self-sufficient or pre-given, but are themselves necessarily constituted 
within the flux of life. The continued subsistence (Bestehen) of the particular 
shapes depends on the fluid breaking down of other shapes. To resist entropy, 
an organism must “extract” the negative entropy of another organism. To con-
tinue its survival it must “assimilate” another organism. To remain closed, as an 
enduring “shape,” it must be open, that is, “fluid.” For each shape to be, it must 
be in a constant metabolism – the shape is a shape only if it is permeable, a mem-
brane. This is also clear from sexual activities that always involve some transgres-
sion of bodily discontinuity, whether inwards or outwards. Generally speaking, a 
“shape” is a closed singular system only as a function of being open and becom-
ing locally de-singularized (qua open to otherness).
This tensional unity between shape and flux – at this early point in Hegel’s 
text – outlines the beginning of the contradictory structure of possibility for any 
individuality as such. In nature, a shape can affirm itself only through the nega-
tion of another shape, paradigmatically by consuming it, thereby perpetuating 
the flux of life. Because of this flux the shape cannot sustain a stable individ-
uality, yet this individuality-destroying flux is also the condition for individu-
ality, since the subsistence of one depends on the destruction of another. Not 
just meaning that one organism must die to give energy to another organism’s 
survival. But the surviving organism must make itself fluid or continuous with 
something other which is not itself proper in order to be itself: “This independ-
ence of the shape appears as something determinate, for an other, for the shape 
is divided within itself; and the supersession [das Aufheben] of this dividedness 
accordingly takes place through an other. But this supersession is just as much 
within the shape itself, for it is just that flux that is the substance of the independ-
ent shapes.”16 At this level the independence of one shape depends on the shape 
negating the independence of another. What Hegel is trying to show is that any 
kind of independence depends on otherness, even at this primitive stage where 
independence means (1) dependence on the other through the destructive assim-
ilation of the other, and (2) the transgression of the very boundary of the self that 
15 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 140; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 106.
16 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 140–141; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 107.
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is paradoxically perpetuated by this very transgression. This complex logic Hegel 
extracts from the apparently simple phenomena of living organisms eating other 
living organisms.
The contradiction at this point can be stated simply: that which breaks down 
an individual shape – namely, fluidity – is also what sustains it: “Its self-given 
unity with itself is just that fluidity of the differences or their general dissolution. 
But, conversely, the supersession of individual existence is equally the production 
of it.”17 The point is that the individuality of the shape is produced in the univer-
sal fluidity itself and not in opposition to it: “this dividedness of the differenceless 
fluid medium is just what establishes individuality […] and the dissolution of the 
splitting-up is just as much a splitting-up and a forming of members [Glieder].”18 
The individual shape is the condition for the universal flux and the universal flux 
is the condition for the individual shape. The process of this tension is what Hegel 
terms “desire.”
This logic of the tensions in the Hegelian “swamp world” also gets to the 
heart of the Kafkan “swamp world.” In each, the world is foreign or alien to the 
individual yet at the same time essential and necessary. What is characteristic at 
this point in Hegel is that individuality is abstract: it sees all that is not it as being 
fundamentally opposed to it. There can be no continuity between “it” and what 
is “not it” (which is, broadly speaking, the others and the world, or the Umwelt). 
It can thus affirm itself only by negating what is not itself. But this negation, as 
noted earlier, is also a continuity with the other, albeit a destructive one; it must 
consume, internalize, the other for its own proper subsistence, and therefore it is 
fundamentally dependent on the other. For a discontinuous living being there is 
thus no way to “escape” continuity; it is only through continuity that discontinu-
ity is possible, and only through discontinuity that continuity is possible. 
Before Hegel finally proceeds to the famous chapter on lordship and bondage, 
there is a transitional passage that foreshadows what will emerge in the later 
developments. Due to restrictions in scope I will select only a few points from the 
argumentations and expand on their significance. In this passage, Hegel writes 
the famous “contradictory” proposition19: “‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is ‘I.’”20 
17 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 142–143; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 108.
18 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 142; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 108. (Glider could 
also, perhaps more appropriately in this local context, be translated as sections, divisions, or 
parts.) 
19 These are called infinite proposition, in the sense that they breach the finitude of each term 
and that the subject and predicate circularly reverse places; they flow into and out of each other, 
and there is no point of either beginning or end: both are primordial.
20 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 145; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 111.
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This is meant to express, in a compressed proposition, the necessary continuity 
of the discontinuous “I” – not as a compromise to its being, but as a necessary 
aspect of it being itself.21 This is also why Hegel’s minimal “definition” of freedom 
is being-oneself-in-otherness,22 that is, the other is not a hindrance to my freedom, 
but an essential aspect of my freedom: “the freedom of the spirit is not just a 
being outside of the other, but rather an independence from the other achieved 
in the other.”23 
The grasping of this requires what Hegel calls a double sense,24 where indi-
viduality is not reduced but rather produced with the other, not only in discon-
tinuous opposition but also and primarily in its fluid continuity with the other. 
The double sense is meant to keep both sides in play at once without isolating 
them, without conflating them, and, importantly, without giving priority to one 
over the other. The singular “I” is constituted in the tension between the isolation 
(or abstraction) from the “We,” and the participation (or concretion) in the “We,” 
which results in the individuation through the “We.” For Hegel, to hold fast to the 
double sense is to affirm the irreducibility of the tension,25 and what I term “the 
space of action” is exactly opened by this irreducible tension. What is so remark-
able in Kafka’s work is that this tension is brought to its highest negative intensity.
Fast-forwarding through the struggle for life and death between two self-con-
sciousnesses and the subsequent hierarchization into lord and bondsman, I wish 
to highlight two aspects that can be termed “the insights of the bondsman.” The 
21 A formulation of this point would be that the individual is universal and the universal indi-
vidual.
22 See “die Freiheit ist eben dies, in seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein” (G.W.F. Hegel, 
Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse I: Die Wissenschaft der Logik, 
Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 8, Suhrkampf Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1970, 84; G.W.F. Hegel, The 
Encyclopedia Logic, trans. T.F. Gereats, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris, Hackett Publishing Com-
pany, Indianapolis 1991, 58). 
23 G.W.F. Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse III: Die Philos-
ophie des Geistes, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 10, Suhrkampf Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1970, 26; 
G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, trans. A.V. Miller, The Clarendon Press, Oxford 1971, 15. Trans-
lation completely altered. The original is as follows: “Die Freiheit des Geistes ist aber nicht bloß 
eine außerhalb des Anderen, sondern eine im Anderen errungene Unabhängigkeit vom Anderen 
[…]”
24 See “die Doppelsinnigkeit” (Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 145; Hegel, Phenomenology 
of Spirit, 111).
25 “The Concept of this its [self-consciousness’s] unity in its duplication embraces many and 
varied meanings. Its moments, then, must on the one hand be held strictly apart, and on the 
other hand must in this differentiation at the same time also be taken and known as not being 
different, or in their opposite significance” (Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 145; Hegel, Phe-
nomenology of Spirit, 111).
 The Logic of the “Swamp World”: Hegel with Kafka on the Contradiction of Freedom    75
cause of this struggle is that each part perceives otherness as inherently in oppo-
sition to itself. Any continuity is perceived as a loss of self. Neither can grasp that 
it can be itself only by also being outside of itself, in the other. Therefore it thinks 
that it must destroy this other side of itself: “its essential being is present to it 
in the form of an ‘other,’ it is outside of itself and must rid itself of its self-exter-
nality.”26 The first step beyond this abstract negation of each other is that one of 
them, succumbing to the fear of death, submits to the other. But, paradoxically, 
in the long run it is the submissive bondsman who comes out on top, because he 
has learned an important practical “philosophical” lesson that is lost on the lord 
(because the latter is, in some sense, still within nature and only able to negate 
and enjoy, or consume, objects). These lessons of the bondsman are lessons in 
fluidity. First, in surrendering to the fear of death the bondsman has lost his 
hard, abstract self-certainty, as being only a discrete and discontinuous being. 
He has seen himself from the perspective of the non-self, as potentially part of 
fluidity27: “[the bondsman] has experienced the fear of death, the absolute Lord. 
In that experience it has been internally dissolved, has trembled in every fiber of 
its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations;” 
he has experienced “the absolute fluidity of all subsistent beings [Bestehens].”28 
Yet in the terror of fluidity, there is a positive and essential lesson. He is not made 
completely fluid nor is he killed, but he has overcome his hard discontinuity; in a 
sense he has become open towards the non-self instead of trying to negate it. He 
has learned to see the “bigger picture” – his perspective has become complex and 
more concrete, beyond mere abstract negation. Thus, he has achieved a middle 
ground, or a unity, between continuity and discontinuity, and on this level new 
possibilities emerge.
The second lesson concerns his relation and continuity towards the non-self, 
the object. Because he is forced to work for the lord he must withhold gratification 
(consumption or negation of the object), and since he cannot enjoy directly he 
must form the object, preparing it for enjoyment by the lord. This opens the realm 
of formation (Bildung) through work with the object, instead of simply negating 
it: “It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in 
the independent being [of the object] its own independence [zur Anschauung 
26 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 149, Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 113.
27 The knowledge of death without the actual experience of death is what allows for a self-re-
flexivity, to think of one’s being from the perspective of one’s own non-being. This is why, for 
Hegel, the knowledge of death is also the beginning of philosophy.
28 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 153; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 117.
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des selbständigen Seins als seiner selbst].”29 Through formation of the world the 
bondsman turns it into a world of his own, a space of action that, in some way, 
corresponds to himself. Instead of seeing the world as constitutively foreign, he 
now sees the possibility of positive continuity across the negative divide between 
self and non-self, or, rather, he sees the necessity of non-self for the self, the con-
crete unity of the two. The slave gives permanency to his individuality not by 
destroying an alien world but by creating a space that reflects his individuality.30
What has been experienced is that fluidity – the continuity beyond the bonds 
of bodily or individual integrity – does not entails a necessary loss of self, but 
is also the very possibility of the self, of self-expression. What is important is 
that, because of this double-edged structure, fluidity can always go both ways. 
If the externalizing, fluid “loss” of self is the only way to be an actual self, then 
there is no pre-given self that is automatically actualized. Because otherness, 
or negativity, is essential in a positive way for the (expression of) self its being 
is always given over to a precarious yet irreducible tension between the two: I 
always express myself together with a world that is not myself (therefore it can be 
both hostile and responsive).
In Hegel, we have the double sense of going both ways at the same time, thus 
outlining the productivity of the tension, whereas in Kafka it is a sense of going no 
way, of being stuck in the pure potentiality of the tension.31 The universal fluidity 
of “the swamp world” also exhibits the minimal logic of individual self-subsist-
ence. The power of Kafka is that he is constantly “looking the negative in the 
face.”32 But Kafka loses himself in tarrying with the negative, remaining in what 
I would call an animated suspension. This results in an experience of utter pow-
erlessness (what Hegel calls despair). The infusion of Hegel in Kafka allows for 
a novel rendition of this powerlessness as something more than simply the last 
29 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 154; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 118.
30 Or, more correctly, he has learned about the potential for it, since at this point he is still re-
stricted by his position of bondage.
31 The “pure potentiality” should not be confused with Giorgio Agamben’s extremely interest-
ing treatment of pure potentiality (or impotentiality). Whereas he has a bivalent notion of pos-
sibility designating two states: the potential to be and the potential not to be, he does not seem 
interested in the question of how potentiality is actualized (rather, his whole project is exploring 
the potential of non-actualization, of impotentiality). Hegel would surely call Agamben a Beau-
tiful Soul (which is meant critically). The pure potentiality that I mention here is the (always 
ambiguous) conditions of actualization either minus actualization, or rather minus effective ac-
tualization. For more on Agamben, see his Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, ed. and 
trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1999.
32 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 36; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 19.
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word to be said on Kafka, for we can extricate the condition of freedom from the 
logic of the swamp.
3  Un-freedom in Kafka as the Condition for 
Freedom
The Kafkan un-freedom, which reveals the very conditions of freedom, is not, or 
is very rarely, intended to be thought of as imprisonment, incarceration, phys-
ical restraint, or brute force. In a note from 1920 Kafka makes this eminently 
clear: “the prisoner was actually free, he could participate in everything, nothing 
outside was lost for him, he could even leave his cage, as a matter of fact the 
bars were several meters apart, he wasn’t even captive.”33 What Kafka is noting 
is that there is a form of captivity that is constituted not by bars but by the very 
space wherein one lives, acts and thinks. A prisoner in an “open” space. And the 
same applies to freedom: it, too, is dependent on a specific form of space. There 
is a captivity that is constituted not by enclosure but by a failure in the identity 
between the subject and object, the agent and the space of action. The logic of 
this failure is what I have termed un-freedom. This logic is suspended out between 
two extremes, namely, a resigned rejection of all immanent space, as if the world 
as such is not conducive to freedom, and a belief in some transcendent space of 
pure freedom, that is impossible to reach.
In Kafka’s unfinished novels, especially The Trial [Der Prozeß] and The Castle 
[Das Schloß], the protagonists (respectively, Josef K. and K.) are slowly being 
exhausted, in the literal sense of “being emptied out,” because each is unable to 
actualize any action in the world wherein he finds himself. This is not to say that 
neither participates in the world around him; on the contrary, this is all they do, 
but their participation lacks any proper efficacy. Each is in a state of animated sus-
pension. Either nothing happens, in the sense that all that is done dissipates into 
nothing, or whatever happens is deformed, such that K. cannot recognize himself 
in the effect of his actions. It is not that there is no correspondence between the 
hero and the others, but that it is never adequate or symmetrical. It is even diffi-
cult to pinpoint this textually, since it is expressed only in the continuous circular 
frustration of both being in the world and yet not having one’s being in the world.
33 Franz Kafka, Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem Lande und andere Prosa aus dem Nachlass 
[Wedding Preparations in the Country and Other Prose from the Estate], Fischer Taschenbuch Ver-
lag, Frankfurt/M. 1983, 216 (my translation). 
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Throughout the unfinished novels the reader experiences this tension, mainly 
in the form of various dissociations between cause and effect. This tension is not 
only about causes without effects and effects without causes; it is also about dis-
symmetry between causes and effects, belated causes, and, most importantly, 
about distortive symmetries between cause and effect (“distortive” like a face in a 
broken mirror or house of mirror-type distortions). If successful free actions occur 
within a space that structures the significance of actions, then Kafka’s world is 
one where it is not clear how or if the space is structured. This world, rather, 
seems to be completely disordered, a “swamp world [Sumpfwelt],” as Benjamin 
describes it.34 Thus, it is never clear what exactly an action means, and so there 
is no ground for K. to recognize himself in the objectivity of his actions (there is 
no stable objectivity of his actions, they are less than actions). This is why he is 
constantly in search of some (ultimately unreachable) space, be it the High Court 
or the Castle, where his words and actions would have undistorted symmetrical 
efficacy.
The Trial presents various representative parts in this respect. In the second 
chapter, K. is unable to find the examination room, which is purportedly located 
in a large, confusing housing complex for poor people. The locality itself shows 
that the space of action is unsettled. Why would juridical affairs take place in 
that place? The space of placements35 is unhinged from the outset. In order not 
to reveal that he is there for a legal hearing, or examination, K. fabricates a story 
that he is in fact looking for a carpenter called Lanz and starts going door to door 
in hope of finding the examination room. Suddenly, as if from out of nowhere, a 
washwoman pulls him into the examination room: it is a small room, packed with 
people, both on the floor and in a gallery above. The air is thick, stale, leaving K. 
almost unable to breath; the room is so crowded that he almost cannot move: a 
veritable space of non-action. The examining magistrates reproach him for being 
too late; when K. indifferently dismisses this, his words are, strangely, met with a 
roar of applause from half of the room. Moreover, when the magistrate mistakenly 
assumes that K. is a painter by trade, K.’s scornful correction of the magistrate is 
met by heartfelt laughter from the same half of the crowd. These effects give K. 
the impression that he is confronted with symmetry in a space of sympathetic 
others who recognize him as a valid agent: “When K. now started to speak, he was 
34 Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death,” 130.
35 I borrow this term, though not its complete meaning, from Alain Badiou’s Theory of the Sub-
ject [Théorie du sujet], trans. Bruno Bosteels, Continuum, London 2009. 
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convinced he was speaking for them [in ihrem Sinne zu sprechen].”36 Overeagerly 
and unsolicited, K. begins speaking from a small podium, expressing both deep 
disdain for the court system and outrage at his treatment during his arrest. His 
exalted talk is met with tense awaiting silence. At one point someone bizarrely 
screams: “Bravo! Why not? Bravo! I say bravo!”37 K. misinterprets the silence 
during his talk as evidence that his speech is holding his audience captive in deep 
interest. At the end the silence is broken by unspecified but noisy sexual activity 
between the washwoman and a man.38 K. attempts to re-establish some degree of 
order and earnestness, but nobody seems interested. Most likely, there had never 
been order to begin with; the responses from the audience had no actual signifi-
cance. K. jumps from the podium and is caught in the crowd around him; seeing 
them face to face, he now completely doubts the efficacy of his speech: “Had he 
overestimated the effect of his speech?”39 Up close, he notices that the people of 
the crowd all carry badges (Abzeichen) of the same type. Outraged that they are 
all part of the court, K. makes his way out, thinking he has achieved nothing. 
The inconsistent, ambiguous, and senseless responses from the crowd testify to 
the fluid lack of structure of this space. Because of this de-structured space, the 
symmetrical tension between cause and effect (talk and response) breaks down 
into blind causes with senseless effects. It is a swampy space, where things inter-
penetrate senselessly and without consistency; K. finds himself amidst a juridical 
orgy, a “hearing” where nothing is heard, or, rather, where it is never certain what 
is heard and what is not heard, and to what effect.
K.’s mistake is that he assumes or believes that he is not in a “swamp” but in 
an ordered setting. He talks, assuming both that his words are heard and that they 
are heard because they stem from him. What becomes apparent, however, is that 
the response from the “floor” is completely aleatory. It is not that the intended 
audience is unresponsive, but that its response is unstructured and asymmet-
rical. It is thus never clear in what space K. really finds himself. At the end, the 
space shows itself to be without any clear order, to be more interested in some 
sordid interruption than in K.’s words, to be driven by some primordial sexual 
“swamp” drive. The arrogance, or idiocy, that K. exhibits, lies in his belief that 
he is an individual agent abstractly independent of the space wherein he acts. 
36 Franz Kafka, Der Prozeß, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1983, 39; Franz Kafka, 
The Trial, trans. Mike Mitchell, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, 33.
37 Kafka, Der Prozeß, 41; Kafka, The Trial, 35.
38 The sexual nature of the act is specified in more detail in a passage crossed out by Kafka in 
his manuscript.
39 Kafka, Der Prozeß, 43–44; Kafka, The Trial, 38.
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He does not examine the space, but instead interrupts the magistrates; he does 
not enquire into their intentions, nor consider that he might even be in the wrong 
room, standing before the wrong crowd. Yet none of this seems to present itself as 
a problem for him. He is certain of himself, and affirms this by negating (uttering 
his spite for) the court. And yet: he believes in the court, for throughout the novel 
he continues searching for it, its true symmetrical core.40
Later, in the chapter titled “The Thrasher” (“Der Prügler”), K. is confronted 
with an exaggerated effect of which he is supposed to be the cause. He discovers 
the two guards who harassed him during his arrest and who were among the 
main targets of his apparently failed speech in the examination room. He finds 
them at his office in a small lumber-room, where they are about to be whipped by 
a man in a leather outfit. The space is again completely out of place. They claim 
that K. was the cause of this punishment: “Sir! We’re going to be given a thrashing 
because you complained about us to the examining magistrate.”41 Despite K.’s 
pleas and attempts at bribing him, the thrasher will not cease to inflict the physi-
cal punishment that K. has apparently caused. 
It is important to note that not only can the impotence of actions be alienat-
ing, but also too strong effects of action, akin to what Freud called “the uncanny 
effects associated with the omnipotence of thoughts, instantaneous wish-fulfill-
ment.”42 I might silently wish that my neighbor drops dead, but if it materially 
happens shortly thereafter then this would make the space of action appear too 
responsive, even to my darkest thoughts, as if by some magical power I had cir-
cumvented the strictures of “civilization,” like some telekinetic version of a wild 
animal unhindered in following its initial deadly instinct. The space becomes 
uncanny, unhomely (unheimlich): the familiarity of cause and effect breaks down, 
yet it is also homely, for it realizes the wish and corresponds to who you are (but 
is too homely, darkly and alienatingly homely, so to speak). The world becomes 
uncanny, unhomely, when our actions have no material effect, but also when our 
thoughts and actions have overly direct material effect. The logic of this swamp 
world is to be too continuous, too fluid, when it was expected to be discontinuous 
and discrete, and too isolating, when it was expected to be continuous.
40 For more on this and the problem of Kafka’s adherence to or counterfactual belief in the 
purity of (especially paternal) authority in general see Walter Sokel’s excellent essay “Freedom 
and Authority in the Fiction of Franz Kafka,” in The Myth and Power of the Self: Essays on Franz 
Kafka, Wayne State University Press, Detroit 2002, 311–324. 
41 Kafka, Der Prozeß, 74; Kafka, The Trial, 58.
42 Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny [Das Unheimliche], trans. David McLintock, Penguin Books, 
London 2003, 154.
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These are examples of the absence of the balance between cause (intention) 
and effect (reception, recognition), the relation of which is essential in estab-
lishing actual free agency. The problem with Kafka’s world is not the excess of 
bureaucratic order that stifles the free spontaneity of the individual. Rather, it is 
the very lack of order that obfuscates the possibility of action for the individual. 
This lack of order – there is no fixture or structure that gives an action a stable 
meaning – is what makes the world swampy. In some sense Kafka’s world is not 
just a world of infinite limits, but also one of infinite permeability. Yet this per-
meability cannot support any actions, for there is no way to know if and how 
the space will react – sometimes it is barring without any bars, sometime open 
without any sense or direction. 
Because K. only encounters spaces of non-action, defined as unstructured 
space that lends no clear significance and thus no objectivity to his action, he 
tries to exploit this very lack of structure, this orgiastic disorder of “the swamp 
world,” by resorting to sex and sexuality as the basest instance of a structuring 
principle: “Women have great power. If I could persuade some women I know to 
work together for me, I would be bound to get through. Especially with this court, 
that consists almost entirely of skirt-chasers.”43 Within this swampy non-struc-
ture, women function as the very instrument of access to the court, or at least K. 
believes so.44 They become a means of agency that K. lacks on his own accord. 
The paradox is that K. actually believes in the validity of the court (or the castle), 
all the while trying to employ invalid means to access this “pure” court-in-itself. 
What we can actually learn from Kafka (something he perhaps never learned 
himself) is that there is nothing behind the surface, that the manifestation is the 
level of truth and not “mere” appearances.45
Thus, there are no real actions in Kafka’s work, only pre-actions trying to 
access the very space of action itself. But these never objectify into more than 
empty gestures in the antechamber of non-action. What K. is seeking to establish 
by these pre-actions is a connection to the absent addressee of his actions. Yet his 
actions never reach this addressee who would give him an adequate response. 
Instead, he is confronted only with ineffective or unwilling intermediaries, and 
43 Kafka, Der Prozeß, 180; Kafka, The Trial, 152.
44 Benjamin notes: “It is from the swampy soil of such experiences that Kafka’s female charac-
ters rise. They are swamp creatures like Leni [from The Trial], ‘who stretches out the middle and 
ring fingers of her right hand between which the connecting web of skin reached almost to the 
top joint, short as the fingers were.’” See Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of 
His Death,” 130–131.
45 I explore this is more detail in the yet unpublished “epilogue” to this article: “Abstraction, or 
Four Kafkan Strategies of Spacelessness.”
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thus never attains the actuality he was striving for. It is not that there is only 
discontinuity between K. and the world; rather, there is an “inverting” continu-
ity alienating K. from the world the more he participates in it. This inverting or 
distorting continuity is exactly the logic of the swamp in its most negative aspect. 
All the reactions that K. receives serve only to stall indefinitely his position in the 
intermediary state. He finds himself trapped between constantly being active and 
yet never performing an action. It is this Kafkan tension between incessant naked 
activity and absent meaningful action that constitutes the swampy quality of his 
world. What makes his world alienating is exactly that K. is never restrained but 
is allowed seemingly free movement; of course, this “freedom” is futile, since the 
very space wherein it is performed precludes freedom. One could imagine the 
alienating quality vanishing if K. actually were restrained, since then it would be 
just a matter of breaking free, a straightforward negative act of self-assertion. It is 
not difficult to trace a certain wish for confinement and isolation in Kafka’s work. 
There would be a clear structure, a simple, physical difference between being 
restrained and not being restrained. But, alas, it is a much more subtle restraint 
that is the source of alienation. This restraint could be called ambient restraint, 
where the space of action and the space of sense is unreceptive or distortive vis-à-
vis the individual in question. This is the kind of restraint that is at work in Kafka. 
Focus is often drawn to it in light of two common features in his writing: the inces-
sant references to the air of the spaces where the protagonist find himself; and 
the focus on pure gestures, where the meaning of the gesture seems unspecified.
I will begin by examining the pure gesture: In the very short story “The Knock 
on the Courtyard Gate” (“Der Schlag ans Hoftor”) the significance of an act, 
namely, the knocking on a gate, is at stake. The story is told from the perspective 
of a brother whose sister – while they are passing the eponymous gate – does 
something. He is not sure if she simply raised her fist or whether she actually 
knocked, and, if so, why she would have done so. This gesture without a clear 
sense avalanches into extreme effects. In short, this is the dissymmetry between 
cause (act) and effect (reception). Suddenly, horsemen come riding in surrounded 
by great clouds of dust. The brother tries to explain the misunderstanding and to 
clarify the situation; however, as he sends his sister back home (to dress herself 
appropriately before she appears in front of the judge), he himself unwittingly 
has to face the judgment. For the brother the matter seems quite simple, and he is 
confident that he can explain it in no time. But as soon as he enters the farmhouse 
parlor that serves as a court,46 it becomes clear that he holds no power over the 
question of the sense of his sister’s gesture. The naked act itself no longer even 
46 Again, the court is not in its “proper” place, the space of placement is misplaced.
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seems relevant, and it is far outweighed by the judging reception of the others. 
The makeshift “courtroom,” itself an unstructured space as such, has a strange 
bed-like object (half plank bed, half operating table) awaiting the brother. This 
peculiar “bed” is the “place” of his complete passive reduction to the judgment of 
others.47 The story ends with a change in the air and the impossibility of escape: 
“Could I still sense any other air than that of a prison? That is the great question – 
or rather, it would be the question if I had any prospect of being released.”48 
There is an extreme disproportion here between the gesture by the individual and 
the question of the gesture’s sense as interpreted by others. Owing to the extreme 
imbalance in favor of the interpretation by the others, the singular gesture itself 
becomes almost irrelevant. Moreover, it is not the agent herself but rather her 
brother who must account for it, a condition that further dissociates the inten-
tion, the gesture, and the interpretation from each other. What this expresses is 
the excess of ascription of significance from others. The brother is caught between 
the ambiguity of the gesture and being the patient of the judgment of others as to 
the sense of the naked gesture. The problem here is that the space of action swal-
lows the singular action itself in a responsive distortion blown out of proportion, 
thereby precluding the independence of the agent.
The protagonist is swamped by the judgment of the others. But this swamp-
ing is a distorted, de-structured version of the structure that also positively gives 
sense to an action and establishes it in the world. Without the responsiveness 
to the action it would be not an action but an empty or naked gesture devoid of 
sense. Sense is not hidden in the singular gesture; the gesture only achieves sense 
depending on the space wherein it occurs. Kafka’s short text intensifies ad absur-
dum the tension between the responsive space and the naked gesture, each being 
“inflated” without either coming into mutual communion or contact. These are 
the two sides of the necessary tension (action and reaction) brought, by Kafka, 
to their highest negative intensity. The continuity between the two serves only to 
separate them into two discontinuous abstractions: a pure senseless judgment, 
and a naked senseless gesture. Any sense of an action, if it is possible, resides in 
their interpenetration.49
47 This object is reminiscent of the apparatus from “In the Penal Colony” (“In der Strafkolonie”) 
that inscribes the judgment into the flesh of the condemned until he dies from the wounds of the 
inscriptions. 
48 Kafka, Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem Lande, 80; Franz Kafka, Kafka’s Selected Stories: 
New Translations, Backgrounds and Contexts, Criticism, ed. and trans. Stanley Corngold, Norton 
Critical Edition, Norton, New York 2007, 125.
49 An action, for Hegel, is always “public,” always interpenetrating with the others, a “lonely” 
action is thus always also the result of the interaction with other: “in merely doing something 
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What is formidable in both Kafka and Hegel is their respective abilities to 
tarry with the negative, as Hegel terms it,50 that is, to resist this interpenetra-
tion to the highest intensity, exactly in order to show its necessity. The difference 
is that, for Hegel, this is also the point of finding oneself “in utter dismember-
ment,”51 whereas for Kafka it is the point of misrecognition and ultimately of 
death and disappearance into nothing, the animated suspension moving towards 
suspended animation. 
I now turn to the problem of air. This is the “universal element,” the immedi-
ate medium of continuity between the inside and the outside; it is also the space 
of openness, the outside as such. The problem with the structure of possibility 
is that, like air, it is transparent and ambient; it is experienced only when it is 
absent. It is a kind of dependence that is not experienced as dependence. Who 
would say that it is a burden to breathe, except someone approaching death? The 
alienating quality of Kafka’s world is created not because of a lack of direct inde-
pendence, but, inversely, because of a lack of any positive kind of dependence. 
This is presented most explicitly in The Castle, when the protagonist, K., 
wants to convince the castle – the unseen yet ubiquitous instance that ascribes 
sense and significance to the village inhabitants – that he is indeed who he claims 
to be, namely, a land surveyor hired by the castle. Here, the central issue is not 
about the question of guilt or innocence, as in The Trial, but about the very person 
himself, about the establishment of his very being, the establishment, or continu-
ity, of his subjective (claim to) being in objectivity.52 Throughout The Castle K. is 
[Allein indem sie etwas tun], and thus bringing themselves out into the light of day, they directly 
contradict by their deed their presence of wanting to exclude the glare of publicity and partici-
pation by all and sundry. Actualization is, on the contrary, a display of what is one’s own in the 
element of universality where it becomes and should become the affair of everyone” (Hegel, 
Phänomenologie des Geistes, 309; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 251, translation modified). 
“A consciousness that opens up a subject-matter soon learns that others hurry along like flies 
to freshly poured-out milk, and want to busy themselves with it” (Hegel, Phänomenologie des 
Geistes, 309; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 251). Even when we act alone, we implicitly expect 
others to understand our actions to mean what we take them to mean, which might also be the 
very reason why we try to do them alone; or we do them alone in fear that they will be taken 
wrongly, judged prematurely, misunderstood, etc. Robert Pippin deals partly with this problem, 
under many qualifications and restraints, in his excellent and detailed study Hegel’s Practical 
Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008.
50 “bei [dem Negativen] verweilen” (Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 36; Hegel, Phenome-
nology of Spirit, 19).
51 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 36; Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 19.
52 Indeed, perhaps K. is not who he takes himself to be. There are many elements in the novel 
that indicate this: for example, the fact that his “assistants” who were supposed to come with 
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constantly trying to establish himself as who he takes himself to be, to be at home 
within the world: once again, however, it is a world that has, literally, no space for 
him. He is there, and yet he is not there.
For example: After seducing Frieda  – who, being a woman, he hopes will 
serve as his access to the castle – K., in his coital reveries, begins reflecting on 
the foreign nature of the air: he “kept feeling that he had lost himself, or was 
further away in a strange land [in die Fremde] than anyone had ever been before, a 
strange land where even the air was unlike the air at home, where you were likely 
to stifle in the strangeness of it, yet such were its senseless lures that you could 
only go on, losing your way even more.”53 Whenever air is evoked as a medium of 
suffocation, one can be sure of having entered a space of non-action. There is no 
guarantee in the medium of continuity. It is not just that the air might turn thick 
and stale and viscous, but also that its continuity is distorting like a mirage. The 
externalization of the subject can be a distortion of the subject if the medium 
of externalization is alien or hostile to him. This is the logic of the swamp, that 
is, that there is no structured space but just a swampy space (that negatively 
shows the necessity of the structure of the space of action for any action as such). 
The closer one is to the swamp, the more impenetrable becomes the air. Within 
the swamp, senseless shifts in continuity and discontinuity allow for no stable 
action to be actualized. The “senseless lures” is not simply a reference to some-
thing sexual, for here sexuality is merely an instrument of accessibility; rather, I 
would argue, it is a reference to the fact that K. confusingly believes that there is 
a possibility of complete affirmation of his being within the swampy space of the 
castle, as if it contained a pure core of symmetry. Despite the swampy perversity 
and obscurity of the castle, K. cannot resist going through the swamp in search 
of symmetry, of having his being affirmed instead of remaining a vague foreign 
body. But the more he approaches the swamp the more distortive is the “symme-
try”; in a sense, however, he cannot stop “hoping” – he is stubbornly attached54 – 
hence the “senseless lures” that he cannot resist.
his “surveying instruments” (the objective proof of K. being who he claims to be) never arrive, 
or that he is not even sure what village he finds himself in. Of course, and more importantly, the 
constant ambiguity of K. being arbitrarily recognized and dismissed as being a land surveyor 
expresses the tension inherent in the objective establishment of the subjective. In the end it does 
not even seem important if he is a land surveyor or not: he simply desires to have his bare exist-
ence objectively affirmed by the castle.
53 Franz Kafka, Das Schloß, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1983, 43–44; Franz Kafka, 
The Castle, trans. Anthea Bell, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, 40 (translation modified).
54 I borrow this term from Judith Butler’s The Psychic Life of Power, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford 1997.
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The paradox is that K. is an empty character; his sole content is his reluctant 
attempts to have his being positively affirmed by the castle that, in turn, consist-
ently refuses him any stable ascription. Indeed, there is nothing binding him to 
either the castle or the village where he finds himself, and he could freely depart; 
he faces no accusation, no conviction, no possible guilt, just a rejection of his 
person beyond his bare, minimal presence. He has bound himself to the castle 
in hope that it will affirm his being.55 Thus, on the one hand, K. is completely on 
his own; in this sense he is independent, a singularity, yet this independence is 
completely ineffective and abstract, for it cannot establish any universal actuality 
for others. All that is constant in his actions is their asymmetry, their failure. On 
the other hand, K. is completely dependent on the castle, for he believes it to be 
the instance that objectively establishes his being, even as he is oblivious to the 
fact that he is in a universal swamp devoid of proper symmetry, where the objec-
tive actuality of his actions is distorted in their very actualization. The castle is a 
dark distillation of all that goes wrong in the space of non-action; nonetheless, K. 
harbors a senseless belief in some pure core. But if there is a core to the castle it is 
even more rotten than its manifestations. This is evident by the fact that the closer 
K. comes to the castle (as well as the closer Josef K. comes to the court) the more 
it becomes dirty, disorganized, unstructured, bedridden, sickly, lewd, decadent, 
obscure, perverted, etc. Of course, it is no coincidence that K. is (supposedly) a 
land surveyor in a foreign space that seems impossible to survey. Even if he were 
to be recognized as a land surveyor, he would be unable to survey the land, since 
the land itself is incoherent, unstructured – another testament to the fact that it is 
not a space of action. There is no way to survey a swamp; each part continuously 
flows into another. Yet, there is nonetheless a logic to this swamp world, because 
besides its destructive potential it is this unstable seasickness-inducing ground 
that makes freedom possible.
55 Hence K.’s strange dismissal of Frieda’s equally strange (in light of the non-locality of the 
story) geographically localizable suggestion of emigration (again, notice the “lure” that binds 
him, not to Frieda, but to the castle): “He slowly removed his arm from her waist, and they sat 
for a while in silence, until Frieda, as if K.’s arm had given her a warmth that was essential to 
her now, said: ‘I won’t endure this life here any more. If you want to keep me we must go away, 
emigrate, go anywhere, to the south of France, to Spain.’ ‘I can’t emigrate,’ said K. ‘I came to this 
place meaning to stay here, and stay I will.’ And in a spirit of contradiction which he didn’t even 
try to explain he added, as if to himself: ‘What could have lured me to this desolate part of the 
country but a longing to stay here?’” (Kafka, The Castle 121–122).
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4  Conclusion: The Concrete Universality of the 
Swamp
“Concrete” literally means “to be grown together.” Hegel vigorously argues for a 
“concrete universal,” which means that it is grown together with “singularity.” It 
would be wrong to assume that either term had an independent existence before 
their concrete unity (this is what Hegel diagnoses as abstract thinking). Rather, 
the universal is universal only in and through the singular, and the singular only 
in and through the universal. In a famous example, Hegel recounts a joke about 
a man who goes to the market and asks for fruit; when the man is offered pears, 
apples, cherries, etc. he declines, since he had asked for fruit, not pears, apples, 
cherries, etc. This is a clear case of abstract thinking, where universality (fruit) is 
held strictly apart from singularities (pears, apples, etc.). However, we should not 
be led to think that Hegel is “against” abstraction as such, for it is an essential 
part of his logical procedure: “we must pay due respect to the infinite force of the 
understanding in splitting the concrete into abstract determinacies and plumb-
ing the depth of the difference – this force which alone is at the same time the 
mighty power causing the transition of the determinacies.”56 Hegel always uses 
the force of abstraction to show that it is unsustainable and that it must transi-
tion into the concrete; by holding it apart in abstract difference, bringing it into 
tension and eventual collapse, he shows the necessity of their concrete unity. In 
Kafka’s world, we are placed in the infinite tension between the abstract and the 
concrete, suspended over “the depths of difference.” Or, to be more precise, we 
also receive the concrete, but it is always distorted, swampy, grown together in 
monstrous ways. This distortion is not something external; rather, it is inscribed 
(as a necessary possibility) within the nature of the concrete universal. If freedom 
is to be by oneself in the other, as Hegel defines it, then the possibility of this 
equally entails the possibility of being alienated from oneself in the other. What 
“the swamp” entails is the necessary openness and complicity between the two 
sides, the singular and the universal, but in an always potentially destabilized 
way. More precisely, this means that the concrete universal is both necessary and 
unstable: it is necessary that both extremes are grown together, yet by their being 
grown together the concrete universal also becomes unstable, open, both to pro-
duction and to destruction. It is, paradoxically, this necessity of the concrete that 
56 G.W.F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logic, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Bd. 6, Suhrkampf Verlag, 
Frankfurt/M.: 1970, 286; G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. George di Giovanni, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 538–539.
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opens a world of possibility – and possibility is, of course, always double-edged, 
stable and unstable, for both ways are opened: un-freedom and freedom are two 
sides of the same structure (just as the structure of consciousness is also the pos-
sibility of insanity, not some external state). Kafka’s characters are un-free but not 
because there is no relation to the space where they act (this would be something 
bordering on absolute imprisonment in one’s own body), but because of the spe-
cific stifling relation that ensues from a de-structured space. In Kafka’s “swamp 
world” there are interpenetrations, relations, communications: it is erotically 
charged, but always only to the effect of stripping the protagonist of the efficacy 
of his proper agency, reducing him to a dog or a bug, a faithful outcast caught in 
the same world that has cast him out, never within, never without. But, and this 
is the important positive point, it is the same swampy structure of never-with-
in-never-without that opens the space of freedom, and this necessary openness 
means that freedom is never guaranteed because it is fundamentally complicit 
with un-freedom. The contradictory ground of possibility is seasickness on dry 
land. The “infinite force” of Kafka is that in taking the abstraction and suspen-
sion to its highest intensity, he necessarily, albeit almost reluctantly, shows the 
distorted “inner face” of freedom.
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Arnaud Villani
The Necessary Revision of the Concept of 
the Universal: Kafka’s “Singularity”
A harmful habit, which includes the argument of authority (Magister dixit!), 
consists in understanding words as they occur in language, without questioning 
their semantic make-up afresh. Doing so risks making a serious mistake in the 
interpretation of Parmenides’s Poem if one maintains that here the verb echein 
indicates possession (“to have”), although in fact it designates a “firm hold,” and 
if, in political philosophy in general, one inherits the term kratos from the tradi-
tion without detecting another meaning in it besides that of “dominant power.” 
Philology is a highly cautious discipline and aims to achieve all required scien-
tificity, but at least it has the audacity to assume that behind every word is a 
semantic, and thus noetic, evolution.
This semantic evolution, which often proceeds by derivation, manifests 
what is at work in words, this “intangible mist” that the Stoics called lekton, or 
“meaning.” Yet any particular meaning derives from a general meaning. Hegel 
gives an account of this meaning and of its evolution over time when he writes, in 
The Phenomenology of the Spirit [Die Phänomenologie des Geistes],
Time was when man had a heaven, decked and fitted out with endless wealth of thoughts 
and pictures. The significance of all that is, lay in the thread of light by which it was attached 
to heaven; instead of dwelling in the present as it is here and now, the eye glided away over 
the present to the Divine, away, so to say, to a present that lies beyond. […] Now […] man’s 
mind and interest are so deeply rooted in the earthly that we require a like power to get them 
raised above that level. His spirit […] seems to long for the mere pitiful feeling of the divine 
in the abstract, and to get refreshment from that.1
Here already meaning clearly appears as a global way of seeing things, an intui-
tion linked to the Everything of things. An example: So long as what was essential 
for the traditional community rested on the idea that reciprocal exchange creates 
what is shared – an idea clearly manifested in the potlatch, in exogamy, and more 
1 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, Volume 1, trans. James Black Bail-
lie, Routledge, New York 2014 [1910], 8.
A previous version of this chapter appeared as “Kafka et la conscience de l’abîme,” in Cahiers 
de l’Herne 108: “Kafka,” eds. Jean-Pierre Morel and Wolfgang Asholt, Paris Éditions de l’Herne, 
Paris 2014, 194–199.
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generally in the “ceremonial gift”2 – a festive banquet where each person benefit-
ted from “equal parts” (the daîs eisê, the daps) was welcomed as a great benefit 
to the group. As the meaning of this practice has weakened, the calculation of the 
operation’s cost has emerged, and then of the ruin that it would entail. According 
to “the era of the conception of the world” and the passing of time, the same root, 
+dap–, thus aims to express a “festive banquet to seal the community” (daps) in 
a very positive sense, and an “extravagant expenditure” (dapané) and “ruinous 
damage” (dam-num in Latin) in a very negative sense. This demonstrates that 
the world is forms which are at once recognizable: moreover, these forms are 
reproduced by the senses and instituted by meaning from an ideational whole; 
this whole corresponds to the concrete reality of the thought of this era, which the 
semantic-noetic evolution translates.
Meaning determines everything, yet in a Wechselwirkung (“interaction”) its 
opposite occurs as well. As Medieval thinkers claimed of the Being and the One, 
meaning and the whole are exchangeable. In the seemingly obvious and trans-
parent term “universal,” one must therefore suspect the thickness of a semantic 
make-up that affects the couple “universal/singular.” As we know, this pair reso-
nates with another pair: “general/particular.” One might think that all has been 
said in repeating that the universal is not the general and the singular not the 
particular. Yet I do not consider this division as anything but a trompe-l’oeil. The 
real break divides between a way of grasping “all things” in a link that is polemi-
cal and yet also bound up with a whole that does not overshadow, and an entirely 
different way of “seeing things,” one that assumes the conceptual and “intelligi-
ble” universality of the transcendent, while singularity would be the pitiful trace 
of the body.
Indeed, “rational” thought, which comes to encompass and dominate all 
of Occidental thought under the name of logos, constitutes a prerequisite to any 
serious conception of the real: the universal dominates and overshadows the real. 
This implies a disjunction between the things that surround us and the One-
Whole, which, simply through the force of what is intelligible, presents itself as 
inalterable majesty, beyond the sensory world. Such logic is disjunctive and exclu-
sive, since the universal and the particular, the Whole as One and all multiple 
things, natural consorts, are considered direct adversaries: “either … or.” Joining 
the camp of the multiple, the particular and the singular will no longer be able 
to rid themselves of this suspicion of divergent organization, where everything 
2 This major ethnographic concept was brought up anew and explained masterfully in Marcel 
Hénaff, The Price of Truth: Gift, Money, and Philosophy [Le Prix de la vérité: Le Don, l’argent, la 
philosophie], trans. Jean-Louis Morhange, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2010.
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tends to scatter itself in countless directions, awaiting the astringent power of the 
One. Whether they wish to or not, the particular and the singular incline towards 
unthinkable chaos. Plato insists on this: they are on the side of the alogos, the 
unsayable, the unthinkable, the irrational, the “too much.”3 
This noetic decision (since everything occurs in thought, and, as Gustave 
Guillaume puts it, is “thought-enveloped”) fractures the world. For, inversely, 
every community’s principles of reciprocity are encapsulated in Heraclitus’s oxy-
moronic formula hen panta, from which the first German Romantics took their 
rallying cry Hen kai pan. Does this expression offer a wise aphorism? Does it sum-
marize the thought of Heraclitus, under the name of the “unity of opposites,” 
or, to speak with Nicolas de Cusa, of “coïncidentia oppositorum”? Is it a colorful 
period of the history of philosophy? No. It summarizes the strong thought that 
precedes the great “rationalism.” Yet, in my opinion, that this thought precedes 
the great current of Occidental logocentrism does not mean that it is inferior; 
indeed, I would consider it in certain ways superior, subtler. 
One must explain why the expressions “hen panta” and “hen kai pan,” with 
their variant “hen diapheromenon heautôi,” from the beginning of Hölderlin’s 
novel Hyperion – all expressions revered by Hölderlin, the two Schlegel brothers, 
Schelling, Novalis, and Nietzsche – would be “noetic” in this very way. For it is 
clear that for a long time we no longer understood either their import or their 
stakes. Reading Kafka’s works, notably the diaries, letters, and Reflections on Sin, 
Suffering, Hope and the True Way [Betrachtungen über Sünde, Hoffnung, Leid und 
den wahren Weg], reveals the character strangely “displaced” from his work and 
offers irrefutable evidence that he does not think like us. And I would willingly 
believe that he shares with traditional communities certain portions of thought 
on what is essential, an issue the German Romantics and Nietzsche attempted to 
rethink, shaped as they were by pre-Socratic and heterodox mystical culture (via 
Böhme). We do not wish to admit it, because we continue to feel that they thought 
incorrectly, that they stammered thought during this era, and that, luckily, pro-
gress has done its work from the Primitives to us. Yet let us recall the insistence 
and the precision with which Lévi-Strauss showed that the “savage mind” knew 
how to look at the surrounding world incomparably better than we do, for it did 
so with the eyes as well as the spirit.
We thus begin to define the problem of the universal and of its necessary revi-
sion. Hen panta means “an entire world in the energizing tension of opposites.” 
The textual form of this expression, the oxymoron (think of the simple word 
deinon, meaning marvelous and terrifying at once) confronts two completely 
3 See Plato’s Philebus, 21d.
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concrete elements, with the promise of resisting as long as necessary. One could 
demonstrate that hen is totalizing Unity,4 neither presupposed nor all-encom-
passing nor transcendent, which creates itself at the same time as the resistance 
of its opposite continues. This opposite is Panta, “everything” in its immense, 
incalculable diversity, brought together in “a living, a thousand times divided, 
inward whole.”5 Instead of ridiculously opposing multiplicity, as though it was 
a poikilos – that is, on one hand a variegation responsible for the ills of the city-
state, and, on the other, an ethereal Unity of perfect order and idyllic essence, 
always situated beyond, in that inaccessible, other place which preserves it from 
encroaching time, yet in fact immediately a dead unity6  – the thought of the 
Pre-Socratics (and it is significant that one finds an identical notion in the work of 
the Chinese Lao Tseu and Confucius, during a comparable period) “stands firm” 
and maintains the principle of this paradoxical union, seemingly impossible yet 
nonetheless vibrant and alive, the One-in-All-Things.
So we understand why pairs were invented: “universal/singular” and 
“general/particular.” Through their difference that has no stakes they are des-
tined to create a diversion, to hide the Platonic operation that has effaced from 
thought the possibility of a “symbolic” confrontation, leaving neither dead nor 
vanquished nor slave nor inferior. We now know enough about this venerable 
way of thinking, which compels us to redefine the term of the universal, and thus, 
of the singular. Kafka understood, at least intuitively, what I have just evoked, 
and this is why he is a step ahead of us. His replies in Conversations with Janouch 
[Gespräche mit Kafka] bear witness to this, even if the renderings of the conversa-
tions are not always reliable.7 For what a cross and what bewilderment the orig-
inality of Kafka’s thought represents, particularly for those of us who, at the end 
of a propagandistic bimillennium, believed Plato and followed his disjunction 
4 I tried to do so in Parménide, le Poème [Parmenides, the Poem], text and translation, in col-
laboration with Pierre Holzerny, followed by Parménide et la dénomination [Parmenides and the 
Denomination] (Hermann, Paris 2008), and in Parménide (Sils–Maria, “Cinq Concepts” series, 
2013).
5 Friedrich Hölderlin, “Letter No. 172: To his Brother,” in Essays and Letters on Theory, ed. and 
trans. Thomas Pfau, SUNY Press, Albany 1988, 139. See my study “Figures de dualité: Hölderlin 
et la tragédie grecque” (“Figures of Duality: Hölderlin and Greek Tragedy”), in Cahier de l’Herne 
Hölderlin, Éditions de l’Herne, Paris 1989, 277–296. 
6 One must remember that Aristophanes, mocking Socrates, whom he considers ridiculous in a 
straw basket in mid-air, named this beyond “the clouds.” Schopenhauer made of this the uedäh 
(an invented, and untranslatable, term) and Master of the Absolute, and Nietzsche the “field-dis-
pensary of the soul” and the “telephone from the beyond.”
7 See Gustav Janouch, Gespräche mit Kafka, Fischer Verlag, Berlin 1968, published in English as 
Conversations with Kafka, trans. Goronwy Rees, New Directions, New York 2012 [1971]).
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unconditionally, not stopping to exclude, to judge, to exterminate without notic-
ing.
It is vital to understand the implications of this forgotten noetic. We see that 
the simple foundation of Occidental logic, the “principle of identity,” in the form 
of “non-contradiction” and the “excluded middle,” is the machine of war that 
overcame the type of thought that makes use of “both … and” as an “immanent 
disjunctive synthesis.”8 We see that the discriminating principle  – exciting for 
the concept, rich in innumerable scientific triumphs, yet deadly for the “living 
whole” – enters thought, owing to what appears to be the base of all logic. Adding 
to the classical descriptions of the failures of dichotomy, Deleuzian reflection 
associates disjunction with that which motivates it. I separate the fluxes: I block 
one; the other I let pass. To what end? In order to manifest the exercise of dom-
ination, to capitalize on an income, to make us aware of the presence of an End.
If A cannot be B, at the same time and from the same perspective, this 
unquestionably distances the possibility of metamorphosis. One could imagine 
Plato very busy with this task, once he considered himself the nomothete of his 
new city-state. For in ostracizing the poets, he excluded their tales of metamor-
phosis. But above all, disjunction, when overshadowed by a transcendence (the 
Deleuzian name derives from this: “transcendent disjunctive synthesis”: “either 
this or that, not both”), disseminates everywhere the contagion of a spirit of dom-
ination, hidden by its final End. It is in the name of glorious tomorrows, of Para-
dise regained, of final Reconciliation, that the domination of person over person 
and of the whole over the all of the earth’s resources can be exerted. The Universal 
is the name that covers these wrongdoings.
Less obviously, on the level at which Kafka works, this spirit of domination – 
which logic exerts or instrumentalizes for its own ends  – insinuates itself into 
language so as to be used in every sentence, in every thought. We see how, since 
the Greeks, the spirit of hegemony deposits itself in the furrows of language. Ben-
veniste has shown the link between powerful desire (oregô in Greek: “to aspire 
to something with all one’s might”) and the organization of territory and of the 
city-state in the Imperium (+reg–, the same root, is present in regula, regio – in the 
double sense of straight line and of region – and in rex, directus, and Recht, the 
Law). More particularly, the respective vocabularies of the concept and of practice 
converge on one point: taking charge in a purely dominant way. How can one be 
8 It is this “both … and” that comes into play to the fullest in The Castle [Das Schloss] and turns 
K. into a person who is at once guilty and innocent, the Helpers into entities that change before 
our eyes, intimates into strangers, inaccessible Klamm into a sleepwalking beer drinker. See my 
Lectures du Château de Kafka [Readings of Kafka’s Castle], Belin, Paris 1984, 18, 34, 53, and 54.
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astonished, then, by the constant presence of curving roads or of crookedness 
(Krumm), of this proximity of the fall, physically present in the Helpers? 
It is not coincidence that the same image – of leading herds or of men become 
cattle – runs through language. In Greek, epagô – precisely the verb that consti-
tutes the concept in Socrates’s “epactic discourse” – means “to lead the herd to 
line up, in order to pass, one by one, through the bottleneck of the enclosure.” 
There we find the origin of arithmetic counting. The verb reducere shares the 
same nature: “to lead the herds back toward the enclosure,” from which “reduce” 
derives. And one can follow with the aggressiveness that Levinas noticed in der 
Begriff, or in concipere, which he translates as “the grasp of the concept” (la griffe 
du concept). We encounter the same thing, in Roman law, in the symmetry of 
aikhmalôtos (“caught at the spear’s tip,” in order to designate the slave) – and 
mancipere (“to take control of a slave, designating him as such by the gesture of 
putting one’s hand (man–) on his shoulder”).
Thus, we can appreciate the concealed intentions contained in the post-Pla-
tonic concept katholou (literally: kata holou, “according to the point of view of 
all”) and the Latin concept universus, “turned towards the one.” The “all” of the 
universal, dedicated to concept and to logic, therefore no longer has any connec-
tion with the “mark of everything in the singular.” We know that “singulus” is 
formed from +sin– (ein–, in German), the same word as heis, (s)mia, hen in Greek 
(“that which presents itself one by one, as a single unit, singulatim”) and +gulus 
(“marking a power of rebellious life”; in German, –zeln). Even placed along the 
linguistic and grammatical thread that assigns it to be nothing but the “straight 
man” of the universal, the singular rebels: it is a “wild boar” (well named: loner) at 
bay. But we will utilize precisely this resistance of the singular to make of it what 
must, at all costs, be tamed: repetition of the Platonic gesture that designates the 
sphere of the sensoripathic sensibility as responsible for all drift towards chaos, 
itself a true challenge for Reason, which dreams of nothing but order. From this 
comes the topos of “mastering” the passions.
“Turned towards the One,” then, like the gaze of the people raised “unani-
mously” towards the face of the Monarch in the frontispiece of Hobbes’s Levia-
than. The “general” still carries with it something blurry and alive, that is to say, 
turbulent, won from a symbolic and hard-fought struggle that does not kill (the 
slave is put to death during his lifetime). In fact, the “general” carries with it the 
notion of species (genos, genus) and of natural filiation; above all, it represents 
the translation of the Greek koinon, which is fundamental to politics. Ta koina, 
the equivalent of ta dêmosia, or public affairs (res publica), the “common good”: 
this still concerns a concrete community. Its opposite, the “particular,” is pre-
cisely the “private” sphere (ta idia), which the Greeks find so hardly incompatible 
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with the common good that they braid and connect one sphere with the other in 
order to construct political man, the citizen.
In the same way, such a particular conception of an interweaving of reli-
gion and politics preserves something of the thought that we detected with the 
Pre-Socratics: the resistance of the affronted parties and their successful struggle, 
the “two-in-one,” comes to constitute a whole. In extirpating the concrete, the 
general embraces plurality. But, as Hegel showed via the expressions “the Now 
is night” and “the Here is a tree,”9 whose contrariness is equally valid, all that 
is lived expresses, once uttered, nothing but “generalities.” Now, here, I: this is 
the superposing of all times and all singular “I”s and of their joint negation. It is 
this negation, returned to itself, which constitutes the universal and institutes 
the superiority of “mediation” over “immediacy.” There is seemingly nothing to 
object to this universal, as it is conceptualized, save that the Nietzschian criticism 
of language (that it is a double metaphorization of sensation) leaves us with one 
eye open to the negative residue of this overcome negation.
Artists have never been mistaken in this. Their “germinal” eye has never 
ceased to see Hegel’s preliminary condemnation of “sensitive certainty” as a 
“false start.”10 In reality, this sinnliche Gewissheit never abandons them; it is their 
pedestal, from the first impression (“the instress” of the ecclesiastical poet Gerard 
Manley Hopkins) to its final account (“the inscape”). Sensitive certainty does not 
need to be educated. It is we who must be taught by it. If one foregoes the initial 
fidelity to the formidable impression that sparks the desire for the work, then no 
concept – be it returned to itself multiple times and mediatized as much as one 
likes – will assist with creation. In this way, the reality of the universal, which 
presents a purely negative thickness that seems like a pretense, is coupled with a 
pretentious projection into the Ideal, a finality “blown away” in spiritual Progress 
and a “majesty” arrived at just the right moment to make “the machine bend.” In 
reality, one sees how much both the general and the universal are ways of feigning 
the notion of living Totality that Hippias, Hippocratus, and the Stoics aspired to 
perpetuate, in dismissing and ridiculing it, in making it disappear from human 
possibilities.
This makes us take an extra step. What constituted the force of ancient 
thought was concern about granting singularity its entire scope by building a 
9 Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, Volume 1, chapter A, “Sense-certainty.” Pages 90–103 are 
essential to the representative discussion of the concepts of singularity and universality. 
10 To employ Henri Maldiney’s term in “La méconnaissance du sentir et de la première parole, 
ou le faux-départ de la Phénomenologie de l’Esprit” in Regard, parole, espace, L’age d’homme 
Press, Lausanne 1973, 254–321.
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Totality from it. But this totality was also found in the intuition of a “singular total-
ization,” which Hegel calls “sensitive certainty”: the pure sentiment that exists, 
Rousseau’s “pure sentiment of existence” in his musings on the Île Saint–Pierre. 
Hen kai pan refers to the artistic double vision, which considers both the speci-
ficity of every phenomenon and the reciprocity of the impact of that minuscule 
entity on the Whole and of the Whole on that minuscule entity. We are dealing 
with Kafka’s Oriental gaze,11 which is staggering for us yet was completely natural 
for the thinkers who preceded the reign of Reason.
To see the whole and the minuscule, to combine the concern for the whole 
and the presence of each part, to conceive of “total parts” and their energy in 
tension, this is what the Greeks before Plato were able to do, and it is what Kafka 
can do so extraordinarily. Put another way, one must change the direction of the 
gaze: to choose the level, kindly gaze, which welcomes multiplicity. Kafka on his 
“vineyard wall,”12 Kafka on the watch for intensities (gold tooth, nose),13 Kafka 
looking in a different way upon at the child who has fallen in another way.14 To 
avoid, above all, both the gaze from on high to below, contemptuous and apprais-
ing the advantage that will gain the upper hand over what presents itself, and the 
gaze from below to above, full of a submission that promises desire for venge-
11 Elias Canetti refers to Kafka as the “only Chinese writer” of the Occident, in Kafka’s Other 
Trial: The Letters to Felice [Der andere Prozess: Kafkas Briefe an Felice], trans. Christopher Mid-
dleton, Schocken Books, New York 1988 [1974].
12 “[T]here are things in the woods that one could lie in the moss for years and think about,” in 
Max Brod, Franz Kafka: A Biography [Franz Kafka, eine Biographie], trans. G. Humphreys Roberts 
and Richard Winston, Da Capo Press, New York 1995, 117. Kafka imagines lying on the “vineyard 
wall” in his letter of 24 August 1902 to Oskar Pollack. See Franz Kafka, Letters to Friends, Family 
and Editors, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, Alma Classics, Richmond 2014), 4.
13 On the gold tooth, see: “Travel Diaries,” in Franz Kafka, The Diaries 1910–1923, ed. Max Brod, 
trans. Joseph Kresh and Martin Greenberg with cooperation of Hannah Arendt, Schocken Books, 
New York 1976, 426–487, 441; Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature 
[Kafka. Pour une littérature mineure], trans. Terry Cochran, University of Minnesota Press, Minne-
apolis 1986, 20. On the nose, see Kafka, Letters to Friends, Family and Editors, letter to Max Brod, 
beginning of May 1920, 236–237; and Kafka, The Diaries, 10, 36, 39, 57, 78–79. Kafka sketches “a 
clean outline that could be drawn in five strokes” (passage from letter after 17 October 1917 to 
Felix Weltsch, in Kafka, Letters to Friends, Family and Editors, 160), as he describes his famous 
angular shadows. This acuity of the gaze is also painstaking. Like Hopkins’s, this gaze searches 
for the real: “the view from a horse leaping the hurdle, say, certainly shows you the utmost pres-
ence, the veritable essence of racing” (letter to Director Eisner, 1907, in Kafka, Letters to Friends, 
Family and Editors, 61).
14 Kathi Diamant, Kafka’s Last Love: The Mystery of Dora Diamant, Basic Books, New York 2003, 
9. Diamant relates that Kafka said to a little boy who had just fallen: “How nimbly you fell and 
how well you got up again!” thereby silencing those who were about to laugh at the child.
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ance. In short, “not to judge,” to give every entity its absolute right to presence 
and its worth as undeniable and irreproducible singularity.
Here we find the stakes of a new thinking. For in the way that a poet can be 
a philosopher and a philosopher a poet, it is thought that changes impercepti-
bly – and then suddenly topples, in the sense of a “noetic evolutionism,” compa-
rable to what happens in the morpho-ecological evolution of a species. Kafka’s 
entire oeuvre summons the opposition between two types of thought, which can 
be summarized in the terms “abrupt” and “direct.” Abrupt thought cannot sep-
arate each singular thing from the enveloping and nourishing presence of the 
Whole. Each thing is signaled and seems surrounded by a halo of the “concern 
for everything.” It is thus much more than itself. From the position of the infin-
itesimal singular thing, the Whole “is visible.” There is thus “an entire world” 
between one thing and another, which forbids us from any examination in simple 
and straightforward terms and renders all searching impossible, even if it were 
to be preceded by an education, as a way of bending a “spirit” to a “competence” 
that makes it suited to an End.
It is the Kafkaesque sense of the “everyday mishap,” of the impossible search 
of The Castle, of the painful impossibility of reaching “the last door.” Everything 
has an immense and numbing thickness,15 that of the non-substantial Whole 
which gave birth to it and supports it. Consequently, the bridges are capable of 
sensation and bend in pain when stepped upon. Such an abrupt world, without 
final conclusion, is numbing, exhausting, grueling – marvelous. In every instant, 
it demands the energy to confront a “cliff,” but derives from it only “stony energy.” 
The world with abrupt borders, with sharp-cut edges, is that of the irremediable 
fall into chaos, an abolishing hole but also and above all a joyous explosion of 
infinite differences. Hölderlin, Kierkegaard, Kafka, and Hopkins, among many 
others, would be the guarantors of this difference “in and for itself,” which iden-
tity would like to eradicate “at all costs,” first forcing it “to atone for its sins.”16
15 “[L]eap up another flight of stairs,” from Franz Kafka, “The Advocates” (“Der Neue Ad-
vokat”), trans. Tania and James Stern, in The Complete Short Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, Vin-
tage Books, London 2005), 449–451, 451. Also: “For he believed that the understanding of any de-
tail, that of a spinning top, for instance, was sufficient for the understanding of all things,” from 
Kafka’s “The Top” (“Der Kreisel”), trans. Tania and James Stern, in The Complete Short Stories, 
444. It is clear that the “general” of which we speak here is an enlargement to the Whole, a thick-
ness of labyrinthian concreteness. In this sense, Kafka takes up Nietzsche’s “pathos of distance.”
16 It will have become clear that we are speaking here of Deleuze’s thesis in Difference and 
Repetition [Différence et Répétition], trans. Paul Patton, Continuum Impacts, London 2004. “Ex-
piating” difference in oneself in order to return it to an Identity is the secret goal of all classical 
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“Direct” thought first breaks infinite value, the intransitivity (as Baudrillard 
would say) of each thing as it represents the effigy of the Whole. In this concep-
tion, the Whole has nothing to do with singular difference; rather, it is the exemp-
tion which, as concept, makes it inaccessible to all-consuming time and to the 
tumult of differences. It is thus normal that the universal initially embraces the 
character of the concept, when one extracts it from the “attachments”17 that still 
hold it in the singular situation and bind it to the singular thing. The process of 
secularization, as Detienne and Vernant discuss it in the Greek context,18 bears 
as much upon natural space as on public space; it has purely the same internal 
structure as the suppression of qualified places, as Aristotle also describes them, 
in favor of a Newtonian, universal, mathematizable space, where the spirit could 
go directly to its End, doing nothing but repeating its desire for absolute control. 
The world has become its region, and the mathematization of the real is the other 
side of an appropriation of every thing, freed from its rough, uneven, abrupt char-
acter. That which juts out, which does not offer a space suitable to the progress 
of theorems and armies, which causes, like the fact of Art, a thick-headed and 
undefined resistance: this is what Deleuze calls anhômalos (“anomalous”).
At the same time, how Kafka transforms both conceptual relations and all 
that allows or favors the domination of one thing over another, beginning with 
the moment when one thing confiscates another’s worth for its own benefit, 
tends to manifest a resistance. One sees this in his abandonment of metaphor, 
which can easily become the unnoticed accomplice of a discourse of assimilating 
mastery, as well as its metamorphic conversion. In the same spirit, he transfers 
conceptual links to physical and topographical relations: bodies and places. The 
Law engraves itself in the bloody furrows of solid flesh; imperceptible domina-
tion arises as a Castle; the difficulty of encountering others translates them into 
a bridge and routes whose going and return do not coincide; ever-present chaos 
philosophy, according to Deleuze. It is not coincidence that he encounters Kafka, Proust, and 
Bacon on his philosophical path, ex abrupto.
17 See Jean Piaget, The Origin of Intelligence in the Child: Selected Works, Volume 3, trans. Mar-
garet Cook, Routledge, London 1997 [1953], where, using the genetic method, he analyzes the 
constitution of the concept as that which dissociates itself and, more precisely, extracts itself 
from the context of “singular situations.”
18 Jean-Pierre Vernant, Myth and Thought among the Greeks [Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs], 
trans. Janet Lloyd with Jeff Fort, Zone Books, New York 2006, Part 3, “The Organization of Space,” 
157–262, and Part 7, Essay 17, “The Formation of Positivist Thought in Archaic Greece,” 371–398. 
See also Marcel Detienne, The Masters of Truth in Ancient Greece [Les Maîtres de vérité dans la 
Grèce archaïque], trans. Janet Lloyd, Urzone Books, New York 1996, chapter 5, “The Process of 
Secularization,” 89–106.
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produces holes in the walls of houses; the “universal philosophical problem” of 
choice becomes the boundless delaying of a “boxer’s attitude.”19 As all of this is 
sufficiently known and the references well documented, we need not dwell on it. 
Here, a case for interpretation presents itself, as well as a risk of confusion 
between the smooth and the striated and the line of flight, as Deleuze takes up 
the problem that preoccupies Kafka, in order to push it to its limits. Deleuze’s 
empiricism predisposes him to challenge general ideas, that is to say, the uni-
versal breaking the moorings of the real. But when, in transposing Riemann’s 
ideas, he creates the notion of “singularities” and reforms the “qualitative” into 
“intensive multiplicities,” he brings the critique of universal-unique thought to 
a point of enlightenment never before reached. The smooth is that which allows 
the fluxes to project themselves, without transcendent blockages, into an open 
space, the “plane of immanence.” It is there that the fluxes, encountering other 
fluxes, enter into syntheses and produce the “plane of composition” from which 
they derive their full power, while also composing both the virtual to which they 
have remained close and the current without which they would remain shapeless. 
Thus, the possibility for the fluxes to run unrestrained, to assume the shape that 
is closest to the speed of chaos while remaining actualized form, is “smooth.” The 
line of flight is the possibility for any system to open itself to “chaotic forms,” to 
run beyond itself, without spoiling in the slowing of a transcendence.20
This is not to say that this space, smooth as it may be, is uniform, like New-
tonian space. The smooth is ridged, because it is inhabited by infinite folds. Each 
of these folds is like Thom’s catastrophe, invisible if one does not look at it from 
the right angle. And yet “all turns” to this point. The singular heterogeneities, 
the haecceities, follow a path “of broken tones.” This plane of immanence and 
consistency is thus not “even”; it is filled with micro-tears and traps, with “man-
holes.”21 At every moment, it bends. And the bend, at the points of inversion and 
of doubling back, at the points where fluxes meet, summons the virtual and pro-
duces metamorphosis. The voice of the Kalda stationmaster changing into that of 
a wolf. A human thorax becomes fluid and knows what the body can do, while 
the wave becomes a surface carrying adventures and dreams, “heads that sing” 
19 See Kafka, Letters to Friends, Family and Editors, letter of 19 September 1907 to Hedwig W., 32, 
and letter of 22 September 1907 to Max Brod, 33.
20 We will attend to the extraordinary sense of speed and continuous movement in Kafka’s work.
21 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, “1914: One or Several Wolves?” in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia [Mille Plateaux, Capitalisme et Schizophrénie II], trans. Brian Mas-
sumi, Athlone Press, London 2000, 26–38.
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(Orpheus), birds of the calm between storms (Alcyon), drunken boats. A flux of a 
human thorax meets a flux of a wave: this constitutes an “event.”
Far from the universal, in full and bent singularity, the event is what occurs 
everywhere and always, the general (allgemein) yet fragmentary face of singularity. 
It is entirely constituted of singularities, of intensive multiplicities, which never 
return to the “same.” Therefore, if it can be put this way, it is “granulated,” as 
esteemed scholars Ruyer and Simondon have seen it (independently of Deleuze). 
These protruding grains explain the feeling that Kafka’s writing is shaky, uneven: 
“Almost every word I write jars against the next, I hear the consonants rub lead-
enly against each other.”22 In the same way, one understands why Kafka struggles 
to grasp correctly the “small shapes in a formless clamor.”23 For the goal, Truth, 
has nothing of the general or the universal. If dignity consists in “rais[ing] the 
world into the pure, the true, the immutable,”24 then to believe that these lines 
might indicate the dream of an ideal world would be pure wandering. The true: 
this is the paradoxical and heart-rending convergence of the “brilliant” detail and 
of the whole in which it has its place. Writing is the suffering construction of this 
convergence.
Death is uniform; life is net-like or granulated, yet continuous, of one piece. 
Yet these singular grains that so fascinate Deleuze and Hopkins, this Hopkinsian 
stain or speckling – constituted by all that is real, small as it may be – do not form 
any sort of striation. Striated space is charted by concepts and an idea of domina-
tion associated with an unfindable and transcendent End. Striated space is made 
of limits allowing the pinpointing of, the falling back on, a unique norm. Striation 
is the action of transcendence, which transforms any real place into a machine 
of war. Thus, the effort to spot the trap is constant for the one who “has an eye” 
on things or “is an eye, but what an eye!”: is it a matter of a grain like a quark or 
quanta of the “real,” of an “amorphous shape” giving speed and accelerating the 
singular fluxes, or of a micro-tower of Control?
We understand why Berkeley, Kafka, Bergson, Proust, Foucault, and Deleuze 
are minuti philosophi, “excavators of detail.” For, whether novelist or philoso-
pher, when one engages in this type of thought on singularity, one needs a keen 
eye to discern in the stoicheion the little bit of nothingness, which is nevertheless 
fundamental: whether it is a matter of a reply of the universal and of Universals 
(which it is advisable, by education and spirit of domination, to repeat so that the 
real “reaches up” to a Paradise) or of a grain of the real (irreducible and unattrib-
22 Kafka, The Diaries, 29, and the allusion to the “billowing overcoat,” 196.
23 Kafka, The Diaries, 171.
24 Kafka, The Diaries, 387.
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utable, which could join a flux and make of it a ball of life). This is what Kafka 
and Kierkegaard assimilate to a fall,25 and Deleuze to the fulguration of a lightning 
bolt.
These, then, are the general ideas and the universal laws that these philoso-
phers and artists, these philosopher-artists, have decided to eject from thought; 
they are the angulations, the fragments, which they have decided to return to 
real thought,26 thereby restoring an old direction of world thought, despised ever 
since, constricted, forgotten under platonic vitrification. Theoretically, this is pos-
sible, albeit on condition of finding again the resistant, “thick” singular, linked 
to the world as a whole. On condition of replacing a war against unity and against 
multiplicity – a war to the death, a war that destroys the world – with a secret 
“understanding” of these two “enemies,” each reinforcing the other in an invig-
orating fight. On condition of being on watch to verify ceaselessly in the singular 
the promise of life or the certainty of death. On condition of leading a constant 
battle in order to give back to words their freely inventive worth and their power of 
affect.27 Such would be the charter of singularity, always to be rewritten.
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Section 2: Before the Law

Eli Schonfeld
Am-ha’aretz: The Law of the Singular. 
Kafka’s Hidden Knowledge
It is not so much we who read Kafka’s words; it is they who read us. And find us blank.
– George Steiner, “A Note on Kafka’s ‘Trial’”1
1  Prologue
There is in Franz Kafka’s prose a density reminiscent of the literary quality found 
in the Scripture. In his letter to Gertrud Oppenheim dated 25 May 1927, Franz 
Rosenzweig writes: “The people who wrote the Bible seem to have thought of God 
in a way much like Kafka’s.”2 Theodor W. Adorno felt it too: paraphrasing the first 
words of Rashi’s3 commentary on the first verse of Genesis, he wrote of Kafka’s 
text: “Each sentence says: interpret me.” Adding, immediately after: “and none 
will permit it.”4 
Adorno’s observation applies first and foremost to Kafka’s parable “Before 
the Law” (“Vor dem Gesetz”), a text which, according to George Steiner, contains 
1 George Steiner, “A Note on Kafka’s ‘Trial,’” in No Passion Spent: Essays 1978–1995, Yale Univer-
sity Press, New Haven and London 1996, 239–252, 251.
2 Quoted by Martin Buber in “The How and Why of Our Bible Translation,” in Martin Buber 
and Franz Rosenzweig, Scripture and Translation [Die Schrift und ihre Verdeutschung], trans. 
Lawrence Rosenwald with Everett Fox, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 
1994, 205–219, 219.
3 Rabbi Shlomo Itzhaki, the major eleventh-century French commentator of the Hebrew bible 
and the Talmud. 
4 Theodor W. Adorno, “Notes on Kafka” (“Aufzeichnungen zu Kafka”), in Prisms [Prismen: Kul-
turkritik Und Gesellschaft], trans. Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber, MIT Press, Cambridge 1982, 
243–271, 246. 
This study is the fruit of an ongoing discussion which I have had the good fortune to have with 
Professor Vivian Liska over the past few years. My reading of Kafka’s “Before the Law” would 
not have been possible without this exchange. Even though our ways are not the same, I believe 
they meet at more than one crossroad. I am also thankful to Professor Moshe Halbertal and the 
Berkowitz Fellowship at New York University Law School, during which this work was completed.
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“the nucleus of the novel [The Trial] and of Kafka’s vision.”5 This is one of the 
most if not the single most commented upon of Kafka’s texts. We approach it with 
fear and trembling, intimidated and vulnerable: “Helplessness seizes one face to 
face with this page and a half,”6 notes Steiner. Has everything not already been 
said, been written, been thought, about this text? Like a detective, the commenta-
tor seeks a new clue; he searches for the key that will once and for all resolve the 
enigma, unveil the mystery that hides so secretively within its depths. A mystery 
which we know everything depends upon. My reader might skeptically wonder at 
the discovery of yet another interpretation of “Before the Law”: “What more can 
be added?” he asks himself. And he may be right. Perhaps nothing new can be 
said here; perhaps nothing original is to be added. Perhaps the gates of interpre-
tation are henceforth sealed. We may have arrived too late. 
But before this text, do we not always already come too late? Are we not, 
by definition, latecomers? Has not the doorkeeper always already shut the door? 
The moment one realizes there is nothing to add to this text might be the very 
moment one realizes that, from the start, this text, though soliciting interpreta-
tion, in fact defies interpretation. We are indeed seized by helplessness. Equally 
impotent before this text, the first reading equals the last reading, because strictly 
speaking there is no first and no last here. No one comes better equipped, better 
prepared. Before this text, as before the law, we find ourselves equally exposed, 
equally empty, without resources. Before this text, we find ourselves, exactly like 
the story’s protagonist, the countryman, the Mann vom Lande: ignorant. And 
from this position the text inspires us infinitely. Something is revealed. Yet we do 
not know exactly what, or why. We are ignorant, from the beginning to the end. 
Ignorance will therefore be my gateway into this story. 
5 Steiner, “A Note on Kafka’s ‘Trial,’” 250. “Before the Law” was first published in the 1915 New 
Year’s edition of the Jewish weekly Selbstwehr. In 1919 the text was included in A Country Doctor 
(“Ein Landarzt”) and Kafka later introduced it in chapter 9 of The Trial, published posthumously. 
A brief synopsis of this parable: a countryman, arriving at the door of the law, requests access 
to it. The doorkeeper denies entry to the countryman, telling him that he cannot enter now. The 
countryman waits here for months and years, and eventually spends his life in front of the door, 
trying to persuade the doorkeeper to allow him entrance. Just before dying, the countryman asks 
the doorkeeper to answer him one question: I have been sitting here all these years, he says to 
the doorkeeper, yet how is it that nobody else tried to access the law? To this, the doorkeeper 
answers: this door was meant only for you; when you die I will shut it and go. 
6 Steiner, “A Note on Kafka’s ‘Trial,’” 250.
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2  Am-ha’aretz
“Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. A man from the country [Mann vom Lande] 
comes to this doorkeeper and requests admittance to the Law.”7 These are the 
first two sentences of Kafka’s “Before the Law.” The protagonist of the story has 
no proper name: he is simply a Mann vom Lande, a countryman, or, more liter-
ally, a man from the land, from the soil. For an ear versed in Jewish texts, the 
term evokes a well-known figure: the Talmudic figure of the am-ha’aretz.8 The 
term am-ha’aretz means, literally, the people (am) from the earth (ha’aretz). In the 
book of Ezra, the am-ha’aretz is opposed to the am Yehuda, the people of Judah.9 
In rabbinic literature the figure came to be associated with the bur, the ignorant 
person, and more precisely the person ignorant of the law. Hillel the Sage states, 
in the Sayings of the Fathers: “A bur cannot be sin-fearing, an am-ha’aretz cannot 
be pious.”10 Even though there are contradicting opinions in the Talmud as to the 
nature of the am-ha’aretz,11 this acceptation eventually became the most current 
7 Franz Kafka, The Trial [Der Process], trans. Breon Mitchell, Schocken Books, New York 1998, 
215.
8 The first to have drawn attention to the affinities between Kafka’s Mann vom Lande and the 
Hebrew am-ha’aretz was Heinz Polizer in 1966: “Yet in spite of the fact that the description ‘the 
man from the country’ hardly seems appropriate at first, it begins to fit K. as soon as it is trans-
lated into its Hebrew equivalent am-ha’aretz. Kafka was familiar at least with the Yiddish version 
of the word, amhoretz; since 1911 he had occupied himself intensively with Jewish and Yiddish 
folklore, and the expression actually occurs in the diaries late in November this year.” See Heinz 
Politzer, Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and New York 1966, 
174. This reference has since been quoted routinely in the literature on Kafka’s “Before the Law.” 
9 See the book of Ezra, 4, 4–5.
10 See: Sayings of the Fathers (2:6) (my rendering). E. E. Urbach remarks that in this passage 
bur – ignorant – and am-ha’aretz, are one and the same thing (cf. Ephraim E. Urbach, The Sages: 
Their Concepts and Beliefs, trans. Israel Abrahams, Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, Jeru-
salem 1975, 585). For a broad survey of the figure of the am-ha’aretz in rabbinic literature, see 
Urbach, The Sages, 630–648. For a sociological account of the role of the am-ha’aretz, see Louis 
Finkelstein, The Pharisees: The Sociological Background of Their Faith, The Jewish Publication 
Society of America, Philadelphia 1966, 24–37. 
11 Some of these opinions suggest that the am-ha’aretz is not necessarily one who is ignorant. 
In tractate Berakoth, for instance, we learn: “Our Rabbis taught: Who is an am ha’aretz? Anyone 
who does not recite the Shema’ evening and morning. This is the view of R. Eliezer. R. Joshua 
says: Anyone who does not put on tefillin. Ben Azzai says: Anyone who has not a fringe on his 
garment. R. Nathan says: Anyone who has not a mezuzah on his door. R. Nathan b. Joseph says: 
Anyone who has sons and does not bring them up to the study of the Torah. Others say: Even if 
one has learnt Scripture and Mishnah, if he has not ministered to the disciples of the wise, he 
is an am ha’arez. R. Huna said: The halachah is as laid down by ‘Others’” (Babylonian Talmud: 
Tractate Berakoth, trans. Maurice Simon, Soncino Press, London 1984, 47b). The first definition 
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one, making its way into Jewish folklore and Yiddish culture (amhorez  – the 
Yiddish pronunciation of am-ha’aretz – refers in Yiddish to someone ignorant in 
religious matters). Kafka knew both the Talmudic and the Yiddish usage of the 
term. In his diary entry of 29 November 1911, he combines the two and writes: 
From the Talmud: when a scholar goes to meet his bride, he should take an amhorez along, 
because, immersed that he is in his study, he will not discern the essential.
[Aus dem Talmud: Geht ein Gelehrter auf Brautschau, so soll er sich einem amhorez mitneh-
men, da er zu sehr in seine Gelehrsamkeit versenkt das Notwendige nicht merken würde.]12 
Kafka does not quote the Talmudic passage accurately: in tractate Baba Bathra 
we learn: 
Abaye said: A scholar [talmid chacham] who desires to betroth a woman should take with 
him a layman [am-ha’aretz] [so that another woman] might [not] be substituted for her [who 
would be taken away] from him. 
[Amar abaye: hai tsurba mi-rabanan de-azil li-kedoushe iteta nidbar am-ha’aretz behedia, 
dilma michluphu lei minei.]13 
The very passage where Kafka evokes the Talmudic am-ha’aretz is one that testi-
fies to his own am aratzut, to his own ignorance. Kafka is an am-ha’aretz. But, as 
I will try to demonstrate here, his ignorance is not an ordinary one: it is an igno-
rance conscious of itself. It is, in a way, a Socratic ignorance. An ignorance that 
hides knowledge: like Socrates, who knows he does not know, Kafka, through 
his ignorance, possesses a deep, hidden knowledge. This hidden knowledge 
is the knowledge of this ignorance without which it is impossible to depict the 
Mann vom Lande in front of the door of the Law as Kafka does in his parable. This 
of the am-ha’aretz is thus not ignorance; rather, it refers to disrespect of certain commandments 
or customs. Nevertheless, there are Talmudic sources that clearly define the am-ha’aretz as the 
non-scholarly individual, as the one who does not study Torah. In Tractate Pesahim, for instance, 
we learn: “It was taught, Rabbi said: An am ha’aretz may not eat the flesh of cattle, for it is said: 
‘This is the law [Torah] of the beast, and the fowl.’ (Lev. XI, 46) Whoever engages in [the study of] 
the Torah may eat the flesh of beast and fowl, but he who does not engage in [the study of] the 
Torah may not eat the flesh of beast and fowl” (Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Pesahim, trans. H. 
Freedman, Soncino Press, London 1983, 49b).
12 Franz Kafka, The Diaries: 1910–1913, trans. Joseph.Kresh, Schocken Books, New York 1976, 
166 (translation slightly modified).
13 Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba Bathra (Volume 2), trans. Israel W. Slotki, Soncino Press, 
London 1976, 168a.
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hidden knowledge must be unveiled in order for us to truly hear what “Before the 
Law” teaches. 
Who is the am-ha’aretz? In the Talmud, this figure is occasionally character-
ized as the one who does not follow the rules of purity. The law applies to him, 
yet he does not live according to the law. This is not due to heresy, however: the 
am-ha’aretz is not a miscreant, an infidel (a kofer or an apikores). He is disobedi-
ent not because he rejects the divine origin of the law or the truth of prophecy, 
but rather because, simply, he does not know, because he is ignorant. The one 
who knows the law and disrespects it, who has studied the law and turned his 
back to it, has a different name in the Talmud: this is the shana ve-piresh, the one 
who has studied the Torah and abandoned it (and whose hatred of the scholar of 
the law is said to be greater than the hatred of the am-ha’aretz towards the talmid 
chacham14). The am-ha’aretz is not this kind of person. He, again, is ignorant of 
the law. Yet the principle is known: Ignorantia legis neminem excusat, ignorance 
of the law excuses no one. Ignorance does not free anyone from the authority 
of the law. In the Talmud tractate Baba Mezia we learn: “the am-ha’aretz, his 
intentional sins (zedonot) are accounted to him as unwitting errors (shegagot).”15 
In ignorance, there is still a relation to the commandment. Ignorance is not an 
escape from the law; it is a particular modality of it. In the words of the Talmud: 
it is a relation characterized by the fact that intentional sins are seen as if they 
are non-intentional. This is the singular position of the am-ha’aretz: he is in rela-
tion to the law without understanding the nature of this relation. His ignorance 
is characterized not only by the fact that he does not know the law, but also, and 
mainly, by the fact that he does not know what it implies to be before the law.16 
He is ignorant of the meaning of being-before-the-law. He is, nevertheless, and 
perhaps more so than anyone else, before the law. 
The Mann vom Lande is the am-ha’aretz, the ignorant. In the Talmud, he is 
systematically opposed to the talmid chacham, the scholar of the law, or, more lit-
erally, the wise pupil. In Kafka’s text, the am-ha’aretz stands before the Türhüter, 
14 Cf. Tractate Pesahim 49b: “It was taught: He who has studied and then abandoned [the Torah] 
[hates the scholar] more than all of them” (The Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Pesahim, 49b). 
15 Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba Mezia, trans. H Freedman, Soncino Press, London 1986, 
33b
16 This is the only way to understand the end of the passage in tractate Berakoth (see supra 
footnote 11) according to which “even if one has learnt Scripture and Mishnah, if he has not 
ministered to the wise disciple [talmid chacham], he is an am ha’aretz.” In other words: the am-
ha’aretz is not necessarily ignorant of the law (he knows Scriptures and Mishnah), but ignorant 
of what it means to stand before the law: he was never in an existential relation with the master 
(Rav), with the true scholar of the Torah. He never served him. 
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the doorkeeper. Like the talmid chacham, the doorkeeper guards the law  – he 
surrounds the law with a fence.17 In order to better understand the am-ha’aretz, 
we should look closer at his counterpart, the talmid chacham. What is the knowl-
edge that characterizes the talmid chacham, the knowledge that the am-ha’aretz 
lacks? What precisely is the knowledge of the wise pupil? Answer: the talmid 
chacham does not possess a specific knowledge; instead, he possesses the art of 
study, the art of limoud. He knows how to study. He is familiar with the particular 
dialectics involved in Talmudic learning, a dialectics which shape his relation to 
the law and constitute his relation to the divine. This relation is not one of blind 
obedience before the authority of the law or even before its divine origin. It is a 
dialectical relation – or, even better, a dia-logical relation – the ultimate goal of 
which is to make sense of our existence in the world. For the wise pupil, therefore, 
Torah – the object of his learning, of his limoud – never simply amounts to law (as 
the translation of the Septuagint (nomos), the Vulgate (lex), or Luther’s (Gesetz) 
suggests). Stated more precisely: the knowledge of the talmid chacham is the 
knowledge of the difference between law and Torah (teaching), between a formal 
legal system, which creates order by disciplining its subjects through coercion 
and power, and a teaching through which the world makes sense. The wise pupil 
knows the difference between Torah and nomos, between Torah and lex, between 
Torah and Gesetz. And this is precisely the knowledge that the am-ha’aretz lacks. 
Therefore, the am-ha’aretz is before the law: “Vor dem Gesetz.” In Kafka’s parable 
we are, from the start – indeed, before even having started – placed in the horizon 
of the ignorant, of the am-ha’aretz. 
It is here that Walter Benjamin’s reading of Kafka becomes extremely pre-
cious. In what can be considered among his most surprising insights into Kafka, 
Benjamin claims – against Gershom Scholem – that following the theme of the 
law in Kafka does not lead anywhere. In his 11 August 1934 letter to Scholem, 
Benjamin writes: 
17 These are the opening lines of the Sayings of the Jewish Fathers: “Moses received the Torah 
from Sinai, and he delivered it to Joshua, and Joshua to the elders, and the elders to the proph-
ets, and the prophets delivered it to the men of the Great Synagogue. They said three things: Be 
deliberate in judgment; and raise up many disciples; and make a fence to the Torah.” See Sayings 
of the Jewish Fathers, Comprising Pirqe Aboth in Hebrew and English with Notes and Excursuses, 
trans. Charles Taylor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1897, 11.
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I consider Kafka’s constant insistence on the Law to be the point where his work comes to 
a standstill, which only means to say that it seems to me that the work cannot be moved in 
any interpretative direction whatsoever from there.18 
For Benjamin, focusing on the theme of the law in Kafka leads to an impasse. 
In his letter of 12 November 1934 to Werner Kraft, Benjamin reiterates this idea, 
adding a crucial point: 
He [Scholem] reproached me with passing over Kafka’s notion of the “laws” [Kafka’s Begriff 
der Gesetze]. At some later time, I will attempt to demonstrate why the concept of the “laws” 
in Kafka – as opposed to the concept of “Lehre” – has a predominantly illusory character 
and is actually a decoy [eine Attrappe].19
The concept of law leads to an impasse, writes Benjamin, and adds: in contrast 
to the concept of Lehre (im Gegensatz zum Begriff der “Lehre”). While most com-
mentators have focused on Benjamin’s negative claim concerning the law in his 
letters to Scholem and Kraft, his positive claim is just as important, if not more 
so: rather than focusing on law, Benjamin states, one should attend to the theme 
of Lehre in Kafka’s writing. Law would only be a simulacrum, a decoy, whose orig-
inal is Lehre. This is a mostly inspiring statement, whose implications I will try 
to deploy here. At least one thing is clear: according to Benjamin, in Kafka one 
should distinguish between law and Lehre. Is this distinction similar to the talmid 
chacham’s distinction between law and Torah? That is the question. 
18 Walter Benjamin, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin: 1910–1940, eds. Gershom Scholem 
and Theodor W. Adorno, trans. M. R. Jacobson and E. M. Jacobson, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago 1994, 453.
19 Benjamin, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin: 1910–1940, 463. In the quotations from 
Benjamin I will henceforth intentionally refrain from translating the term Lehre, because the 
question of how to translate this term is at the heart of my study. The existing translations of 
Lehre alternate between “doctrine” and “teaching.” 
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3  What is Lehre? Walter Benjamin’s Reflections 
on “Before the Law”20
One thing is certain: Lehre, for Benjamin, is not Gesetz, law. What is it positively? 
In his notes from “Versuch eines Schemas zu Kafka” (“Tentative Outline on 
Kafka”) Benjamin procures a first answer: 
Haggadah is the name that the Jews give to the stories and anecdotes of the Talmud that 
serve as explanations and confirmations of the Lehre – the Halachah.21
And in “Franz Kafka: Beim Bau der Chinesischen Mauer,” Benjamin reiterates this 
saying: “We may remind ourselves here of the form of the Haggadah, the name 
the Jews have given to the rabbinical stories and anecdotes that serve to explicate 
and confirm the Lehre – the Halachah.”22 We have here a firsthand translation 
of Lehre: for Benjamin, it stands for Halachah. Before pursuing this clue, I will 
formulate a first consequence stemming from this translation. If Lehre means 
Halachah, and if Lehre is to be distinguished from Gesetz, then we can at least 
posit that for Benjamin Halachah is not Gesetz, that is, Halachah is not law. This 
consequence will reveal itself to be of uttermost importance for the understand-
ing of Benjamin’s texts on Kafka. 
But we still do not know what Lehre actually means. Benjamin offers a 
description of what Haggadah is  – those Talmudic stories and anecdotes that 
explain and confirm Lehre-Halachah – yet he does not explain what Lehre posi-
20 In this part I am not trying to procure a synthesis of Benjamin’s reading of Kafka or of Kafka’s 
role in Benjamin’s thinking. Instead, I propose to elucidate Benjamin’s intuition about the im-
portance of Lehre in Kafka through a close reading of selected Benjamin texts that relate – direct-
ly or indirectly – to Kafka’s “Before the Law.” For an extensive analysis of Benjamin’s 1934 text 
on Kafka and the meaning of Law in it, see Rodolphe Gashé’s excellent article: “Kafka’s Law: In 
the Field of Forces between Judaism and Hellenism,” in MLN 117.5 (2002), Comparative Literature 
Issue, 971–1002. Nevertheless, though Benjamin’s intuition about the irrelevance of the law in 
Kafka (in his letters to Scholem and to Kraft) is central to Gashé’s reading (see pages 972 and 
997), he does not account for the alternative that Benjamin proposes to law in Kafka in his letter 
to Kraft (that is, Lehre). 
21 Walter Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften [Collected Writings], Vol. II:3, eds. Rolf Tiedemann 
and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1977, 1204.
22 Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: Beim Bau der Chinesischen Mauer,” trans. Rodney Living-
stone, in Selected Writings, Volume 2: 1931–1934, eds. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and 
Gary Smith, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1999, 494–500, 496.
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tively is.23 We have a clue, at least: Lehre is Halachah. And as we will see, through-
out his Kafka texts, Benjamin is entirely consistent in his use of the term Lehre, 
maintaining systematically the equation Lehre=Halachah. He does this especially 
in the texts where he compares Kafka’s relation to Lehre to the relation between 
Halachah and Haggadah. In order to approach the dimension of Lehre in Kafka, 
let us look closer at these texts. 
The most suggestive version of this comparison is in Benjamin’s letter of 12 
June 1938 to Scholem:
They [Kafka’s parables] don’t simply lie down at the feet of Lehre, the way Haggadah lies 
down at the feet of Halachah. Having crouched down, they unexpectedly cuff Lehre with a 
weighty paw.24 
In its normal state, the Haggadah simply lies before Halachah, explains Ben-
jamin: Haggadah is at the service of Halachah. Just as in his “Versuch eines 
Schemas zu Kafka,” Haggadah serves Halachhah, by explaining and confirming 
it. Is this the relation to Lehre that is found in Kafka’s texts? Benjamin answers: 
no. The Haggadah-Halachah relation is brought up here in order to contrast it 
with Kafka’s texts and their relation to Lehre: his texts, contrarily to Haggadah, 
do not submit peacefully to Halachah, that is, “They don’t simply lie down at the 
23 I will follow here Benjamin’s understanding of the relation between Haggadah–Halachah 
without questioning it, although his presentation is simplistic and fails to account for the nu-
anced way haggadah and halachah interact in the Talmud. Benjamin’s sources are unclear. In 
his correspondence, he repeatedly asks Scholem for a copy of Bialik’s essay “Halacha and Agga-
dah,” but it is difficult to determine whether Benjamin received this text by the time he wrote his 
Kafka essay (there is no mention in the correspondence of Benjamin thanking Scholem for hav-
ing sent Bialik’s text). Nevertheless, bearing in mind Bialik’s extremely sensible phenomenology 
of the relation between Halachah and Haggadah in his essay, it is highly improbable that Benja-
min read his text. For instance, from Bialik’s text, it is impossible to deduce that Haggadah is at 
the service of Halachah (see Haim Nahman Bialik, “Halacha and Aggadah,” trans. Leon. Simon, 
in Revealment and Concealment: Five Essays, Ibis Editions, Jerusalem 2000, 45–87). For a schol-
arly discussion of the nature of Haggadah and its relation to Halachah, see Joseph Heinemann, 
“The Nature of the Aggadah,” trans. Marc Bregman, in Midrash and Literature, eds. Geoffrey H. 
Hartman and Sanford Budick, Yale University Press, New Haven 1986, 41–54; Moshe Simon-Sho-
shan’s introduction to his Stories of the Law: Narrative Discourse and the Construction of Authority 
in the Mishnah, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012; and Berachyahu Lifshitz, “Aggadah Versus 
Haggadah: Towards a More Precise Understanding of the Distinction,” in Dine Yisrael 24 (2007), 
11–29 of the English section.
24 Walter Benjamin, “Letter to Gershom Scholem on Franz Kafka,” trans. Edmund Jephcott, in 
Selected Writings, Volume 3: 1935–1938, eds. Edmund Jephcott and Howard Eiland, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 2002, 322–329, 326.
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feet of Lehre.” Kafka’s texts and their relation to Lehre are not repetitions of the 
Haggadah-Halachah relationship. Instead, declares Benjamin, Kafka’s parables 
raise a weighty paw against Lehre. 
In order to understand this comparison – which is in fact an opposition – and 
the metaphor with which it ends we must return to the beginning of Benjamin’s 
reasoning. The theme of Benjamin’s text from which the paw metaphor is taken 
concerns the relation between truth, tradition, and transmissibility. Reflecting on 
the origins of Kafka’s world, Benjamin writes: 
The sole basis for his experience was the tradition to which he wholeheartedly subscribed 
[…] Kafka listened attentively to tradition – and he who strains to listen does not see.25 
What is this tradition that constitutes the sole basis of Kafka’s experience? Two 
answers are possible: Judaism and literature. Perhaps both are true, and even 
interconnected: Judaism as literature or literature as Judaism. For reasons that 
will become clear, I will suppose that Benjamin is referring here to Judaism. Kafka 
listened with extreme attention to this tradition, that is, to Judaism. But why this 
extreme attention, why this great effort, which, according to Benjamin, cost Kafka 
his eyesight? Benjamin answers: 
This listening requires great effort because only indistinct messages reach the listener [nur 
Undeutlichstes zum Lauscher dringt]. There is no Lehre to be learned, no knowledge [Wissen] 
to be preserved. What are caught flitting by are snatches of things not meant for any ear.26 
Vague, indistinct, shattered messages reach Kafka, as if through a heavy fog: no 
distinct Lehre, no distinct knowledge to which he has access. He is doomed to 
ignorance. Why did no distinct Lehre reach him? Benjamin answers: because this 
tradition to which Kafka is attentive is a broken tradition, an interrupted tradi-
tion, a tradition experiencing a crisis of transmission, or, in Benjamin’s terms, a 
sickening of tradition, eine Erkrankung der Tradition.27 This sickness results from 
the loss of a certain form of truth particular to tradition, that is, wisdom. Or, as 
Benjamin puts it: the loss of truth in its haggadic consistency: 
Wisdom has sometimes been defined as the epic side of truth. Wisdom is thus characterized 
as an attribute of tradition; it is truth in its haggadic consistency. This consistency of truth 
has been lost.28
25 Benjamin, “Letter to Gershom Scholem on Franz Kafka,” 326. 
26 Benjamin, “Letter to Gershom Scholem on Franz Kafka,” 326. 
27 Benjamin, “Letter to Gershom Scholem on Franz Kafka,” 326.
28 Benjamin, “Letter to Gershom Scholem on Franz Kafka,” 326.
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Let us try to understand this dense text. Two years before his letter to Scholem, it 
was Benjamin himself, in “The Storyteller” (“Der Erzähler”), who defined wisdom 
as the epic aspect of truth: “Counsel woven into the fabric of real life is wisdom. 
The art of storytelling is nearing its end because the epic side of truth – wisdom – 
is dying out.”29 Truth expressed in an epic form is wisdom, which Benjamin, in 
“The Storyteller,” links to the oral dimension. Transmitted orally, wisdom – the 
epic form of truth – becomes an “attribute of tradition” (and not, for instance, of 
pure thinking, of philosophy). And it is here that Benjamin, switching registers, 
turns to Talmudic categories: wisdom is truth in its haggadic consistency. This is 
what has been lost. The crisis of tradition is first and foremost a crisis of transmis-
sion, that is, a crisis of wisdom. And the proposition can be inverted: the crisis of 
transmission is the crisis of tradition. And this is what preoccupies Kafka: accord-
ing to Benjamin, Kafka does not worry about truth as such, but rather about 
wisdom, this particular modality through which truth can be transmitted (and 
not simply proven). The genius of Kafka, according to Benjamin, is that having 
understood this he made a decision: to save transmissibility, not truth. 
This consistency of truth has been lost. Kafka was by no means the first to be confronted 
with this realization. Many had come to terms with it in their own way – clinging to truth, 
or what they believed to be truth, and, heavyhearted or not, renouncing its transmissibility. 
Kafka’s genius lay in the fact that he tried something altogether new: he gave up truth so 
that he could hold on to its transmissibility, the haggadic element.30 
Kafka’s fundamental decision, according to Benjamin: to sacrifice truth in order 
to save transmissibility. Yet to separate the consistency of truth from truth itself 
means to separate form and content, and to choose form over content. Hence 
the form adopted by Kafka’s prose: not simply the parable – which always has 
a meaning, a content – but the more-than-the-parable. As Benjamin notes, “His 
works are by nature parables. But their poverty and their beauty consist in their 
need to be more than parables.”31 It is in order to formulate this “more than,” 
this surplus of Kafka’s parable, that Benjamin addresses the Haggadah-Halachah 
relation and the metaphor of the menacing paw. Kafka’s more-than-parables 
raise a menacing paw to Lehre. This very Lehre that did not reach Kafka, that tra-
dition failed to transmit. Why does Kafka’s prose “unexpectedly cuff Lehre with 
29 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller: Observations on the Works of Nikolai Leskov” (“Der Er-
zähler: Betrachtungen zum Werk Nikolai Lesskows”), trans. Harry Zohn, in Selected Writings, 
Volume 3: 1935–1938, 143–166, 146.
30 Benjamin, “Letter to Gershom Scholem on Franz Kafka,” 326.
31 Benjamin, “Letter to Gershom Scholem on Franz Kafka,” 326.
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a weighty paw”? In order to ensure transmissibility. For this to be possible, the 
haggadic consistency of truth – and not truth itself – should be able to deploy 
itself entirely, without any hindrance from Lehre. In this way, and only in this 
way, Lehre has a chance – surprisingly – to reemerge. 
In order to understand this we should turn to one last text: Benjamin’s text on 
Kafka published on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Prague author’s 
death. In this text, and more precisely in the passage contending with “Before 
the Law,” Benjamin addresses the question of the nature of Kafka’s parables. And 
again, he evokes Haggadah and Halachah.
The word unfolding has a double meaning. A bud unfolds into a blossom, but the boat 
which one teaches children to make by folding paper unfolds into a flat sheet of paper. 
This second kind of ‘unfolding’ is really appropriate to parable; the reader takes pleasure 
in smoothing it out so that he has the meaning on the palm of his hand. Kafka’s parables, 
however, unfold in the first sense, the way a bud turns into a blossom. That is why their 
effect is literary. This does not mean that his prose pieces belong entirely in the tradition of 
Western prose forms; they have, rather, a relationship to religious teachings similar to the 
one Haggadah has to Halachah […] but do we have the Lehre which Kafka’s parables accom-
pany and which K.’s posture and the gestures of his animals clarify? It does not exist.32 
Unlike other parables, Kafka’s parables unfold the way a bud turns into a 
blossom. Each opens up little by little, expanding more and more, revealing its 
potentialities while never disclosing its mystery. The meaning never discloses 
itself smoothly in the palm of the reader’s hand, it never become transparent. 
This lack of transparency, the fact that no concealed truth is ever disclosed, is 
what singularizes the literary effect of Kafka’s parables. An effect on the border 
of literature: Kafka’s texts still belong to literature, to the history of literature, 
to the literary tradition, says Benjamin, but not entirely. A part of them belongs 
to another tradition: they have “a relation to religious teachings similar to the 
one Haggadah has to Halachah.” Again, for Benjamin, Kafka’s parables are to 
be understood in light of Talmudic categories: Haggadah and Halachah. Without 
concealing the fundamental difference between the two: in Kafka’s case, unlike 
the case of the Haggadah-Halachah relation, Halachah is absent, Lehre is lost. 
Hence the strange situation of Kafka’s parables: they incarnate all the properties 
of Haggadah except one, the most essential: they have lost their message. They 
are clarifications of a lost, absent, Lehre. They are like buds unfolding – ad infini-
32 Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death” (“Franz Kafka: Zur 
zehnten Wiederkehr seines Todestages”), trans. Harry Zohn, in Selected Writings, Volume 2: 
1931–1934, 794–818, 802–803.
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tum – into blossoms. The haggadic consistency of truth and not truth: it is only at 
that cost that Kafka’s more-than-parables can assure transmissibility. 
And yet, even though Lehre does not exist as such in Kafka’s more-than-para-
bles, it ultimately emerge in an original form, through its absence: 
All that we can say is that here and there we have an allusion to it [Lehre]. Kafka might have 
said that these are relics transmitting the Lehre, although we could just as well regard them 
as precursors preparing the Lehre.33 
Lehre is lost, and yet, in Kafka’s parables we find allusions to it: relics from the 
past, “transmitting the teachings,” or precursors, announcing the future, “pre-
paring the teachings.” It is as if by choosing transmissibility Kafka unintention-
ally, as by inadvertence, attains the dimension of Lehre. This Lehre would be of an 
extraordinary nature: ironically, it would be accessible through ignorance. Only 
through ignorance. 
Benjamin’s lesson is fundamental: in Kafka there is a difference between 
Gesetz and Lehre. To distinguish between them allows one to recognize Kafka’s 
choice: transmissibility instead of truth (a choice to be understood in light of the 
Talmudic categories of Haggadah and Halachah). Inspired by this insight I wish 
to return to Kafka’s “Before the Law,” pushing the analysis further, eventually 
beyond Benjamin.
4  Before the Law
For the Jew, in so far as he is not detached from the origin, even the most exposed Jew like 
Kafka is safe.34
The am-ha’aretz stands before the law. He stands there because Lehre is lost, 
because tradition is in crisis, because truth was preferred over transmissibility. 
He stands before the law – and yet he will ultimately hear a meaningful word. 
Lehre, through its absence, in-forms Kafka’s writing. The task of the reader is to 
unveil what the Lehre of Kafka’s text, through its absence, transmits. 
The am-ha’aretz’s starting point is a false knowledge: “The man from the 
country has not anticipated such difficulties: the Law should be accessible to 
33 Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death,” 803.
34 Martin Buber, Two Types of Faith [Zwei Glaubensweisen], trans. Norman P. Goldhawk, Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, London 1951, 168.
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anyone at any time, he thinks.”35 The am-ha’aretz imagines the law as universal. 
This is what he was always told. This is what reason, or simple common sense, 
seems to imply. The man from the country thinks the law is there, once and for all, 
immobile and indifferent, always open to everyone but addressing nobody spe-
cifically. It is a universal and objective law. The man’s first surprise: the law is not 
what he thought it was; it is neither universal nor objective. From the start, the 
final teaching (“this door was meant solely for you”36) is suggested, through the 
am-ha’aretz’s surprised ignorance. He will have to journey a long way before that 
hidden knowledge will appear in full light. He will have to spend an entire life in 
front of the doors of the law for this truth to be revealed. And for this to happen, 
he will need a partner: the doorkeeper. 
The doorkeeper, like the am-ha’aretz, stands at the threshold of the law. Yet 
his position is different from the am-ha’aretz’s: whereas the am-ha’aretz faces 
the door of the law, the doorkeeper has the law at his back. The am-ha’aretz has 
come to the law, yet the doorkeeper was always already there, as if waiting for 
the countryman since times immemorial. And mainly: whereas the am-ha’aretz 
is ignorant, the doorkeeper knows. His knowledge is the knowledge of time and 
the knowledge of the singular. His knowledge of time is the knowledge of the 
appropriate moment: “jetzt aber nicht” – not yet, not now, says he to the man of 
the country.37 Those words contain a promise. It is as if he whispers in the coun-
tryman’s ear: be patient, your waiting is not in vain, do not worry, one day you 
will eventually reach the law, but now is not that time. The doorkeeper possesses 
the knowledge of time; he knows the virtue of patience. Moreover, he knows how 
to maintain the am-ha’aretz in this fruitful tension which will, eventually, allow 
the man of the country to arrive at his destination. Like Socrates’s daimon, this 
half-human half-divine creature, Kafka’s doorkeeper possesses the wisdom of the 
appropriate moment (kairos, in Greek). The daimon restrains Socrates; he does 
not allow him to follow his inclinations (for instance, to address Alcibiades38) 
until the moment is ripe. His main function is to say: not now. And like Socrates’s 
daimon, who cares only for one soul (that of Socrates), the doorkeeper likewise 
35 Kafka, The Trial, 215–216.
36 Kafka, The Trial, 216.
37 Kafka, The Trial, 215. 
38 In the prologue of the First Alcibiade, Socrates confesses to Alcibiade: “I have not spoken one 
word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain spiritual 
opposition [daimonion] of whose power you shall be informed at some later time. However, it 
now opposes me no longer, so I have come to you, as you see. And I am in good hopes that it will 
not oppose me again in the future” (Plato, First Alcibiades, trans. W. R. M. Lamb, Loeb Classical 
Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1979, 98–99 [103 a–b]).
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cares for only one soul: the soul of the am-ha’aretz. Standing between the law and 
the am-ha’aretz, he is there for the am-ha’aretz. He too spends his life waiting. 
Watching over the am-ha’aretz’s door, he is in fact watching over the am-ha’aretz. 
He cares for the am-ha’aretz, warning him that there are other doors to come, 
with more powerful doorkeepers, so powerful that even he (the first doorkeeper) 
would not endure the mere sight of the third doorkeeper. And the doorkeeper is 
unconcerned that nobody save the man from the country has tried to enter the 
gates of the law during all these years. Exactly as the door itself, he is there for the 
am-ha’aretz. The only difference is that he knows this. And therefore it is he who 
liberates the am-ha’aretz: “this door was meant solely for you.”39 
“Not now” and “this door was meant solely for you.” These are the two fun-
damental sayings of the doorkeeper. These are the two sayings that make sense. 
In chapter nine of The Trial, the priest, having just related the parable to Joseph 
K., engage him in a discussion about the meaning of the parable. The ecclesiastic 
says: 
The story contains two important statements by the doorkeeper concerning admittance to 
the Law, one at the beginning and one at the end. The one passage says: “that he can’t 
grant him admission now”; and the other: “this entrance was meant solely for you.” If a 
contradiction existed between these two statements you would be right, and the doorkeeper 
would have deceived the man. But there is no contradiction. On the contrary, the first state-
ment implies the other.40
The first statement echoes the second; it implies the other: the science of the 
appropriate moment is the science of the singular. And the knowledge of the sin-
gular is the knowledge of the appropriate moment.41 The temporal singularity 
(kairos) and the existential singularity (this door was meant for you, only for you) 
39 Kafka, The Trial, 217.
40 Kafka, The Trial, 217–218.
41 The prologue of Plato’s First Alcibiades enacts exactly this link: “In your younger days, to 
be sure, before you had built such high hopes, the god, as I believe, prevented me from talking 
with you, in order that I might not waste my words: but now he has set me on; for now you will 
listen to me” (Plato, First Alcibiades, 104–105 [105e–106a]). The daemon possesses a very par-
ticular knowledge: the knowledge of the right moment (the science of kairos). The daemon – and 
only he – knows when logos can be effective; when it can affect one’s soul, move one’s soul. 
And only an effective speech, one which provokes a metabolê of the soul, is a speech worthy of 
being promulgated. This is why, in the prologue of the First Alcibiades, the daemon determines 
at which moment the soul of Socrates can enter into a dialogue with the soul of Alcibiades. Sin-
gularity and kairos are intimately linked in the inaugural scene of this dialogue. 
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are intimately bound. Both exceed the regularities, the boundaries, and the uni-
versality of the law.
The doorkeeper does not delude the man from the country when he tells him 
that now is not the time. To Joseph K., who argues that “the doorkeeper conveyed 
the message of salvation [erlösende Mitteilung] only when it could no longer be 
of use to the man,”42 and that maybe his task was to let the countryman enter 
the law, the priest answers in anger: “You don’t have sufficient respect for the 
text and are changing the story.”43 Why is the doorkeeper not deluding the man 
from the country when he tells him “not yet”? The priest answers: because the 
two sayings of the doorkeeper are linked. The final words of the doorkeeper are 
this teaching that the countryman, without knowing, waited for all his life. This 
saying is, as Joseph K. senses, a liberating message, a message of redemption, or 
a redemptive message: “erlösende Mitteilung.” 
What is liberating in the doorkeeper’s final teaching? What is redemptive in 
this message?
If the priest’s reading is correct, then this can mean only one thing: that the 
doorkeeper knows that entering the Law, for the am-ha’aretz, has no sense. Or 
better yet: he knows that, even for himself, entering into the law has no sense. 
The gate does not “lead to the world of meaning,” as Buber presents it44; the locus 
of meaning does not dwell inside the law, but before the law. Paradoxically, in 
this Kafkaian world, penetrating the law has no sense. This is precisely the per-
spective of the talmid chacham: the idea of penetrating the law, of fulfilling the 
law, is a false desire. A disastrous desire. 
En marge: It is this desire that characterizes Paul’s messianic haste. According to certain 
interpretations, Paul’s despair of being unable to entirely fulfill the law (nomos) is at the 
origin of his antinomianism. In Romans 7, this despair is linked to man’s carnality, and Paul, 
after having depicted the impossible struggle between his inner, spiritual self and his outer, 
carnal self, proclaims: “O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of 
this death?”45 Paul, who looks for a pleromatic accomplishment of the law, for an abso-
lute fulfillment of the law, cannot find it in the law of works (nomos ergon), and therefore 
abolishes it. He institutes instead a nomos pisteos, a law of faith, or a law of love, which 
is, according to Romans (13: 10), the pleroma of nomos, the fulfillment of the law.46 The 
inner (spiritual) law of faith accomplishes and thereby abolishes the outer (carnal) law of 
42 Kafka, The Trial, 217 (translation slightly modified).
43 Kafka, The Trial, 217. 
44 Buber, Two Types of Faith, 165.
45 Epistle to the Romans, 7: 24, King James Bible.
46 For a scholarly analysis of the question of the pleromatic principle in Paul, see E. P. Sand-
ers, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, Fortress Press, Philadelphia 1983, 93–100; and Michael 
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deeds. Nietzsche, in his portrait of Paul in paragraph 68 of The Dawn of Day [Morgenröte], 
gives an acute description of the apostle’s despair: “This man suffered from a fixed idea, or 
rather a fixed question, an ever-present and ever burning question: what was the meaning 
of the Jewish Law? And more especially, the fulfillment of this law? […] Now, however, he 
was aware in his own person of the fact that such a man as himself […] could not fulfill the 
Law.”47 Paul could not bear the idea that the Law cannot be fulfilled. Yet not being able to 
fulfill the law was never a matter of despair for the rabbis, for the talmid chacham. Travers 
Herford, in his remarkable work on the Pharisees, insightfully remarks: “It is safe to say 
that no Jew before Paul ever thought of the Torah in that way, or ever felt the despair which, 
according to this theory, he should have felt. Certainly, or let me say probably, no Pharisee 
ever completely fulfilled all the ‘mitzvoth’ of the Torah; but I have never come across any 
Pharisee who was overwhelmed with despair on that account.”48 Contrary to the talmid 
chacham, Paul cannot imagine that there can be a meaningful life before the law that does 
not consist in the pleromatic desire, in the desire to entirely fulfill the law. 
If “Before the Law” were to be inscribed in a messianic tradition, it would not be the 
Paulinian-pleromatic kind, which is a messianism of haste (failing to fulfill the law now, it 
should be superseded today: we have to reach the telos of the law, the end of the law, which 
is not law anymore but something different (love, faith)).49 It would be in the context of a 
Cranford, “The Possibility of Perfect Obedience: Paul and an Implied Premise in Galatians 3:10 
and 5:3,” in Novum Testamentum 36 (July 1994), 242–258.
47 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Dawn of Days, trans. J. M. Kennedy, Dover Publications, Inc., Mine-
ola and New York, 2007, 67–68.
48 Travers Herford, Pharisaism: Its Aims and Its Methods, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, New York 1912, 
196.
49 Giorgio Agamben, in his article “The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Wal-
ter Benjamin,” goes this way when he reads Kafka’s text as a messianic-antinomistic text, which 
he links to the Paulinian heritage he recognizes at work in Jewish messianism as presented by 
Scholem (mainly his 1959 essay “Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism”). 
Agamben finds the principle of pleroma at work both in the relation between Torah de Briah and 
Tora de Azilut as depicted in the kabalistic tradition, and in Paul: “What is decisive here is the 
concept of fulfillment, which implies that the Torah in some way still holds and has not simply 
been abrogated by a second Torah commanding the opposite of the first. We find the same notion 
in the Christian tradition of the pleroma of the law, for example in Matthew 5:17–18 […] and in 
the theory of the law proposed by Paul in the Epistle to the Romans (8:4). What is at issue here 
are not simply antinomical tendencies but an attempt to confront the pleromatic state in which 
the Torah, restored to its original form, contains neither commandments nor prohibitions but 
only a medley of unordered letters.” See Giorgio Agamben, “The Messiah and the Sovereign: 
The Problem of Law in Walter Benjamin,” in Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, trans. 
Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1999, 160–176, 167. Further in the text, 
Agamben links those unordered letters to Scholem’s definition of the law in Kafka as a law being 
in force without significance. For Scholem, writes Agamben, “this is the correct definition of the 
state of law in Kafka’s novel. A world in which the law finds itself in this condition and where 
‘every gesture becomes unrealizable’ is a rejected, not an idyllic, world” (page 169). Every gesture 
becomes unrealizable: this is the messianic situation which characterizes Kafka’s text according 
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messianism of patience, which is the only messianic attitude that does not lead to a (mes-
sianic) aufhebung of Judaism (Paulinism, Sabbatheanism, Hegelianism, etc.), and thus to 
an abolishment of Judaism.50 The countrymen, as well as the doorkeeper, are waiting. Their 
to Agamben: “The thesis that I intend to advance is that this parable [Kafka’s “Before the Law”] is 
an allegory of the state of law in the messianic age, that is, in the age of its being in force without 
significance” (page 172). Agamben’s analysis is possible only if one maintains the dichotomy of 
the inside and the outside (the idea of the ban supposes an inside and an outside, a logic of ex-
clusion), or of nomos and anti-nomos (the idea of fulfillment supposes an unfulfilled law versus 
an ideal of fulfillment without law), whereas what is singular in “Before the Law” is precisely 
that this parable deactivates those classical dichotomies. Everything happens in the outside, 
and therefore the outside becomes the locus of meaning. And the Law is there only in order to be 
placed before it. Not in order to enter it, or to accomplish it. This is true if we follow the priest’s 
lesson, and if we are attentive to Benjamin’s remark about the centrality of Lehre in Kafka. For 
a critique of Agamben’s Paulinian reading of Kafka’s parable see Vivian Liska, “‘Before the Law 
stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper comes a man…’: Kafka, Narrative, and the Law,” in Na-
haraim 6/2 (June 2013): 175–194, 179–183. 
50 This messianism of patience, nevertheless, should not be confounded with Derrida’s logic of 
“indefinite adjournment” and “interminable différance.” Derrida, in his “Before the Law” writes: 
“After the first guardian there are an undefined number of others, perhaps they are innumerable, 
and progressively more powerful and therefore more prohibitive, endowed with greater power of 
delay. Their potency is différance, an interminable différance, since it lasts for days and ‘years’, 
indeed, up to the end of (the) man. Différance till death, and for death, without end because 
ended. As the doorkeeper represents it, the discourse of the law does not say ‘no,’ but ‘not yet,’ 
indefinitely.” See Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law” (“Devant la loi”), trans. Avital Ronell and 
Christine Roulston, in Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, Routledge, New York 1992, 181–220, 
204. Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s parable – like Agamben’s – is possible only if one dissociate 
the two doorkeepers’ respective sayings (“not yet” and “this door was meant only for you”). His 
reading is possible only if the doorman’s last saying is not the accomplishment of a promise (“not 
yet”), as the coming true of the man from the country’s hope (which is not a fulfillment or an 
accomplishment of the Law, but the redemptive apparition of Lehre). If, contrary to Derrida and 
according to the priest’s exegesis in The Trial, the two sayings are connected, then the waiting of 
the “Man vom Lande” acquires a completely different meaning. This waiting is not in vain any-
more; it now leads somewhere (to Lehre, precisely). It is a messianic patience, not messianicity 
without messiah. The best way to illustrate the difference between my reading and Derrida’s is by 
evoking a symptomatic passage in his text where he refers explicitly to the “Jewish Law”: “There 
is an analogy with Judaic law here. Hegel narrates a story about Pompey, interpreting it in his own 
way. Curious to know what was behind the doors of the tabernacle that housed the holy of holies, 
the triumvir approached the innermost part of the Temple, the center of worship. There, says 
Hegel, he sought ‘a being, an essence offered to his mediation, something meaningful (sinnvolles) 
to command his respect; and when he thought he was entering into the secret, before the ultimate 
spectacle, he felt mystified, disappointed, deceived. He found what he sought in ‘an empty space’ 
and concluded from this that the genuine secret was itself entirely extraneous to them, the Jews; 
it was unseen and unfelt” (Derrida, “Before the Law,” 208). Pompey, as related by Hegel in The 
Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, tells us, according to Derrida, the truth of “Jewish law”: entering 
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main trait is patience, a patient hope which eventually will be realized not as the abolish-
ment of the law but as the apparition of a Lehre. “Before the Law” is not a text enacting 
the messianic accomplishment-abolishement of the law, but a text about the conditions of 
possibility of Lehre in an epoch of crisis of tradition.51 
From the perspective of the talmid chacham, as noted previously, the issue is 
not the fulfilling of the law. The doorkeeper never enters the law. Perhaps he has 
never entered the law. Indeed, he does not even see it: in facing the man from 
the country, he has the door at his back. He already knows that the door is there 
not to be entered but to remain open, until the one for whom this open door is 
destined – the am-ha’aretz – dies. This the talmid chacham knows: no one pene-
trates the law, not because it is impossible but because penetrating the law is, in 
fact, to violate it. Incarnating it means abolishing it. Standing in front of the open 
gates of the law is not a sign of failure; rather, it is the only disposition that will 
eventually render it possible to hear a Lehre. There is no accomplishing of the law, 
no entering the law. Instead, there is a lifelong existential study of one’s place 
into the saint of saint, one would encounter… nothing, “an empty space.” Instead of listening to 
what the sages of Israel have to say about the divine commandment and the saint of saint (kodesh 
ha-kodashim), Derrida reposes on Hegel’s authority, himself telling a story about Pompey. This 
surely serves Derrida’s reading (“The law is silent, and of it nothing is said to us. […] Is it a thing, 
a person, a discourse, a voice, a document, or simply a nothing that incessantly defers access to 
itself […]” (page 208)), though it is unclear if it clarifies anything about Jewish law.
51 Moreover, this text is not a Paulinian text but a Pharisaic text. In bringing up the categories 
of haggadah and hallachah, which are genuine rabbinic categories, Benjamin anticipates this 
perspective. In fact, in The Trial, it is Kafka himself who very clearly alludes to the Talmud-
ic-Pharisaic context. The parable is referred to as Scripture (“I’ve told you the story word for 
word according to the Scripture [der Schrift],” says the priest to Joseph K, and further: “You don’t 
have sufficient respect for the Scripture [der Schrift]”). Scripture, the text insists time and again, 
has commentators, but most importantly, the discussion itself between the priest and Joseph K., 
as is obvious from the text and as was noted by numerous commentators, has all the traits of a 
Talmudic debate. Derrida for instance qualifies this sequence as “a prodigious scene of Talmudic 
exegesis” (Derrida, “Before the Law,” 217). For a more detailed analysis of Kafka’s Talmudic exe-
gesis in The Trial see Iris Bruce, Kafka and Cultural Zionism: Dates in Palestine, The University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison 2007, 102. Nevertheless, if this passage says something essential about 
Kafka’s parables in general, then Benjamin’s analysis should be revisited. Indeed, if the debate 
between the priest and Joseph K. echoes the Talmudic way of debating, then, strictly speaking, 
the parable occupies the place of Scripture, which the Talmud (more precisely its later layer, the 
Guemara) refers to so as to construct its argumentations and convey its teachings. The relation 
of Kafka’s parable to Lehre should then be compared not to Haggadah and Halachah, but to Tora 
she bi’chtav (written Torah, or the Hebrew Bible) and Tora she beal pe (oral Torah, or the Talmud-
ic reading of the Written Torah), between the biblical verse and its dialectization. But I will not 
engage in this direction, as it leads us too far.
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in relation to the law. The doorkeeper and the countryman in this text are first 
and foremost students, subjects questioning their existences, their place in the 
world, in front of an open door. In this study there are degrees. Degree zero: the 
am-ha’aretz, the ignorant. What does the am-ha’aretz know? What is his hidden 
knowledge? Answer: he knows – without knowing – that in being before the law 
he is at his place. He does not accomplish the law, and nevertheless he is – body 
and soul – before the law. The am-ha’aretz does not accomplish the law without 
being for this reason an outlaw.52 He is, on the contrary, in a living relation with 
the facticity of the law, with the very fact of standing before a commandment. His 
life is, from beginning to end, an existence before-the-law. 
Inspired by Benjamin’s reading, let us push the analysis a step further: what 
is the hidden knowledge of the ignorant person? In his existence, he in fact knows 
that law is not the issue here. He knows without actually knowing  – he has a 
deep, implicit, knowledge – that what is at stake here is Lehre, and not some kind 
of cold, meaningless and oppressive law. If he did not have this (hidden) knowl-
edge, he would not stay at the gate of the law. Indeed, no one obliges the man 
from the country to stay there: “Now the man is in fact free: he can go wherever 
he wishes […]. If he sits on the stool at the side of the door and spends the rest of 
his life there, he does so of his own free will; the story mentions no element of 
force,”53 explains the priest to Joseph K. But the man from the country does not 
leave. He is there and there he stays. Does he not have a life of his own? Affairs 
he must attend to? A wife? Children? The man from the country stands where 
he is supposed to be. This is his place. He knows that what is at stake here is his 
existence, the meaning of his existence. And this will be the final teaching of the 
doorkeeper: this place was destined for you. You were where you were supposed 
to be. You were, until the end, where you were supposed to be, attentive to the 
call. Before the Law: an am-ha’aretz. 
The first trait of ignorance is the confusion between Gesetz and Lehre, the 
impossibility to see, beyond the law, a teaching. In Kafka’s parable, the death 
of the am-ha’aretz is also the death of ignorance, of his ignorance. Not because 
the am-ha’aretz dies, but because his death is simultaneous with the unveiling of 
52 As in opposition to Derrida, for whom “since he is before it because he cannot enter it, he is 
also outside the law (an outlaw)” (Derrida, “Before the Law,” 204). The equivalence outside the 
law=outlaw is possible only in a Paulinian world, where the pleromatic realization of the law is 
the ideal. And indeed, Derrida, even though very far from Agamben, situates his reading in the 
Paulinian horizon (see Derrida, “Before the Law,” pages 203, 217, and 219).
53 Kafka, The Trial, 221. At the end of the chapter, the Priest concludes on a similar note: “The 
court wants nothing from you. It receives you when you come and dismisses you when you go” 
(page 224).
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what was always already there, beyond the visible, beyond the superficial, beyond 
the law: Lehre. The doorkeeper, who has withheld his teaching until the ultimate 
moment, which is the appropriate moment, is now able to say: “No one else could 
gain admittance here, because this entrance was meant solely for you. I’m going 
to go and shut it now.”54 The law, says the doorkeeper to the am-ha’aretz, is mean-
ingful only so far as it is addressed to the singular. This you always already knew. 
In saying this, the doorkeeper is revealing to the man from the country the hidden 
law of the man’s existence, the very sense of his awaiting, of his patience.55 True 
law is not universal. True law is such only so far as it is the law of the singular. 
And therefore, only so far as it is not law anymore, but teaching: Lehre. 
In “Before the Law” Kafka brings us to the point where law becomes teaching, 
where Gesetz becomes Lehre. He brings us to the point where the forgotten and 
absent Lehre, this Lehre that is ignored and to which Kafka’s parables are Hag-
gadah, unexpectedly – as by a miracle – appears; as a revelation full of sense.56 
“Here and there we have an allusion to Lehre in Kafka,” writes Benjamin in his 
Kafka text.57 This is what happens at the end of Kafka’s parable. Not a suspen-
sion, not a différance or a déférance of the law, not a deferral or a procrastination 
of the time under the law, but the appearance, against all odds, of this law which 
is not a law, of this law which defies the concept itself of law along with all the 
dichotomies that accompany this concept (inside/outside, oppressive/anarchic, 
54 Kafka, The Trial, 217.
55 In this sense, what Benjamin says about Kafka’s “The Truth about Sancho Panza” (“Die 
Wahrheit über Sancho Pansa”) can be said of “Before the Law”: Kafka, on at least one occasion, 
“has found the law of his journey” (Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His 
Death,” 815).
56 Here is where my interpretation strongly differs from Scholem’s, which defines the law in Kaf-
ka’s texts as “the Nothing of Revelation” (Nichts der Offenbarung): “You ask what I understand by 
the ‘nothingness of revelation’? I understand by it a state in which revelation appears to be with-
out meaning, in which it still asserts itself, in which it has validity but no significance [Geltung 
ohne Bedeutung]. A state in which the wealth of meaning is lost and what is in the process of ap-
pearing (for revelation is such a process) still does not disappear, even though it is reduced to the 
zero point of its own content” (see Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, The Correspondence 
of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem: 1932–1940, ed. Gershom Scholem, trans. Gary Smith 
and Andre Lefevre, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1992, 142). Even though Scholem’s idea 
of validity without significance is a very powerful idea, “Before the Law” defies this idea: there 
is a moment of positive revelation at the end of the parable. As readers, meaning overflows us: 
there is an excess of sense in the doorkeeper’s final words, a sense that retroactively colors all the 
parable with a redemptive tint. An excess that makes us, readers, shiver. Agamben, who takes 
Scholem’s intuition and reads “Before the Law” according to it (see supra footnote 49), can do 
this only by silencing the redemptive character of the doorkeeper’s final words. 
57 Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death,” 803.
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nomistic/antinomistic, liberal/state-of-exception, etc.): the appearance of Lehre. 
The genius of Kafka is that he understood that this appearance could be rendered 
possible only through pushing the logic of ignorance to its last consequences. 
In this time, which is the time of the crisis of tradition, only the ignorant can 
recognize, beyond the law, a teaching. Only he is capable of recognizing – if he is 
prepared to spend his entire life before the law – a Torah.
And maybe Kafka, this Socratic ignorant, transmits truth – and not only the 
haggadic consistency of it – through his ignorance. Maybe the amhorez indeed 
saves the essential.
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Arthur Cools 
Desire and Responsibility: The Case of K.
The category of the universal does not seem to fit well in relation to literary texts. 
There are many reasons not to relate this notion to literature. It is obvious that the 
meaning of literary expressions can never have the same transparency or neces-
sity as a mathematical formula, not least because of the metaphoric operations 
characteristic of literary language. Moreover, it is generally accepted that liter-
ary works are dependent of the context in which they originate and that their 
meaning is relative to this context.1 Nevertheless, literary texts have often been 
considered as bearers of universal meaning, especially in religious traditions. 
Since modern times, however, various claims have been made concerning the 
epistemological status of literary texts. Realism is based upon an empirical claim, 
namely, that literary narratives describe the experience of life as it is. German ide-
alism claims that literary texts are able to express universal ideas. It considered 
the tragic genre to be the expression of the idea of freedom as embodied by the 
acceptance of responsibility with regard to a situation that did not result from a 
choice. Marxist theories claim that literary works contribute to an emancipated 
society by unraveling ideological mechanisms and power relations in society. 
Whatever the differences between these theories, the basic argument underlying 
all of them is ethical, the universality of which is taken as something absolute: for 
realism, this is the idea of faithfulness; for German idealism, the idea of freedom; 
and for Marxism, the idea of a true emancipation.
Attributing a universal meaning to Kafka’s work – which is among the most 
commented-upon literary works of the twentieth century – seems to be an entirely 
justified and self-evident adjudication. However, it is difficult to assess this uni-
versality within the limits of the respective frameworks of the literary theories of 
realism, German idealism, and Marxism. It seems that Kafka’s modernist writings 
escape such categories and resist elucidation in terms of faithfulness, freedom, 
and emancipation. Moreover, it seems similarly problematic to state that Kafka’s 
work has a universal meaning because of its belonging to the Jewish tradition. As 
is known, Kafka’s relations to Judaism are far more complex than Max Brod was 
willing to say. And even when these relations to Judaism do play a role in Kafka’s 
writings, it does not imply that his texts can be considered to express the univer-
1 This view is called “contextualism” and generally accepted as the main theory about the on-
tological status of literary artworks. Cf. Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature, Blackwell, 
Oxford 2009, 78–81.
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sal meaning of the religious Jewish tradition as such.2 On the contrary, it is gener-
ally accepted that Kafka’s narratives contribute to the modernist transformation 
of the novel.3 Are there other candidates by which to ensure the foundation of the 
universal meaning of Kafka’s work? 
In this article, I will focus on Zygmunt Bauman’s proposal, from Postmod-
ern Ethics, to understand Kafka’s story “Before the Law” (“Vor dem Gesetz”) in 
terms of Emmanuel Levinas’s concept of responsibility.4 I confront this interpre-
tation with a reflection upon the kind of narrative in Kafka’s novel The Trial [Der 
Process], in which “Before the Law” is told. I will consider the question whether, 
in what way, and to what extent it is possible to interpret this narration in con-
tinuation with the tragic model of narration as articulated by German idealism. 
Indeed, this tragic model still retained important influence in the development of 
the modern novel during the nineteenth century. I will show that the narration in 
The Trial is, in certain respects but not in others, a continuation with this model, 
and I will examine the implications of these narrative transformations as con-
cerns the question of the universal meaning of Kafka in terms of responsibility.
1  Universality as a Singular Rule?  
Zygmunt Bauman on “Before the Law”
In his book Postmodern Ethics, Zygmunt Bauman establishes a remarkable con-
nection between Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy of responsibility and Kafka’s 
story “Before the Law.” After discussing the modern concept of universality and 
its discontents, he presents the condition of morality in a new way, via introducing 
Levinas’s concept of selfhood in which Bauman welcomes the idea of a non-gen-
eralizable uniqueness and the idea of the non-reversibility of personal responsi-
bility. For Bauman, “[b]eing a moral person means that I am my brother’s keeper. 
But this also means that I am my brother’s keeper whether or not my brother sees 
his own brotherly duties the same way I do; and that I am my brother’s keeper 
whatever other brothers, real or putative, do or may do.” Bauman quotes the well-
2 For an interesting reflection on this issue, see Eli Schonfeld’s contribution, “Am-ha’aretz: The 
Law of the Singular. Kafka’s Hidden Knowledge,” in this volume.
3 Cf. Vivian Liska, “Kafka, Modernism, and Literary Theory,” in A Handbook of Modernist Stud-
ies, ed. Jean-Michel Rabaté, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 2013, 75–86.
4 Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, Blackwell, Oxford 1993, 52. 
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known sentence which Levinas takes from a novel of Dostoyevsky: “The I always 
has one responsibility more than all the others.” He continues: 
only on this assumption is a “moral party,” as distinct from contractual partnership, think-
able and realizable. My responsibility is always a step ahead, always greater than that of 
the Other. I am denied the comfort of the already-existing norms and already-followed rules 
to guide me, to reassure me that I have reached the limit of my duty and so spare me that 
anxiety which I would account for as “guilty conscience.” If my responsibility can be at all 
expressed as a rule, it will be (like in the famous Kafka parable of the door to the Palace of 
Justice through which no one ever entered, as it had been kept open but for a single penitent 
and was bound to be closed the moment he died) just a singular rule, a rule which for all I 
know and care has been spelled out for me only and which I heard even if the ears of others 
remained blocked. “Appel de la sainteté précédant le souci d’exister. […] Le moi de celui qui 
est élu à répondre du prochain … Unicité de l’élection.”5
Because of this explicit connection with Levinas’s philosophy, Bauman seems 
able to add a new reading of Kafka’s “Before the Law,” one of Kafka’s most com-
mented-upon texts.6 However, his comparison between Levinas’s concept of 
responsibility and Kafka’s story of the man before the law is mistaken. It is not 
difficult to say why. First, the law to which the door is open, in Kafka’s story, is 
not the law of the Palace of Justice, in which case it would be possible to gener-
alize the law and to guarantee reciprocity between the subjects of the law; it is 
also different from the ethical commandment “you should not kill,” as is revealed 
in the face of the other in Levinas’s account of responsibility: the normativity 
of this injunction is universal, but does not guarantee justice. Second, Kafka’s 
story relates the uniqueness of one’s selfhood not to the response given to one’s 
neighbor but rather to the impersonal presence of the law which binds the man 
of the country and the doorkeeper to its own authority; in Levinas’s philosophy, 
however, the uniqueness of one’s selfhood appears in relation to the encounter 
of the other person before any reference to a third party. And finally, Kafka’s story 
is ethically indifferent, without consideration of what is good and what is evil – 
the man of the country is simply waiting and dying hopelessly, and the guard-
ian undertakes nothing to interrupt this dying: it is never even suggested that he 
gives food, clothes, and shelter; it is mentioned only that he looks powerful and 
that he regularly interrogates (in an apathetic way) the unfortunate man of the 
5 Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 51–52.
6 For an overview see Vivian Liska, “‘Before the law stands a doorkeeper: to this doorkeeper 
comes a man…’: Kafka, Narrative, and the Law,” in Naharaim 6/2 (June 2013), 175–194. See as 
well Rodolphe Gasché, “Kafka’s Law: In the Field of Forces between Judaism and Hellenism,” in 
MLN 117.5 (2002): 971–1002.
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country. Yet Levinas still wishes to say something about goodness: a common 
world and the possibility of justice in the world are dependent on one’s response 
to the other person.
Consequently, it seems right to conclude that the respective universes of the 
works of Kafka and Levinas are incompatible. Nevertheless, in his examination of 
Levinas’s philosophy, Bauman points to a condition which he has good reason to 
refer to Kafka. Bauman, rejecting the universality of modern rationality (because 
of its internal contradictions which neutralize moral autonomy and depersonal-
ize the effects of this rationality), welcomes in the works of Kafka and Levinas the 
attempt to account for the sense of a singular commitment before any reference 
to a pre-given logos (as in ancient Greek philosophy), to a shared belief (as in a 
pre-modern Christian society), to a faculty of reason (as in Kant), to a universal 
idea of freedom (as in German idealism), or to an hermeneutic understanding 
of one’s being together with others (as in Heidegger’s ontology). In this respect, 
Bauman’s reference to Kafka’s story “Before the Law” in his considerations of 
postmodern ethics is not accidental. For Bauman, the story reveals at once the 
commitment of the individual (the man from the country seeking access to the 
law), and the singularity of the commitment: the door where he requests access 
was open only to him and “was bound to be closed the moment he died.” In other 
words, uniqueness is not so much a question of giving answer to an appeal (let 
it be a universal one), as it is a question of being chosen or accused by an appeal 
that is addressed only to oneself and to which one does not have access.
There is no doubt that Kafka’s work reaches without restraint into these 
depths of uniqueness and singularity, even more than the philosophy of Levinas, 
who still wishes to say something about both the sender of the address (the face 
of the other) and the ethical sense of justice in one’s relation to the other. The 
Trial opens with the arrest of Josef K. and the accusation of a court that commits 
him individually; this arrest is one from which he will never be able to be deliv-
ered and it is based upon reasons that will never become clear. It is in this novel 
that the story “Before the Law” appears: a priest relates it to Josef K. Given the 
differences already noted, it is clear that the problem of the universal is not the 
same for Kafka as it is for Levinas, who considers his philosophy of responsi-
bility compatible with an intellectualism of reason. Yet Bauman, in referring to 
Kafka while explaining Levinas, opens, without realizing it, the possibility of a 
reading which undermines this compatibility and in which Kafka’s expression of 
uniqueness functions as an uncontrollable disorder of Levinas’s argument that 
articulates the singular position of responsibility in relation to the possibility of 
a just world. Is it possible to recover the sense of the universal, which is required 
in order to do justice, starting from the unique position of the elected and the 
accused? Levinas’s answer to this question is a complex articulation of different 
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steps which implies a diachronic temporality: the independence of an enjoying 
and egocentric self, the trace of the other’s face, the responsibility for the non-de-
sirable other, the presence of the third, and the eschatology of the time of gener-
ations.7 Yet what about Kafka? How does the narrative of a singular commitment, 
the position of being accused in The Trial, express meaning that can be consid-
ered as universal? Does the law reveal at the end its power of justice, as Bauman 
seems to suggest in his interpretation of “Before the Law”? Or does the law fail 
to assess its universality? Does Kafka’s narrative reveal an impediment to joining 
any sense of the universal?
2  Kafka’s Narrative and the Legacy of the 
Tragic Model 
The difficulty in answering these questions is related to particular features of 
Kafka’s fictional work, especially its enigmatic, fragmentary, and disorientating 
character, which invites an infinite hermeneutics. But it may be that the difficulty 
concerns a preliminary question as well: the difference between philosophical 
discourse and fictional writing. Since Plato, i.e., since the existence of a philo-
sophical discourse, distinct from mythos, this distinction has been established 
on the basis of the notion of representation (mimesis). Philosophical discourse 
defines itself as a criticism of representation and formulates new access to truth 
by means of conceptual clarification. This remains the case in Levinas’s phi-
losophy, which intends to delimitate, as did Plato, the role of representation in 
the general understanding of existence. Thus, Plato and Levinas agree upon the 
universal meaning of the idea of goodness being distinct from representation 
of this idea. Levinas, moreover, articulates this meaning in terms of an ethical 
injunction. Yet Aristotle, in his Poetica, shows that philosophy does not need to 
dismiss representation; moreover, he argues that poetics, as the art of representa-
tion, not only contributes towards understanding of the human condition but 
is able to present the essentials while contending with the possible instead of 
being addicted to the factual. It seems therefore that the Aristotelian notion of 
representation (and its legacy) sets the stakes for an approach that can answer 
the question of the universal in Kafka’s narrative of Josef K.
7 Cf. Arthur Cools, “Levinas’ Defense of Intellectualism: an Undecidable Ambiguity?” in Debat-
ing Levinas’ Legacy, eds. Andris Breitling, Chris Bremmers, and Arthur Cools, Brill, Leiden and 
Boston 2015, 3–15.
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At first sight, it may seem problematic to refer to a Greek notion in order to 
approach the question of the universal in Kafka’s fictional work, which, accord-
ing to so many commentaries, has its origin in a Jewish tradition. In fact, there is a 
striking parallel between the Aristotelian approach to representation and Kafka’s 
narrative in The Trial. The main issue of tragedy – tragedy, according to Aristotle, 
being the model of representation par excellence – is the problem of being chosen 
or accused by a demand that is addressed only to the individual, a demand that 
he or she is unable to undo and to which he or she does not have access. This is 
the case for Oedipus and Antigone alike. The problem we face here seems to be 
similar to the case of K. in The Trial or the man from the country in “Before the 
Law.” Moreover, since German idealism, and especially since the reflections of 
Schelling and Hegel on tragedy and Hölderlin’s translations of ancient tragedies, 
the reference to the Greek model and the attempts to actualize it in a modern 
condition have played a major role in aesthetic theory, in the development of the 
German mourning play (Trauerspiel), and in the transformation of the modern 
novel. I am inspired here by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s analyses of the destiny 
of mimesis in modern times.8 It is quite unlikely that Kafka, reading and writing 
novels and stories in German in the early decades of the twentieth century, was 
unfamiliar with this context and not involved in this transformation. It may be 
that the representation of the accused who is victim of a destiny he or she could 
not choose is not at all specific to Kafka’s narratives. It may be moreover that 
this representation entails a question by which modern times confront the art 
of narrative, for it is in modern times that the question of the meaning and rele-
vance of the tragic model is raised as such and thereby invites exploration of new 
approaches.9 
For these reasons, in order to answer the question of the universal in the case 
of Kafka’s The Trial, it is interesting to examine to what extent it is possible to 
say that the Greek legacy of representation is transformed in this novel and to 
what extent the novel still repeats features of the tragic model. For this kind of 
examination, Marthe Robert’s interpretation of Kafka merits particular attention, 
8 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, L’imitation des modernes. Typographies II [Typography: Mimesis, 
Philosophy, Politics], Galilée, Paris 1986. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, La fiction du politique. Hei-
degger, l’art et la politique [Heidegger, Art, and Politics: the Fiction of the Political], Christian Bour-
geois, Paris 1998. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger. La politique du poème [Heidegger and the 
Politics of Poetry ], Galilée Paris, 2002.
9 About the transformation of the Greek legacy of tragedy in the context of German idealism, 
especially in the case of Hölderlin, see for instance Frans van Peperstraten, “Modernity in Höl-
derlin’s Remarks on Oedipus and Antigone,” in The Locus of Tragedy, eds. Arthur Cools, Thomas 
Crombez, Rosa Slegers, and Johan Taels, Brill, Leiden and Boston 2008, 105–120. 
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owing to the explicit connection she establishes with the Greek epopee. She con-
siders Kafka’s The Castle [Das Schloss] a modern imitation of Homer’s Odyssey, 
and articulates the search of K. in this novel in terms of tragic conflict. Although 
she does not consider the tragic model and does not examine its relevance for 
Kafka’s fictional work, she rightly observes “the dramatic organization” and “the 
striking theatrical expositions” of various scenes in his novels.10 Indeed, in The 
Trial the majority of the scenes are located strictly within single rooms, each of 
which functions as the décor of the narrated interaction: these rooms include the 
bedroom, the living room, the office, the storage room, the atelier of the artist, 
the office of the lawyer, the church. Moreover, many scenes have immediate the-
atrical effect, owing to detailed descriptions of bodily presence and movements: 
the two men arresting K. at the beginning and end of the novel, the old couple 
looking indifferently through the window into the living room as K. is arrested, 
the scene of punishment in the storage room, the dispute and competition with 
the vice-director, K.’s suffocation each time he begins to know something about 
the trial. 
Commenting on the protagonist’s search, Robert implicitly points to a main 
feature of the tragic model: the excessiveness and opacity of desire which is 
the driving force behind the protagonist’s choices until the tragic ending – for 
Oedipus, this is the desire to know the truth of his own destiny; for Antigone, it 
is the desire to properly bury her deceased brother, even at the cost of her own 
life.11 In The Trial, K.’s desire to know the object of the charge, the instance of the 
accusation, and the rules of the trial, and his desire to free himself from the accu-
sation constitute the main dynamic of the sequence of chapters; these desires 
determine the regulations and permissions which upend K.’s daily life, and they 
disturb continuously all his various interactions with others. Faced with his accu-
sation, K. is no longer in a position where he can avoid being obsessed by it. As 
with the tragic hero, the exorbitance of K.’s desire to make the court withdraw its 
10 Marthe Robert, L’Ancien et le nouveau: de Don Quichotte à Kafka [The Old and the New: From 
Don Quixote to Kafka], Payot, Paris 1967, 27: “l’allure étonnamment théâtrale de ses romans laisse 
supposer une passion dont on trouve effectivement mainte preuve dans son Journal –, l’organisa-
tion dramatique de leur œuvre est tellement frappante qu’elle tente continuellement les adapta-
teurs, en les persuadant qu’ici au moins, ils peuvent adapter sans trahir, ayant somme toute peu 
de choses à faire pour transformer le roman en pièce.”
11 Jean-Pierre Vernant recalls that this desire, being intrinsically determined by a blindness, 
cannot yet be interpreted in the modern term of (free) will. Cf. Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Ébauches 
de la volonté dans la tragédie grecque” (“Intimations of the Will in Greek Tragedy”), in J.-P. Ver-
nant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Mythe & tragédie en Grèce ancienne [Myth and Tragedy in Ancient 
Greece], Maspero, Paris 1972, 41–74.
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accusation is misleading for him and continuously compels him towards inter-
pretations and examinations beyond the limits of the ordinary. It is most striking 
to observe that K. becomes interested in his trial despite there being no reason to 
afford credence to the charge against him. 
The exorbitance of this desire is partially comprehensible because of its rela-
tion to another important feature of the tragic model: the ambiguity of guilt and 
innocence, the contingency of the accusation, what Aristotle calls the “hamar-
tia.” The accusation testifies that K. is guilty, but K., convinced of his innocence, 
considers the accusation a mistake. Therefore, his desire to speak before the court 
is motivated by the purpose to prove his innocence. However, as in the tragic 
model, not only do the origins of the accusation remain inaccessible to the pro-
tagonist, but his attempts to prove his innocence inevitably fail. Finally, another 
key characteristic of the tragic model is the sacrificial logic which, at the end, 
punishes the culprit. It would seem that the final scene of The Trial, where K. is 
slaughtered like a dog, repeats this logic.
It appears that we can go a long way with the model of tragedy in order to 
understand the case of K. in The Trial – long enough, at least, to become aware 
of a certain presence of the former in the narration of the latter. Even so, other 
essential features of the model of tragedy are absent from Kafka’s novel. First, the 
novel does not refer to a given destiny previously announced by an oracle or a 
name or a past: the initial K., for example, entails no information about the char-
acter’s origin or destiny. Furthermore, one cannot discern a plot in the narration: 
the different scenes and acts do not lead to a moment of insight in the sequence of 
scenes or in the reasons of the trial. Indeed, the plot is neutralized by the arrest of 
K., in the first chapter. In a realistic story, this scene would inaugurate the story of 
the events which had led to the arrest, or to the story of the events which lead to 
the judgment of the trial. In the case of K., however, there is no such ordered con-
catenation of events. Moreover, Kafka’s narration affords no catharsis: the dis-
tanced, almost indifferent descriptions of K.’s experiences in no way appeal for 
either approval or sympathy from the reader/spectator. This may be the most dis-
turbing aspect of the narration: the estrangement of the reader before the images 
of the story and his or her incapacity to join the world of K. Finally, there is no 
chorus: the narration does not incorporate or accommodate commentary, save for 
K.’s comments. A potential exception is the priest’s comment about the parable 
“Before the Law”: his observations seem to figure in the text the experience of the 
reader challenged by the multi-interpretability of the descriptions, though they 
shed no light upon the figure Josef K. or on the meaning of his actions. Unlike 
the words of the priest Tiresias in respect to Oedipus, the priest’s comments in 
Kafka’s parable offer nothing as to the truth of Josef K. or his lack of insight about 
his own destiny. 
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It is thus also possible to conclude that Kafka’s novel is something quite dif-
ferent than mere imitation of the tragic model, different enough at least to under-
mine the intended effects of the tragic operations. The transformation of the nar-
ration in The Trial is such that the reader or spectator is no longer in a position 
where he or she can arrive at insight into the protagonist’s desires or even sym-
pathize with him. Yet how does one then address the question of the universal in 
Kafka’s novel?
According to German idealism’s interpretation of the Greek tragedy, the uni-
versal meaning of the tragedy is the paradox of the recognition of human freedom 
in the protagonist’s defeat and punishment. This interpretation is based upon the 
conflict between the power of destiny and the finitude of the protagonist’s capac-
ities to contest this fatality. The moment of insight reveals the tragic meaning of 
his freedom: accepting his destiny, the protagonist resigns himself to punishment 
for a crime which was inevitable but for which he takes responsibility. Recog-
nition of freedom through the protagonist’s acceptance of being responsible for 
his actions in being punished: this recognition is a spiritual defeat of the power 
of destiny, for it creates the condition for a self-esteem which is appropriate for 
man and elevates him beyond the vicissitudes of his destiny. Nothing of all this 
is applicable to Kafka’s novel, because there is no given destiny of the protago-
nist and there is no insight into the accusation of the trial. Although K. resigns 
at the end to the punishment to which he is subjected, this resignation does not 
reveal any particular meaning of his freedom and/or of his responsibility. After 
all: what is the crime for which K. is put to death? What kind of responsibility 
does K. assume when he consents to his own death? The end of the novel reveals 
certainly the power of the court, but it does not reveal the possibility of the sense 
of justice. On the contrary, in defeating K.’s indignation and struggle against a 
trial without cause and whose rules never become transparent, this end takes 
away the possibility of self-esteem. 
From this, it might become clear why “Before the Law” can be understood 
as a kind of abstract symbol of the narrative of The Trial. Despite K.’s various 
attempts to establish contact with the court’s authorities, there is no progression 
in the events. At the end of the novel there is no more than in the beginning: the 
protagonist, accused of a charge that remains unclear, seeks to address himself 
to the relevant authority, so as to be admitted to its rules and to be able to prove 
his innocence; but he never receives access to the actual circumstances of the 
charge against him and his death follows from his tenacious efforts to retain his 
demand. Nevertheless, the narrative of the novel differs from the story “Before 
the Law” in that the former is able to reveal something about the opening scene 
of the demand and about the protagonist’s perseverance not to give up. Indeed, 
from the first chapter the protagonist’s freedom and responsibility appear as the 
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effect of the unique position of his being chosen or accused by an appeal that is 
addressed only to him and to which he has no access. K.’s choices and claims – 
in fact, his whole existence – are presented and described as the effects of this 
accusation, as if there had never been a life of K. without his being accused. Con-
sequently, his case shows the impossibility of clear distinction between, on one 
hand, his desire to know the origins of the accusation and the rules and author-
ity of the court and, on the other, his self-affirmed responsibility to contest the 
groundless charge. 
3  Uniqueness of Desire or Uniqueness of 
Responsibility?
This impossibility may well be at the core of the difference between Kafka’s novel 
and the tragic model. In K.’s case, the desire to know is an effect of the law that 
accuses him in a singular way. In Greek tragedy, the desire to know is excessive 
because the law is in default. K.’s attempts to justify himself before the court do 
not infringe the rules of the law; instead, they manifest its power. In contrast, the 
protagonists of the tragic model by their very actions transgress the law, thereby 
revealing its weakness and finitude. This strange reversal of the tragic model may 
have its origin in another difference. The subject of Greek tragedy is the law of 
the city, and what this law is about is clear: enemies of the city are punished; 
beneficiaries and what is good for the city are approved. In the tragic representa-
tion, this law is in default: it is confronted with a conflict that it cannot manage 
or resolve and where the distinction between enemies and benefactors becomes 
unclear and instable. In Kafka’s story, however, it is never certain whether the law 
is the law of the city. Obviously, the law concerns a community, for there are court 
administrators and lawyers who conduct the trial, other people know about the 
trial, and it is said that “the law should be accessible for everyone at any time.” 
Some commentators have thought that it is possible to recognize the presence of 
the Torah in Kafka’s description of the law,12 but this identification does not allow 
for revealing fundamental ambiguities in Kafka’s description. The authority of 
the law is unaffected and indisputable, but the terms and the rules of the law are 
not clear: it is never entirely discernible whether they prescribe moral duties, reli-
gious prohibitions or political agreements, and the content of the charge against 
K. is never articulated. As a consequence, in Kafka’s narrative the law remains an 
12 Cf. the contribution of Eli Schonfeld in this volume.
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abstract entity, whose anonymous omnipresence K. immediately feels yet also 
rejects as inacceptable, inescapable, unjust, and merciless. 
In other words, there is no outside the law in the case of K. “Before the Law” 
is the law. The law does not accept a beyond where its power is neutralized or sus-
pended. All ambiguities stem from this “not beyond.” The law is as much external 
as it is internal; it is as much the instance of an accusation whose authority K. is 
unable to undo as it is the object of his desire. K.’s strivings to claim his freedom 
and to prove his innocence before the court, and his laziness or distractedness 
are equal effects of the omnipresence of the law. The indistinctness of K.’s desire 
and responsibility becomes especially evident in the scenes of his attempts to 
take responsibility for his trial, attempts which are time and again disturbed by 
erotic escapes with women he meets (apparently by accident) in the immediate 
proximity of the instances of authority: these include the woman of the examin-
ing magistrate in the session of the empty courtroom; the nurse Leni tending to 
the ill lawyer whom K.’s uncle has requested to defend K. before the court; the 
hunchbacked girl who is close to the painter who is asked to paint the judges 
of the court. In these scenes, K.’s approach to the court’s authority is each time 
mediated by the presence of a woman who seems, to K., to be familiar with the 
instances of the court, yet who also attracts and seduces him, precisely because 
of his being accused. It is the same position of the accused that both leads him to 
look for support in regard to the inaccessible court’s authority and renders him 
the chosen object of an erotic desire; hence, the distinction between K.’s interest 
in the court and his erotic attraction becomes unclear. In his conversation with 
the woman of the magistrate, K.’s intention to plead his innocence before the 
court is easily substituted by another aim: 
And probably there could be no more fitting revenge on the Examining Magistrate and his 
henchmen, than to wrest this woman from them and take her himself. Then some night 
the Examining Magistrate, after long and arduous labor on his lying reports about K., 
might come to the woman’s bed and find it empty. Empty because she had gone off with 
K., because the woman now standing in the window, that supple, voluptuous warm body 
under the coarse heavy, dark dress, belonged to K. and to K. alone.13 
The indistinctiveness between the intention to prove his innocence and the inten-
tion of his erotic desire can also be shown in a reverse way, as when K. contem-
13 Franz Kafka, The Trial, translated by Willa and Edwin Muir, revised and with additional ma-
terials translated by E.M. Butler, Vintage Books, New York 1969, 70–71.
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plates profiting from his arrest by exploiting it as a means to seduce his flatmate, 
Fräulein Bürstner.14 
However, the ambiguity is not restricted to K.’s unfortunate position with 
regard to the authority of the court. The Trial is not just a narrative about the 
double bind of the protagonist’s behavior in a world ruled by an abstract, omni-
present law. The law’s authority is itself represented as the origin of that ambi-
guity, in that it is both (and each through the other) the instance that accuses 
and the object of erotic desire. The painter shows K. the portrait of a judge that 
he is painting. He explains that it is a picture of justice, “actually it is Justice 
and the goddess of Victory in one” and that he has to paint it according to the 
instructions given by the court: “my instructions were to paint it like that.”15 The 
picture attests the relations between the painter and the judges of the court, and 
these relations guarantee the authenticity of the representation as required by 
the court. Yet the painting is not the representation of a general idea of justice; 
rather, it is the portrait of a single man: “their superiors give them permission 
to paint them like that. Each one of them gets precise instructions how he may 
have his portrait painted.”16 However, upon looking closer, K. realizes that the 
figure resembles “a goddess of the Hunt in full cry”: “But the figure of Justice was 
left bright except for an almost imperceptible touch of shadow; that brightness 
brought the figure sweeping right into the foreground and it no longer suggested 
the goddess of Justice, or even the goddess of Victory, but looked exactly like a 
goddess of the Hunt in full cry.”17 The ambiguity is not only that the authority of 
the judge is represented by a goddess and that the representation of the goddess 
of Justice is so easily transformed into the representation of the goddess of Hunt; 
what is more important is that the court’s authority authorizes these ambiguities. 
This authority installs simultaneously a law of justice that accuses and a law of 
desire that attracts, a law of justice as a law of erotic desire. Being accused is 
being in search of an erotic substitution.
From this, it follows that the court and all its representatives are in the ban 
of a radical, unresolvable ambiguity. The girls and women whom K. encounters 
in his attempts to make contact with the court are time and again considered 
to be trustworthy guides to the representatives of the court: “Thanks to her [the 
hunchback], he was able to make straight for the right door.”18 Yet, in their bodily 
14 Cf. Kafka, The Trial, 29–38. 
15 Kafka, The Trial, 182.
16 Kafka, The Trial, 183.
17 Kafka, The Trial, 184.
18 Kafka, The Trial, 178.
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appearances in their encounters with K., they are immediately described as being 
“depraved” (verdorben), and their intimate relations to men (or at least their ever 
present intentions for such relations) leave no doubt for imagined ascriptions: 
“The girl, who was slightly hunchbacked and seemed scarcely thirteen years old, 
nudged him with her elbow and peered up at him knowingly. Neither her youth 
nor her deformity had saved her from being prematurely debauched. She did not 
even smile, but stared unwinkingly at K. with shrewd, bold eyes. K. pretended not 
to have noticed her behavior.”19 The warders, who have the power to announce 
the arrest, are as much the “trustworthy services” of the court’s authority as they 
are submitted to the court’s authority and punished by its executors. In the scene 
of the lumber-room, one of the two men who arrested K. and who are now sub-
mitted to the punishment of being flogged, remarks: “Both of us, and especially 
myself, have a long record of trustworthy service as warders  – you must your-
self admit that, officially speaking, we guarded you quite well – we had every 
prospect of advancement and would certainly have been promoted to be Whip-
pers pretty soon, like this man here.”20 The humiliations inflicted to the various 
representatives of the court (women, warders, lawyers) manifest not only the 
power of the court, but moreover the state of being a representative of the court’s 
authority. Even K., in the final scene, “submitted himself to the guidance of his 
escort,” assuming even the initiative, “pull[ing] his companions forward” before 
the policeman who seemed to stop their journey going outside the city (a figure 
whose appearance indicates that the court’s authority does not coincide with the 
law of the city) and convinces himself to be “grateful for the fact that these half-
dumb, senseless creatures have been sent to accompany me on this journey, and 
that I have been left to say to myself all that is needed.”21
It may be clear now what is lost if one interprets the story “Before the Law” 
without embedding it in the context of the narrative of The Trial. In fact, the ambi-
guity of the law, the double bind of its manifestation, remains unseen. Only “the 
fleas in his [the doorkeeper’s] fur collar” in the story “Before the Law” remind us 
of the image of the goddess of hunt, and the “radiance that streams inextinguish-
ably from the door of the Law” reminds us of the law’s irresistible attraction – 
albeit in an abstract (not gender-based) way. What one loses here is nothing less 
than the question of the singular effectivity of the law, its double bind of accusing 
and attracting, which cannot be approached without revealing the intrinsic con-
nection between the omnipresence of the law and the imagined relations to the 
19 Kafka, The Trial, 177.
20 Kafka, The Trial, 105.
21 Kafka, The Trial, 283–284.
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law’s authority as articulated in and through the singular chain of images in The 
Trial. This chain of images is but the unique door to the law which reveals what it 
means that “[n]o one but you could gain admittance through this door, since the 
door was intended for you.”22 
4 Concluding Remarks
Where has our consideration of the Greek legacy in Kafka’s novel The Trial led 
us? First, it has taken us to the conviction that, though, it is possible to insert 
the narrative of The Trial into the legacy of the tragic model, Kafka’s narrative 
actually reverses the meaning of the tragic as understood in German idealism, 
for it shows the progressive loss of both self-esteem and recognition of human 
freedom. This reversal has its origin in a new presence and a new approach of 
the law: it is not the law of the city which has defaulted, leaving space for human 
initiative. The law, in the case of K., is abstract, anonymous; it has no outside; it 
is omnipresent and the protagonists are all in the ban of this “not beyond” which 
constitutes a law that accuses as much as it attracts, a law that meanwhile is ines-
capable as well as inaccessible. With regard to this law, the protagonist can only 
be a victim and an executor, an accused and an accuser… an executor because of 
being a victim, an accuser because of being accused. Second, and moreover, it 
has brought us to the point where Bauman mentions the story “Before the Law” 
in order to establish a new moral condition as a singular commitment in Levi-
nasian terms of the uniqueness of responsibility; nonetheless, it enables us to 
state that it is in fact doing exactly the opposite from what Bauman claims: in 
short, rather than revealing the non-ambiguous meaning of a unique responsi-
bility for the non-desirable other person, it erases the moral sense of this unique-
ness, by undermining the clear distinction between desire and responsibility 
without which it is not possible to conceive of a just world. Third, it has helped 
us to approach the question of the universal in Kafka’s literary work. For, as the 
confrontation with Aristotle’s concept of representation has made clear, there is 
no possibility and no guarantee to define the universal in the narrative of The 
Trial: there is no insight into the meaning of the protagonist’s action, no insight 
into the meaning of the accusation against the protagonist, no insight into the 
court’s authority – the law itself is, despite its omnipresence, not transparent and 
therefore not universal. In other words, the narrative of The Trial denies the very 
22 Kafka, The Trial, 268–269.
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possibility of grasping the universal in terms of an (ethical) idea (be it the idea of 
justice, of faithfulness, of freedom, or of emancipation). Is Kafka therefore not the 
writer who shows why the question of the universal is misguided in relation to lit-
erary fiction, claiming the autonomy of the literary text and withdrawing it from 
any discourse about truth? Unless literary fiction reveals, in the concreteness of 
the image and in the singular chain of images, the true condition of any approach 
to the universal. In this respect, it may be possible to say that the narrative in The 
Trial reveals the paradox of the universal that situates each of us into a singular 
position before the law. 
Works Cited
Bauman, Zygmunt, Postmodern Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
Cools, Arthur, “Levinas’ Defense of Intellectualism: An Undecideable Ambiguity?” in Debating 
Levinas’ Legacy. Eds. Andris Breitling, Chris Bremmers, and Arthur Cools (Leiden and 
Boston: Brill, 2015), 3–16.
Gasché, Rodolphe, “Kafka’s Law: In the Field of Forces between Judaism and Hellenism,” in 
MLN 117:5 (2002): 971–1002.
Kafka, Franz, The Trial. Trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, revised and with additional materials trans. 
E.M. Butler (New York: Vintage Books, 1969).
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, Heidegger. La politique du poème (Paris: Galilée, 2002). 
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, L’imitation des modernes. Typographies II (Paris: Galilée, 1986). 
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, La fiction du politique. Heidegger, l’art et la politique (Paris: 
Christian Bourgeois, 1998). 
Lamarque, Peter, The Philosophy of Literature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009).
Levinas, Emmanuel, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence. Trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 2006). 
Levinas, Emmanuel, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority. Trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).
Liska, Vivian, “‘Before the law stands a doorkeeper: to this doorkeeper comes a man…’: Kafka, 
Narrative, and the Law,” in Naharaim 6/2 (2013): 175–194. 
Liska, Vivian, “Kafka, Modernism, and Literary Theory” in A Handbook of Modernist Studies. Ed. 
Jean-Michel Rabaté (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 75–86. 
Robert, Marthe, L’Ancien et le nouveau: de Don Quichotte à Kafka (Paris: Payot, 1967).
van Peperstraten, Frans, “Modernity in Hölderlin’s Remarks on Oedipus and Antigone,” in 
The Locus of Tragedy. Eds. Arthur Cools, Thomas Crombez, Rosa Slegers, and Johan Taels 
(Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 105–120.




“He took all conceivable precautions against the interpretations of his writings,” 
wrote Benjamin about Kafka. “One has to find one’s way in them circumspectly, 
cautiously, and warily.”1 Cautious, circumspect, wary, and anti-hermeneu-
tic is also Derrida-reads-Kafka: thus, in one breath, the way one says Derri-
da-reads-Celan or Derrida-reads-Shakespeare or Derrida-reads-Blanchot, each 
time producing a deconstructive exemplar, enacting differently the role of the 
philosopher-reading-literature that Derrida performed, a role that served him as 
a quasi-starting-point in an attempt to contend with all elements which constitute 
the philosophical architechtonics throughout Western tradition; a role whose ful-
filment brings us closer to Derrida’s own conception of writing.
Though Derrida is not a Kafkologist, in two of his three essays on Kafka he 
makes the question of literature itself a central question, as if he gave this highly 
specific encounter between himself and Kafka a meta-literary status. Derrida’s 
“Before the Law” (“Devant la loi”), which discusses Kafka’s ascetic parable, jux-
taposes the literary thing to a legal and a moral discussion in order to address 
alternately the law of literature and the narrativity of law as communicating 
vessels; the chapter “Literature in Secret: An Impossible Filiation” (“La Littéra-
ture en secret: une filiation impossible”), which concludes The Gift of Death 
[Donner la mort] and reads Kafka’s hyperbolic “Letter to His Father” (“Brief an 
den Vater”) in relation to the Sacrifice of Isaac, links the literary and the religious, 
searching after the fundamental plot of literature. In each discussion literature 
is embodied in secret and as a secret which is more radical than any intentional 
concealment of content; in each discussion literature is half described and half 
performed in the very philosophical text by a philosopher who declares himself, 
in his turn, as someone who does not want to say or, better, is unable to say. 
Despite the differences between these two texts and their respective protagonists, 
one can read them together, namely, read the one through motifs that are raised 
by the other. The issues of marriage, the desire for women, parasitism, and de-so-
cialization thus pervade “Before the Law” (“Vor dem Gesetz”), while the question 
of the fiction of the law and the validity of the Oedipal Law gnaw at the “Letter to 
His Father.”
1 Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death” (“Franz Kafka: Zur 
zehnten Wiederkehr seines Todestages”), trans. Harry Zohn, in Selected Writings, Volume 2: Part 
2: 1931–1934, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1999, 794–818, 804.
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Let us first tarry with each discussion separately. Derrida chose Kafka’s 
German – as well as French, English, and Hebrew – idiomatic title, “Before the 
Law,” as his own essay’s title, a gesture seemingly unique in his writing. This 
choice of course joins the idiom’s repetition both in the title and at the beginning 
of Kafka’s text, thereby creating a non-synonymic homonymic chain, for each 
appearance of the same words does not carry the same semantic content. As a 
title that mediates between the text and the world of law, the expression “Before 
the Law” gives the text its proper name, attaching to it a unity and an identity 
which makes it classifiable. A title, Derrida argues, belongs to literature but is 
heterogeneous to it, while the reiteration of “Before the Law” in the parable is 
homogeneously assimilated to the text: it opens it and situates the characters 
both in the scene’s interior space – that is, before the Law, namely, at a certain 
distance from it (the doorkeeper turns his back, as if he were ignoring, deserting, 
or perhaps even transgressing the Law, while the man from the country faces both 
the doorkeeper and the law) – and in time, for the characters precede the law and 
perhaps condition it. But, as is his way, the incorporation that Derrida enacts 
does not relate only to the title that will occur again and be cited and mentioned 
throughout his text. The impressive incorporation, more effective than absorp-
tion of a sheer motif or notion of the other (such as pharmakon, trace, Shibboleth, 
etc.), that transpires here swallows the temporality of Kafka’s text, namely, the 
time of the story’s deferral: expectation, regression, aging, the différance of days 
and years until the man’s death. Derrida defers, at the beginning, his discussion 
of the parable itself – indeed, we must undertake a considerable detour until he 
reaches Kafka’s text – in order to postpone the discussion once again, and then 
to promise, time and again, that he is about to end and will continue, until the 
moment comes when he finally closes the text. Never has Derrida’s incorporation 
been so comprehensive. It seems that Kafka is totally absorbed in this melan-
cholic friendship between two sons-brothers, a friendship that transforms, as we 
shall see, the Oedipal rules of the game.
Neither Kafka’s “Before the Law” nor Derrida’s discloses to what Law it refers. 
This silent Law might be the moral, natural, legal, or political, or, more precisely, 
the Law of the Law, the very notion of the Law, namely, the transcendent Law that 
is beyond space and time, and not the contingent phenomenal law. Derrida avoids 
interpreting the Law in the Jewish terms of the Tora or the Halakha. As his dis-
cussion advances, he quotes what he calls the most religious moment of Kafka’s 
parable: “At length his eyesight begins to fail, and he does not know whether the 
world is really darker or whether his eyes are only deceiving him. Yet in his dark-
ness he is aware of a radiance that streams inextinguishably from the gateway of 
 Derrida-Reads-Kafka    147
the Law.”2 This is the only moment where an analogy to the Jewish Law is men-
tioned; this analogy is insistently raised by Kafka’s door- or archive-keepers, yet 
here, as we shall learn, it offers no help in unveiling something that may have 
escaped other discourses. The analogy is presented precisely in order to expose 
the Holy of Holies as an empty space, which is profaned or secularized within 
literature’s secret. The rigorous conceptual examination of the notion of the Law 
conducts Derrida towards Kant’s idea of pure morality; the latter is an iron Law 
that allegedly exists from time immemorial and gains authority from its categor-
ical neutralization of any empirical genesis which might refer, at the most, to the 
exterior circumstances of its revelation. The Law of “Before the Law” has never 
taken place. In his essay “Force of Law” Derrida will write: 
The being “before the law” that Kafka talks about resembles this situation, both ordinary 
and terrible, of the man who cannot manage to see or above all to touch, to catch up with 
the law: it is transcendent […] The law is transcendent, violent and nonviolent, because it 
depends only on who is before it (and so prior to it), on who produces it, founds it, authorizes 
it in an absolute performative whose presence always escapes him. The law is transcendent 
and theological, and so always to come, always promised, because it is immanent, finite, 
and thus already past. Every subject is caught up in this aporetic structure in advance.3 
The man from the country is thus caught in this structure like everyone else, 
that is, in an aporia that leads him towards a voyage, both impossible and inev-
itable, to the origin of the Law. He fails to recognize that what he perceives as 
general and available to everyone is in fact singular and transcends any historical 
sequence. The origin is always a moment of foundation without foundation, a 
moment which in other contexts Derrida terms “constitutive violence”: “These 
are difficulties the man from the country has not expected; the Law, he thinks, 
should surely be accessible at all times and to everyone.”4 When sobriety comes, 
before a gate that was until then not closed but by the force of the doorkeeper’s 
words, the man’s consciousness can no longer contain the doorkeeper’s state-
ment: “No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for 
you. I am now going to shut it.”
2 Franz Kafka, “Before the Law,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, ed. 
Nahum N. Glatzer, Schocken Books, New York 1971, 3–4, 4.
3 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” (“Force de loi: Le 
‘Fondement mystique de l’autorité’”), trans. Mary Quaintance, in Acts of Religion, ed. Gil Anidjar, 
Routledge, New York 2002, 228–298, 270.
4 Kafka, “Before the Law,” 3.
148   Michal Ben-Naftali
For Kafka’s abstract and solitary figures, Derrida finds quasi-replicas in some 
of the major protagonists of modern thought, including Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud. The historicist or hermeneutical efforts to tell the history of the Law, that 
is, to describe an entity that pushes, in principle, any genealogical gesture, share 
something of the vain journey made by the man from the country. Derrida’s long 
detour to Freud does not ask to interpret the literary text through semantic, psy-
choanalytic, or philosophical contents. On the contrary, though Freud, in Totem 
and Taboo [Totem und Tabu] attempts to historically and narratively reconstruct 
the origin of moral Law, he wanders just like the man from the country. Appar-
ently free to enter the Law, he is also forbidden to do so, by the Law. Freud invents 
a story that nobody experienced, the story of the murder of the primitive father, 
in order to explain in a phylogenetic manner the origin of the Oedipal Law’s per-
sistence, namely, the feelings of guilt and regret which overwhelm the neurotic 
sons and which in their turn augment the power of the dead father. Yet for these 
feelings to be evoked in the first place, the Law should have already existed. In 
other words, morality does not generate from this hopeless crime that keeps the 
murdered father alive. Morality should have been possible before the crime. The 
sons thus transgress an already existing Law rather than giving birth to it. This 
quasi-event does not generate anything, since one should assume the originary 
guilt of the sons, a guilt not connected with any specific crime. In the end the 
Freudian Law is history-free as well. In inscribing the Kantian Law into history, 
without reducing it to history, Freud repeats the Law’s impenetrability and the 
unrecoverable nature of its origin. Here, as in Kafka’s story, respect for the Law 
or the very relation to Law means forfeiting the relation to Law, ignoring who or 
what or where it is. Here also the subject stands before the Law outside the Law. 
What seems to be a re-appropriation of the Law is revealed as a futile effort before 
something that in principle excludes any cognitive relation to it. The Law is 
neither a subject nor an object before which one stands, and this includes Freud. 
Scholarly discussions are both necessary and superfluous, since they enact the 
same incapacity. Kafka and Freud’s respective texts relate an impossible story, 
one that neither describes nor tells anything but itself. This is the case without, 
on one hand, Freud “influencing” Kafka, or, on the other, Kafka entering ipso 
facto an Oedipal pattern.
In fact, we experience the same paralysis before the Law and before the story, 
as if the Law shared with the literary object the same conditions of possibility. 
In this deconstruction, the Law is summoned before literature and literature is 
summoned before the Law, where both are simultaneously legible and illegible. 
Whatever the craft, erudition, or pretention of a certain nobility of interpreta-
tion, the text remains closed to reading, though illegibility, for Derrida, does not 
contradict legibility. The rule makers of literature, that is, the doorkeepers of the 
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text – interpreters, critics, editors, scholars, translators, and teachers – receive 
and lose their privileged authority. For no apparent hierarchy can bypass the 
essence without essence of the singular Law of the text, a Law which is inaccessi-
ble to all, including the author him- or herself. Literature legislates its own Law. 
Like the reader, it is before the Law it legislates, as a singular performance that 
embraces the categorical and the idiomatic. No literary text belongs to literature 
as a phenomenon contained within a tradition whose borders are indivisible. The 
work should overcome its genre in order to be itself. The man from the country, 
writes Derrida, does not understand that the singular crosses the universal, and 
thus has difficulties not only with the Law but with literature. In “Literature in 
Secret” Derrida will formulate this differently: “every text given over to the public 
space, relatively legible or intelligible, but of which the content, the meaning, the 
reference, the signatory and the addressee are not fully determinable realities, 
realities at the same time non-fictive or pure of all fiction, realities handed over, 
as such, by an intuition, to some determinative judgment, can become a liter-
ary thing.”5 The description that follows is more specific, since it engages with 
the literary plot: “Literature would begin there where one no longer knows who 
writes and who signs the account of the call, and of the ‘Here I am!’ between the 
absolute Father and Son.” The writer and the one who signs are undefinable, 
but their contours are absolute. The story, Derrida claims, is one of a call and a 
responsiveness between the absolute figures of father and son, which are replace-
able in their very absoluteness. But to whom do the categories of writer and sig-
natory relate? Are they characters inside the text, or do they refer to the addressor 
and addressee outside the text? Could the latter stay altogether undefinable? The 
passage from, on one hand, the abstract figures of the man from the country and 
the doorkeeper to, on the other, Kafka and his father complicates the picture. 
Moreover, it problematizes any attempt to distinguish, at least in the modern lit-
erary space beginning with the seventeenth century, between the author as an 
identified citizen, who signs and has legal rights, and the Orphean or Blancho-
tian writer; the latter is condemned by writing to de-subjectivization and expro-
priated from every possession, yet is afforded an infinite hyperbolic responsibil-
ity, neither ethical nor civil, in relation to the content of writing and its referent.6
5 See: Jacques Derrida, “Literature in Secret: An Impossible Filiation” in The Gift of Death [Sec-
ond Edition] and Literature in Secret, trans. David Wills, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
2007, 117–158. 
6 “We say Proust, but we sense that it is the entirely other who writes, not only someone else but 
the very demand of writing, a demand that uses the name Proust but does not express Proust, 
that expresses him only by disappropriating him, by making him Other.” See: Maurice Blan-
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This is a story with no woman, Derrida emphasizes in The Gift of Death, in the 
chapter on the Sacrifice of Isaac. He refers also to Melville’s Bartleby, wondering 
whether a woman’s presence would have softened the law. One can say in the 
same vein that Kafka’s “Before the Law” is a story of two alienated and solitary 
men, with no family, a story devoid of combat for possession of the woman or the 
mother. It is a scene of naked life and of years of expectation which inscribe them-
selves on the body with no mediation, no medicine, no work, no distraction. The 
man from the country stops working, in a kind of Blanchotian “worklessness” 
[désoeuvrement]. In a certain sense, by approaching the Law, he ceases being a 
man from the country; he leaves everything behind. He stays there, even after 
being forbidden to enter, and does not return to his homeland. Before the Law also 
means outside family and genealogy. Derrida, who dedicates himself to Kafka’s 
abstraction, raises these motifs only indirectly, noting the increasing difference 
in height between the two protagonists: they create a kind of intimate encounter 
that blurs the borderline between the private and the public, or the infantile and 
the adult – the man dies as a little boy, on all fours, while the doorkeeper stands, 
looking down at him. De-territorialization and infantilization reveal the lining 
which links, for both men – who seem to share the same language and perhaps 
even a specular identification – between law and abjection, between the sacred 
and the profane.
Turning now to “Letter to His Father” means deepening what stands at the 
basis of Derrida’s reading of Kafka, namely, the matrix of the plot deployed 
between the literary and the non-literary, de-socialization, literature as a language 
of withdrawal – the common language of the man from the country and the door-
keeper, which links literature to secret and involves religious space and non-eth-
ical, absolute responsibility. There is, however, something delicate and complex 
in this trajectory. Of course, this is not done from a psychoanalytic stance that 
discerns in “Letter to His Father” a key to the work of someone who apparently 
did not escape a hyperbolic Oedipal complex. Moreover, Derrida expropriates the 
letter from its context, perceiving it as a foundation to literary creation in general, 
albeit precisely not by way of a hermeneutic key but instead as a secret that forms 
its heart. He does not present a key to Kafka’s oeuvre. Interestingly, Kafka’s most 
autobiographical work becomes a meta-literary work. In a direction somewhat 
opposite to the Oedipal, which, in Archive Fever [Mal d’Archive], he elaborates 
for example in relation to Yerushalmi and Freud, namely, to the monologue with 
the Father that reproduces the Father’s score, here Derrida imagines another sce-
chot, “The Search for Point Zero” (“La Recherche du point zero”), in The Book to Come [Le Livre 
à venir], trans. Charlotte Mandell, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2003, 202–210, 208–209. 
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nario. What was altogether omitted from his description of “Before the Law” – the 
motifs of the Law’s brightness, or the Gate of Law which keeps the Law’s Halls – 
receives apparent compensation through the affinity Derrida establishes between 
“Letter to His Father” and the Sacrifice of Isaac. Yet the Sacrifice is presented in 
turn as a narrative elaboration of the paradox of responsibility. The link with the 
Bible does not make Kafka Jewish. This is an affinity of literature whose Biblical 
origin, which indeed differs from that of the Greek epos, transcends the sacred 
ipso facto. Moreover, in Derrida’s reading, the Sacrifice itself, namely, the willing-
ness to sacrifice the most dear and unique, de-sacralizes the world, constituting 
a moment that profanes or secularizes the Sacred Writings, a moment which is by 
definition emptied of sacred signification or content. In “Literature in Secret” we 
learn that the crucial interest posed by the Sacrifice is neither in Isaac nor in the 
gift of death to the son. Instead, it lies in the secret that excludes any others and 
any generality, in Abraham’s obligation to keep a secret no matter what. Through 
this affinity Derrida presents literature as a unique alliance, outside society: a 
locked unity betrayed by transmission, translation, interpretation and tradition. 
Literature generates from revelation yet necessarily both profanes and betrays it.
The connection to the Sacrifice is thus crucial. It concerns the de-socialization 
of Abraham the father. The son seemingly inhabits ethical generality, whereas the 
father, via Derrida’s curious juxtaposition of him and Bartleby, transcends ethical 
normalcy towards non-ethical religiosity; thus the father inhabits the heart of the 
aporia of Law or responsibility, a singular law destined for him alone. Abraham, 
unlike the man from the country, knows what literature is; he dwells within the 
literary element, between the general and the singular, the communicative and 
the silent and secretive. The father is expelled from society, addressing himself 
against the future, against his son, against the promise, and keeping a secret 
unknown to himself. In order to draw the plot of the Sacrifice closer to the “Letter 
to His Father,” which, given Kafka’s stance regarding the father, seems far from 
the Sacrifice, Derrida uses Kierkegaard’s parables from the beginning of Fear and 
Trembling. Kierkegaard here invents Isaac’s response to facing a secret, undeci-
pherable father. Because Abraham is neither epic nor tragic, a genre-less Knight 
of Faith, Kierkegaard can imagine Isaac and redeem him from generality, in a way 
that can, in a sense, link him to Kafka the son. Isaac witnesses his father without 
his father’s knowledge, yet he is ordered to keep his father’s secret. Derrida asso-
ciates between Isaac, Hamlet, Kierkegaard, and Kafka: in each of these cases, the 
son gives the father the right to speech, but also dictates to him what he should 
say in response to his (the son’s) letter. In each case, the son actually speaks to 
himself. It is as if Derrida were saying, following Kierkegaard – a pertinent possi-
bility even if not explicit, given the son’s writing which releases him from ethical 
generality – that Isaac invents Abraham as someone who is about to sacrifice him. 
152   Michal Ben-Naftali
Abraham never considered it, being too preoccupied with earning a living, and 
thus Isaac himself hallucinates the whole affair from beginning to end through 
his parasitic tool, namely, writing. The son is afraid of the social burden and task 
imposed on him, from being the son of the promise; yet what he really wants 
is to write – he does not want to marry, he does not wish to further his familial 
lineage, he does not want a commitment that does not fit his own measures. He 
wishes that his father would sacrifice him in order to put an end to all this, once 
and for all, because he experiences the very pattern of his life and its telos as a 
sacrifice. Isaac does not want to live; he is Abraham’s “mute,” “dry,” “doomed” 
son. This is the plot that Kafka seemingly formulates, a plot which is opposed to 
Totem and Taboo and which is written by the son, a plot whose interest is not a 
fight over power, women, or desire. Following this, Derrida formulates what he 
calls an absolute axiom: “there is in each case a sort of Letter to His Father before 
the event [avant la lettre] – before that by Kafka – signed by a son who publishes 
pseudonymously.”7
To grant such a text –which was not meant to be published, and surely not 
as a literary work – the status of a foundational plot of literature, is a gesture that 
calls for explanation. If indeed this letter constitutes an autobiography – the most 
comprehensive one Kafka ever writes – then still, as Derrida insists, Kafka invents 
in it the letter his father should or could have written his son in response to it. 
We are facing the figure of a son who is not unlike the figure of the man from the 
country, a figure of someone who has failed, to use Benjamin’s expression. Benja-
min describes the fathers’ corrupt world, which resembles the bureaucratic world 
in its degeneration and filth, but while Benjamin emphasizes the parasitism of 
the father who eats away at his son’s existence, Derrida speaks of the parasitism 
of the son who cannot marry, who is neither respectable nor strong, and who fails 
to compete with his father for his place: “Parasitism is the whole cause to which 
the son has devoted his life, everything to which he admits having unforgivably 
devoted his life. He has committed the error of writing instead of working; he has 
been content to write instead of marrying normally.”8 Sacrifice is here conceived 
as part of the father’s socialization and not as an anti-social act. Society sacrifices 
the parasitical sons who threaten its continuity, who stand outside ethical nor-
malcy while unveiling it. Concerning Noah’s son Ham, who witnesses his father’s 
nakedness and tells his brothers, Derrida writes later in this chapter: “The fable 
7 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 128. 
8 Derrida, “Literature in Secret,” 138.
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that we never stop recounting, the ellipse of time of every (hi)story, is also the 
nudity of the father.”9
I noted that Derrida-reads-Kafka is a unique exemplar of deconstructive mel-
ancholia. Yet at the end of our short journey, we find Kafka distilling Derrida’s 
Blanchotian voice, a voice crucial for understanding Derrida’s writing gesture in 
general, also where he supposedly addresses worldly issues. Blanchot’s words 
thus shed light on its most vital characteristics: “The work demands that […] the 
man who writes it sacrifice himself for the work, become other – not other than 
the living man he was, the writer with his duties, his satisfactions, and his inter-
ests, but he must become no one, the empty and animated space where the call 
of the work resounds.”10 
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Of Mammoth Smallness:  
Franz Kafka’s “The Village Schoolmaster”
What is it, precisely, that the village schoolmaster has discovered in Kafka’s short 
story “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole]” (“Der Dorfschullehrer [Der 
Riesenmaulwurf]”) and over which he and the narrator, a businessman from the 
city, are engaged in a struggle that opposes them and ties them to each other? 
Obviously, it is the discovery of a giant mole in the neighborhood of the school-
master’s remote, small village. Yet this is also no ordinary mole, but a truly giant 
mole, the size of “two yards,” as the schoolmaster, “somewhat exaggerating the 
length of the mole in exasperation,”1 exclaims while reporting his discovery to 
a hostile and mocking scholar whose help he has sought. In other words, it is a 
mole which, as the title of the pamphlet that he wrote about the case suggests, is 
“‘larger in size than ever seen before.’”2 Since, indeed, the size of the animal is 
of the order of the incredible and improbable, the fact that the schoolmaster has 
made the matter – which is, he avers, “infinitely [himmelhoch] [above the narra-
tor’s] intellectual capacity”3 – “his lifework”4 – a life-task as huge as the giant 
mole itself – raises the question of what precisely this gigantic mole actually is 
and what is at stake in its gianthood or giantism. Could it be that the prodigious 
size of this mole – a size which is indicative of a significance so huge that, in the 
schoolmaster’s words, it infinitely transgresses the narrator’s understanding  – 
which, from the start, sets it apart from that of all other individual moles, who, as 
a rule, are small, has something to do with the abstract problematic of generali-
zation, or universality? Is the tremendous size of this unique mole an instance of 
singularity which standard universal categories are unable to classify, or do this 
mole’s dimensions, on the contrary, point toward a universality so heaven-wide 
that it becomes overbearing? In any case, with this small animal of gigantic 
proportions, Kafka not only seems to complicate the philosophical distinction 
between the universal and the singular, but, perhaps, also to suggest that, par-
1 Franz Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in 
The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum Glatzer, Schocken Books, New York 1971, 168–182, 169–170. All 
references in the text are to this edition.
2 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 171.
3 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 173.
4 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 169.
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adoxically, the towering significance of the animal in question is, perhaps, also 
infinitely insignificant, but, as such, also all the more oppressive.
Throughout literature and philosophy, the imagery associated with the mole 
has, since the biblical book of Leviticus, related to an impure (because chtonic) 
animal. Yet the mole has also been commonly depicted, in Shakespeare and Karl 
Marx, for example, as a diligently toiling animal tunneling through the earth. 
Moreover, in what has been termed “l’univers talpologique de Franz Kafka,” the 
figure of the mole is shown to be involved in the construction of an elaborate 
labyrinthine underworld of tunnels, i.e., burrows.5 In Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature [Pour une littérature mineure], such 
burrowing is established as a guiding thread in their reading of Kafka’s work, if 
not of this work’s line of flight itself.6 According to Karlheinz Stierle, this empha-
sis on burrowing, which Stierle interprets as a metaphor for “the objectification 
of a subjective complex of experience,” is a major aspect of what he characterizes 
as Kafka’s “development of a new meaning of the image of the mole which, at 
the same time, keeps alive a whole field of metaphorical relations through forms 
of complex metaphorical polysemy.”7 Yet although this feature of the mole’s 
underground labor is not altogether absent from the “The Village Schoolmaster,” 
which Kafka wrote between 1914 and 1915 but, supposedly, left uncompleted, it 
is, in comparison to this mole’s prominent size, of secondary importance.8 This is 
one reason why the story of “The Burrow” (“Der Bau”), from 1923, cannot, in my 
view, provide directives for how to read “The Village Schoolmaster.” As several 
critics have noted, it is quite improbable that the animal of “The Burrow” is even 
a mole. The story features a much bigger animal, more likely a badger, and some 
have held (though I have not yet been able to discern any basis for doing so) that 
Kafka had initially wished to entitle the story “The Badger.”9 Be it as it may, the 
5 Maurice Fleurent, Célébration de la taupe [Celebration of the Mole], ed. Robert Maurel, Editions 
R. Morel, Les hautes plaines de Mane 1970–1971.
6 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. D. Polan, University 
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1986.
7 Karlheinz Stierle, “Der Maulwurf im Bildfeld: Versuch zu einer Metapherngeschichte” (“The 
Mole in the Image Frame: An Attempt At Metaphoric History”), in Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 
[Archives of Conceptual History] XXVI, no. 1 (1982): 101–143, 133.
8 In his diary entry of 19 December 1914, Kafka notes that on the previous night he had written 
“The Village Schoolmaster” “almost without knowing,” but did not finish it; on 6 January 1915 
he notes that “for the time being he has abandoned it.” See Franz Kafka, Diaries 1914–1923, trans. 
M. Greenberg, Schocken Books, New York 1974, 103, 107.
9 Hartmut Binder, Kafka Kommentar zu sämtlichen Erzählungen [Kafka Commentary on Selected 
Stories], Winkler Verlag, Munich 1975, 304. See also Fleurent, Célébration de la taupe.
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critics’ embarrassment in making sense of the giant mole in “The Village School-
master” is, perhaps, best illustrated by Karl-Heinz Fingerhut’s study of animal 
figures in Kafka’s work. On the basis of the enormous dimensions of the burrow 
in the homonymous story from 1923, Fingerhut concludes that the animal in “The 
Village Schoolmaster” is no other than “The Giant Mole” of the earlier story, 
thereby relieving himself from having to address what this mole’s gigantic size is 
actually all about.10 Giantness has not figured among the mole’s distinguishing 
features in its characterizations in literature and philosophy. However, as we will 
see, this does not mean that Kafka invented the giant mole.
Chronologically, “The Village Schoolmaster” follows by one month the com-
position of the parable “Before the Law” (“Vor dem Gesetz”). If the story presents 
few of the many traditional aspects of the mole metaphor as found in literature 
and philosophy; and if, furthermore, the rather frequent references to moles in 
Kafka’s diaries and letters leading up to the period of the story’s composition in 
1914/1915 are not particularly helpful in addressing the issue of the giantism of 
the mole in question11; and if, finally, most of the sources that are considered as 
potential stimuli for this story, such as Ernst Hardt’s “Morgengrauen” (“Dawn”),12 
shed no light on the mole’s size  – except, perhaps, Micha Josef Bin Gorion’s 
Die Sagen der Juden [The Legends of the Jews](1913), a work Kafka possessed – I 
suggest that, when turning to the text of the story, we keep in mind Kafka’s other 
short stories from the same period – in particular the parable “Before the Law” 
(written in 1914) and “The Judgment” (“Das Urteil”) (from 1912).
At this juncture it is appropriate to offer some consideration of the qualify-
ing adjective “giant.” According to Elias Canetti, Kafka is the only Western poet 
who “practices, with a sovereign skill matched only by the Chinese,” the art of 
“transformation into something small.”13 Canetti, over the course of several won-
derful pages, documents Kafka’s interest in “very small animals,” and his trans-
formation into them, precisely by way of Kafka’s early accounts of his encounters 
with moles.14 Yet Kafka also has a genius for the opposite talent, the skill of cre-
10 Karl-Heinz Fingerhut, Die Funktion der Tierfiguren im Werke Franz Kafkas [The Function of 
Animal Characters in the Works of Franz Kafka], Bouvier, Bonn 1969, 190, 225.
11 Klaus Wagenbach, to my knowledge, is the first to have recorded the presence of the figure 
of the mole (especially in Kafka’s early writings). See Klaus Wagenbach, Franz Kafka: Eine Bi-
ographie seiner Jugend 1883–1912 [Franz Kafka: A Biography of His Youth], Francke Verlag, Bern 
1958, 111.
12 Ernst Hardt, Gesammelte Erzählungen [Collected Stories], Insel Verlag, Leipzig 1922, 78–82.
13 Elias Canetti, Kafka’s Other Trial: The Letters to Felice [Der andere Prozeß. Kafkas Briefe an 
Felice], trans. C. Middleton, Calder and Boyars, London 1974, 89.
14 Canetti, Kafka’s Other Trial, 92.
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ating giants. His concern with giants, and giant things, is easily documented: 
for example, “the dove […] as big as a cock,” from “The Hunter Gracchus” (“Der 
Jäger Gracchus”)15; the “curious animal[s], half kitten, half lamb,” “huge [riesen-
hafte] whiskers,” from “A Crossbreed” (“Eine Kreuzung”)16; the “overlarge egg” 
noted in the sixth blue octavo notebook17; and the “huge city” mentioned in the 
second notebook.18 There are also giant persons, beginning with the “gigantic 
form” of the narrator in the first notebook who, in a low-ceilinged room, receives 
a Chinese visitor whose eyes are half-closed.19 There is also “the huge [riesige] 
man, my father,” from the “Letter to His Father” (“Brief an den Vater”) whose 
“mere physical presence” weighed Kafka down.20 To him Kafka says: “You were 
such a giant in every respect.”21 Another such figure is the “political careerist” 
evoked in “Fragments from Note-Books and Loose Pages” (“a man with a gigan-
tic jaw that was gigantically moved, too, by strong muscles”) as well as “the 
accused [who] grated his huge teeth in suspense” during the trial alluded to in 
these “Fragments.”22 And what about the doorkeeper of “Before the Law” (not 
to mention the Law itself) whose size, toward the end of the story, has, to the 
extent that the man from the country has shrunk, “altered much to the [country] 
man’s disadvantage.”23 However, as is already the case in “Before the Law,” and 
even more so in “The Village Schoolmaster,” Kafka does not simply depict giants. 
Rather, his art consists in describing processes that inexorably cause something, 
or some being, to become gigantic, overbearing, and even oppressive. Yet, if it 
is not simply a question of things, or creatures – a mole, for example – having 
grown excessively large, then what is it precisely that has become gigantic?
A useful preamble to commentary on “The Village Schoolmaster” is a passage 
from the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [Anthropologie in pragma-
tischer Hinsicht] in which Kant, while distinguishing sincerity from simplicity (in 
15 Franz Kafka, “The Hunter Gracchus: A Fragment,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Com-
plete Stories, 226–230, 228.
16 Franz Kafka, “A Crossbreed [A Sport],” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, 
426–427, 426, 427.
17 Franz Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, ed. Max Brod, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne 
Wilkins, Exact Change, Cambridge 1991, 70.
18 Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 9.
19 Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 2.
20 Franz Kafka, Letter to His Father / Brief an den Vater, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, 
Schocken Books, New York 1973, 17, 19.
21 Kafka, Letter to His Father, 41. 
22 Franz Kafka, Wedding Preparations in the Country and Other Posthumous Prose Writings, 
trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, Secker and Warburg, London 1954, 366, 369.
23 Franz Kafka, “Before the Law,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, 4–5, 4.
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short, from naïveté) and from the forced appearance of one’s own personality, 
writes:
The plain manner of expressing oneself, as a result of innocence and simple-mindedness 
(ignorance in the art of pretence), as evidenced in […] a peasant [Landmann] unfamiliar 
with urban manners, arouses a cheerful laugh among those who are already practiced and 
wise in this art […] It is a momentary cheerfulness, as if from a cloudy sky that opens up 
just once in a single spot to let a sunbeam through, but then immediately closes up again 
in order to spare the weak mole’s eyes of selfishness [um der blöden Maulwurfsaugen der 
Selbstsucht zu schonen].24
Undoubtedly, these lines merit lengthier commentary on the metaphor of the 
proverbial blindness of moles. For the moment, however, it is important to note 
that here it is the city dweller whose short-sighted self-interest reveals him as an 
idiotic and nearsighted mole, when the man from the country’s unsophisticated 
simplicity elicits in him a momentous, cheerful laughter. This passage is further 
notable because, in analyzing the countryman-and-city-dweller “dialectic” that 
structures Kafka’s short story, one may encounter something like a significant 
variation of this theme. It should also be noted that among the antagonists in 
the story’s struggle, not only is one from the country and the other from the city, 
but the man from the country is an older man, whereas the man from the city is 
a young man – a child, in fact, in the words of a schoolmaster.25 Furthermore, it 
is a struggle between differing forms of deception. “Most old people,” the young 
businessman submits, “have something deceitful, something mendacious, in 
their dealings with people younger than themselves”; however, it turns out that 
he himself is, admittedly, not “entirely sincere” in his dealings with the man from 
the country, precisely to the extent that the latter is an old man.26
The literature on Kafka offers few references to this short story, thereby 
raising the question of why this particular narrative, which possesses a remark-
able formal structure, has scarcely interested scholars.27 Most critics hold that, 
24 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. R. B. Louden, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2006, 21. For further references to moles in Kant, see David Farell 
Krell, “Der Maulwurf: Die philosophische Wühlarbeit bei Kant, Hegel und Nietzsche,” in Bound-
ary II 9/10 (1981), 155–167.
25 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 176.
26 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 176.
27 A notable exception is Bernard Dieterle, “Der Dorfschullehrer (<Der Riesenmaulwurf>)” 
(“The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole]”) in Kafka-Handbuch [Kafka Handbook], eds. M. 
Engel and B. Averochs, Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart 2010, 266–268. This volume also contains the 
short bibliography of scholars who have addressed the story in question (page 280).
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compared to the conflict between the two protagonists, the mole’s role in the 
narrative is negligible.28 Undoubtedly, it is true that by being qualified from the 
outset as an apparition, or even mirage (Erscheinung), and, furthermore, not just 
a rumor (Gerücht) but a rather “sluggish”29 one that was never investigated in any 
precise fashion, the mole remains rather elusive. All we learn is that this mole 
is atypical and has been seen only once – all of which, not unlike the curious 
animal in “A Crossbreed,” invites “the strangest questions,” such as “why is there 
only one such animal?” and why “rather than anybody else” should a school-
teacher have discovered it and, in this very capacity of being its discoverer, thus 
“own it”?30 But even though the village teacher stylizes himself the discoverer 
(Entdecker) of the apparition, it is far from certain that he has actually seen it. As 
the narrator notes, the schoolmaster was not even the discoverer of the mole31; 
all he seems to have done is been the first to interrogate “those who had seen or 
heard of the mole”32 and to have written “the sole account in black and white of 
the incident.”33 Apart from the schoolmaster’s angry and exaggerated response to 
the scholar that the mole is two yards in size, one learns nothing else about “the 
mole itself.”34 Thus it might seem justified to brush aside the topic of the mole in 
favor of the conflict between the two protagonists. As will be shown, however, 
this conflict between the antagonists concerns the mole and cannot be addressed 
by abstracting from the topic they quarrel about.
Before turning to their fight, one should recall Kafka’s statement, in “Frag-
ments,” that fighting “is the only thing to do” and that if one stops fighting, one 
is already definitively lost.35 In “The Village Schoolmaster,” struggle is the very 
condition of the protagonists. Indeed, both the village schoolmaster and the 
narrator from the city are, like the wrestlers from “Description of a Struggle,” 
involved in a fight36 or, what amounts to the same, in “working against” each 
28 As one critic even remarks, “‘Der Riesenmaulwurf,’ another example of the motif of the mole, 
again serves [Kafka] only as a pretext for a lengthy discussion on our most vital, yet ‘camou-
flaged’ subject: religion.” See Joachim H. Seyppel, “The Animal Theme and Totemism in Franz 
Kafka,” in The American Imago 13 (1956): 69–93, 75.
29 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 168.
30 Kafka, “A Crossbreed,” 426.
31 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 172.
32 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 171.
33 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 168.
34 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 174, translation modified.
35 Kafka, Wedding Preparations in the Country, 334, 343–344.
36 Franz Kafka, “Description of a Struggle,” trans. Tania and James Stern, in The Complete Sto-
ries, 9–51, 33–34.
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other (entgegenarbeiten, that is, working against and toward each other) in a way 
not unlike how, in the story “My Neighbor,” the businessman recounts his neigh-
bor’s actions.37 Now, although Kafka notes of the two schoolmates from “The 
First Long Train Ride” (“Die erste lange Eisenbahnfahrt”) that they experience in 
variable ways attraction and repulsion,38 a remark from “A Little Woman” clari-
fies the kind of struggle that opponents in Kafka undergo. Of his relation to this 
little woman, who, despite her sickness, is “a fighter by nature,”39 the narrator 
observes that, though he is a complete stranger to her, she “is very ill-pleased 
with [him]” and that “any connection between [them] is her own invention and 
entirely one-sided [die Beziehung, die zwischen uns besteht, nur von ihr hergestellt 
ist und nur von ihrer Seite aus besteht].”40 In other words, the struggle between 
Kafka’s characters is grounded in relations to others; these relations originate in 
one character without reciprocity from the other, and thus they will never meet 
midway, as it were. Speaking of his relation to his own father, Kafka evokes their 
mutual “helplessness” as the reason for the “impossibility of getting on calmly 
together.”41 Indeed, what is significant is that while Kafka’s siblings and father 
“were always in a fighting position,” and thus involved in a “terrible process 
[…] pending between” him and them (Kafka himself had lost the fight from early 
on), this struggle is not in any way “chivalrous combat, in which independent 
opponents pit their strength against each other.”42 It is always a non-symmetrical 
struggle, where each opponent’s relation to the other is always created by only 
one of them, independently of the other, and thus it is a struggle that is mutually 
entirely one-sided. It is the very helplessness of each protagonist that makes him 
or her invent the relation to the other; moreover, this helplessness embroils them 
in endless struggle, not only because help is never available, but also because 
each opponent refuses help even while calling for it. As explained in “The Hunter 
Gracchus,”
no one will come to help me; even if all the people were commanded to help me, every door 
and window would remain shut […] And there is sense in that, for nobody knows of me, and 
if anyone knew he would not know where I could be found, and if he knew where I could 
37 Franz Kafka, “My Neighbor,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, 424–425, 
425.
38 Franz Kafka, Erzählungen [Stories], Fischer Verlag, Berlin 1946, 295.
39 Franz Kafka, “A Little Woman,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, 317–
234, 320.
40 Kafka, “A Little Woman,” 319.
41 Kafka, Letter to His Father, 33.
42 Kafka, Letter to His Father, 65, 69, 123.
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be found, he would not know how to deal with me, he would not know how to help me. The 
thought of helping me is a sickness that has to be cured by taking to one’s bed. I know that, 
and so I do not shout to summon help. Even though at moments […] I think seriously of it.”43
The struggle (over the mole) between the village schoolmaster and the business-
man from the city is one waged by helpless men who invent their relation to 
others in search for help that they can, at best, only think of. And yet, though the 
participants are equal in their helplessness, the asymmetry of their mutual strug-
gle holds as far as its outcome is concerned. One antagonist will lose the battle; 
the other will score a victory, however ambiguous it may be.
Concerning The Trial [Der Process] it has been remarked, for example by 
Hannah Arendt, that this work has from the start been recognized as “critique of 
the bureaucratic form of government of the old Austria in which the numerous 
nationalities which mutually fought each other were governed by a uniform hier-
archy of civil servants.”44 Not surprisingly, one of the earliest prevailing assump-
tions in Kafka scholarship, one that Arendt fully shares, is that Kafka’s heroes are 
caught in an oppressive and malicious bureaucratic machine whose machina-
tions they seek to destroy but against which they rebel in vain. The assumption 
holds that Kafka’s heroes always, from the start, face overpowering force against 
which they can only react before eventually being crushed by it. But if Kafka in 
the third notebook can advance that “one of the most effective means of seduc-
tion that Evil has is the challenge to struggle [Aufforderung zum Kampf],” is it not 
precisely because the struggle itself engenders, through the very machinations 
of the combatants, the oppressive force that destroys them?45 What follows from 
this is that Kafka’s heroes are anything but innocent cogs in the machine that ulti-
mately crushes them. Rather than being entangled in a preexistent machine, it is 
they themselves who, through their combative machinations rooted in their very 
helplessness, create, with ineluctable necessity, something bigger than them-
selves that, inevitably, gets the better of them. As will be seen, in the struggle 
between the village schoolmaster and the businessman from the city, something 
terrible emerges from the antagonists’ merciless struggle, something for which 
they themselves fully bear responsibility rather than simply being its innocent 
victims. Much Kafka scholarship is undergirded by still another assumption, or 
rather temptation, one which, though only implicitly, I must take issue so as to 
43 Kafka, “The Hunter Gracchus,” 230.
44 Hannah Arendt, “Franz Kafka,” in Die verborgene Tradition. Acht Essays [The Hidden Tradi-
tion. Eight Essays], Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1976, 88–107, 92, see also 90–91.
45 Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 16.
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account for what happens in the story in question. I certainly do not claim any-
thing new in noting that Kafka’s main protagonists do not even have names. In 
the case of “The Village Schoolmaster” all that determines the two main char-
acters are their professions and thus, at best, the social roles assigned to them 
in society. They lack the depth of real people; as merely a businessman and a 
schoolteacher they cannot be approached in any psychological or psychoanalyt-
ical manner, however seductive this temptation might be. They are exclusively a 
function of their actions and relations with each other, that is, of what follows 
from one being a man of the city and the other of the country, one being younger 
and the other older, one being steeped in the art of deception and the other naïve, 
and so forth. They will have constructed their identities as a result of their words 
and deeds.
The previous claim about the combative relation of Kafka’s protagonists 
might, at first sight, be contradicted by the narrator’s decision to aid the village 
schoolmaster. Indeed, the businessman, notwithstanding his thorough disgust for 
even small, ordinary moles, and his comment that the view of a giant mole would 
certainly have killed him, decides to come to the schoolmaster’s defense.46 From 
the start, of course, it is clear that his decision is hardly unselfish. On the con-
trary, it immediately takes the form of competition. Indeed, since in his response 
to the businessman’s help the schoolmaster claims that he is “the first man pub-
licly to vindicate the mole [der erste öffentliche Fürsprecher des Maulwurfs zu 
sein],”47 it is unmistakably clear that the businessman has stylized himself as a 
Fürsprecher (an intercessor or advocate). But a Fürsprecher is also, especially in 
Swiss German, an attorney, that is, someone who pleads the cause of someone 
else in a court of law. Moreover, as we know from The Trial, writing reports always 
takes place in view of a pending examination, or trial. Hence, by writing pam-
phlets and engaging in a battle of documents, the advocates and attorneys in 
“The Village Schoolmaster” are, from the beginning, set for some sort of trial. 
One attorney, or Fürsprecher, usurps the priority of the other and earns, there-
fore, from the discoverer of the mole (Maulwurf) the constant reproach (Vorwurf) 
of seeking to disown him of his finding and rob him of his fame. Furthermore, as 
the schoolmaster argues, the city dweller’s help is essentially no help at all and 
has in fact “damaged [the schoolmaster’s] credit”48 in a case (Sache) that is all 
but credible. The question, therefore, arises as to the motives and sincerity of the 
46 Throughout the popular literature about the mole, disgust is not only regularly associated 
with the animal but also inspires incredible violence against it.
47 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 172.
48 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 171.
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businessman in seeking to assist the schoolmaster in this incredible case. Even 
he admits that although he came to help the schoolmaster, “instead of helping 
him I myself would probably require support [statt zu helfen, für mich einen neuen 
Helfer brauchen würde], which was most unlikely to appear.”49 The struggle 
between the antagonists is about help, which the schoolmaster rejects yet contin-
ues to expect, and which the businessman seemingly wishes to provide but not, 
as will be seen, in full honesty, and this in turn renders him in need of help that 
cannot be offered. Everyone needs help, everything necessitates a supplement, 
and every Wurf requires a Gegenwurf, as it were. If, in this war that opposes one 
advocate, or attorney, against another, there is a trial, it can result only from the 
asymmetry of the positions and actions of both antagonists, even though at first 
sight this war appears to be a struggle in which one agent seeks to help the other 
(while at the same time usurping the other’s elusive fame) and the other rejects 
the help he so acutely needs (yet also continues to request such support).
As noted earlier, giantism is not one of the features that commonly charac-
terize the figure of the mole in literature and philosophy. Rather, with respect to 
size, it is the smallness of the extremely laborious animal that is generally high-
lighted, especially in contrast to its vast underground constructions and to the 
devastations that it creates. So far, my diggings to unearth a giant mole in the 
corpus of Western literature and philosophy preceding Kafka have been in vain, 
save for one exception, that of Jonathan Swift. In Gulliver’s Travels, Swift notes 
that Gulliver, during his visit to the Brobdingnagians, after “walking to the Top 
of a fresh Molehill […] fell to [his neck], in the hole through which that Animal 
had cast up the Earth.”50 Kafka knew this passage extremely well, as evidenced 
in a letter he wrote to Max Brod in 1922. But the inventor of the giant mole in 
Kafka’s story, that is, Swift, may also have stood as a model for the battle of the 
pamphlets, rather than of books, that characterizes the antagonists’ actions in 
the short story. “The Village Schoolmaster” is a story, narrated by a businessman 
from the city, about an exchange of pamphlets (kleine Schiften) variously supple-
menting, replacing, and disowning one another. Everything starts with a small 
pamphlet that the village schoolmaster writes in order to testify to the veracity 
49 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 170.
50 Jonathan Swift, The Writings of Jonathan Swift, eds. R. A. Greenberg and W. B. Piper, W.W. 
Norton, New York 1973, 94. It is, of course, difficult to assess whether Kafka, who in a letter to 
Max Brod refers to Gulliver’s encounter with the Maids of Honor, whose naked bodies instill in 
Gulliver horror and disgust, was aware that the giant hairy blemishes on their skin – “as broad 
as a Trencher, and Hairs hanging from it thicker than Pack-threads” (see Swift, The Writings of 
Jonathan Swift, 95) – are, in English, moles. The letter to Max Brod is from August 1922. See Franz 
Kafka, Briefe 1902–1924 [Letters 1902–1924], Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1958, 405.
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of the giant mole’s appearance in the vicinity of his village. This small piece of 
writing soon gives rise to a battle of pamphlets of somewhat giant proportions, 
a gigantomachia, of sorts, concerning the existence of the giant mole. Indeed, 
several years after its publication, the schoolteacher follows up his pamphlet with 
another “brief brochure [kleiner Nachtrag],”51 as the first one had passed unno-
ticed, not least by those who should have been especially concerned, namely, the 
scholarly establishment. Of course, this should hardly have been surprising, the 
narrator observes, since neither the abilities nor the equipment of this “excellent 
man in his own profession […] made it possible for him to produce an exhaustive 
description that could be used as the foundation by others, far less, therefore, an 
actual explanation of the occurrence [Erscheinung].”52 The only response to the 
schoolmaster’s writings comes from the businessman, who is also the narrator. 
He is an unlikely advocate of the schoolmaster’s cause, not least as he is equally 
unqualified to explain exhaustively the witnessed phenomenon. As soon as he 
reads (it is not stated where) about the schoolmaster’s mistreatment by scholars, 
he decides to come to the defense of this “honest but uninfluential man”; before 
even familiarizing himself with the teacher’s pamphlet, he resolves “to collect 
and correlate all the information [he] could discover regarding the case.”53 He 
muses: “If I wanted to convince people I could not invoke the teacher, since he 
himself had not been able to convince them. To read his pamphlet could only 
have led me astray, and so I refrained from reading it until I should have finished 
my own labors. More, I did not even get in touch with the teacher.”54 As a result, 
the businessman from the city shoulders a “great burden of work” in that he is 
“compelled to undertake anew all the inquiries [the village schoolteacher] had 
already made.”55 In fact, he inadvertently reduplicates everything the teacher 
had accomplished in the original pamphlet, such that “from my words one might 
have thought nobody had ever inquired into the case before, and I was the first 
to interrogate those who had seen or heard of the mole, the first to correlate the 
evidence, the first to draw conclusions.”56 The businessman’s reduplication of 
the schoolmaster’s efforts, which characterizes their conflict, is itself already a 
usurpation not only of the schoolmaster’s initial efforts to reduplicate witnesses’ 
accounts of the phenomenon, as well as efforts of those who had heard about it, 
51 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 169.
52 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 168–169.
53 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 170.
54 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 170.
55 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 170.
56 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 171.
168   Rodolphe Gasché
but also of something that belongs properly to the schoolmaster. Indeed, com-
menting on how the schoolmaster responds to the businessman’s statements, the 
latter notes “the old teacher’s habit of repeating the other person’s answers.”57 As 
a teacher, the schoolmaster is, in a way, a champion of reduplication.
Of course, in the introduction to his pamphlet, the narrator states that his 
intention is only to give “the schoolmaster’s book the wide publicity it deserves”58 
and that, once this goal has been reached, that his name should be effaced from 
the affair. However, by completely ignoring the schoolmaster’s pamphlet, the 
businessman not only forces himself (drängte ich mich), in the schoolmaster’s 
words, into the discovery itself, but also substitutes his pamphlet for the school-
master’s and thus potentially robs the latter of the fame of being the mole’s first 
public advocate. Admittedly, there are differences between the two pamphlets; 
yet this lack of agreement on certain important points partially invalidates 
the schoolmaster’s conclusions. Furthermore, the businessman, although he 
declares in the introduction of his pamphlet that he has no wish to achieve any-
thing for himself through these efforts but seeks only to help the first discoverer 
of the mole become publicly recognized, by “disclaim[ing] expressly any major 
participation in the affair [Sache]” and by suggesting that he is merely interested 
in defending the teacher’s honesty, in fact belittles (entwerten) the significance 
of the teacher’s so-called discovery. As the schoolmaster observes, this new pam-
phlet, under the pretext of helping him, instead draws attention to the discovery 
“merely for the purpose of depreciating it.”59
As the businessman undertakes anew all of the schoolteacher’s investi-
gations in order to write his own first pamphlet in the aftermath of the school-
teacher’s two publications, the latter places myriad obstacles in his way. When 
the businessman finally contacts the schoolteacher, the difference of opinions 
not only prevents establishment of friendly relations; it also triggers a battery 
of reproaches from the latter. It is important to note that although the narrator 
considers the reproaches that he receives for his efforts as an intercessor in the 
schoolmaster’s case to be “unbelievable reproaches [Vorwürfe],” he also claims 
to have “in some manner foreseen” them.60 He even observes that “there was a 
faint show of justice in what [the schoolteacher] said or rather hinted”61 and that 
the latter’s perspicacity (Scharfsinn) regarding his intentions was to the point. 
57 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 175.
58 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 172.
59 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 173.
60 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 172.
61 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 172.
 Of Mammoth Smallness: Franz Kafka’s “The Village Schoolmaster”    169
Furthermore, following the schoolmaster’s claim that the businessman does not 
understand the significance of his discovery, that he does “not prize it at its true 
value,” and that he has “no real feeling for it” because “it was infinitely above 
[his] intellectual capacity [himmelhoch über meinen Verstand hinaus],” the nar-
rator admits not only that he lacks the necessary scientific qualifications for the 
affair, but also that his interest in the matter was perhaps “really too trivial” and 
that even if he “had been the discoverer [of the mole, he] would probably never 
have come forward so gladly and voluntarily in defense of the mole as [he] had in 
that of the schoolmaster.”62
Writing a pamphlet in support of the fate of the schoolmaster usurps from 
the start his originality, and thus supplants it. However much the schoolmaster 
may have depended on help from a man of the city, he cannot but respond to the 
latter’s work by way of a series of reproaches. In the schoolmaster’s words, the 
businessman’s pamphlet is double-faced (doppelzüngig). It is divided in itself, as 
are the reproaches of the schoolmaster himself, insofar as he, without hesitation, 
accepts the businessman’s financial generosity. There is also the fact that, just as 
the schoolmaster’s two pamphlets were unsuccessful, that of the businessman 
also fails to achieve success; the two pamphlets even become confused with each 
other. This happens when a comment on the businessman’s piece appears (albeit 
in “small print”) in “a leading agricultural journal.” This article not only derides 
the whole affair; it mistakes the pamphlet of the businessman for one of those of 
the teacher, thereby demonstrating that neither man’s research has been read by 
the article’s author.63 This review of the case complicates, and even exasperates, 
the battle of the pamphlets, particularly when the schoolmaster learns about the 
article. He even suggests, in a letter sent ahead of his visit to the businessman, 
that the latter not only is responsible for the confusion in question, but also had 
smoothed the path for it to occur. Furthermore, the businessman, in his verbal 
reply to the schoolmaster’s accusation – a reply of which he “made a note […] 
shortly after [their] interview”: hence, in another piece of writing – declares that 
their “ways part from this moment.”64 One should not overlook the business-
man’s offer to eventually publish in the agricultural journal an admission of his 
failure to help the schoolteacher, so that the confusion concerning their pam-
phlets could be undone and the schoolmaster’s original authorship be restored; 
as the businessman confesses, these words “were not entirely sincere, but what 
62 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 173–174.
63 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 174.
64 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 175.
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was sincere in them was obvious enough.”65 Resultantly, the old man’s response 
is, in the young businessman’s words, unsurpassably mendacious (unübertreff-
lich Lügnerische). Indeed, despite denying any need of help throughout all their 
exchanges, the schoolteacher now professes, not without some ambiguity and 
only after his advocate admits his failure, to have looked forward to the busi-
nessman’s help. What makes this “new decree” a “final deceit,” as the translator 
renders “unübertrefflich Lügnerische,” is that it is, paradoxically, more self-ev-
ident (as if there could be an intensification [Steigerung] of the self-evident, as 
Kafka muses) than what the schoolmaster had always said, which itself was thus 
always also already mendacious.
Before turning to the narrator’s final response to this decree from the vis-
iting schoolmaster, it should be kept in mind that he has “sent out a circular 
[Rundschreiben] demanding the return of all the copies” of his own pamphlet.66 
Most of these copies have been returned to him and lie piled upon the table. The 
schoolmaster has not yet seen the circular, which, according to its own wording, 
is intended to annul the businessman’s intervention in the affair and to restore 
all credit for the mole’s discovery to the schoolteacher. Yet, there is no evidence 
in the story that the businessman will eventually show it to the schoolmaster. For 
the moment, at least, the narrator keeps his hand over the circular, in which he 
declares that he is withdrawing his pamphlet but not because the expressed opin-
ions about the case were erroneous. However, without the schoolmaster having 
seen the circular, the retroactive annulation of the advocate’s intervention will 
not have taken effect. It will not have ended their struggle, nor will it lead to the 
separation that the businessman seeks. That there is seemingly no end to the case 
becomes evident in the businessman’s lengthy response to the schoolmaster’s 
decree.
The businessman, still hiding the circular from the schoolteacher, reminds 
him that his discovery is not necessarily more important than any other discov-
ery, and that his expectations that his findings would be embraced by the learned 
societies were entirely unrealistic. He then submits:
While I myself still hoped that something might come of my pamphlet, the most I expected 
was that perhaps the attention of a professor might be drawn to our case, that he might com-
mission some young student to inquire into it, that this student might visit you and check in 
his own fashion your and my inquiries once more on the spot, and that finally, if the result 
seemed to him worth consideration – we must not forget that all young students are full of 
65 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 176.
66 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 178.
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skepticism – he might bring out a pamphlet of his own in which your discoveries would be 
put on a scientific basis.67
The businessman conjectures that, in the best of scenarios, an even younger man 
than himself would, after independently verifying the evidence for the existence 
of the giant mole, have written another  – this time, properly scientific  – pam-
phlet. At this point the businessman wonders about the implications of the 
unlikely scenario in which this hypothetical pamphlet would have met not ridi-
cule but acceptance. Some people, perhaps, may then have paid attention to the 
schoolmaster, and the agricultural journal might possibly have had to publicly 
apologize for its dismissal of his discovery; in all likelihood, however, the sci-
entific establishment would have soon sent him back to his village. Even worse, 
by being recognized by scientific societies the village schoolmaster would have 
been disowned of his discovery. Furthermore, as the businessman argues, the 
schoolmaster would no longer “hear much more about it,” and what he would 
hear would be scarcely understandable to him: the discovery, as “related to fun-
damental axioms” so abstract as to be impossible for people like themselves to 
understand, would have been “raised on these axioms into the very clouds.”68 
The schoolmaster, who had claimed that his discovery infinitely (himmelhoch) 
surpassed the businessman’s intelligence, would no longer be in a position to 
recognize his own discovery. In short, his discovery, though he “clung to his mole, 
so to speak, with both hands,”69 “would [have been] taken out of [his] hands,”70 
without possibility of reproach or protest.
It merits noting again the businessman’s claim that, in wanting to help the 
schoolmaster, it was bound to happen that he himself would be misunderstood 
“and that instead of helping him I myself would probably require support [einen 
neuen Helfer brauchen würde], which was most unlikely to appear.”71 In speculat-
ing about a young student who could have offered such help, it becomes evident 
that this assistance would have been effectively the exact opposite of help and 
in fact would have cemented the schoolmaster’s total disownment from his dis-
covery. And thus the businessman’s last speech, in which he acknowledges his 
67 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 179.
68 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 180. The qualification of the discovery 
as one of skyward importance that infinitely surpasses the understanding of the city dweller is a 
rare occasions in the story in which Kafka resorts to, and transforms, a classical connotation of 
the figure of the mole in literature and philosophy, namely, the mole’s binary opposition to the 
figure of the imperial eagle.
69 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 173.
70 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 180.
71 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 170.
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failure, is the final effort to “withdraw now and undo what I’ve done [es ungesche-
hen zu machen] as far as I’m able.”72 It is, indeed, an attempt to withdraw from the 
struggle by conceding defeat. However, before examining how the schoolmaster 
frustrates the advocate’s attempt to withdraw on his own terms (that is, in a way 
that would prevent him from having entirely lost the struggle) and undo what 
he has done, namely, to extirpate himself from the battle of pamphlets (and the 
accompanying speeches) and the trial of sorts that he has engendered, it is neces-
sary to return to the question of the mole, and its giantness.
As has been seen, the village schoolmaster has made the appearance of a 
giant mole in the neighborhood of his village into his lifework. In devoting 
himself to investigating (untersuchen) this phenomenon, the schoolmaster, who, 
on one of his visits to the businessman, wears “an old-fashioned padded overcoat 
[eigentümlich wattierten Rockes],”73 has dug through all the witnesses’ reports 
and quarried an immense amount of work, not unlike the proverbial mole. And 
yet the discovery of the mole “failed to penetrate [durchdringen].”74 By making the 
discovery (Entdeckung) of this giant mole his lifework – unearthing it, so to speak 
(entdecken originally means aufdecken)  – and always claiming, in his struggle 
against any attempts to reduplicate his discovery, to be the original discoverer, 
the schoolmaster clearly asserts his privilege, or prerogative, over the mole. It is, 
indeed, a gigantic mole, and thus much is at stake in it. It is so sizable, in fact, as 
to affect the schoolmaster’s life; as his efforts and appearance reveal, he has even 
assumed some of the animal’s features.
At the beginning of this article I raised the question about what is at stake in 
the giantness of the mole. Any ordinary mole is a small animal. So what is at stake 
in rendering as oversized this animal that is so small and, therefore, so insignif-
icant? In the context of the story, is smallness and insignificance not also the 
fate of all country people? Do the city people not far surpass them? Are they not 
infinitely insignificant, even tiny in, every regard? And, finally, are the country 
people, and in particular the peasants, not themselves all moles, clinging to the 
soil, digging through the earth, nearsighted, if not even blind, in short, disgust-
ing? In contacting the scientific societies in the city did the village schoolmas-
ter not endeavor to attain their recognition and, in order to do this, thus need a 
mole significantly larger than any previously witnessed? Yet what, indeed, is a 
giant mole? Since ordinary moles are small animals, the giant mole is, perhaps, 
not just a mole that measures some two yards, as the schoolteacher holds when 
72 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 181.
73 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 175.
74 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 174.
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defending himself against an incredulous scholar. In my view, the question of 
proportion concerns not so much the animal itself as its characteristic smallness. 
Is the giant mole, then, not rather a mammoth small animal whose distinguishing 
trait is its oversized smallness? That is, is not this gigantically tiny creature in fact 
a small animal whose very smallness has been magnified to such an extent that 
its tininess appears monstrously huge? But how is one to think such mammoth 
smallness? Rather than just a single, magnified mole, might not the giant mole be 
the incarnation of the species “mole,” that is, the entire species in the shape of 
one oversized mole? If so, what the village schoolmaster discovered would in fact 
be the universal mole, the hyperbolic blow-up of all particular moles. Perhaps! 
But it should be kept in mind that in the story only one particular mole has been 
sighted, one that is oversized, even gigantic. From the start, what is in question is 
a singular mole, which is unique in that it is a mammoth animal. The very size of 
this small animal makes it universally significant. Yet, Kafka’s story is in no way 
a literary illustration of the philosophical distinction between the universal and 
the singular; rather it is a radical reconception of it. Indeed, if something small is 
perceived and conceived as huge, without being defined by species-related crite-
ria, then such mammoth smallness would thereby hint at a novel conception of 
the universal. Furthermore, if the mole’s gigantic size is an “analogon” of univer-
sality, this universality is also necessarily singular in a sense. The singularity of 
the mole’s importance, paradoxically, is its unique insignificance.
As noted earlier, the schoolmaster qualified his discovery of the giant mole 
as being sky-high (himmelhoch), infinitely surpassing the businessman’s under-
standing. In inflating the mole’s smallness, does his discovery not rather consist 
of a disproportioned smallness that rises above the earth and soars, eagle-like, 
into the heavens – a mammoth smallness of imperial dimensions? Moreover, in 
defending his discovery and forging it into his lifework, he takes responsibility 
not only for its smallness, even made gigantic, but also for the overwhelming 
significance of whimsical, or droll, insignificance. However, as suggested previ-
ously, the mole is the schoolmaster’s privilege; thus he, and not the businessman 
from the city, has a prerogative in the affair. Yet what, essentially, is a privilege? 
In answering this question, it is important to note, especially as here the school-
teacher’s quarrel is with a city dweller, that, traditionally, the law is always the 
law of the city. So, again, what does a privilege consist of? Is it not, as its der-
ivation from the Latin privus (“single,” “each every individual,” “one’s own,” 
“peculiar,” and “particular”) and lex (“law”), suggests, a law for one, a law that 
is peculiar to only one singular case or to one individual? A privilege, then, rather 
than being an abstract generality or universality, is a singular law. As suggested, 
not only has this giant mole been sighted only once: like the animal in “A Cross-
breed,” there is only one exemplar of it – and it is the schoolmaster who, in a way, 
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is its only owner, in that he has made it his life’s task to render the giant mole’s 
existence public. In the same way as the law in “Before the Law” reveals itself as 
one accessible (and thus defined) by a gate made exclusively for the countryman, 
the giant mole, I contend, is the law of the schoolteacher. In this context, it is 
important that the businessman suggests that the schoolmaster “had hit upon 
[his] discovery more by chance than by design” and that it remained “one case 
[Einzelfall]”75 – just as, in “Before the Law,” the gate before which the man from 
the country waits was made solely for him. With Keats in mind, who, in “Isabella,” 
evokes “a demon-mole,”76 I submit that the appearance of the giant mole, rather 
than being just a specter or ghostly apparition, is the schoolmaster’s individual 
daimon, “the divine something” within him alone, of which Socrates speaks. If 
the giantism of the mole is repeatedly qualified in the narrative as improbable 
and laughable, is it not also because this giantism is construed as a law for only 
one? Therefore the project of proving this giantism requires all the help it can get, 
even though such help, because of its intrinsic ambiguity, is counterproductive.
But the schoolmaster, by writing a pamphlet about the discovery of an over-
sized mole, has also thrown down the gauntlet to the city dwellers. He is not 
only the one who discovered the giant mole but, driven by this daimon, also the 
one who initiated the struggle, the war of pamphlets. In seeking the attention of 
the scientific establishments of the city, he initiated the “dialectic” between the 
country person and city dweller, between mole-like blindness and enlightenment, 
between naïveté and the art of appearance. This “dialectic” leads the schoolmas-
ter’s advocate from the city to have, as he boasts, “probed deeply [eingebohrt]”77 
into the former like only a mole can and thus to have been countrified in turn. But 
the conflict is not symmetrical. It initially seems that the businessman has manip-
ulated, and thus dominated, the struggle; however, the shift that occurs after it 
has “turned out [gewendet]”78 that all his efforts have been a failure, causing him 
to disengage from the conflict and wash his hands of it, suggests that in fact the 
schoolmaster has gained the upper hand in the struggle. It is he who will pro-
nounce the final verdict. Furthermore, as a result of their struggle, the sky-high 
important discovery of the schoolmaster’s giant mole has become transformed: it 
no longer represents a law, or universal, applicable to only one singular person; 
it has become a most oppressive reality. Indeed, although the businessman has 
bidden him a last farewell, thereby seeking to permanently disengage himself 
75 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 180.
76 John Keats, Poetical Works, ed. H. W. Garrod, Oxford University Press, London 1966, 190.
77 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 176.
78 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 179.
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from the conflict, the schoolmaster does not budge and continues to burden his 
host with his “silent presence.”79 The narrator observes: “As I contemplated the 
stubborn little fellow from behind, while he sat at the table, it seemed an impos-
sible idea ever to show him the door.” On previous visits, the schoolmaster had 
often disturbed (befremdet) him, but this time “his silent presence as he sat there 
was an actual torture.”80 By characterizing the village schoolmaster as a “little 
fellow” (kleinen zähen Alten), the struggling young businessman is seen as rising 
beyond the old man and all his self-deluded importance. But when the school-
master recounts to the businessman the conversation he had with his wife after 
he had learned that a man of the city had felt compelled to enter into his affair, 
he “pushed his chair back from the table, got up, spread out his arms, and stared 
at the floor, as if his tiny little wife were standing there and he were speaking to 
her.”81 Rising before his wife while explaining to her how the businessman could 
help him in bringing his discovery of a giant mole to the attention of the city, the 
little fellow, indeed, becomes a giant who is no match for the businessman. Fur-
thermore, in the final scene, the little fellow, who, with all his bitter reproaches 
(Vorwürfe) against the businessman, has proven to be somewhat mole-like, is not 
only regarded by the narrator as a giant, but also, seen from behind – clad, it 
can be assumed, in his old-fashioned padded overcoat – he actually looks like a 
giant mole. Not unlike, in The Trial, the judge in the painting, about whom Leni 
informs Josef K. that “he’s a small man, almost a dwarf” and “yet in spite of that 
he had himself drawn out to that length in the portrait,” the schoolmaster has 
enhanced his size.82 It is as if the insignificant village schoolteacher, who has, the 
narrator asserts “in a certain sense […] become [his] teacher,”83 has also, for his 
part, learned from the man of the city the art of deceptive appearance of which 
Kant spoke. The narrator, as described at the beginning of the story, finds even a 
small, ordinary-sized mole utterly disgusting. But the stink of the schoolmaster’s 
tobacco is so penetrating as to be unbearable. Thus, it can easily be assumed that 
the presence in his room of this giant mole, who shows no desire or inclination 
to stir forth, is oppressive enough to conclude the conflict, and the trial, with a 
death sentence for the narrator – a sentence resulting from a law that he himself 
has labored to bring about, but whose sight is so disgusting as to kill him on the 
spot. The little fellow, whom the businessmen cannot show the door, will have 
79 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 182.
80 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 181.
81 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 177.
82 Franz Kafka, The Trial, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, Schocken Books, New York 1974, 108.
83 Kafka, “The Village Schoolmaster [The Giant Mole],” 176.
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won the struggle that he initiated. Indeed, now that the verdict has been ren-
dered, it is he, though not budging from his seat in the businessman’s apartment, 
who will replace the man from the city. His singular law will have substituted 
itself for the law of the city. Yet the death of the businessman is the death of the 
story’s narrator. His execution leaves no one to help by testifying or speaking for 
someone denied a hearing. No one remains to advocate his case, that is, to pub-
licly vindicate the giant mole and its mammoth smallness. The schoolmaster’s 
victory is thus, to say the least, ambiguous: In the narrator’s place only “the silent 
presence” of the man of the country can be “heard,” or, rather, is no longer heard. 
With the destruction of the law of the city, i.e., the law for the many, the law for 
one will also have been reduced to silence.
Kafka owned a copy of Micha Josef Bin Gorion’s Die Sagen der Juden, and thus 
would likely have been familiar with the Jewish legend about the three strange 
or monstrous creatures that God created in distinction from all other creatures: 
these three are the mole, the snake, and the frog. It is true that only the snake 
and the frog are described as giant creatures. But of the mole it is expressly stated 
that “if it sees the light of day, no being is capable of continuing to exist anymore 
[wenn er das Tageslicht erblickt, so kann kein Wesen vor ihm bestehen].”84 In other 
words, no other creature can possibly subsist the presence and the sight of this 
monstrous mole. But, in light of the logic of Kafka’s short story, it follows that the 
very day the mole sees the light of day and succeeds in imposing his own law, 
his own presence is also reduced to inexistence. Before himself even he cannot 
subsist.
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David Suchoff
Irreducible Pluralities: The Jewish Legacy of 
Franz Kafka
In revisiting the Jewish reception of Kafka, I would like to begin with a story that 
Franz Kafka told Milena Jesenská, his Czech translator and lover. In this story, 
Kafka tells Milena of his own interest in the problem of “universal” definitions – 
those ways we categorize other people. The topic of Kafka’s story is the com-
monplace definitions that are used to distinguish Germans from Jews. The tale 
concerns Mathilde, the wife of Heinrich Heine, the greatest – we could say the 
most universally loved – German-Jewish writer before Kafka. “Next we come to 
Judaism,” Kafka tells Milena, after a sardonic discussion of Franz Werfel, “but 
then again, you should hear a pretty story from me once in a while.” The promise 
here is of pleasure, expressed in Kafka’s awareness that he is both defining and 
crossing a linguistic line: he is telling this tale about Heine’s family, after all, in 
response to Milena’s request to define his Jewish identity: and to do so, as one 
would say in the Jewish tradition, while standing on one foot. 
“You ask me if I am a Jew,” Kafka reminds his correspondent, with his next 
line posing the question of his own singularity with a difference: as the “particu-
lar” that transforms its universal box into a liberating variety of terms. “Perhaps 
you were joking around,” is how he makes his opening, as he introduces his pre-
ferred and in a strict sense most essential approach to such questions of defini-
tion: “or perhaps you are asking whether I am one of those anxious Jews.” From 
the outset it is evident that Kafka’s answer proceeds in his characteristic fashion: 
he sets two popular, and limiting, notions of Jewish difference – laughter, and 
anxiety – in contact with one another. In terms of Kafka’s own bestiary, he moves 
forward like his “giant mole,” that creature difficult to discover: as an animal who 
works to establish covert passageways, and pleasurable, underground tunnels 
that connect two. Whereas the “anxious Jew” acts out uncertainty over his lack 
of fit with the “universal” and plays a predictable vaudeville role, the prospect 
that Milena was “just joking around” uncovers a different formulation: that Kafka 
took pleasure in his own Jewish difference, and viewed the “universal” less as a 
source of “paradox” or contradiction than as a repository of irreducibly plural 
perspectives and differences to be excavated and enjoyed. 
Kafka first apologizes before telling the story of his Jewish identity: one 
reason for this might be that Milena is not herself Jewish and the story he is about 
to retell includes various stereotypes, some of which she may not know how to 
apply. But since, as Kafka writes elsewhere in an aphorism, “what is intended to 
 Irreducible Pluralities: The Jewish Legacy of Franz Kafka   179
be actively destroyed must first of all have been firmly grasped,”1 he recounts the 
tale in the following form: 
Mathilde was constantly irritating [Meissner] with her outbursts against the Germans: they 
were spiteful, opinionated, overly clever, quibbling, and pushy – in short, an unbearable 
people. “You don’t know the Germans at all,” Meissner finally answered back. “Henry’s 
social circle here in Paris consists entirely of German journalists,” he told her, “and they 
are all Jews.” “Come on,” she responded, “you’re exaggerating, of course there might be 
a Jew here or there in the bunch. Take Seiffert, for instance.” “No,” said Meissner, “he is 
the only non-Jew.” “Really?” said Mathilde. “What about Jeitteles?” she asked, who was 
a strong, blond specimen of a man: “could he be a Jew?” “Of course,” said Meissner. But 
“Bamberger?” “Him too.” “Amstein?” “Just the same.” And so it followed as she went down 
the list of all his acquaintances. Finally, Mathilde became angry and said: “You’re just trying 
to make fun of me! Now you’ll try to top it off by telling me that ‘Kohn’ is a Jewish name, but 
Kohn is a cousin of Henry’s and Henry is a Lutheran!” (to this Meissner had no response).2 
Kafka concludes by entertaining his future readers with this moral: “in any case, 
you don’t seem frightened of Judaism at all”: Mathilde is thereby redeemed from 
her role as the idiot of the Jewish family by her failure to master the terms that 
would place every individual in a universal box. In this failure to reduce Germans 
and Jews to their dominant paradigms, Mathilde becomes quite beautifully singu-
lar, as she makes a mockery of universally valid categories. Her wisdom therefore 
refers us neither to the philo-Semite, sometimes defined as an anti-Semite who 
likes Jews, nor to the Talmudic adage that all praise carries within it the seeds 
of its opposite by holding us to a pattern we can only fail to match. In her own 
inimitable fashion, Heine’s wife points us toward those multiple differences that 
fit no priestly definition – national, religious, or otherwise: she is, in other words, 
the potential mensch of the story, or the Jewish definition of the human being. 
Why would Kafka – like Wittgenstein – highlight these multiple pleasures of 
the universal? The reason, as his own story about Heine suggests, was that such 
categories for identity had already reduced Jews, and other others, into a stage 
comedy of types that were much less enjoyable in his period. And by discuss-
ing “whether I am a Jew” with his translator, Kafka was raising the question of 
his reception as a Jewish writer with this negative – that is, reductive – form of 
1 Franz Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, ed. Max Brod, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, 
Exact Change, Cambridge 1991, 95; Franz Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II [Post-
humous Writings and Fragments II], ed. Jost Schillemeit, S. Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1992, 133: “Was 
tätig zerstört warden soll, muß vorher ganz fest gehalten worden sein.”
2 Franz Kafka, letter to Milena Jensenská, 30 May 1920, in Briefe an Milena [Letters to Milena], 
Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1983, 93, my translation.
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comedy in mind. Such acts of self-definition, for Kafka, were thus a special kind 
of pain: something less than a pursuit of philosophical meaning, yet also more 
profound, in that his writing cleverly internalizes and explodes the narrowness 
of national clichés. “You as a woman of Prague,” Kafka therefore tells Milena, 
“will not be so innocent.” For “innocent,” Kafka uses the German word harmlos: 
for while universal definitions can indeed inflict much harm, we are not so easily 
los, or rid of them, especially, as he means to relate to her, where the Jews are 
concerned. Joking, according to some definitions of humor, indeed sought to sin-
gularize this gift as a “Jewish” capacity (one often heralded in the Yiddish writers 
Kafka studied) to produce a literature of “laughter through tears.” However, 
Jewish literature, the baby in this quotation, should not be thrown out with 
the bathwater. For Kafka defined his own reception as a writer in these German 
Jewish terms. “Thoughts of Freud,” Kafka wrote in 1912, when reflecting on his 
story “The Judgment” (“Das Urteil”) but also on Max Brod and his Arnold Beer: 
das Schicksal eines Judens [Arnold Beer: The Fate of a Jew] (1912) and on Jakob 
Wasserman, who in 1918 would produce the classic Mein Weg als Deutscher und 
Jude [My Life as German and Jew] (1921).3 For just as Kafka was famously opposed 
to psychoanalysis, he regarded his peers as those German Jewish writers able to 
take deadening – and ostensibly universal – national definitions and make them 
come alive. 
It would be the “universalist” Freud who, in 1927, defined “humor” as the 
ability of the ego to obtain pleasure from a painful situation.4 Kafka found this 
position through a Jewish doorway to the plural, and took it far from home. Schol-
ars generally agree that Kafka would never have experienced his “breakthrough” 
to stature as a universal modernist writer without his having fallen in love, in 
1911–1912, with the Yiddish theater he brought to Prague. In this same period, 
Kafka carefully read Meyer Pines’s Histoire de la littérature Judeo-Allemande 
[History of Judeo-German Literature], noting the following  – one wants to say 
Freudian – description of Jewish writing and its unique European voice: in defin-
ing the style of Mendele, Pines states, “c’était un rire à travers des larmes,” that is, 
“it was a laughter through tears, more painful and full of sorrow than tears them-
selves.”5 This intensified feeling of sorrow, according to Pines, became the trigger 
3 Franz Kafka, diary entry of 23 September 1912, in The Diaries 1910–1923, ed. Max Brod, trans. 
Joseph Kresh and Martin Greenberg with the cooperation of Hannah Arendt, Schocken Books, 
New York 1976 [1948], 213.
4 Sigmund Freud, “Humour,” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey, Hogarth Press, London 1961, XXI: 163. 
5 Meyer Pines, Histoire de la littérature Judeo-Allemande, Jouve et Cis, Éditeurs, Paris 1911, 410. 
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that unleashed “this spirit of gaiety and good-natured openness” that Yiddish lit-
erature makes the reader feel. This quiet openness to multiple influences finds its 
surprising “father” figure, as he was called, in Sholem Aleichem, who borrowed 
the motto “laughter through tears” from the famous Chapter VII of Gogol’s Dead 
Souls. Yiddish, Kafka learned, was less than averse to lifting its pleasures from 
more “universal” European languages – that is, “great” literatures that had cor-
nered the market on prestige. And so Kafka understood that, as follows from this 
version of Jewish tradition, “tears” could be cried with a hidden smile as Russian 
and other literary influences entered through the door. 
Kafka expressed his joy at this discovery in his famous diary entry of 25 Decem-
ber 1911. There, Kafka outlines his concept of “small” or “minor” literatures, as 
French post-structuralist theory calls them, though his use of Jewish tradition 
deserves a more enjoyable description than that. A better name for the Jewish and 
universal Kafka would be post-pleasure-less: for in Yiddish and the new writing of 
modern Hebrew, he noted, the “antithesis between sons and fathers, and the pos-
sibility of discussing this,” appears in a new way: as the “presentation of national 
faults in a manner that is painful, to be sure, but also liberating and deserving of 
forgiveness.”6 “Pain,” in Kafka’s formulation, thus signals a process of liberation 
already underway. The “faults” of the nation – the signs of its struggles – were 
to be regarded as different forms of “universal” patterns as they emerged – and 
forgiveness as the art of an unbinding that set these multiple forms of energy 
free. Were Freud to be summoned from the dead to join a discussion, we might 
discover him sitting in the back of the room, in the same spot where a Talmudic 
parable places Moses: the position in Talmudic academies awarded to the worst 
readers of the Torah.7 If, in the tradition of Jewish commentary, the author of 
the Law itself – Moses, our Teacher – gets the cheap seats, then Freud should be 
similarly honored, albeit in Kafka’s perspective. Where Freud imagined a father 
killed by his sons – envious, no doubt, of the father’s Egyptian as well as Hebrew 
origins – Kafka saw a house with many mansions: “Abraham,” after all, means 
Av Hamon [אב המןו], or “father of a multitude,” in the Hebrew text.8 In the Jewish 
tradition, the author of the Law sits at the back of the Talmudic Academy because 
6 Kafka, diary entry of 25 December 1911, in The Diaries, 148.
7 Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Menahot 29B. For the text and discussion, see Jeffrey L. Ruben-
stein, Talmudic Stories: Narrative Art, Composition, and Culture, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore and London 1999, 271–272. 
8 See Genesis 17:5: “but your name shall be Abraham, for I make you the father a multitude of 
nations,” footnote b: [Abraham]: “understood as ‘father of a multitude.’” Tanakh: A New Trans-
lation of the Holy Scriptures According to the Traditional Hebrew Text, The Jewish Publication 
Society, Philadelphia 1985, 23. 
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he is the “worst” student of his own text: because, as this Mosaic figure suggested 
to Kafka, the “universal” meaning of the father is more varied – and ultimately 
more marked by the traces of many nations – than the author himself could see. 
In Kafka’s view, the “people” or “nation” suffers from uniformity because of 
the narrow roles accorded to “others”: like the odd woman or gay male, whose 
pleasures are judged a failure rather than as the new forms of reading and expres-
sion they actually are. In this respect, Kafka’s innovation re-discovered “forgive-
ness” as a Jewish pleasure: in his re-reading of Abraham and the binding of Isaac, 
for instance, it is the patriarch, who would impose his deadly form of universal-
ity on the son, who receives the honored position of Moses and is thus placed 
at the back of the class. “I can imagine,” Kafka wrote, “a different Abraham for 
myself.”9 Instead, Kafka’s original patriarch is re-imagined as an “old clothes 
dealer,” whose assemblage of a nation from different, cast-off sources was his 
grandest human quality of all. In this same spirit, Kafka identified what he called 
“the old story” – “universal” roles of father and son that he thought were deserv-
ing of “Verwandlung,” or transformation: that is, of being situated on a new stage 
for the German Jewish voice. 
1  Paradox as Comedy: Kafka and Beckett
As Kafka recorded in a notebook, “universal” and “particular” were, as terms for 
the father-son struggle, already stale formulations: they constituted a staging 
that made one forget that a bad  – because limiting  – script was not the real 
thing. The problem, for Kafka, was therefore not that Freudian interpretation was 
Jewish; rather, it was that such interpretation was not Jewish enough in its ability 
to take pleasure from these vaudeville scenes. In this way, Adorno’s quip – that in 
psychoanalysis only the exaggerations are true – can be understood as his own 
version of Kafka’s reading of Freud.10 For “while psychoanalysis lays stress on the 
father-complex and finds the concept intellectually fruitful,” as Kafka wrote to 
Max Brod in 1921, “in this case I prefer another version, where the issue revolves 
not around the innocent father but the father’s Jewishness,” that is, a version 
where exaggerations are already implicit and waiting to have their truth values 
9 Franz Kafka, “Abraham,” trans. Clement Greenberg, in Parables and Paradoxes in German and 
English, Schocken Books, New York 1946, 36–41, 41.
10 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life [Minima Moralia: Re-
flexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben], trans. E.F.N. Jephcott, Verso, London 1978, section 29, 
“Dwarf Fruit,” 49.
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uncovered in the canonical text.11 Kafka’s reflections on Abraham, the original 
Jewish father figure, already envision, in 1918, this notion of “general” paternal 
authority as a displacement of actual life, its lively borrowings and trades – as a 
theater to be renewed. “It is as if,” Kafka writes, “the back and forth between the 
general and the particular were taking place on the real stage, and, as if, on the 
other hand, life in general were only sketched in on the background scenery.”12 
Samuel Beckett’s relation to English was similar in this respect to Kafka’s 
feeling for German: both encountered languages that needed to be re-created, 
and each found his own way out. With English having reduced Irish culture to 
stereotype, Beckett’s desire to break the hold of that language through humor 
is particularly evident in the Shakespearean sonnet presented in Watt, his final 
English novel. In this miniature poem that critics have discovered hiding amidst 
his prose, Beckett uses an English form to find his Irish voice. Repunctuating the 
prose sentence (and adding a rhyme scheme) yields the following poetic form: 
    The wacks, (A)
    the moans, (B)
    the cracks, (A)
    the groans. (B)
    The welts, (C)
    the squeaks, (D)
    the belts, (C) 
    the shrieks. (D)
    The pricks, (E)
    the prayers, (F)
    the kicks, (E)
    the tears. (F)
    The skelps, (G)
    and the yelps. (G)
With this sentence Beckett has in fact produced the most classic form of English 
poetry: the fourteen points follow the rhyme scheme of the Shakespearean sonnet, 
even as they scream against the English brutality that wears gentleman’s clothes. 
The hatred of English becomes the pleasure of rejecting its most “British,” and 
11 Franz Kafka, letter to Max Brod, June 1921, in Letters to Friends, Family, and Editors, trans. 
Richard and Clara Winston, Schocken Books, New York 1977, 286–289, 289. 
12 Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 55. 
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thus most sickening, assumptions about his people: learning the language, in 
other words, begins when “life begins to ram her fish and chips down your gullet 
and you puke.”13 
Beckett did eventually expel the English language, subsequently writing 
his greatest works in French. As Mark Nixon has noted, Beckett was, as early as 
1931, when he published his “A Casket of Pralinen for a Daughter of a Dissipated 
Mandarin,” already conceiving of “waste” as a model for his literary products.14 
This process intensified in the 1930s, when his final English works appeared; 
these were published in the journal transition, alongside early translations of 
Kafka and the first sections of Joyce’s Finnegans Wake. Beckett’s “Casket” was 
quite alive: much in the spirit of Kafka’s story that begins “I Was A Visitor Among 
the Dead” [Ich War Unter den Toten zu Gast], where the underworld contains a 
“Jewish maiden” [ein Judenmädchen] who refuses to wear a shroud.15 Beckett like-
wise thought of national literary categories as deathly for the living force of lit-
erary creation: he sought, as he states in a German-language letter to Axel Kaun, 
“to bore one hole after another” [ein Loch nach dem anderen in ihr zu bohren] in 
what he called “official” language and literature.16 The only writing truly alive 
for Beckett – as Kafka’s Jewish figure already suggests – had re-opened the con-
nections between different languages, to escape the living death of literature as 
separate and sealed-off national spheres. Beckett’s “Casket of Pralinen” therefore 
recognized the sweets of national literatures as productive of “memory’s invol-
untary vomit”17: the creation of canons that could not be swallowed, and whose 
tastes for the voices of other nations needed to be read anew. And it would be the 
remnants – those multiple differences – of this mother tongue that would speak 
with the greatest eloquence in Beckett’s French-language novel Molloy, an Irish 
name that combines “mother” with a recapture of his linguist “alloy.” 
Kafka’s attitude toward German was quite similar, if his “Letter to the Father” 
(“Brief an den Vater,” translated as “Letter to His Father”), from 1921, is any 
guide. “Six months of German Studies,” Kafka recalls, followed by law studies 
13 Samuel Beckett, Watt, Grove Press, New York 1953, 55, 44 
14 Mark Nixon, Samuel Beckett’s German Diaries 1936–1937, Continuum, New York 2011, 58. 
15 Franz Kafka, “Bei den Toten zu Gast” (“A Guest Among the Dead”), in Die Erzählungen und 
andere ausgewählte Prosa [The Stories and Other Selected Prose], ed. Roger Hermes, Fischer 
Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 2002, 354–356, 356. 
16 Samuel Beckett, “German Letter of 1937,” in Disjecta: Miscellaneous Writings and a Dramatic 
Fragment, ed. Ruby Cohn, Grove Press, New York 1984, 51–55, 52.
17 See Samuel Beckett, “A Casket of Pralinen for a Daughter of a Dissipated Mandarin,” in 
Lawrence Harvey, Samuel Beckett: Poet and Critic, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1970, 
278–283, 281.
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at Prague’s German university, had each given him the pre-Beckett experience 
of digesting a literary and legal language that was pablum, especially from a 
German national point of view: “I was positively living, in an intellectual sense,” 
Kafka notes, “on sawdust, which had, moreover, already been chewed for me in 
other people’s mouths.”18 In his discussion of the Jewish vernacular in Prague, 
Kafka notes that in Yiddish he found what he called the “youngest European lan-
guage,” that is, a memory of the translation roots which languages like German 
and Yiddish shared.19 He had thus discovered a multiple perspective on a 
German language whose myth of origin, like that of Beckett’s English, he felt had 
been ruthlessly forced upon him. Whereas English claimed cultural priority in 
Ireland – and branded the Irish as comic imitators – French, for Beckett, exposed 
many of the pieces from which English was composed. And whereas German 
forced the “Jewish mother” into a cold, staged role as a would-be Christian – “the 
Jewish ‘Mutter’ is no mother,” Kafka wrote  – Yiddish exposed those holes, in 
Beckett’s sense, between “official” and unofficial forms of the national voice.20 
The original German form of “we are,” Kafka observed, had in fact become sec-
ondary: the earlier form was actually preserved in the Yiddish “mir seien,” thus 
rendering the Yiddish, itself closer to middle high German, more “original” than 
standard German itself. Kafka therefore urges his audience in Prague to be wary 
not of Yiddish, their own deliciously varied language, but rather “of yourselves” 
for running from its multiple national embrace: “for we did not come to punish 
you,” Kafka concludes.21 
Beckett’s English was much like Kafka’s German in this respect, especially 
given Beckett’s dislike for universals and the humor he attained by switching to 
French. Thus in Molloy, when the hero declares  – first in French, and then in 
Beckett’s English translation – that he was “born out of my mother’s arse, if I am 
correct,”22 no Irish self-hatred or misogyny is involved. Beckett’s object is English, 
his mother tongue: Molloy reminds us that he was, as the original French so aptly 
puts it, born “par le trou,” – that is, “by the truth”; in other words, the “whole” 
18 Franz Kafka, “Letter to His Father,” trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, in The Basic 
Kafka, ed. Erich Heller, Pocket Books, New York 1979, 186–236, 223.
19 Franz Kafka, “Einleitungsvortrag über Jargon” [“Talk on the Yiddish Language”], in Franz 
Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente I [Posthumous Writings and Fragments I], ed. Mal-
colm Pasley, S. Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1992, 188–193, 189.
20 Kafka, diary entry of 24 October 1911, in The Diaries, 88.
21 Kafka, “Einleitungsvortrag über Jargon,” 190, 193, my translation. 
22 Samuel Beckett, Molloy, trans. Patrick Bowles in collaboration with Samuel Beckett, in Three 
Novels: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable, Grove Press, New York 1955, 12; Samuel Beckett, 
Molloy, Les Éditions de Minuit, Paris 1951, 20. 
186   David Suchoff
of English generalizations about the Irish should be expelled and treated as utter 
waste. The true “hole” – or “Loch,” as Beckett writes in his “German Letter of 
1937” – is where original identity arrives already defaced by prejudiced attitudes: 
precisely that point where a multiple, trans-national channel of influence receives 
its sign. As in Kafka, however – who referred to “The Judgment” as a story that 
emerged “covered in filth and slime”23 – birth imagery is used as the opportu-
nity to re-imagine one’s native ground. And in a doubly original sense: Beckett 
reclaims the Irish tradition of scatological humor in this passage, using Kafka 
to explain that German and English notions of identity are indeed a pain in the 
behind, so to speak, and establishing a breakthrough from closed national atti-
tudes to multiple-linguistic style. Hence Beckett’s allusion to the French version 
of Kafka’s diary entry, as provided by Max Brod in 1945.24 One would, of course, 
very much like to say that ceteris paribus, or all other things being equal, Kafka’s 
Jewish attitude toward German works the same way as Beckett’s self-delivery 
from English, that is, via the courtesy of French. The point of humor, for both 
Beckett and Kafka, is precisely to discover the positive and multiple meanings 
of the different, in those many linguistic passageways that already inhabit the 
universal judgments of a more prestigious tongue. 
Such is the “way out” described in Kafka’s “A Report to an Academy” (“Ein 
Bericht für eine Akademie”), a story published in Martin Buber’s monthly journal 
Der Jude [The Jew] in 1917. This tale – of an African ape who is captured, boxed, 
and shipped to Berlin by the German circus – is Kafka’s most Jewish story in this 
humorous sense, as it encourages the reader to de-identify with the German lan-
guage the narrator has so carefully acquired. Little wonder, then, that Beckett’s 
“Premier Amour,” or first love  – one of his first French compositions after the 
Second World War – would visit the grave of the “wild animal collector Hagen-
23 Kafka, diary entry of 11 February 1913, in The Diaries, 214. The passage reads: “the story came 
out of me like a real birth, covered with filth and slime, and only I have the hand that can reach 
to the body itself, and the strength of desire to do so.”
24 The quotation, from Kafka’s diary in French translation, reads: “car ce récit est sorti de moi 
comme par un veritable accouchement, couvert de souillures et de mucus.” See Max Brod, Franz 
Kafka: souvenirs et documents [Franz Kafka, Memories and Documents], trans. Hélène Zylber-
berg, Gallimard, Paris 1945, 149. Beckett’s final library contained the version cited here: a French 
translation of Brod’s Franz Kafka: Eine Biographie: Errinerungen und Dokumente [Franz Kafka: 
A Biography: Reminiscences and Documents], Heinrich Mercy Sohn, Prague 1937. See Dirk Van 
Hulle and Mark Nixon, Samuel Beckett’s Library, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, 
239.
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beck,” the “Führer,” or “leader,” of Kafka’s earlier tale.25 The obvious Jewish, 
as well as African, paradox of Kafka’s story has always been that Peter, though 
he is the “animal” of the tale, is far more human than his German captors. Less 
obvious is how the similarity between Jews and Africans opens the vulgar ste-
reotypes in which both were confined. Indeed, Arthur Holitscher’s Amerika 
Heute und Morgen [America Today and Tomorrow] – Kafka’s source for his novel 
Amerika – reports a conversation between the author and an African American 
he met on the streets of New York’s Tin Pan Alley: the young man informs him 
that “our fates share much in common: we negroes and the Jews!”26 In this, the 
source for Kafka’s “ape”  – who has been enslaved by his German captors and 
then carried over sea to Berlin – the African American from the vaudeville world 
effectively tells his Jewish friend: “We’re in the same boat!” 
The African ape of “A Report to an Academy” is therefore deeply Jewish, 
though for exactly the opposite reason that Kafka scholars have traditionally sug-
gested. The standard reception of the story regards Peter as “Jewish” because he 
is “assimilated” and “aping” German customs: the comedy of the story reveals 
more than one hole in the vaudeville reductions that the philosophic tradition 
has substituted for thought. Germans are of course the ostensible “apes” in this 
story, having assimilated stereotypes in unthinking fashion, thus constituting 
what Beckett termed the “risus purus,” or the laugh at that which is “unhappy.”27 
This purest laughter – in Beckett as in Kafka – occurs when one escapes from the 
highest – and also stupidest – concepts that give so much pain, and approaches 
the multiple forms of our common human ground. As Kafka’s narrator relates, 
with a broad range of cultural reference present in his voice, “The whole con-
struction was too low for me to stand up in, and too narrow for me to sit down 
in.”28 These Germans, he informs the reader, have also imitated a Jewish sage: 
25 Samuel Beckett, “First Love,” in Samuel Beckett: The Complete Short Prose 1929–1989, ed. 
S.E. Gontarski, Grove Press, New York 1995, 25–45, 27. Kafka’s Red Peter recalls the “hunting ex-
pedition sent out by the firm of Hagenbeck – by the way, I have drunk many a bottle of good red 
wine since then with the leader of that expedition.” See Franz Kafka, “A Report to an Academy,” 
trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, Schocken Books, 
New York 1972, 250–259, 251; Franz Kafka, “Ein Bericht für eine Akademie,” in Die Erzählungen 
und andere ausgewählte Prosa, 322–333, 323: “Jagdexpedition der Firma Hagenbeck – mit dem 
Führer habe ich übrigens seither manche gute Flasche Rotwein geleert.”
26 My translation. The original German reads: “Unsere Schicksale haben ja viel Ähnlichkeit 
miteinander. Und dann kommen wir beiden aus Afrika, wir Neger und die Juden.” See Arthur 
Holitscher, Amerika Heute und Morgen, S Fischer Verlag, Berlin 1912, 365.
27 Beckett, Watt, 48. 
28 Kafka, “A Report to an Academy,” 252.
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their arrangement recalls a passage from Moses Maimonides, who himself had 
taken his definition of the African from the Aristotelian-Arabic philosophers of 
the middle ages. In this respect, one could say that in Kafka’s fiction Jews have 
the potential to become the best kind of human animals: creatures so full of 
“varieté”  – a job that Peter is offered  – that they break out of any German or 
Jewish cage.29 
2  Bite Your Tongue: Kafka’s Jewish 
Multi-lingualism
In Kafka’s “The Judgment,” Georg Bendemann offers this tasty and ultimately 
open response to his father: “‘You Comedian!’ Georg could not resist the retort, 
realized at once the harm he had done and, his eyes starting in his head, bit his 
tongue back, only too late, till the pain made his knees give.”30 Georg’s attempt 
at self-stifling is only the surface meaning of this phrase: when he “bit his tongue 
back” [biß in seine Zunge] the bite triggers a trembling gesture – “a Beltschmer-
z,”31 according to Beckett – that one feels when multiple meanings begin their 
transition to expressive form. A transfer and indeed a translation are acted out 
in this scene. First, the son indicates the staged quality of the father’s angry per-
formance  – “You Comedian!” is reminiscent of the “transitional generation of 
Jews” as described in Kafka’s “Letter to His Father”: the vaudeville terms suggest 
how Jewish fathers of his generation would resort to Yiddish curses in their anger 
and rage.32 “Biting the Tongue” indicates a taste for the multiple in this respect – 
Kafka’s translation of what in Yiddish has been called “Pronouncing the Magic 
Word Kholile and its Relatives.”33 Loosely translatable into English as “Horrors!” 
or “Perish the Thought,” these “Kholile” expressions can be termed an opening 
to multiple pleasures: in Kafka’s translation, “Kholile” appears in German where 
29 On Maimonides in Kafka’s text, and “varieté” as an allusion to connections between dispa-
rate national traditions, see David Suchoff, Kafka’s Jewish Languages: the Hidden Openness of 
Tradition, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2012, 4. 
30 Franz Kafka, “The Judgment,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, 77–88, 
86.
31 Samuel Beckett, “What A Misfortune,” in More Pricks Than Kicks, Grove Press, New York 
1972, 114–151, 118. 
32 Kafka, “Letter to His Father,” in The Basic Kafka, 186–236, 217. 
33 James A. Matisoff, Blessings, Curses, Hopes and Fears: Psycho-Ostensive Expressions in Yid-
dish, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2000, 48–49. 
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the bite, or biß, in other words, opens our tastes to a series of trans-linguistic 
meanings, alive on the tip of the filial – that is, a complex and ramified tongue. 
For “it was not so long ago,” as Kafka informs his audience in Prague in 1912, that 
“the familiar colloquial language [Verkehrsprache] of German Jews […] seemed to 
be a remoter or closer approximation to Jargon, and many nuances remain to this 
day.”34 
“Bite Your Tongue,” in this signal gesture, holds back: in a way that fully 
tastes the variety of the pleasure withheld: a good description of the richness 
that comes across in Kafka’s German style. In much the same fashion, the Kholile 
principle of Yiddish, as James Matisoff notes, is most often used sarcastically: 
telling us something is terrible – God forbid – as a way of admitting a fuller view-
point and its pleasures. The saying about comedy that Kafka cites bites its own 
tongue in just this sense: – “a joke can, kholile,” lay waste to an entire world, 
when abhorrence, that is, is at the same time enjoying a more expressive voice: 
already tasting, as it were, the plural meanings of both the German and Jewish 
tongue.35 As a model for reading Kafka, this “bite” in the “tongue” also offers 
a morsel of Kafka’s sense of humor, whose joys have been savored far too little 
in the reception he has received. Of this crime, however, Freud can certainly be 
forgiven, even in Kafka’s own Jewish terms, since Kafka exemplifies this version 
of recapturing the past by taking the father’s place in a more pleasurable way: in 
this case, in the small connections that Kafka draws between German and Jewish 
speech. In this minute instance, abhorrence already enjoys an expanded form of 
linguistic pleasure: namely, the “biß” that is already tasting, as it were, “a bisl” – 
a little bit, or bite, in English – of the meanings common to both the German and 
Jewish mouth.36
Kafka’s Jewish reception could therefore be said to be lacking because  – 
Kholile!  – readers have taken such “Comedian!” moments in a singular way. 
Georg’s gesture also enacts a completion of Goethe’s “loosening one’s tongue” 
[die Zunge los].37 Kholile, essentially a form of biting one’s tongue  – that is, of 
34 Franz Kafka, “An Introductory Talk on the Yiddish Language,” trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne 
Wilkins, in Mark Anderson, ed., Reading Kafka: Prague, Politics and the Fin de Siècle, Schocken 
Books, New York 1989, 263–266, 266; Kafka, “Einleitungsvortrag,” in Nachgelassene Schriften I, 
192.
35 Matishoff, Blessings, Curses, Hopes and Fears, 49
36 Kafka thus preferred books, as he wrote in 1904, “die einen beißen und stechen” – “that bite 
and stick.” See Franz Kafka, letter to Oskar Pollak, 27 January 1904, in Briefe [Letters] 1902–1924, 
Schocken Books, New York 1958, 27. 
37 See Kafka, diary entry of 16 November 1910, in The Diaries, 28: “I’m reading Iphigenie auf 
Tauris [Iphigenia in Tauris]. Here, aside from some isolated, plainly faulty passages, the dried up 
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magically neutralizing a painful state of affairs, and thus enjoying the broadest 
secular tastes – enjoys a rich tradition in the Hebrew language. In the Hebrew 
Bible the root of the word for “horrors” in this Yiddish sense was deeply anti-
thetical from the start and appears in boundary-crossing forms that suggest the 
universal pleasure involved. Thus the same Hebrew root that means “desecrate, 
ruin, make unfit” – but also “to begin anew” – first appears in the Hebrew text 
when Abraham pleads with God to spare Sodom and Gomorrah; he tells God that 
destroying the cities would be an act of desecration: “Far be it from You” – liter-
ally Kholila – “to bring death upon the innocent as well as the guilty” (Genesis 
18:25).38 A related form of the word appears in Jeremiah 31:5, a source that Kafka 
alludes to in The Castle via the name of the character Jeremias, one of the two 
playful “assistants.” In the biblical book of Jeremiah, Hebrew accordingly gives 
a form of khalel and its “horrors” as a form of reaping joy: “men shall plant, 
and live to enjoy common things,” as the verse is translated in a version that 
highlights “Khol” – literally, “sand.” In modern Hebrew this everyday word now 
means “secular,” as opposed to a religiously narrow point of view. In this partic-
ulate and grammatical sense, “Khol” in the Hebrew of Jeremiah can be said to 
speak of the common and multiple soil from which all life grows and thus to offer 
a hint of the many differences in our language and of the lives that bear the most 
enjoyable human fruit.
Kafka’s humor performs a secular version of these Jewish linguistic pleas-
ures. In his diary entry of 26 January 1912, he notes the “eastern Jewish habit of 
biting one’s lips” [Ostjudische Gewohnheit des an den Lippen Beißens] as being 
another model of such expansive linguistic control  – such as when we taste 
meanings that are ready to explode.39 This expressive potential well describes 
a figure like Kafka’s Odradek, in his aptly named “The Cares of a Housefather” 
(“Die Sorge eines Hausvaters”) (translated into English as “The Cares of a Family 
Man”), who gives forth “only the kind of laughter that has no lungs behind it.”40 
German language in the mouth of a pure boy is really to be regarded with absolute amazement. 
The verse, at the moment of its reading, lifts every word up to heights where it stands in perhaps 
a thin but penetrating light.” “Vom alten Bande löset ungern sich/Die Zunge los,” as Goethe’s 
Iphigenia says, “ein lang verschwiegenes / Geheimniß endlich zu entdecken” [Its ancient bands 
reluctantly my tongue Doth loose, a long-hid secret to divulge].
38 See Francis Brown, Samuel Rolles Driver, and Charles Augustus Briggs, “חלל ,חלילה,” in A 
Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1968, 370.
39 Kafka, diary entry of 26 January 1912, in The Diaries, 174; Franz Kafka, Tagebücher II: 1912–
1914, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1994, 25. 
40 Franz Kafka, “The Cares of a Family Man,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete 
Stories, 427–429, 428
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In biblical Hebrew, “lip” designates what other languages call “tongue” – that is, 
a bit, as it were, of the language that helps the reader to discover the many senses 
of what Odradek’s breathless laughter might mean. “Safa” – “lip,” in English – in 
biblical and modern Hebrew also means “language”: and breath, forced through 
lips, teeth and tongue, shapes one’s voice, in what is known as pronunciation 
[Aussprache], or how a particular accent is given to the words brought to speech. 
In this spirit, it would be correct to say that what worries the “Housefather” of 
Kafka’s story is the peculiar accent of the son – Odradek – whose voice – like the 
meanings of his name – can be pronounced so many ways. That Odradek is also a 
figure from Jewish tradition is clear in the story: for while this creature looks like 
a “spool” for collecting many threads, he is also “star-shaped” and promises to 
be there “at the feet of my children, and my children’s children,”41 recalling the 
wording of many Hebrew prayers. Not surprisingly, this figure for the open future 
of the tradition provokes a kholile reaction – Žižek calls him an emblem of “cas-
tration”42 – that fearful reaction of the master toward the “lachen” or “laughter” 
of the son. That Odradek lacks “lungs” suggests a Hebrew vernacular that had 
long remained unspoken – except for the “Blätter” or dead “leaves” of tradition – 
while this same figure who remains “Od” – Hebrew, meaning “more,” “another,” 
or “differently” – names the potential of a language whose best days are still to 
come. 
This “horror” at transformed future was not to be taken that seriously – at 
least in the sources Kafka knew. “The idea that he is likely to survive me I find 
almost painful” [ist mir eine fast schmerzliche], the Haus-Vater, or House-Father, 
declares – worrying his way to pleasure, like balabustas of every national taste.43 
A Talmudic story Kafka possessed – the debate over ritual purity known as “The 
Oven of Akhnai” – suggests the sources from which this humor drew.44 Like much 
Jewish commentary, this parable was less concerned with purity than with how 
the Hebrew tradition could flourish in the actual world. And like Kafka’s father 
figures, Rabbinic authority initially turns the world upside down in its quest for 
interpretive judgment and control. A stream of water flows in reverse, a carob 
tree uproots itself one hundred yards from its place: all without convincing the 
academy of any single answer. And when “the very walls of the schoolroom 
41 Kafka, “Cares of a Housefather,” 428, 429.
42 Slavoj Žižek, The Parallax View, MIT Press, Cambridge 2006, 121. 
43 Franz Kafka, “Die Sorge eines Hausvaters,” in Die Erzählungen und andere ausgewählte 
Prosa, 343–344, 344. 
44 Baba Metzia 59b here is quoted from Jakob Fromer, Der Organismus des Judentums [The Or-
ganism of Judaism], Selbstverlag des Verfassers, Charlottenburg 1909, 118, my translation. The 
book was in Kafka’s library and is discussed in his diary. 
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began to topple” in support of Rabbi Eliezer, the decree that the answer “is not 
in heaven” settles the case. And what did the Holy one, blessed be he, do in that 
hour?” the prophet Elijah is asked at the end. “God smiled,” according to the text, 
then spoke the following words – “my children have defeated Me, my children 
have defeated Me”  – For the superiority of our children  – as all good parents 
know – is the most lasting Jewish pleasure of all.45 For just as Latin lives on in 
English and German – “Vater”(“Father”) might be the best example – Odradek’s 
“laughter,” like the “rustling” of apparently dead linguistic “leaves,” suggests 
what Hebrew calls kedusha – the blessing of a life that thrives in new and unex-
pected forms “unto all generations” (Psalms 146:10). 
Kafka’s Judaism was thus quite universal, in its own secular and different 
form. “The Messiah will come,” as Kafka wrote, “as soon as the most unbridled 
individualism of faith becomes possible – when there is no one to destroy this 
possibility and no one to suffer its destruction.”46 This kind of Jewish expectancy 
is the reverse of a self-fulfilling prophecy that holds us back: for once we have 
discovered the many differences in ourselves, Kafka tells us, the idea of waiting 
for someone to liberate us can truly be left behind. As in a Jewish joke, Kafka’s 
messiah comes only when he’s no longer necessary: and so will he will appear 
in the figure of the nudnik when he finally arrives: the messiah is a pest who has 
been superseded – “no longer needed” – once we have become the multiple crea-
tures that we are.47 The way Kafka waited for this possibility was quite singular – 
a posture dramatized in my concluding passage, from Kafka’s “Investigations of a 
Dog” (“Forschungen eines Hundes”): 
45 Kafka’s story is likewise less concerned with the name of the father than with the meanings 
to be discovered in the name of the son. “Some say the word ‘Odradek’ is of Slavonic origin, and 
try to account for it on that basis,” Kafka begins his story of filiation: “others believe it to be of 
German origin, only influenced by the Slavonic,” indulging in a form of self-citation. For such 
was precisely the linguistic history of Yiddish, which, as Kafka told his Prague audience when 
lecturing on that language, was spoken in different versions – more influenced by German or 
Slavic sources – depending on whether the Jews lived in East or West. See Kafka, “An Introducto-
ry Talk on the Yiddish Language,” 266.
46 Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes, 81. 
47 In terms of a distinction between two kinds of messianism, in which a global – one would say, 
universal – form requires the destruction of existing arrangements, while a smaller form of the 
messianic spirit consists of the work of mending the world. The latter is known as tikkun olam: 
mending by discovering and accepting its openness to others, and establishing a universalism 
worth its name. Kafka’s messianic spirit would find its voice in his comic use of the former, as a 
screen for ultimately the more open form of the latter.
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Our forefathers appeared threateningly before me. True, I held them to be responsible for 
everything, even if I dared not say so openly; it was they who involved our dog life in guilt, 
and so I could easily have responded to their menaces with counter-menaces: but I bow 
before their knowledge, it came from sources of which we know no longer, and for that 
reason, much as I may feel compelled to oppose them, I shall never actually overstep their 
laws, but content myself with wriggling out through these gaps, for which I have a fine sense 
of smell.48
For the Kafka who called the “revolutionary” process a “continuous” one, such 
potential was ready to break out at any time.49 “Certainly such freedom as is pos-
sible today is a wretched business,” Kafka assures us, “but nonetheless freedom, 
nonetheless a possession”50 to discover the hidden openness of closed traditions 
to one another with the devotion of a research dog. As Kafka’s canine wisdom 
suggests, it is only these gaps in our legacies from the past that connect us and 
make us fully human – while allowing us to experience laughter, that animal in 
us all. 
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Anna Glazova
Kafka’s Cat-Lamb: Hybridization of Genesis 
and Taxonomy
А passage in Kafka’s diaries contains a highly peculiar representation of the uni-
versal natural and cultural history. It combines the notion of technical progress 
with a vision of origin as described in the Book of Genesis:
Inventions hasten on ahead of us as the coast always hastens on ahead of the steamer, 
which is ceaselessly shaken by its engine. Inventions achieve all that can be achieved. It 
is unfair to say, for instance: The airplane does not fly like the bird, or: We shall never be 
capable of creating a living bird. Of course not, but the error lies in the objection, just as if 
the steamer were expected ever and again to arrive at its port of departure in spite of keeping 
on a straight course. – A bird cannot be created by means of an original act, for it is already 
created, is continually coming into existence as a result of the first act of Creation, and it is 
impossible to break into this series, created on the ground of an original, unceasing will, 
a living series continually showering forth; it is just as is recounted in a legend: although 
the first woman was created out of the man’s rib, this was never repeated, but from then on 
men always took to wife the daughters of others. – The method and tendency of the creation 
of the bird – this is the point – and the airplane need not, however, be different; and the 
savage’s way of interpreting things, confusing a shot from a gun with a roll of thunder, may 
have a limited truth.1
Technical progress is described here from the modern scientific perspective, 
whereas the story of the human origin refers to the creation of Adam and Eve as 
it appears in the Book Bereshit.2 Kafka invents here a hybrid of a specific Jewish 
metaphysical narrative and a modern, universal scientific belief. Progress, in 
Kafka’s understanding, is the unfolding of the original will – which is synony-
mous with the will to unfold – and thus history as a whole can be understood as 
a progression of individual creatures and creations (in the sense of Erfindungen, 
“inventions”) related to each other, even if their individual geneses become for-
gotten and unreconstructable. As an example, Kafka traces the genesis of birds 
and airplanes to a common origin. Airplanes are not born of birds, and yet, from 
a certain point of view, they are descendants of birds – not in blood and not so 
1 Franz Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II [Posthumous Writings and Fragments 
II], ed. Jost Schillemeit, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1992, 67; Franz Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 
ed. Max Brod, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, Exact Change, Cambridge 2004: 51–52. 
Translation modified.
2 Genesis 1:24–28.
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much in shape as in the same will that is responsible for flying forms. The phylog-
eny Kafka has in mind is essentially different from Darwin’s model of evolution. 
For Kafka, birds and airplanes are close relatives sharing the same branch on the 
tree of life. Darwin, in contrast, would find the very idea of a relation between a 
living organism and a man-made construct puzzling at best. Creatures and inven-
tions, for Kafka, are bound by the principle of semblance, and this semblance 
leads back to the hidden origin of all life, which Kafka calls, in the previously 
noted diary entry, “the original, unceasing will.” Creatures as well as creations 
represent stages in the genesis of this will, and these stages give rise to a taxon-
omy that is based on existential facts rather than blood relations or similarities 
in genetic codes. In this taxonomy, airplanes stem from birds, guns from thunder, 
and literary creations can be traced to the same root of the universal tree of life. 
As Kafka notes in his diary, “Tree of life – lord of life.”3 Everything that exists, be 
it an animal, a vehicle, or a literary invention, springs forth from this same tree. 
This model of genesis is particularly recognizable in Kafka’s stories about 
animals and inanimate creatures, all of whom occupy a place directly next to 
humans in Kafka’s taxonomy  – creatures like the ape-human Red Peter, the 
childlike wooden spool Odradek, and the crossbreed of cat and lamb who sheds 
human tears of compassion. This genus of creatures has a common predecessor, a 
hybrid of hound and donkey from a dream that Kafka records in his diary in 1911: 
I dreamed today of a donkey that looked like a greyhound, it was very cautious in its move-
ments. I looked at it closely because I was aware how unusual a phenomenon it was, but 
remember only that its narrow human feet could not please me because of their length and 
uniformity. I offered it a bunch of fresh, dark-green cypress leaves which I had just received 
from an old Zürich lady (it all took place in Zürich), it did not want it, just sniffed a little at it; 
but then, when I left the cypress on a table, it devoured it so completely that only a scarcely 
recognizable kernel resembling a chestnut was left. Later there was talk that this donkey 
had never yet gone on all fours but always held itself erect like a human being and showed 
its silvery shining breast and its little belly. But actually that was not correct.4 
Kafka sees this creature in a dream on the night following an evening spent in the 
Jewish theater together with his friend Yitzhak Löwy, whose last name is essen-
tially identical to that of Kafka’s maternal uncle Joseph Loewy. Kafka felt close to 
both men, and their common surname was important for him, not only because 
it was shared by two people whom he esteemed but also because of its semantic 
3 Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II, 72; Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 37.
4 Franz Kafka, Diaries 1910–1913, ed. Max Brod, trans. Joseph Kresh, Schocken Books, New York 
1965, 119.
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content (just as his own surname is a homophone of “kavka,” the Czech term for 
a jackdaw). We know from Kafka’s notorious “Letter to the Father” (“Brief an den 
Vater”) that he felt torn between his paternal and maternal bloodlines, the Kafkas 
and the Loewys, respectively. He depicts the mild and non-offensive Loewys as 
the precise opposite of the assertive and easily irritable Kafkas. 
But being born into the Kafka-Loewy household was also to be born into a 
linguistic reality co-defined by these two conflicting names. Werner Hamacher 
shows in his imaginative analysis of names and the naming power in Kafka’s 
texts5 that the discrepancy between the two names, Kafka and Loewy, serves as 
a model for the creature in the short story “A Crossbreed” (“Eine Kreuzung”).6 
Since the word “Kafka” means “jackdaw” in Czech and the name Loewy derives 
from “Löwe,” or “lion,” being a child of Kafka and Loewy entails, if the names 
are taken literally, being both a bird and a cat, that is, prey and predator simulta-
neously. This is the existential condition of the cat-lamb in Kafka’s story: it “flees 
cats” and “wants to assault lambs.” Its conflicted double-nature tears it apart; 
yet this conflict, as Hamacher shows, originates in Kafka’s language and in the 
logic of his literary production, where the figurative pairs with the non-figura-
tive, making it impossible to interpret metaphors, as each undermines its own 
metaphoric content. Following this observation, Hamacher shifts the focus of his 
analysis away from the figure of the hybrid and towards the underlying problem 
of the hybridization of language, in which proper names transform into general 
terms and general terms mixed with names lose their signifying function. This 
hybridization allows Kafka to work towards the disintegration of linguistic means 
of representation, but also to work in anticipation that this disintegration may 
give rise to some new, unprecedented form of language. Taking this analysis as 
my starting point, I would like to linger on the logic of hybridization of names and 
figures in Kafka’s stories. 
It is true that the Czech word “kavka” happens to mean “jackdaw” and that 
Franz’s father, Hermann Kafka, was well aware of this when he chose a figure of 
a jackdaw for an emblem of his store’s sign-plate. It is also true, however, that 
the surname Kafka derives from the biblical name Jacob and its Yiddish dimin-
utive form, Kovka. This proper name mantels itself in a familiar general term in 
5 Werner Hamacher, “The Gesture in the Name: On Benjamin and Kafka” (“Die Geste im Namen. 
Benjamin und Kafka”), in Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from Kant to Celan, 
trans. Peter Fenves, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1999, 294–336.
6 Here and in the following: Franz Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente I [Posthumous 
Writings and Fragments I], ed. Malcolm Pasley, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1993, 372–374; Franz Kafka, 
“A Crossbreed [A Sport],” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. 
Glatzer, Schocken Books, New York 1976, 426–427. Translation modified. 
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order to enter the sphere of a language – Czech, in this instance – by means of 
homophony. In this transformation the name becomes a nomad between lan-
guages, homeless among proper names as much as among ordinary nouns. Pre-
cisely this is the fate of the homeless name and figure called Odradek in Kafka’s 
story “The Cares of the Family Man” (“Die Sorge des Hausvaters”). “A Crossbreed” 
also tells a story of a nomad, except this nomad is not a traveler but rather a host 
for a nomadic origin within its own body. This creature has no place in the tax-
onomy of living things, because its creation is still en route: “it only developed in 
my time; formerly it was far more lamb than kitten.” The narration captures the 
moment in the history of its development when the two fighting natures within 
its body are in a balance: “Now it is both in about equal parts.” The genesis of the 
creature is exactly half-completed but it remains unclear what further develop-
ment would bring and whether the animal would become only a cat, only a lamb, 
or something else entirely. This literary invention, Kafka’s cat-lamb, is a figure 
of thought that pairs a notion of natural history with a notion of an ahistorical 
origin within it. Creation, from the perspective of this story, is not only an ongoing 
process; it is also a process that is intrinsically bound to history yet that does 
not share history’s linear progression. Widely diverging branches on the phyloge-
netic tree reveal themselves as potential origins of another degree. Kafka formu-
lates this thought laconically, noting in his diary that “Adam’s first domestic pet 
after the expulsion from paradise was the serpent.”7 This thought establishes an 
alternative genetic succession, in which all pets and livestock are offspring of the 
snake – a succession as wildly divergent from Darwin’s view as from the biblical 
Genesis. In Kafka’s succession, cats and lambs appear to be as easily crossbred as 
horses and donkeys. 
The specificity of the hybrid in Kafka’s story is that its phylogenesis is unfin-
ished and, as long as it remains unfinished, secures a succession of generations: 
the creature, though it does not (and probably cannot) have progeny, is a “piece 
of heirloom” (Erbstück) that ensures a continuation of heritage in the narrator’s 
family, even if this continuation comes as a personal sacrifice for the creature. If 
all pets and livestock are offspring of the original sin – itself mediated by one par-
ticular animal, the snake – then, as Kafka’s aphorism suggests, the cat-lamb must 
likewise have a specific place in this natural history of human and animal co-ex-
istence. From the little that Kafka tells us, we know that at least a partial destiny 
of this crossbreed is to become a sacrificial animal. He writes, “Perhaps the knife 
of the butcher would be a redemption (Erlösung) for this animal.” As long as the 
animal remains unscathed, no redemption can seal its destiny, and nothing in the 
7 Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II, 65; Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 33.
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common destiny of humans and sacrificial animals can be changed; the animal 
will remain sinful. If we take for granted that the family history of the cat-lamb 
and its owner is a Jewish history, we can situate Kafka’s cat-lamb on the ladder 
of Jewish living things; however, this requires that we first consider both the role 
that lambs play in Judaism and in related monotheisms, as well as the Halakhic 
status of crossbreeds.
Sheep are sacrificial animals in many traditions. All Abrahamic monothe-
isms respect this exclusive status of sheep, and one such sacrifice lies at the very 
foundation of Judaism, namely, in the narrative of the Aqedah. After Abraham 
is tested and called to sacrifice his only son, Isaac, a ram appears miraculously 
in the bushes on the Mount Moriah; Abraham is ordered to sacrifice the animal 
instead of Isaac. After this test, Abraham becomes the arch-patriarch of the Jewish 
tradition, as his son later becomes a father and there follows a sequence of gener-
ations. In this story, a ram enters between the father and his child and has to give 
its life, so that the child can live. There is a similar constellation in Kafka’s story, 
except that the sacrifice seems to have gone entirely awry. The narrator inherits 
an animal that wants to be sacrificed but cannot be, precisely because it is a piece 
of inheritance. What if Abraham had not killed that ram found in the bushes of 
Mount Moriah? Would he have walked it back home and given it as a pet to his 
son? Would this animal, whose miraculous appearance was caused by divine 
intervention, have been mortal or would it have continued living until the entirety 
of human (or Jewish) history had run its course? Kafka’s story reads like a narra-
tive of one of the possible futures of this ram. The fatal change in the procedure 
of the sacrifice has caught up with the lamb and imprinted itself on the animal’s 
body, just as the original sin became imprinted in the body of the snake, who is 
cursed to crawl on its stomach. The sacrificial lamb who has failed to be sacrificed 
becomes haunted by original sin. After the expulsion from paradise, lambs and 
lions no longer live in peace with each other, at least not until the world of crea-
tion is redeemed, as the prophet Isiah envisioned. In the current – sinful – world, 
lions hunt lambs; the unsacrificed lamb, however, is torn from within by its 
natural predator, and seems to retain some memory that it was supposed to have 
been sacrificed. Its desire to be butchered does not remain secret to the man, to 
whose household the lamb belongs; but it is precisely because the fatal mistake of 
the unfinished sacrifice has become a part of the family history that this solution 
is no longer possible, at least not until the family line ends. The animal cannot 
stop wanting to be sacrificed, yet its owner cannot kill it, because both stand in 
a relation of guilt toward each other that remains the same, no matter how much 
the animal and the human may change. This is why the cat-lamb’s owner consid-
ers questions about the existence of this piece of his inheritance inadequate: its 
existence is inseparable from the existence of the owner himself. “[T]he strangest 
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questions are asked, which no human being could answer: Why there is only one 
such animal, why I rather than anybody else should own it, whether there was 
ever an animal like it before and what would happen if it died, whether it feels 
lonely, why it has no children, what it is called, etc.” These questions are, like the 
question of human origin, impossible to answer. 
The relation of guilt between the owner and the cat-lamb replaces the sac-
rifice. When the intended offering is not presented, it manifests itself in what 
the owner calls “heiliger Schutz” (“sacred protection”): “It remains faithful to 
the family that brought it up. In that there is certainly no extraordinary mark of 
fidelity, but merely the true instinct of an animal which, though it has countless 
step-relations in the world, has perhaps not a single blood relation, and to which 
consequently the protection it has found with us is sacred.” The animal has no 
blood relatives, because its blood remains reserved for a blood offering that never 
transpired. It can have no other blood relation to anyone or anything on the tree 
of life except for the relation to the family who owes its blood and owns it. From 
the perspective of the Halakhic rules, the blood of one such crossbreed would 
not be kosher; thus no ritual slaughter of this animal could occur within the legal 
bounds prescribed by the Jewish law. 
There are good reasons to believe that as Kafka wrote this story he had in 
mind the rules of kosher slaughter. He and Yitzhak Löwy may have recently dis-
cussed shechita (ritualistic slaughter), and it is beyond doubt that together they 
had seen a play that alludes to the ritualistic slaughter. In a diary note from 24 
November 1911, Kafka mentions Jacob Gordin’s play Di shkhite [The Slaughter] 
and records quotations from the Talmud that appear in this play. A member of 
Kafka’s family, his paternal grandfather, Jakob Kafka, had been a ritual slaugh-
terer. Kafka, who was a vegetarian, once noted in a letter: “my grandfather on the 
paternal side was a butcher in a village near Strakonitz; I have to not eat as much 
meat as he has slaughtered.”8 A similarly strange food economy is the fate of the 
cat-lamb: the creature can survive only on milk, because its lamb-half cannot eat 
meat and its cat-half cannot eat grass. It is remarkable, too, that in this same letter 
Kafka labels his lack of musical talent “a piece of heirloom” (“ein Erbstück der 
8 The original German reads: “mein väterlicher Großvater war Fleischhauer in einem Dorf bei 
Strakonitz, ich muß soviel Fleisch nicht essen, als er geschlachtet hat.” Franz Kafka, letter to 
Milena Jesenská from 25 June 1920, in Briefe an Milena. Erweiterte Ausgabe [Letters to Milena. 
Extended Edition], eds. Jürgen Born and Michael Müller, Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1995, 79; 
Franz Kafka, Letters to Milena, trans. Philip Boehm, Schocken Books, New York 1990, 33. Trans-
lation modified.
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Vorfahren”), repeating an expression from “A Crossbreed,” in which the cat-lamb 
is identified as “a piece of heirloom” (“ein Erbstück”). 
The cat-lamb, being a hybrid of a feline and a ruminant, could not be eaten 
by people. The Mosaic law prescribes that certain animals may be eaten, some 
may not, and some may not even be touched. The list of clean and unclean 
animals in Deuteronomy 14:5 contains a hapax legomenon, which has led to 
various diverging speculations about the species in question. The name of the 
animal as it appears in the Tanakh is זָמֶר (zamer); this animal is, according to the 
Mosaic law, kosher, like other cloven-hoofed ruminants. The current consensus 
is to identify the zamer as a wild sheep (Ammotragus tragelaphus). Because the 
exact species has never been identified with certainty, translators of the Bible 
have faced considerable difficulty in finding an adequate translation. Both the 
Septuagint and the Vulgate translate zamer as “camelopard,” likely deriving this 
word from Pliny’s Naturalis Historia, where the word stands for “giraffe.” The 
giraffe, however, could hardly be the zamer of the Tanakh, as it is most unlikely 
that this animal, native to Central and South Africa, would have presented much 
of a concern to the Rabbinic authorities of the time.9 Despite the eventual clarifi-
cation and the resulting general agreement to identify the zamer as a wild sheep, 
the history of its shape-shifting has left a trace in the Halakhic tradition. The 
Greek and Latin translations mentioning the giraffe provoked discussion among 
rabbis as to the animal’s Halakhic status. The giraffe does fulfill the criteria for 
being kosher, though this hardly means that it will ever become a staple product. 
Interestingly, the question of whether giraffe meat is kosher has become a bit of 
a new lore in contemporary Israel. The profane curiosity most commonly associ-
ated with giraffe slaughter concerns where to cut the neck. The rabbinic authority 
response to this is simple: “anywhere.” 
Giraffe’s meat is kosher meat yet that of the “camelopard,” the name given 
to the giraffe by Pliny and later adopted by Linnaeus, is not. The giraffe’s name 
in modern binomial nomenclature is Giraffa camelopardalis, a designation that 
reflects Pliny’s belief that the animal was a crossbreed of camel and leopard, with 
the hooves of an ungulate and the spotted fur of a feline. As such, should a half-
camel half-cat animal ever exist, it would be unquestionably non-kosher, accord-
ing to the Halakhic rules. It is curious that the kosher zamer’s non-kosher modern 
name “camelopard” has become part of the Biblical tradition, passing through 
translation into Greek and Latin with a detour through Pliny. It is even more 
9 The Jewish Encyclopedia, Funk and Wagnalls, New York 1906. The complete articles are now 
available online. See also the page on “chamois” (the translation of zamer in the King James 
Bible): http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/4227-chamois 
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curious, though, that this same tradition has the need to classify this animal – 
born, as it were, in translation – in accordance with the Halakhic order of things.
The Talmud mentions a creature that, like the cat-lamb, is a transitory life 
form, whose Halakhic status changes when it reaches maturity. This is a dirt-
mouse: a mouse whose hind legs, until fully formed, are dirt, indivisible from 
the earth. There are at least two instances when the dirt-mouse is invoked, one 
in Chullin 9:10: “A mouse [achbar] which is half flesh and half earth; if someone 
touches the flesh part, he becomes tamei [unclean]; if he touches the earth part, 
he remains tahor [clean]”; and in Sanhedrin 91a: “A certain sectarian said to 
Rabbi Ami: You say that the dead will live again – but they become dust, and 
can dust come alive? He replied… Go out to the field and see the rodent that one 
day is half flesh and half earth, and on the next day it has transformed into a 
creeping creature and has become entirely flesh.”10 As long as one can differen-
tiate between the mouse’s two parts, the question of its Halakhic status is easily 
answered. One cannot say this about Kafka’s cat-lamb, because its two halves 
cannot be differentiated with certainty. Furthermore, cat and lamb do not seem to 
be the only two natures fighting for the creature’s body. There is something dog-
like about it, even human-like: it has “the ambitions of a human being.” When 
the narrator notes that it “simply cannot be parted from me” and that its place of 
choice is “lying on my loins,” the animal indeed appears to be of one flesh with 
him. The hybridization of the animal affects even its human owner. Divided as 
it is within its own body, the creature has no place within the taxonomy of the 
Judaic animals. 
Like the camelopard of Deuteronomy, the dirt-mouse of the Talmud does not 
have a corresponding life form in Linnaean taxonomy. It has been suggested, 
however, that the dirt-mouse ended up being mentioned in the Talmudic trac-
tate through Greek and Roman sources (Diodorus Siculus and Pliny the Elder, 
among others).11 These sources, of course, had no rabbinic authority as such. 
Yet Diodorus’s authority as a natural historian was revered even by the rabbis, 
so much so that they became concerned with a creature not mentioned in the 
Tanakh. If a dirt-mouse indeed existed, it would be imperative to define its 
Halakhic status. This much stands to reason. Less comprehensible is that this 
10 Natan Slifkin, Sacred Monsters. Mysterious and Mythical Creatures of Scripture, Talmud and 
Midrash. Zoo Torah / Yashar Books, New York 2007, 329–330.
11 Sid Z. Leimann, “R. Israel Lipshutz and the Mouse that is Half Flesh and Half Earth: A Note 
on Torah U-Madda in the Nineteenth Century,” in Hazon Nahum, eds. Norman Lamm and Jeffrey 
S. Gurock, New York, Yeshiva University Press, 1998, 449–458. He cites Johann Link, a German 
biologist, who discusses the passage about the “springmaus” in Diodorus (see page 453).
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creature, whose existence was supported only by anecdotal evidence from a 
Greek source, somehow burrowed its way into the Talmud. If the law prescribes 
a particular Halakhic status to the dirt-mouse, it must also, by necessity, assume 
that a dirt-mouse actually exists; otherwise, the animal would be of no interest to 
scholars of Jewish law. The law prescribes that the flesh part of the dirt-mouse is 
unclean, thereby establishing that the dirt-mouse does indeed exist. Diodorus’s 
description may well have referred to an animal identifiable within the Linnaean 
system (modern scholars suggest a jerboa); however, the dirt-mouse of Mishnah, 
having been defined as “legal,” can no longer be assimilated into any scientific 
taxonomy. Like its “cousin” the camelopard of the Septuagint, the dirt-mouse 
entered into Halakhah through a door in Greek natural history, via cross-cultural 
inclusion. Kafka’s cat-lamb, “an animal which, though it has countless step-rela-
tions in the world, has perhaps not a single blood relation,” entered into the order 
of creatures that are “step-relations” of those belonging to Linnaean taxonomy 
(such as lambs or cats), but only by means of language. The cat-lamb – a mix of 
predator and ruminant, and thus, in the Halakhic perspective, an abomination – 
is a crossbreed whose flesh is essentially and entirely language.12
The etymological histories of words that signify things in nature do not 
always correspond to natural history. The history of the transition of zamer to 
camelopard to giraffe captures a development not found in any systematic 
12 Jorge Luis Borges, a dedicated reader of Kafka, explored fantastic creatures as well as fantas-
tic classifications of real animals. In his Book of Imaginary Beings [El libro de los seres imaginar-
ios], Borges collected concise descriptions of mystical creatures from antiquity to modern times. 
The book contains, among others, the barometz, a hybrid of lamb and plant, described by Pliny 
the Elder, and Kafka’s “Crossbreed,” which is cited in its entirety. Furthermore, Borges, in his 
short story “The Analytical Language of John Wilkins” [“El idioma analítico de John Wilkins”], 
invented a Chinese encyclopedia entitled “Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge,” which 
offers a fantastic taxonomy of animals arranged according to no principle save the author’s im-
agination. All animals in this “encyclopedia” are divided into the following categories: “Those 
that belong to the emperor; Embalmed ones; Those that are trained; Suckling pigs; Mermaids 
(or Sirens); Fabulous ones; Stray dogs; Those that are included in this classification; Those that 
tremble as if they were mad; Innumerable ones; Those drawn with a very fine camel hair brush; 
Et cetera; Those that have just broken the flower vase; Those that, at a distance, resemble flies” 
(see Jorge Luis Borges, “John Wilkins’ Analytical Language,” in Selected Nonfictions, trans. Eliot 
Weinberger, Penguin Books, New York 1999, 229–232, 231). Besides thematizing hybridization 
in its narrative, this text, as are many by Borges, is an example of a hybridization of common 
genres: the essay genre, which is supported by facts, quotations, and references, undergoes a 
crossing with the genre of the fantastic short story. Some interpreters take Borges’s fantastic 
figures to be references to actual sources and have sought to locate them among existing books. 
Thus, these interpretations have a similar fate as that of the word zamer in its translations: pieces 
of scientific knowledge become mixed with a generous portion of free imagination.
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account of natural history. Most of this development occurs in the transitory zone 
between languages, and it is precisely this transitory zone that is the place of 
abode of Kafka’s Odradek, who is homeless in at least two languages, German 
and Czech. Kafka’s writings present at least one other invented creature whose 
place on the tree of living things remains unknown. Unlike with Odradek, this 
animal’s place of abode is entirely definite; in contrast to the cat-lamb, however, 
its relation to people is veiled and unclear. This creature, as described by Kafka in 
an unpublished fragment (likely written in 1922), belongs to a place rather than 
to an owner:
In our synagogue there lives an animal about the size of a marten. One can often see it very 
well; it allows people to approach to a distance of about two meters. It is pale blue-green 
in color. Nobody has ever yet touched its fur, and so nothing can be said about it, and one 
might almost go as far as to assert that the real color of its fur is unknown, perhaps the color 
one sees stems only from the dust and mortar with which its fur is matted, and indeed the 
color does resemble that of the paint inside the synagogue, only it is a little brighter.
It is asserted that the animal would stay here even if the building were no longer 
being used as a synagogue. It is also related that generations ago someone had 
attempted to banish the animal; the proposed action, however, had introduced 
problems pertaining to Halakhic regulations: 
There is evidence that at that time the question whether the presence of such an animal 
might be tolerated in the house of God was investigated from the point of view of the reli-
gious laws. Opinions were sought from various celebrated rabbis, views were divided, the 
majority were for the expulsion of the animal and a reconsecration of the house of God. 
But it was easy to issue decrees from afar, in reality it was simply impossible to banish the 
animal.13
If the cat-lamb in the earlier story is the token both of the family’s continued 
history and of its inheritance, the blue-green creature of the synagogue14 has 
a history preceding the community of people who, in relation to this creature, 
13 Kafka, Nachgelassene Schriften und Fragmente II, 405–411; Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes, 
49–59. 
14 It is unlikely that Kafka ever read the Talmudic tractate Berakhot in Seder Zeraim, but it is en-
tirely plausible that he heard about the regulation concerning when the morning prayer should 
be recited. The earliest time for the morning Shema, as Rabbi Eliezer ben Hurcanus proposed, is 
when the natural light is bright enough for the human eye to recognize the difference between 
blue and green (m.Ber.1.2; I thank Yulia Shtutina for this reference). The color of Kafka’s blue-
green creature would thus create a noticeable obstacle for someone intending to say a morning 
prayer in the synagogue. 
206   Anna Glazova
appear to be its guests rather than its owners. Precisely for the reason that the 
animal’s genesis precedes the foundation of the synagogue, the Halakhic regula-
tions prove inadequate for defining its status and proper place. Walter Benjamin, 
though he would not have seen this fragment at the time, recognized that animals 
in Kafka’s stories were representatives of an order preceding the systematized 
view of creation in Judaism. As Benjamin observed, in 1931, in his notes for an 
unwritten essay on Kafka:
[G]anz verschollen ist [die prähistorische Stufe der Menschheit] in der Torah nicht. Die 
Reinigungs- und Speisegesetze beziehen sich auf eine Vorwelt, von der nichts mehr erh-
alten ist als diese Abwehrmaßnahmen gegen sie.
[The prehistoric stage of humanity has not gone completely missing in the Torah. The laws 
of purification and food preparation refer to a pre-world, from which there remains nothing 
besides these mechanisms of defense against it.]15
The cat-lamb is not only an abomination from the point of view of the Halakha 
because it is an unclean animal; the problem also lies in the heterogeneity of its 
nature. The animal’s two taxonomic identifications are mixed to the extent that 
no part of its body can be discerned as clean or unclean. The transitory nature of 
its existence sets it beyond the taxonomy of creatures; taxonomy is powerless in 
the face of mixed origins. Kafka’s furry creature, because of its birthright, renders 
this same taxonomy powerless: its existence in the synagogue is primogenital in 
relation to the Jewish community with its set of beliefs and laws. In this text it 
is the community, rather than the animal, that exists in a transitory state. The 
community must adopt their fellow tenant, even if its nature does not fit within 
the taxonomy defined by the community’s laws. Either way, the transition as 
such appears to be problematic for laws and regulations.16 Kafka investigates pre-
15 Walter Benjamin, Benjamin über Kafka [Benjamin on Kafka], ed. Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M. 1981, 116. English translation my own. Mary Douglas, who researched 
rules and rituals of purity and purification extensively, saw the reason of the distinction between 
clean and unclean animals in Judaism in the need to expand the special status of Jews: they were 
God’s chosen people, and the kosher animals were God’s chosen creatures. See Mary Douglas, 
Leviticus as Literature, Oxford University Press, New York 2000. Benjamin’s statement is more 
radical. For him, the distinction between kosher and non-kosher animals is a sign of the prehis-
toric dividing line between humans and animals.
16 Mary Douglas suggests that unclassified animals cause danger to taxonomy and thus are 
banned from the order of Jewish animals as impure: “I proposed a theory of anomaly, a universal 
feeling of disquiet (even of disgust) on confrontation with unclassifiables. Taking the Levitical 
classification system as it revealed itself, the said abominable species failed to show the taxo-
nomic requirements of inhabitants of the three environmental classes, land, air, water, and the 
abominability of species that ‘go upon the belly’ in all environments went by the same rule: the 
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cisely this transitory zone in order to reach the critical point, at which the law, 
as the tool of systematization, loses its ability to separate and define. Benjamin 
terms this transitory zone die Vorwelt [pre-world]. Yet there is no going back to 
the prehistoric stage, when the powers of the pre-world were not yet contained 
by and within laws; thus, there is no access to the origin of these laws. In order to 
describe the world together with its origin hidden in the depths of the pre-world, 
Kafka collapses in his texts the law with what it seeks to regulate. The blue-green 
creature of the synagogue does not, as such, give birth to the generations of Jews 
inhabiting the building; it does, however, reference a time when the future of 
this Jewish community was only germinating. The animal is not the community’s 
progenitor and yet it signifies the prehistoric stage in its world. As in Benjamin’s 
note about the laws and regulations of the Torah, the animal in Kafka’s story 
survives as a sign of the Jewish community’s prenatal stage without disclosing 
anything about its own origin. The animal and the community have a common 
history without sharing a common genesis and yet they are related  – not by 
blood but by history – through something hidden in their pre-history. This logic 
can be extended to Kafka’s literary practice as a whole. His literary inventions 
resemble a crossbreed of a bird and an airplane: the history, natural and cultural, 
that separates them on the chronological scale abbreviates their genesis without 
answering as to where the origin of the inherent will for such hybridization is to 
be sought. Kafka’s prose gives shape to this abbreviation.
Origin and continuation, as Kafka shows in the passage (on technical pro-
gress) cited at the beginning of this article, stand in a paradoxical relation to each 
other. On one hand, origin defines the sequence of what originates from it; on the 
other, origin is unlike any other element in this sequence and thus is excluded 
from it. In mathematics, for example, zero is unlike any other number and thus 
a special set of rules applies exclusively to it. Kafka explains this mechanism 
through the example of Eve, the first woman. She, unlike any other woman in 
history, was born from Adam’s rib; being the first woman, she gives birth to the 
generations to come but her own birth remains unrepeatable and exclusive to her 
alone. In order to generate a sequence, one must be or become excluded from it. 
This logic is reflected in the story of Abraham and Isaac as re-told repeatedly 
by Maurice Blanchot. Blanchot, too, like Kafka in his story “A Crossbreed,” speaks 
about an animal’s sacrifice for a human family’s sake and alludes to Abraham’s 
sacrifice. This allusion appears in Blanchot’s works at least three times: in two 
forbidden animals were species that escaped being classified.” See Douglas, Leviticus as Litera-
ture, vii. I thank Mikhail Iampolskii for this reference.
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essays on Kafka and in a short story.17 In the latter, entitled At the Desired Moment 
[Au moment voulu], Blanchot writes: 
When Abraham came back from the country of Moriah, he was not accompanied by his 
child but by the image of a ram, and it was with a ram that he had to live from then on. 
Others saw the son in Isaac, because they didn’t know what had happened on the moun-
tain, but he saw the ram in his son, because he made a ram for himself out of his child. A 
devastating story [histoire accablante].18
“Accablante,” from “accabler,” traces to “katabole,” the Greek word meaning 
“laying down,” in the sense of both “laying a foundation” but also, metaphori-
cally, the physiological act of conception.19 In view of this etymology, Blanchot’s 
words “histoire accablante” characterize the Aqedah as a story (or a history) of 
Abraham sacrificing his right to found a family and tradition rather than proving 
this right. In order to start the sequence of generations and become the arch-pa-
triarch of the Jewish people, Abraham must be excluded from this very succes-
sion. Just as Eve, the mother of all women, can have no mother herself, so too 
Abraham, in Blanchot’s version, can be the father of all Jewish sons only if he 
gives up his own son. We know the story of the Biblical Abraham’s life prior to 
his journey to Moriah and thus we know that he does not stand outside human 
history; Blanchot’s point in his description of the Aqedah is that God’s demand to 
sacrifice Isaac tears Abraham from the generations’ succession. If Abraham sacri-
fices his only son, he will cede all hope of becoming the forefather for generations 
17 My focus in this article is specific to the problem of mixed origin, human and animal, in Kaf-
ka’s prose, and my reading thus limits itself to the discussion of the constellation involving Isaac 
and the ram. Chris Danta’s excellent book-length study of the Aqedah in Kafka, Blanchot, and 
Kierkegaard offers a much more detailed analysis of Kafka’s and Blanchot’s respective versions 
of the Biblical story. See Chris Danta, Literature Suspends Death: Sacrifice and Storytelling in 
Kierkegaard, Kafka and Blanchot, Continuum, New York 2011.
18 Maurice Blanchot, When the Time Comes, trans. Lydia Davis, Station Hill Press, New York 
1985, 65; Maurice Blanchot, Au moment voulu, Gallimard, Paris 1951, 147.
19 The word occurs several times in the New Testament and always, with only one exception, 
in the expression “από καταβολής κόσμου,” “from the foundation of the world” (Matthew 13:35; 
Matthew 25:34; Luke 11:50; John 17:24; Ephesians 1:4; Hebrews 4:3; Hebrews 9:26; 1 Peter 1:20; 
Revelation 13:8; Revelation 17:8). The only exception is Hebrews 11:11, where the word occurs in 
connection to Isaac’s conception: “Through faith also Sara herself received strength to conceive 
seed, and was delivered of a child when she was past age, because she judged him faithful who 
had promised [Πίστει καὶ αὐτὴ Σάρρα δύναμιν εἰς καταβολὴν σπέρματος ἔλαβεν καὶ παρὰ καιρὸν 
ἡλικίας ἔτεκεν, ἐπεὶ πιστὸν ἡγήσατο τὸν ἐπαγγειλάμενον].” It is not clear, however, whether 
Blanchot explicitly intended this use of the word “accablante” to be an allusion to its Biblical 
precursors and the Aqedah or whether the link is incidental. 
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of Jews, and yet it is precisely his willingness to sacrifice this future that renders 
him, in God’s eyes, worthy of becoming the Jewish arch-patriarch. 
This paradox of sacrificing the future for the future’s sake recurs in a later text 
by Blanchot, “Kafka and the Work’s Demand” (from 1958), where he explains to 
a fuller extent that Abraham’s sacrifice concerns waiving his belief in the future, 
for the sake of his son’s future and for the future sons:
What is demanded of Abraham is not only that he sacrifice his son, but God himself. The 
son is God’s future on earth, for it is time which is the Promised Land – the true, the only 
dwelling place of the chosen people and of God in his people. Yet Abraham, by sacrificing 
his only son, must sacrifice time, and time sacrificed will certainly not be given back in the 
eternal beyond. The beyond is nothing other than the future, the future of God in time. The 
beyond is Isaac.20
Kafka, as Blanchot explains here, faces a paradox similar to Abraham’s. In order 
to be able to write, he must sacrifice his belief in being a writer. This comparison 
also appears in Blanchot’s “Kafka and Literature” (from 1949):
As soon as [the writer] starts writing, he is within literature and he is there completely: he 
has to be a good artisan, but he also has to be a word seeker, an image seeker. He is compro-
mised. That is his fate. Even the famous instances of total sacrifice change nothing in this 
situation. To master literature with the sole aim of sacrificing it? But that assumes that what 
one sacrifices exists. So one must first believe in literature, believe in one’s literary calling, 
make it exist – to be a writer of literature and to be it to the end. Abraham was willing to 
sacrifice his son, but what if he was not sure that he had a son, and what he took for his son 
was really just a ram?21 
Blanchot knew Kafka’s own variations of the Aqedah from a letter Kafka had 
written to Robert Klopstock22; however, Blanchot’s comparison of Kafka and 
Abraham has little to do with these variations, or at least not directly. The paral-
lel he draws emphasizes one sole aspect: both Abraham and Kafka are not sure 
whether they exist in the only respective quality that, for each, has the utmost 
existential meaning: Abraham as father, Kafka as writer. In Blanchot’s baffling 
description, Kafka’s existence as a writer is firmly rooted in the very uncertainty 
as to whether he is able to enter the realm of literary tradition, whereas Abra-
20 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock, Nebraska University Press, Lin-
coln 1982, 61.
21 Maurice Blanchot, The Work of Fire, trans. Charlotte Mandell, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford 1995, 15.
22 See Franz Kafka, Briefe 1902–1924. Gesammelte Werke [Letters 1902–1924. Collected Works], 
Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1998, 332–334.
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ham’s existence as a father is rooted in his uncertainty about whether he does 
indeed have a son. This uncertainty, for Blanchot, contains the true essence of 
sacrifice. Isaac must become a ram in Abraham’s doubting eyes so that he (Isaac) 
can remain human in the eyes of others; Abraham himself must reduce his son to 
an animal so as to exclude him from the progression of sons born of sons and thus 
establish himself as the original arch-patriarch. With this procedure Abraham 
becomes dissolved in the origin of this progression. “The desired moment” – “un 
moment voulu,” in Blanchot’s formulation – is the zero point in this sequence, 
the moment of founding a history of the Jewish people. The will to originate 
embodied by Abraham lies at the foundation of this sequence and projects itself 
into the future. 
Blanchot, like Kafka, seeks to capture in his narration the border between 
the animal and the human. To become human, the human must step beyond 
being just animal, that is, the human must make a conscious choice to sacrifice 
willingly in response to God’s calling. This ethical dimension in the relation of 
man to God forms the core of Judaism. Abraham incorporates the ethical princi-
ple of choosing God and being chosen by God, in that he chooses to sacrifice his 
own flesh and blood, Isaac. Blanchot claims that this is possible only if Abraham 
reduces Isaac to mere flesh and blood, that is, if he sees him as just a living organ-
ism, an animal rather than an individual capable of his own choices. Blanchot’s 
version of the Aqedah is a narration in which the human is separated from the 
animal at the precise moment when the separating line is drawn by Abraham’s 
sacrificial knife. 
Kafka’s story about the cat-lamb-dog-human is an invention of a hybrid whose 
body as a whole encloses the demarcation between the human and the animal. 
Within its body the common origin of the human and of the animal lies hidden. 
The border between the animal and the human natures cannot be located and 
described, as it is not possible to identify the exact evolutionary moment when 
humans became a separate species. Humanity does not remember its origin, just 
as no person remembers his or her own birth. It is possible, however, to include 
this critical moment in a narration about human origin and humans’ separation 
from animals. The same can be said, too, about being Jewish. It is not possible to 
draw a separating line in one’s nature between what is Jewish and what is univer-
sally human. It is possible, though, to live a life doubting the existence of this very 
division, as did Kafka. His doubt became the foundation of his existence and the 
source of his literary inspiration. Moreover, his doubt about whether there was 
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anything Jewish about his literary creation23 made him into a writer whose works 
embody the impossibility and necessity of choosing to be Jewish as much as that 
of choosing to be human.
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My approach to the “paradox of the universal” reopens a critical debate concern-
ing Kafka. This debate, now almost forgotten yet still full of meaning, opposed 
the American art critic Clement Greenberg, the main exponent of modernism 
as Abstract Expressionism, and the British critic and Cambridge professor F. R. 
Leavis. Their discussion commenced in the spring of 1955. Greenberg had previ-
ously translated several of Kafka’s short stories, including “Josephine the Singer, 
or The Mouse Folk” (“Josefine, die Sängerin oder Das Volk der Mäuse”) for a 
co-edition of Parables, published in 1947. In 1955, he published “The Jewishness 
of Franz Kafka: Some Sources of His Particular Vision,” in which he explained 
that Kafka’s vision could not be dissociated from his being Jewish. According to 
Greenberg, Kafka’s tradition was the Halachah, even if he, an emancipated and 
enlightened Jew, did not believe in the promise of a Messiah. If the meaning of his 
texts was not exhausted by Jewish mysticism, the form itself was Jewish. As in the 
Halachah, Kafka’s tales and parables revolve around the interpretation of the law 
“with a patient, if selective, circumstantiality that belongs more to description 
and logical exposition than to narrative.”1 Thus, according to Greenberg, 
[Kafka’s] shorter efforts are generally more successful than his novels or extended short 
stories like “The Metamorphosis.” […] Beyond a certain point the peculiarly stealthy, 
gradual movement in time and perception that Kafka is able to achieve tends to bore the 
reader  – whose patience is further taxed by the insufficient promise of a resolution. […] 
States of being are what are conclusive here, and these for Kafka can have no beginnings 
or endings, only middles. What is more, these exclude moral issues, and hence no moral 
choices are made in Kafka’s fiction. To the extent that this fiction succeeds, it refutes the 
assumption of many of the most serious critics of our day – F. R. Leavis is notably one of 
them – that the value of a work of literary art depends ultimately on the depth to which it 
explores moral difficulties.”2 
1 Clement Greenberg, “The Jewishness of Franz Kafka: Some Sources of His Particular Vision,” 
in The Collected Essays, Volume 3: Affirmations and Refusals, 1950–1956, ed. John O’Brian, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, Chicago 1993, 202–209, 208. 
2 Greenberg, “The Jewishness of Franz Kafka,” 208.
Parts of this essay overlap with sections from a chapter of Crimes of the Future, Blooms bury, New 
York 2014, 171–184.
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Beyond the revealing admission that he found Kafka’s novels boring, Greenberg 
was challenging Leavis’s ethical type of criticism. This elicited a counter-attack 
from the British critic, who reiterated his idea that good literature engages with 
ethical issues and that Kafka, in this respect, was no exception. Leavis objected 
to Greenberg’s emphasis on Kafka’s limitations as a creative writer3 – indeed, did 
Greenberg’s argument not in fact merely underscore that the meaning of Kafka’s 
works was opaque for readers not familiar with Jewish culture? Leavis was clearly 
on the side of the universal, explaining that he himself, though neither Jewish nor 
Catholic, could sense Kafka’s greatness just as he could recognize the point of one 
of Graham Greene’s Catholic novels. For Leavis, Kafka transcended both his local 
neurosis – but Greenberg doubted this point – and the Jewish tradition, a tradi-
tion that had the disadvantage of remaining “particularist” or even “non-West-
ern,” the latter phrase coming from Greenberg. 
Greenberg responded by highlighting Kafka’s humor, which he saw as a 
means by which Kafka transcended his fragmentariness and “imprisonment” in 
a tradition. Kafka’s greatness, for Greenberg, appeared more in his mannerisms 
than in grand projects, which often were no more than abortive schemes. Thus, 
stories like “Josephine the Singer,” “Investigations of a Dog” (“Forschungen eines 
Hundes”) and “The Hunter Gracchus” (“Der Jäger Gracchus”) would offer the full 
measure of Kafka’s genius. There should be, Greenberg argued, a dialectical rela-
tionship between universal appeal and the specific conditions of production: 
What I cannot see at all is why the resemblances I find between the method of Kafka’s imag-
ination and Halachic logic should have any more special – that is, exclusive – an interest for 
“those familiar with Jewish culture and tradition” than Shakespeare’s echoes of Montaigne 
have for experts in 16th-century French literature, or the cosmological scheme of the Divine 
Comedy has for Catholic medievalists. I hoped I was explaining the cause of an effect in 
Kafka’s writings that those unacquainted with Jewish tradition feel as much as I do – who 
am not, in my ignorance of Hebrew and many other things, that familiar with Jewish tradi-
tion anyhow. The explanation of the cause was not intended to enhance one’s opinion of 
the effect, nor was the Jewishness of Kafka’s art expected to recommend it in any way that it 
could not recommend itself at first hand to any reader, Gentile or Jew.4 
Greenberg touched a nerve here. A longer reply followed, in which Leavis insisted 
on a discrepancy between Greenberg’s evaluation of Kafka and his account of 
Kafka’s work.5 Kafka’s humor, according to Leavis, could not suffice to offset the 
3 Greenberg, “The Jewishness of Franz Kafka,” 208.
4 Greenberg, “The Jewishness of Franz Kafka,” 212–213.
5 Greenberg, “The Jewishness of Franz Kafka,” 213.
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absence of moral issues. He argued that Greenberg, having fallen into the trap 
of aestheticism, was in fact denying that our discriminations about art and lit-
erature have no bearing on “our future personal living.” This triggered a reply 
from Greenberg that marked the end of the exchange. Greenberg agreed that 
Leavis was right. Greenberg did indeed reject any form of moralism and preferred 
aestheticism to moralism: “I do hold with art for art’s sake. […] If I agreed with 
Dr. Leavis, I would have to conclude that art was a substitute for life and expe-
rience.”6 Greenberg flaunted a Kantian aestheticism. His letter’s conclusion has 
much to say about the “paradox of the universal”: 
In his Critique of Aesthetic Judgment Kant demonstrated that one cannot prove an aesthetic 
judgment in discourse. Let Dr. Leavis see whether he can, in practice or theory, refute Kant’s 
arguments. For what he [ Kant] is claiming in effect is that one can so adequately exhibit in 
words one’s grounds for an aesthetic judgment that agreement with it is compelled by the 
rules of evidence and logic. Kant holds that one can appeal only to the other person’s taste 
as exercised through experience of the work of art under discussion. 
[…] Morality is built into the mind, and works of art have to respect the limitations that 
morality imposes on fancied action; otherwise the reader’s or observer’s interest cannot be 
held, whether in high- or lowbrow literature. But this does not mean that we have to learn 
from literature in order to enjoy it properly or that those who do not learn from it are in no 
position to judge it. Art, in my view, explains to us what we already feel, but it does not do 
so discursively or rationally; rather it acts out an explanation in the sense of working on our 
feelings at a remove sufficient to protect us from the consequences of the decisions made by 
our feelings in response to the work of art.7 
The reference to Kant functioned as an absolute weapon. Greenberg would later 
use it to define modernism as such; at that time, it was heavy enough to silence 
Leavis. Greenberg’s catharsis left him no wiser than before, but he had made his 
point. The chain of reasons leads from a stylistic preference for Kafka’s shorter 
texts to a general theory that not only establishes the laws of art but also finds, 
in Kant’s third Critique, a means of connecting modernism and theory. This is 
a clear opposition to a universalist concept of literature, which corresponds to 
Leavis’s position, a universalism that must be reinforced by the ethical function 
attributed to literature. According to such a concept, Kafka’s appeal is universal; 
he helps us make sense of the “human condition” and this understanding will in 
its turn make us better people. Literature, in other words, contains “universals of 
fantasy,” as Giambattista Vico would have it, thanks to which we imaginatively 
merge with other points of view. In the name of a postulated empathy with such 
6 Greenberg, “The Jewishness of Franz Kafka,” 216.
7 Greenberg, “The Jewishness of Franz Kafka,” 216.
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views (those of people whose religion the reader does not share, for instance) the 
experience of reading literature offers tools for living better. Ethics –an Ethics of 
the Other, to be sure – remains the telos and horizon of literary criticism, a posi-
tion taken more recently by deconstructive critics like Derek Attridge. 
However, Greenberg also insists on a Jewish particularism; it is a welcome 
limitation, and such a limitation will later echo the idea that modernism is fun-
damentally defined by its limitations; indeed, these limitations, once accepted 
and understood, can then be successfully transformed into aesthetic programs. 
Here, the limitations of Kafka’s thought and origins return us to a question about 
the judgments needed by literature. These should not be confused with aesthetic 
judgments, for there is something specific to the latter, as Kant shows in his third 
Critique. We have accordingly moved from a Jewish reading of Kafka to a Kantian 
appreciation of the function of judgments (not a priori but reflexive in this case) 
about art. In experiencing the beauty and depth of Kafka’s writings, one learns 
about both oneself and the judgments one inevitably makes when appreciating 
works of art. 
Greenberg does not believe in the ethical power of Kafka’s works; rather, he 
insists upon the works’ beauty and aesthetic value. In short, Kafka’s works are 
powerful precisely because they bypass the ethical mode; they do so by hesitating 
between the aesthetic and the religious, to use Kierkegaard’s useful categories. 
The story aptly called “The Judgment” (“Das Urteil”) offers a case in point. Here, a 
son is condemned to death, by his father, for no other reason than perhaps having 
wished to supplant his father in his roles as a businessman. Despite the son’s pro-
fession that he loves his father dearly, he finds himself torn on an evening when 
he writes to his best friend, who now lives in Russia, about his recent engagement 
and other news. In deploying the convoluted dynamics of “judging” as a verdict 
invariably leading to a “death sentence,” Kafka spurs any personal awareness of 
how the reader reacts to authority as “sons.” Since we are always already caught 
up in Oedipal patterns of subversive and punishable desires, love for our parents 
is ambivalent, and love must make room for hate; the apparently unexpected 
condemnation can then be re-interpreted as the only logical resolution. Yet this 
logical resolution – so effective when it allowed Kafka to dramatize his own ina-
bility to marry – is also, of course, a logical absurdity. 
For Parables and Paradoxes Greenberg had translated “The Building of the 
Temple” (“Der Tempelbau”), “The Watchman” (“Der Wächter”), “The Sirens” 
(“Die Schweigen der Sirenen”), “The New Attorney” (“Der Neue Advokat), “Cou-
riers” (“Kurier”) and “Josephine the Singer”; one of his earlier essays served as 
the volume’s introduction. Greenberg specialized in Kafka’s shorter forms, or 
what can be termed the “aphoristic” in Kafka. I will try to understand, via using 
Richard T. Gray’s systematic analysis of aphorisms in Kafka, how the shorter 
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forms aim at mediating between the universal and the particular.8 This does not 
mean that aphorisms should be considered as more “universal” because of their 
closeness to philosophy or traditional morality. As a genre, the aphoristic frag-
ment is often classified as “classical” or “romantic” yet it also has serious claims 
to a modernist status. Aphorisms (not to be confused with “sentences”), in fact, 
resemble what I would call “philosophemes,” that is, philosophical maxims of 
a certain type. “Philosophemes” are pithy phrases replete with meaning: they 
include tags, mottos, and apophthegms that can be mentioned independently 
of their original context. They are cryptic, dense, and often paradoxical or truly 
oxymoronic.9 Such arresting sentences sustain their tension and usually avoid 
mere sententiousness. Their brevity and notable structural parallels transform 
them into maxims that are easily memorized. A highly subjective list, to exem-
plify what I mean: “Die Sprache spricht” (Heidegger), “Tout autre est tout autre” 
(Derrida), “Le coeur a des raisons que la raison ne connaît pas” (Pascal), “Die Welt 
ist alles, was der Fall ist” (Wittgenstein), “Je est un autre” (Rimbaud), “Les non-
dupes errent” (Lacan), “Verum Ipsum Factum” (Vico), “Das Wirkliche is das Reale” 
(Hegel), “Rien n’aura eu lieu que le lieu” (Mallarmé), “O my friends, there are no 
friends” (Aristotle, translated by Derrida), “D’ailleurs c’est toujours les autres qui 
meurent” (Duchamp), “Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis” (Geulincx), “I wouldn’t want 
to belong to any club that would accept me” (Groucho Marx). One could easily add 
myriad other examples or adduce Oscar Wilde’s famous paradoxes. However, the 
number of such sentences, great as it is, is not infinite. These sentences, moreo-
ver, share characteristics, including a notable syntactic compression10 and a high 
dependence on the given language’s amphibologies, which often render literal 
translation almost impossible; often, the sentences can be used only in their orig-
inal languages. 
This is highlighted by Kafka’s aphorism 46 from Contemplation [Betrachtun-
gen]: “The word sein means two things in German: ‘being’ and ‘belonging-to-
him.’”11 It is unclear where exactly Kafka sought to go with this. I would argue 
that the obviousness in his semantic remark (sein as the possessive pronoun 
8 Richard T. Gray, Constructive Destruction: Kafka’s Aphorisms: Literary Tradition and Literary 
Transformation, Niemeyer, Tübingen 1987, 264. 
9 See the wonderful collection gathered by Mardy Grothe, Oxymoronica: Paradoxical Wit and 
Wisdom from History’s Greatest Wordsmiths, Harper, New York 2004. Kafka is quoted only once: 
“Don’t despair, not even over the fact that you don’t despair” (page 164).
10 See Virginia Tufte, Artful Sentences, Syntax as Style, Graphics Press, Cheshire 2006. 
11 Franz Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” in The Great Wall of China and Other Short Works, 
ed. and trans. Malcolm Pasley, Penguin, London 1991, 79–98, 86. In the original: “Das Wort 
‘sein’ bedeutet im Deutschen beides: Dasein und Ihm-gehören.” See Franz Kafka, Nachgelassene 
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“his” doubling as the noun or verb for “to be” and “being”) hides a deeper desta-
bilization of ontology, and that this has as foundational an impact, as when Hei-
degger differentiates between Sein (as capitalized “Being”) and Seiendes (as the 
lowercase-b “being being” of a Dasein understood as existence). The tantalizing 
semantic ambiguity of these aphorisms has triggered proliferating commentaries 
that lead in various directions and which evince the inexhaustible richness of the 
expression. 
Is this comparable to certain similarly dense and cryptic writings of James 
Joyce, which he termed epiphanies? In Joyce’s Epiphany 36 (a dream epiphany) 
we see him similarly and subtly questioning ontology via a comparable accident 
of language: 
Yes, they are the two sisters. She who is churning with stout arms (their butter is famous) 
looks dark and unhappy: the other is happy because she had her way. 
Her name is R . . . . Rina. I know the verb “to be” in their language. 
– Are you Rina?
– I knew she was.12 
The dream is triggered by Ibsen: Rina is a character in Hedda Gabler; she is the 
old aunt who is terminally ill and dies at the end of the play. We see that Joyce 
remembers the verb å vaere – meaning “to be,” in Norwegian – and also linking 
its signifier, Være, with the Latin Vera, or “Truth,” a truth apparently disclosed 
in dreams. For Joyce and Kafka, are ontology and language pitted against each 
other, placed at the extreme poles of a long conceptual arc, or are they instead 
like two sides of a coin? Does it help if, in one’s native French, one can halluci-
nate the vrai as a “true” sein, a breast that will owe to Melanie Klein’s split object, 
that one can divide between a good and a bad breast? Such seemingly irrelevant 
questions can be answered more rigorously by examining the parallel corpuses 
referred to previously, namely, Kafka’s aphorisms and Joyce’s epiphanies. 
The Joycean epiphany and the Kafkan Betrachtung share a degree of com-
monality. However, attempts to set Kafka and Joyce into straightforward or unme-
diated dialogue seem glib or forced. Many have felt that these two authors come 
from worlds so fundamentally different that any attempt to align them appears 
problematic. Yet there are points of entry into a comparative study of their 
respective aphoristic works. Such points include the aphorisms’ connections to 
Nietzsche, their common reverence for Flaubert’s style, their similar awareness 
Schriften und Fragmente II [Posthumous Writings and Fragments II], ed. Jost Schillemeit, Fischer, 
Frankfurt/M. 1992, 123.
12 James Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, Faber, London 1991, 196. 
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that clichés or “received ideas” constitute the basis for popular wisdom, their 
reduction of myth to catchphrases, and their wish to condense culture to a syn-
thetic idiom. 
If one tries to compare the Kafkan aphorism to the Joycean epiphany, an 
important difference becomes apparent almost immediately. Joyce began his 
career with these short texts, which date from 1902 to 1904; they are disseminated 
throughout Stephen Hero, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, and Ulysses 
and even reappear in Finnegans Wake. Kafka, in contrast, was near the end of his 
literary career when he composed his two collections of aphorisms: those in the 
first collection, known as “He,” date from the fall and winter of 1917 and 1918; the 
others, known as the Zürau aphorisms, were copied from notebooks and com-
piled in 1920, at a moment when he had renounced writing novels. This funda-
mental difference between the two sets of aphorisms must be kept in mind when 
noting their formal similarities. These short fragments, ranging in length from 
a single sentence to a paragraph, often have a content that is essentially cryptic 
or so condensed that the meaning is not immediately apparent. The main point 
of convergence between the aphorisms and the epiphanies is that they share a 
dialectical relationship between the particular and the universal. This is achieved 
via the link between fragment and totality: “Only fragments of a totality,” Kafka 
notes, in his third octavo notebook.13 Above all, their tensions generate “dialec-
tical images” (to quote Walter Benjamin), in that they deploy, in a startling fig-
urative language, a broader consideration of the whole, be it named “Truth” or 
“Life.” 
Any study of the aphorism should begin by considering its literary tradi-
tion, as does Richard Gray, as noted previously, in his Constructive Destruction: 
Kafka’s Aphorisms: Literary Tradition and Literary Transformation. Gray reminds 
us that the word aphorism derives from the Greek aphorismos, a term coined by 
Hippocrates to designate a set of symptoms; indeed, the medical sense adheres 
to Joyce’s epiphanies. Over time, the genre of the aphorism addressed a wider 
range of discourses. Aphoristic writing as practiced by Pascal, Vauvenargues, de 
La Rochefoucault, Novalis, Lichtenberg, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Wittgen-
stein moves easily between philosophy and autobiography, religion and cultural 
critique. The aphorism’s innate tendency to straddle genres contributes to its 
complexity. A working definition of an aphorism is that it is a short, condensed, 
apodictic statement that aims at giving a striking shape to an abstract truth. Gray 
13 Franz Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, ed. Max Brod, trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne 
Wilkins, Exact Change, Cambridge 1991, 14. 
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concludes that the aphorism is “the ultimate expressive form of modernism.”14 
His main thesis is that aphorism is the embodiment of modern skepticism facing 
the arrogance of the Universal when the latter becomes identical with Reason. Fit-
tingly, the aphorism’s resistance to any single definition parallels the form itself, 
since the tension between the universal and the particular generates series of 
dense, cryptic, tantalizing hermeneutical puzzles to be savored and solved one 
at a time.
Yet what it is that renders such short forms distinctly “Kafkan” or “Joycean”? 
These fragments compress the struggle of a subject who balances language and 
reality; indeed, they point to the discrepancy between linguistic capabilities and 
the shock of a real perceived as foreign, opaque, threatening. A Kafkan or Joycean 
aphorism thus presents the shortest narrative form capable of capturing the inter-
action – at times quite aggressive, disturbing or enigmatic – of Self and Other. 
I will study Joyce’s practice first, not only because it took place earlier, around 
1903–1904, but also because, despite being invoked by many critics, it retains an 
enigmatic air. We do not understand everything in the Joycean epiphany, and one 
of my contentions is that a detour via Kafka can bring new elements. Conversely, 
a detour through Joyce yields new insights into Kafka’s literary practice. 
I will survey two main features: the first is that these short texts are num-
bered in a manner that is either continuous (for Kafka) or discontinuous (for 
Joyce); the ongoing struggle to understand the logic behind these numberings is 
often reminiscent of the long-raging critical debate about Pascal’s ordering of his 
Pensées. The second feature is the necessary fragmentation of the texts. In Joyce’s 
case, the short texts exhibit countless ellipses; the many periods dot the texts, 
opening them up. In Kafka’s fragments, the ellipses are more conceptual: we find 
myriad breaks, reversals in syntax, and countless evasions and self-referential 
loops. In each case, the vignettes enact a certain dynamism, often by evoking 
physical movement. For Joyce this may be a person who reads a book and identi-
fies with characters who are moving, as in Epiphany 2. Epiphany 21 depicts two 
female mourners hurrying through a crowd, while Epiphany 23 presents a male 
dancer who moves noiselessly in an amphitheater: “He begins to dance far below 
in the amphitheatre with a slow and supple movement of the limbs, passing from 
movement to movement, in all the grace of youth and distance, until he seems 
to be a whirling body, a spider wheeling amid space, a star.”15 Dancers, dream 
animals, passers-by: all move with an oneiric precision. Epiphany 16 depicts “an 
14 Gray, Constructive Destruction, 135.
15 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 183.
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artic beast”: “Something is moving in the pool.”16 The dreamer pushes it with a 
stick: “He moves his paws heavily and mutters words of some language which I 
do not understand.”17 Epiphany 6 presents bearded satyrs – each half-man and 
half-goat – who threateningly “move about me, enclosing me.”18 Epiphany 31 has 
a more urgent tone: “What moves upon me from the darkness subtle and mur-
murous as a flood […]?”19 Epiphany 32 begins with a crowd moving in a dream: 
“The human crowd swarms in the enclosure, moving through the slush.”20 
Epiphany 33 evokes society ladies who “pass in twos and threes amid the life 
of the boulevard.”21 Many of these vignettes have an inchoative and exhortatory 
function: they shake the speaker and push him to an action or a decision. Typical 
in this respect is Epiphany 30 (reused at the end of A Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man), in which the plural voices of adventure beckon: “they call to me 
their kinsman, making ready to go, shaking the wings of their exultant and terri-
ble youth.”22 Even Epiphany 7, a vignette that evokes a moment of pious devotion 
and presents the young man after communion in a church, begins “It is time to 
go away now.”23 
To grasp what Joyce does with his epiphanies, we must return to Stephen 
Hero, to the introduction of the term. Near the end of the remaining fragments of 
this long autobiographical novel, the eponymous hero, Stephen, overhears a dis-
cussion between a man and a woman; this takes place in Eccles Street one misty 
evening and resembles a scene written for the stage: 
The Young Lady – (drawling discreetly) . . . O, yes . . . I was . . . at the . . . cha . . . pel . . . 
The Young Gentleman – (inaudibly) . . . I . . . (again inaudibly) . . . I . . . 
The Young Lady – (softly) . . . O . . . but you’re . . . ve . . . ry . . . wick . . . ed . . . 24
This is, admittedly, disappointing; dots and ellipses count more than what is said. 
This may leave the impression that an epiphany leads to a quintessentially Pinte-
rian mode of dialogue, in that silences are more significant than what is spoken. 
16 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 176.
17 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 176.
18 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 166.
19 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 191.
20 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 192.
21 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 193.
22 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 190.
23 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 167.
24 James Joyce, Stephen Hero, Jonathan Cape, London 1956, 216.
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These three lines of – broken – dialogue nevertheless manage to touch the 
young poet’s sensitivity, spurring his decision to collect similar vignettes, in a 
“book of epiphanies.” His definition of epiphany follows: “The triviality made 
him think of collecting many such moments together in a book of epiphanies. By 
an epiphany he meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity 
of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself. He believed 
that it was for the man of letters to record these epiphanies with extreme care, 
seeing that they themselves are the most delicate and evanescent of moments.”25 
For Joyce, the lack of content in the actual words of the exchange is constitu-
tive; it is the equivalent of a maximum of content, and such a dialectical reversal 
is something that we find in Kafka’s Contemplation as well. Here, ellipses con-
dense Irish paralysis, adding curious sexual innuendoes: for example, what was 
the young lady doing at the chapel that is so unspeakable? This almost forces the 
reader to be “wicked,” though the actual exchange may well have been banal and 
harmless. Was there a priest in the dark, to whom she was muttering her soft “O… 
yes…”? Was she doing something to him? What does she suggest with her sensual 
drawling of “O”s? Excited, seduced, baffled, the reader becomes an involuntary 
voyeur. Joyce is trying to capture less a moment of plenitude or revelation than 
gaps in speech, pauses or loopholes in dialogues. In this, he testifies to the always 
surprising emergence of truth as a hole in discourse, to use a formulation shared 
by Jacques Lacan and Alain Badiou. Hence this systematic attempt at voiding 
language of its meaning. Such an attempt is apparent elsewhere in Stephen Hero, 
such as in the following passage, which, in describing the experience, calls up an 
identical hollowing out of meaning: 
As he walked thus through the ways of the city he had his ears and eyes ever prompt to 
receive impressions. It was not only in Skeat that he found words for his treasure-house, he 
found them also at haphazard in the shops, on advertisements, in the mouths of the plod-
ding public. He kept repeating them to himself till they lost all instantaneous meaning for 
him and became wonderful vocables. […] In class, in the hushed library, in the company of 
other students he would suddenly hear a command to begone, to be alone, a voice agitating 
the very tympanum of his ear, a flame leaping into divine cerebral life. He would obey the 
command and wander up and down the streets alone, the fervour of his hope sustained by 
ejaculations until felt sure that it was useless to wander any more: and then he would return 
home with a deliberate, unflagging step piecing together meaningless words and phrases 
with deliberate unflagging seriousness.”26 
25 Joyce, Stephen Hero, 210–211. 
26 Joyce, Stephen Hero, 30–31.
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This passage is rarely linked to the account of the epiphany, yet it is obvious that 
both are describing the same process. This affords a rationale for the striking 
lack of content in the initial dialogue in Eccles Street. The words lose all content, 
and, once they have become almost meaningless, they can be reshuffled at will, 
reworked in patient combinations as required by the creative process. Moreover, 
the literary task is triggered by an order from outside; it is initiated by a com-
mandment from the Other. The idea of obeying this voice from above may strike 
one as irrational and unhinged, yet the literary task would be impossible other-
wise, since it aims at opening the whole world to artistic recreation. Thus Joyce 
first empties the Real of meaning; he then leaves the mark of the hole open for a 
while, until he manages to knot it with other holes. Epiphany 19 offers an illus-
tration of this process:
(Dublin: in the house in Glengariff Parade: evening)
Mrs Joyce – (crimson, trembling, appears at the parlour door) . . . Jim!
Joyce – (at the piano) . . . Yes?
Mrs Joyce – Do you know anything about the body? . . . What ought I do? . . . There’s some 
matter coming away from the hole in Georgie’s stomach . . . . Did you ever hear of that hap-
pening?
Joyce – (surprised) . . . I don’t know . . .
Mrs Joyce – Ought I send for the doctor, do you think?
Joyce – I don’t know . . . . . . What hole?
Mrs Joyce – (impatient) . . . The hole we all have . . . . . . here (points) 
Joyce – (stands up)27
The vignette found its way into Stephen Hero as the conclusion of chapter XXII, 
where it becomes more dramatic: the blank page that follows the last spoken 
word (“ – The hole … the hole we all have … here”) leaves the reader in intolerable 
suspense. The next chapter jumps ahead and the reader learns that Isobel (in the 
novel, she has replaced real-life George) has indeed died. The setting is also more 
theatrical. Stephen had been playing the piano, and he stops to hear something. 
Dusk is coming when death is announced to him. The characters are steeped in 
27 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 179. 
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dramatic shadows: “A form which he knew for his mother’s appeared far down 
in the room, standing in the doorway. In the gloom her excited face was crimson. 
A voice which he remembered as his mother’s, a voice of terrified human being, 
called his name. The form at the piano answered.”28 
The fragment then refers to a nameless hole, perhaps the navel or anus. The 
text leaves the readers as startled as the protagonists. In naming the impossible 
site of death, the fragment allegorizes the presence of a void at the core of the 
epiphany. The epiphany allegorizes the function of letters, which, in Lacanian 
terms, function as the rim of the hole of jouissance. The foundational role of such 
a hole derives from the emergence of Truth in the Real. The truth can then be dis-
seminated in the social fabric, as seen in Epiphany 22: 
[Dublin: in the National Library]
Skefflington – I was sorry to hear of the death of your brother . . . . sorry we didn’t know in 
time . . . . . to have been at the funeral . . . . .
Joyce – O, he was very young . . . . a boy . . . .
Skefflington – Still . . . . . it hurts . . . .29 
From the outset, Joyce recognized that his epiphanies would become discrete 
parts of a greater whole – either a series of short texts, or integrated into a novel. 
He used many of the epiphanies as fragmentary sketches for scenes and conver-
sations. From the opening scene of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man to Ste-
phen’s recurrent dreams of his mother in Ulysses, the epiphany plays a central 
role throughout Joyce’s oeuvre. The form reinforces and anchors the rest of the 
text. I argue for the central porosity of the Joycean epiphany. In using “porous,” I 
mean to convey the Greek meaning of “poros,” the way. In short, wherever there 
is a linguistic hole, there is a way, or, rather, there is a way of tying this hole to 
another hole. 
Kafka’s experience, though starting from a similar “triviality,” that is, identi-
cal urban crossroads, leads instead to an aporia. The aporia, as with Plato’s apo-
retic dialogues, requires a different passage, and often this dead-end can be over-
come only by an ascent, a groping for a revelation. This is allegorized in Kafka’s 
“Unmasking a Confidence Trickster” (“Entlarvung eines Bauernfängers”), one of 
the shorter texts that echo with Joyce’s urban epiphanies. This short story, dating 
28 Joyce, Stephen Hero, 162–163.
29 Joyce, Stephen Hero, 162–163.
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from 1913, features a narrator who explains that he has come to a fine house 
because he has been invited for a party. On his way, he has been followed for two 
hours by a stranger who has thrust himself upon him. Finally, having decided 
to shake off this stranger, the narrator confronts him. The unwanted companion 
then makes a mistake: in trying to be seductive and pleasant, he stretches his 
arm along the wall, leans his cheek upon it, and, closing his eyes, smiles. This 
smile reveals to the narrator that the man is a confidence trickster (Bauernfänger). 
“Caught in the act!” the narrator exclaims. He is then able to climb the stairs, 
alone, and give his coat to a servant. What is revealing in this tale is the sugges-
tion, at the moment of the unmasking, of shame (“shame suddenly caught hold of 
me”) and the idea of doubling: the man of the city and the peasant are successive 
versions of the same person.30 But where are they planning to visit? 
Indeed, if we examine the text closely, the signs become even more opaque. 
The story was triggered by a visit that Kafka and Max Brod made to a Parisian 
brothel during their 1911 trip. During these excursions into the red-light district, 
the two friends had to fend off seedy barkers, aggressive touts, and conniving 
middlemen trying to lure customers into their establishments. The final sense 
of ease at the story’s close contrasts with the embarrassment felt by Kafka, who 
once fled, in shame and disgust, from a Parisian brothel. Here, the confidence 
trickster appears more like Alfred Prufrock’s confidant, a reminder of sordid 
street-corners seductions, someone ready to use his urban cunning to ensnare 
gullible “peasants”  – in this case, clearly, non-Parisian visitors. Here we meet 
triviality with a vengeance. However, this is the rare Kafka text in which the narra-
tor actually reaches his aim, that is, he moves on, unimpeded, to a company and 
enjoys a successful social life. The text ends thusly: “With a deep breath of relief 
and straightening myself to my full height, I then entered the drawing room.” 
Yet, as we know from most of his other texts, above all The Trial [Der Prozess], in 
Kafka’s world one cannot shake a confidence trickster so easily…
What matters, then, both for Joyce and Kafka, is to capture such evanescent 
signs when the flash of the Real is perceptible. Even though the truncated signs 
are displayed in corners so as send one on the path to writing, they appear on the 
spot of a missing corner; thus, they are literally blind spots, not unlike that dark-
ened parallelogram in Euclid’s “gnomon,” itself the geometrical figure evoked at 
the beginning of the first story in Joyce’s Dubliners. 
Kafka’s Zürau aphorisms outnumber Joyce’s epiphanies, as only forty 
vignettes survived of the seventy-one numbered by Joyce. The epiphanies include 
30 See Franz Kafka, “Unmasking a Confidence Trickster,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The 
Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, Schocken Books, New York 1971, 396–397.
228   Jean-Michel Rabaté 
dream transcriptions, fragments of dialogues, first drafts of objective narratives 
and lyrical, autobiographical confessions. Curiously, the term becomes derog-
atory in Ulysses: Stephen muses ironically on his juvenile fantasy of sending 
copies of his “epiphanies on green oval leaves” to “all the great libraries of the 
world, including Alexandria.”31 Did Joyce, by the late 1910s, no longer believe in 
his theory of the epiphany? Has the term been swallowed by the movement of 
mimesis seen as the work of writing itself? 
In rewriting Stephen Hero, Joyce erased the Romantic echoes lurking in the 
first version of his theory. In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the same 
phraseology recurs, without being founded on the term “epiphany.” The “man-
ifestation” showing the divine nature of Jesus belongs to a discourse of disclo-
sure and revelation, but in the negative sense rather than in the positive. In “The 
Dead,” set on the night of the Epiphany, Gabriel Conroy has no “good news” to 
bring to anyone at the party. At the story’s end, he comes to terms with his own 
blindness, selfishness, and emotional limitations. He discovers these limits in 
facing a wife who emerges as a more opaque “Other,” and this leads to revision of 
all his values. This process of divesting himself of his last illusions parallels the 
process of the Joycean epiphany. Again, the epiphany is relayed by a narrative 
process, its deadly work accompanying the radiance of the Thing. While pointing 
to the radiance of pure manifestation, the “shine” of epiphanies does not conceal 
their blindness. This is why the term retains the suggestion of “betraying,” which 
finds an equivalent in how most of Kafka’s Contemplation seems obsessed with 
issues of lies, deception, and self-deception. By revealing something that had 
been concealed, the fragment condenses a process of aletheia – that is, it gives 
birth to truth as unconcealment. Joyce’s epiphany is never far from a Freudian 
symptom, albeit with a political twist  – in the context of an Ireland endlessly 
abused and betrayed. According to Joyce’s brother Stanislaus, the “manifesta-
tions or revelations” in which the epiphanies consist undo the very process of 
ideological concealment while exhibiting ironically the type of repression at 
work: “these notes were in the beginning ironical observations of slips, and little 
errors and gestures – mere straws in the wind – by which people betrayed the 
very things they were most careful to conceal.”32 In Epiphany 12, Hanna Sheehy, 
asked who her favorite German poet is, replies sententiously, after a pause and a 
hush: “I think … Goethe …”33 A Proustian irony is created by the multiplication of 
31 James Joyce, Ulysses, ed. H. W. Gabler, Garland Press, New York 1986, 143. 
32 Stanislaus Joyce, My Brother’s Keeper: James Joyce’s Early Years, Viking Press, New York 1958, 
134–135.
33 Joyce, Poems and Shorter Writings, 172.
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dots. The pretensions of provincial culture – here, a young woman taking herself 
too seriously – are exposed by a conflation of personal, social, and cultural symp-
toms. 
A similar complexity is observable in Kafka’s aphorisms, parables, and par-
adoxes. These short texts range from single sentences – such as “A cage went in 
search of a bird”34 and “Never again psychology!”35 – to longer paragraphs that 
condense a short tale. These aphorisms tend to be serious, enigmatic, at times 
even grotesque; often they evince a weird sense of humor. Most of these apho-
risms are bound together by a deconstructive dialectic that Richard Gray labels 
“constructive destruction” and Stanley Corngold calls “chiastic recursion.” In 
this structure, each new term, consisting of elements syntactically and conceptu-
ally parallel to those of a previous term, arises by means of an inversion of similar 
elements. Patterns of “chiastic recursion” construct parallel lines of inverted 
meaning and fold the text back upon itself. 
Thanks to such an inbuilt logic of paradox, each aphorism contains its own 
undoing. For instance, the first aphorism – “The true way is along a tightrope, 
which is stretched aloft but just above the ground. It seems designed more to 
trip one than to be walked along.”36 – exemplifies the deconstructive energy of 
the Kafkan aphorism. Kafka sets forth the idea of a pure truth and then decon-
structs it in three stages: the first stage describes the image of an ideal, lofty truth 
suspended in the air; the second inverts the image of a rope suspended above: 
the rope is now just on the ground; and in the third stage, the transformation of 
the tightrope to a tripwire juxtaposes the image of a true path with its inverted 
parallel, a tripwire. The ascendance of truth that the aphorism initially invokes is 
deconstructed through negation, inversion, and chiastic recursion.
Where does this trope come from? As Peter Sloterdijk has argued, the aph-
orism makes better sense if we understand it as Kafka’s ironical response to 
Nietzsche’s axiom, from Thus Spake Zarathustra [Also Sprach Zarathustra], that 
“man is a rope over the abyss.” The latter axiom is from the Prologue, when Zara-
thustra gives his first discourses. He asserts: “Man is a rope, fastened between 
animal and Superman – a rope over an abyss [Der Mensch ist ein Seil, geknüpft 
zwischen Tier und Uebermensch, – ein Seil über einem Abgrunde].”37 Even before 
Zarathustra had expressed this idea, the crowd had called him a “tight-rope 
34 Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 88.
35 Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 42.
36 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 79.
37 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin, London 1969, 
43.
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walker”38 (Seiltaenzer) and an actual tightrope walker appears in section  6 of 
the Prologue. This tightrope walker walks between two towers in the village; 
however, when he is midway the devil appears on the rope and quickly overtakes 
the man, jumping over him and causing the tightrope walker to fall to his death. 
As the dying man sees Zarathustra kneeling next to him, he says that he knew the 
devil would trip him. Zarathustra refuses to pity him and mocks his belief in god 
and the devil.39
For Peter Sloterdijk, this marks a general shift from asceticism to acrobatics 
in European thought.40 Nietzsche’s dying tightrope walker prefigures the dying 
artist in Kafka’s story “A Hunger Artist” (“Ein Hungerkünstler”). Kafka manages 
to condense a tension already present in Nietzsche. After all, Zarathustra could 
take the fallen acrobat as a disciple, even if a clumsy follower; instead, he berates 
the dying man, without sympathy. This gives a more ominous overtone to a sen-
tence he had uttered previously: “What is great in man is that he is a bridge and 
not a goal; what can be loved in man is that he is a going-across and a down-going 
[ein Übergang und ein Untergang ist].”41 
Thus we see that if the aphorisms stage a tension between the particular 
and the universal, this tension should generate “dialectical images” (to quote 
Walter Benjamin). Their implied dialogism (here, between Nietzsche and Kafka, 
between Zarathustra and the acrobat, between rise and fall, etc.) prevents them 
from deploying a single thesis. Thus the apodictic structure of statements that 
sound as necessarily true, their authoritative aspect disguise more malleable and 
proliferating meanings. Fittingly, the aphorism’s resistance to a single definition 
parallels the form itself, in that the aphorism presents a set of cryptic, fragmented 
hermeneutical puzzles to be unwound. Yet this does not explain what makes a 
particular aphorism distinctly “Kafkan.” These fragments can be read as com-
pressed fictions presenting a subject who struggles to balance language and 
reality. They point to a discrepancy between linguistic capabilities and the shock 
of a real perceived as foreign, opaque, threatening. A Kafkan aphorism would be 
the shortest narrative form capable of capturing the sometimes quite aggressive 
interaction of Self and Other, while noting that the point of view is more often 
than not that of the Other.
38 Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, 43.
39 Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, 48.
40 Peter Sloterdijk, “Last Hunger Art: Kafka’s Artistes” (“Letzte Hungerkunst: Kafkas Artistik”), 
in You Must Change Your Life [Du mußt dein Leben ändern], trans. Wieland Hoban, Polity, Cam-
bridge 2013, 61–72, 64.
41 Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, 44 (emphasis in original).
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Although it is impossible to identify a common structure among the various 
epiphanic forms, some trends are worth noting. Richard Gray, countering Max 
Brod’s thesis of a religious Kafka, suggests that Kafka’s aphorisms move away 
from revelation. They pose complex hermeneutical puzzles and seem shrouded 
in a “willed obscurity,” since truth remains a blinding truth. For example: “In a 
certain sense you deny the existence of this world. You explain life as a state of 
rest, a state of rest in motion.”42 This paradox leads us to the Way – yet there are 
several ways at once, and the fragment always battles with Freudian over-deter-
mination. One of the “ways” I would choose to negotiate the paradoxes of Kafka’s 
“Reflections on Sin, Pain, Hope, and the True Way” (“Betrachtungen über Sünde, 
Leid, Hoffnung und den wahren Weg”) would be by focusing on the paradigm of 
movement. 
Aphorism 14: “If you were walking across a plain, had every intention of advancing and 
still went backwards, then it would be a desperate matter; but since you are clambering 
up a steep slope, about as steep as you yourself are when seen from below, your backward 
movement can only be caused by the nature of the ground, and you need not despair.”43 
Aphorism 15: “Like a path in autumn: scarcely has it been swept clear when it is once more 
covered with leaves.”44
Aphorism 21: “As firmly as the hand grips the stone. But it grips it firmly only to fling it away 
the further. But the way leads into those distances too.”45
Aphorism 26: (second half) “There is a goal, but now way; what we call a way is hesita-
tion.”46
Aphorism 38: “There was one who was astonished how easily he moved along the road of 
eternity; the fact is that he was racing along it downhill.”47
Aphorism 76: “This feeling: ‘Here I will not anchor,’ and instantly to feel the billowing 
uplifting swell around one.”48
42 Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 47.
43 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 81.
44 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 81.
45 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 81.
46 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 83.
47 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 85.
48 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 91.
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This movement is indeed “moving” yet outside any psychology. Aphorism 93 
famously states: “Never again psychology!”49 Why then should we dismiss all 
psychology? The answer, as Maurice Blanchot well understood in his own frag-
ments and short novels, is that psychology moves one too easily and generates an 
excess of fictional comprehension or empathy. As Kafka explains, “Nausea after 
too much psychology. If someone has good legs and is admitted to psychology, he 
can, in a short time and in any zigzag he likes, cover distances such as he cannot 
cover in any other field. One’s eyes overbrim at the sight.”50 Is this nausea or 
ecstasy? No matter what causes it, the moving excess brought about by psychol-
ogy must be reduced by a writing of the outside. Truth will be opposed to the field 
of psychological masks and disguises, fictions, and lies about oneself and others. 
The result is a certain stillness, as delineated in Aphorism 109: “It is not necessary 
that you leave the house. Remain at your table and listen. Do not even listen, only 
wait. Do not even wait, be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to 
you for its unmasking, it can do no other, in ecstasy it will writhe at your feet.”51 
Of course, the trajectory returns us to the writing desk… For Kafka, writing 
must go deep enough; the subjectless subject can remain still, and he may end 
up cutting his body and writing on it, as in the famous parable of “In the Penal 
Colony” (“In der Strafkolonie”). Meanwhile, the world will also have unmasked 
itself, an unmasking that would offer the promise of an absolute jouissance. 
Stanley Corngold has rightly mentioned a Gnostic streak in Kafka. One might be 
tempted to add, as Lacan, does in Seminar XX, a mystical jouissance of the Real 
as pure Otherness. It is the lack of narrative placement that makes the aphorisms 
difficult to decipher. The technique evokes the abysmal aura of a Truth that will 
be withheld. If the aphorisms aim at truth, truth is always blinded by an excess 
of aura – as if the epiphany had become a little sun, its light a blinding glare. All 
that remains is an afterimage of the blinding process, a flicker of lost revelation. 
Kafka’s main novels are marked by the absence of expected revelation. In 
The Castle [Das Schloss] and The Trial he constructs intricate labyrinths of rela-
tionships and possibilities in tracing the respective protagonists’ futile and seem-
ingly endless journeys. The Castle concludes mid-sentence, lost amidst a tangle 
of narrative possibilities. The Trial ends with Josef K.’s humiliating death. This 
death can be read as an anti-revelation, for it removes any possibility of illumi-
nation or final understanding. It serves to obfuscate the plot further. Against this 
tendency, Kafka’s aphorisms correspond to a desire to reach the truth quickly 
49 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 95.
50 Kafka, The Blue Octavo Notebooks, 79. 
51 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 98.
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and immediately; in other words, they echo what Hermann Broch has called the 
“impatience of knowledge.” Yet, even when the aphorisms manifest this impa-
tience, they also debunk it, as in Aphorism 3: “There are two cardinal human sins 
from which all others derive: impatience and indolence. Because of impatience 
they were expelled from Paradise, because of indolence they do not return. But 
perhaps there is only one cardinal sin: impatience. Because of impatience they 
were expelled, because of impatience they do not return.”52 
Driven by “impatience,” Kafka’s aphorisms explore the metaphorical divi-
sion between the material world and a higher state of being even as they chal-
lenge this barrier in its impossibility. It does not matter that the ground is limited 
to where the subject can stand, as per Aphorism 24: “What it means to grasp the 
good fortune that the ground on which you stand cannot be greater than what 
is covered by your two feet.”53 A tension between the local and the eternal, the 
trivial and the universal, provides the dynamism to the verbal engine. Kafka’s 
negative dialectics imply contrapuntal relationships in the flow from universal to 
trivial. The effect is one of deconstruction or demystification rather than revela-
tion, yet the concept of Truth is not destroyed. On the contrary, Truth plays a role 
similar to that I have analyzed in Joyce’s epiphanies: namely, that of a decenter-
ing tool, a hole in discourse. Kafka goes further, since this Truth risks devouring 
all others and thereby destroying both the world and the subject. 
We have seen that the porosity of Joyce’s epiphanies led to a practice of 
writing that was buttressed by the letter. For Joyce the letter provides a key 
because it contains and rims a hole. In a similar manner, the logical impossibil-
ities in Kafka’s aphorisms evoke a principle of verticality. Any hope that a vision 
of the vertical truth will bypass the obscure labyrinths of The Trial and The Castle 
is frustrated. The aphoristic style achieves a shortcut, yet, when it literally puts 
an end to the narrative, it undercuts itself. Kafka generates perpetual movement 
by using a very small textual surface. Thus, what moves him is the possibility 
of jumping from an ethics of language to a perception of the Law as such. This 
means not that singularity is abolished but rather that the writer tends to see 
himself from the outside. The writing becomes once more the writing of the 
Real, at least insofar as the divided subject is told to side with the world and not 
with subjectivity. Three aphorisms are relevant here, namely, Aphorism 52: “In 
the struggle between yourself and the world, second the world”54; Aphorism 53: 
52 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 79.
53 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 82.
54 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 87.
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“One must not cheat anyone, not even the world of its triumph”55; and the aph-
orism “He”: “He has discovered the Archimedean principle, but he has turned 
it to account against himself; evidently it was only on this condition that he was 
permitted to discover it.”56 
We can distinguish three modernist attitudes facing what I have called the 
“Style of the Real.” First, there is Proust’s position: a writer must come to terms 
with the signs written in him by reality and time – involuntary memory tells him 
that Time can be abolished. The operation of involuntary memory supposes that, 
in the end, all particular places, names, or sensations can be brought together 
by the text. Time will be abolished once two sensations are superimposed. One 
could read this as a certain Platonism. 
Kafka would not allow such a way out. He is haunted by an ethics in which 
God, the, Real, or an Unconscious to which we have no access, wholly dominate. 
With Proust, the writer can, in the end, learn to trust this Unconscious and find 
reassurance in the thought that the work of art continues being written, as it will 
in each of us. Thus, each of us should not only enjoy but also make use of this 
process of writing. What Proust calls a “metaphor” depends upon a utopia in 
which time is abolished in exchange for the promise of a work of art to come. 
Moreover, Proust’s promise of writerly bliss is granted without any personal God 
being present or relevant; Kafka, however, needs the framework of messianic 
promise, or, as a second-best theory, Kierkegaard’s or Pascal’s overcoming of the 
ethical by the religious. The Jewish Messiah embodies the principle of the “to 
come” – it will come, as we know, not on the last day but on day after the last day, 
or, as Kafka puts it, “The Messiah will come only when he is no longer necessary; 
he will come only on the day after his arrival; he will come, not on the last day, 
but on the very last day.”57
Joyce contents himself with the promise of a law of seriality: he believes in 
the text to come. There will always be other privileged moments to jot down; the 
task may be infinite but it remains possible. Yet, there is another version of the 
Unconscious at work here, the aptly named “agenbite of inwit” that Stephen feels 
gnawing at his soul. That one can trust history does not liberate it from the taint 
of original sin; and thus Finnegans Wake becomes a universal history of the orig-
inal sin. Finally, whereas Joyce seems to always gain (loss is his gain, as Beckett 
would argue), Kafka prefers to always lose: gain is his loss. In this sense, he paves 
55 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 87.
56 Kafka, “The Collected Aphorisms,” 105.
57 Franz Kafka, “The Coming of the Messiah,” in The Basic Kafka, ed. Erich Heller, Washington 
Square Press, New York 1979, 182.
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the way for Beckett’s poetics of impotence and deprivation. Yet, these three posi-
tions still imply a hermeneutic circle, one that must be run through over and over 
again. This mechanism is best illustrated by Kafka’s famous text “On Parables” 
(“Von den Gleichnissen”), which, in the version proposed by Willa and Edwin 
Muir, perhaps with help from Clement Greenberg, ends thusly:
Concerning this a man once said: Why such reluctance? If you only followed the parables 
you yourselves would become parables and with that rid of all your daily cares.
Another said: I bet that is also a parable.
The first said: You have won.
The second said: But unfortunately only in parable.
The first said: No, in reality: in parable you have lost.58 
The first speaker addresses the utopia of pure aestheticism: if one agrees that 
the only life worth living is that of literature, as Proust suggests, then, indeed, 
one should be able to live happily ever after, for life will always be inferior to 
fiction. Yet, if the parables’ true meaning simply yields a tautology, such as the 
idea “that the inconceivable is inconceivable,” then this fictional world would 
seem too remote, too far from the need to battle every day with life’s intracta-
ble concerns and dramas. Thus the second speaker is right to tell the first that 
he has not progressed toward the truth and has merely added a level of fiction 
to the problem. The first speaker is obliged to concede that he has been beaten. 
Yet when the second speaker believes that he has won, the first qualifies the 
victory: he has won in reality and lost in parable, that is, he may have won a 
space for reality as distinct from fiction, but in doing so has relegated the world 
of fiction to an “other” world, one marked by lies and alienation. He will be safer 
in his everyday life but will have lost the possibility of consolation in the name 
of literature – hence his life, deprived of the imagination, will be all the poorer. 
Commenting on this exchange, Stanley Corngold wittily remarked that one can 
always add to the last comment: “I bet that is also a parable.”59 The movement 
of what Sartre would call a “whirligig” (tourniquet) in his book on Jean Genet 
or of what Barthes had called “bathmology” (the “science of degrees”) is virtu-
ally unstoppable. We can only quote from Kafka’s final diary entry: “Every word, 
twisted in the hands of the spirits – this twist of the hand is their characteristic 
gesture – becomes a spear turned against the speaker. Most especially a remark 
58 Franz Kafka, “On Parables,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in Parables and Paradoxes, ed. 
Nahum N. Glatzer, Schocken Books, New York 1961, 11.
59 Stanley Corngold, “Kafka’s Later Stories and Aphorisms,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Kafka, ed. Julian Preece, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, 95–110, 105. 
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like this. And so ad infinitum.”60 Or Aphorism 29: “The beast wrests the whip 
from the master and whips itself in order to become master, not knowing that this 
is only a fantasy produced by a new knot in the master’s whip-lash.”61 A similarly 
constitutive division is at work in Joyce and Kafka alike. It can be summed by a 
portmanteau word that Joyce coins in Finnegans Wake, where an “individual” is 
called an “individuone.”62 Division and wholeness are combined when the body 
turns into writing, as is the case of Shem the Penman. Shem unfolds all history as 
a universal but dividual chaosmos: “his own individual personal life unlivable, 
transaccidentated through the slow fires of consciousness into a dividual chaos, 
perilous, potent, common to allflesh, human only, mortal.”63 What, then, in this 
universalizing context, of Kafka’s own epiphanies? I thought I had found one, in a 
recent translation of his Abandoned Fragments: “The first epiphany I’ve had since 
the move to”64 Alas, no sooner had I checked the original than I had to admit that 
this was a translator’s invention; the German text is simply “Die einzige Erkennt-
nis, die ich der Uebersiedlung in”65 – “The only insight [realization] I had since the 
move to” (my translation). Well: did Kafka have his epiphany in the end? Proba-
bly not, at least not insofar as his Uebersiedlung remained infinite or indefinite. 
We will have to re-read once more these fragments, maxims, and aphorisms, and 
then, perhaps, we will decide. 
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Lorraine Markotic
Modernism’s Particulars, Oscillating 
Universals, and Josefine’s Singular Singing
1  The Universal in Modernity: Lost and Found
And it really was kind of the moon to shine on me, too, and out of modesty I was about to 
place myself under the arch of the tower bridge when it occurred to me that the moon, of 
course, shone on everything.
– Franz Kafka, “Description of a Struggle”1
Without a doubt, Kafka’s works have a universal feel about them. The very short 
stories include rewritings of ancient Greek myths; others are set in distant lands 
(distant from a German-speaking, European audience, at least) or in past times. 
References to concrete places are few: Laurenziberg, the hill in Prague, Riva in 
Italy, and the United States (although this is an imaginary country, where the 
Statue of Liberty carries a sword and Oklahoma is spelt “Oklahama”2). Neither are 
Kafka’s narratives temporally located; they never begin, for example, “In 1903” 
or “At the end of the previous century” or even “Many centuries ago.” In several 
stories, characters go unnamed and are referred to otherwise, such as by physical 
characteristics (“a small woman”), role (“doorkeeper,” “father of the family”), 
or profession (“village schoolmaster,” “starvation artist,” “trapeze artist”). In 
The Trial [Der Process] and The Castle [Das Schloss], each protagonist is desig-
nated only by the initial “K.” Animals speak in some stories, which gives them 
the quality of fables. 
In certain ways, then, Kafka’s texts seem to eschew particulars, despite the 
detailed and meticulous quality of the writing. Adorno, following Benjamin, con-
siders Kafka’s works to have the attribute of parables.3 But as Adorno also percep-
1 Franz Kafka, “Description of a Struggle” (“Beschreibung eines Kampfes”), trans. Tania and 
James Stern, in The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, Schocken Books, New York 1976, 
9–51, 19. 
2 As noted in A Franz Kafka Encyclopedia, following Max Brod and Alfred Wirkner, Kafka was 
likely influenced by Arthur Holitscher’s critical book Amerika heute und morgen: Reiseerlebnisse 
[America Today and Tomorrow: Travel Experiences] (1912), which contains such a spelling. See A 
Franz Kafka Encyclopedia, ed. Richard T. Gray, Greenwood Press, Westport 2005, 128.
3 Theodor W. Adorno, “Notes on Kafka,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge 1997, 243–271.
 Modernism’s Particulars, Oscillating Universals, and Josefine’s Singular Singing   239
tively notes in his Aesthetic Theory: “Artworks have no power over whether they 
endure; it is least of all guaranteed when the putatively time-bound is eliminated 
in favor of the timeless.” Kafka’s abjuring of the time-bound is not, therefore, 
what affords his works their enduring power; neither, I would argue, is it what 
gives them their universal quality. Adorno continues: “It was out of Cervantes’ 
ephemeral intention to parody the medieval romances that Don Quixote originat-
ed.”4 Analogously, I would postulate, it was out of Kafka’s (often parodic) rejoin-
der to modernity and modernism, and precisely to its concern with universals 
and particulars, that his enduring works originated. 
Kafka’s texts respond to prevalent aspects of modernity: increased urbani-
zation, isolation, and enlarged state bureaucracies. Both the novels and short 
stories are concerned with hierarchical institutions and with oppressive relations 
within institutions, including the family. Of course, Austro-Hungarian society 
had always been hierarchical, and the bourgeoisie family patriarchal, but, in ear-
ly-twentieth-century Europe, entrenched authoritarian structures and apparently 
natural spheres of control were fundamentally questioned. What had previously 
been regarded as universal forms of knowledge, social structures, and power 
relations came under scrutiny. The ways in which these apparently universal – 
yet actually quite contingent and particular – structures and relations neverthe-
less permeate our being and our bodies is something Kafka spiritedly attests to 
and explores. Many of his texts portray what Bourdieu will come to depict as the 
“habitus,” the system of non-conscious social dispositions we inculcate, includ-
ing at the bodily level. Others demonstrate what Foucault will refer to as “cap-
illary” power,5 the decentralized, defining, and intricate power that invisibly 
extends its tentacles into the thinking, discourses, and minutest practises of our 
lives. 
In “The Metamorphosis” (“Die Verwandlung”), even after awaking to find 
himself transformed into an insect, Gregor’s main concern is to go to work. An 
elderly father’s condemnatory words in “The Judgment” (“Das Urteil”) impel his 
son to commit suicide. The story “In the Penal Colony” (“In der Strafkolonie”) 
literalizes the idea that language is inscribed upon the body (subsequently psy-
choanalytically elaborated by Lacan) through an apparatus invented precisely 
for the purpose. The very short story “Fellowship” (“Gemeinschaft”) recounts 
five friends who live together simply because they had exited a house in succes-
4 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory [Ästhetische Theorie], ed. and trans. Robert Hullot-Ken-
tor, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2013, 38.
5 Michel Foucault, “Prison Talk,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 
1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon, Harvester Press, Brighton, 1980, 37–54, 39.
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sion and stood before it, and people noticed them having done so. Based on this 
simple, arbitrary event, they become a community and are displeased that a sixth 
person wishes to join them and intrude on their fellowship – even though this 
fellowship has no intrinsic basis. 
Many of Kafka’s works delineate forces of convoluted and labyrinthine origins 
and directions. In “The Refusal” (“Die Abweisung”), the narrator tells of a town so 
far from the frontier that to reach it one must cross desolate highlands and wide 
fertile plains. It is unlikely anyone from the town has ever been to the frontier, for 
“to imagine even part of the road makes one tired, and more than one part one 
just cannot imagine.”6 Even further than the frontier is the capital, but the town 
humbly submits to it. The town’s highest official is from the capital. He consist-
ently refuses petitions; these assured refusals are something the town seems to 
need, however, though they allegedly are not a formality. The narrator explains: 
“Time after time one goes there [to the official from the capital] full of expecta-
tion and in all seriousness and then one returns, if not exactly strengthened or 
happy, nevertheless not disappointed or tired”7 – despite one’s petition having 
been refused. Like many of Kafka’s texts, “The Refusal” depicts the tangled for-
mations and the remote and obscure origins of power – power that shapes bizarre 
practices and even more bizarre understandings. 
Kafka’s figures and narrators generally seem less like individuals than like 
illustrations and embodiments of forces with which all humans must contend, 
and which, insofar as we contend with them, become constitutive. Kafka’s charac-
ters hardly exhibit the defiant and critical hyper-consciousness of Dostoyevsky’s 
singular underground man. They are more likely to manifest the clichéd (and 
prejudicial) thinking of Schnitzler’s Lieutenant Gustl, of the eponymous novella 
that appeared at the opening of the twentieth century. Lieutenant Gustl was the 
first German-language literary work to present a character’s “stream of con-
sciousness.”8 Schnitzler’s restriction of his text to inner monologue nonetheless 
paints an expansive social scenery, each brushstroke adding detail to a recogniz-
able landscape: the Austrian world of the “k. und k.” (“kaiserlich und königlich,” 
or “imperial and royal”), the defining ethos of the Austrian-Hungarian empire. 
6 Franz Kafka, “The Refusal,” trans. Tania and James Stern, in The Complete Stories ed. Nahum 
N. Glatzer, Schocken Books, New York 1976, 263–267, 263.
7 Kafka, “The Refusal,” 267.
8 Approximately two decades later, the interior consciousness of individuals became key to 
the works of high modernism: Joyce’s Ulysses, Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway, Proust’s Remembrance of 
Things Past, and (later on) Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury. Individual subjectivities were por-
trayed as containing and revealing something universal – including the loss of universal truths 
or universally accepted social understandings. 
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Gustl’s particular, innermost thoughts disclose a broader, more universal (albeit 
hollow and crumbling) social world. Literary modernism seemed to respond to 
the erosion of traditional beliefs systems, the loss of putative social cohesion, 
and experiences of individual isolation by focussing on the perspective of one or 
more characters. 
The idea that the universal can be gleaned through the particular is some-
thing Kafka mocks in his brief story “The Top” (“Der Kreisel”), in which a philos-
opher believes that he can grasp the universal by grasping the particular: “For he 
believed that the understanding of any detail, that of a spinning top, for instance, 
was sufficient for the understanding of all things.”9 Part of the story’s humour, of 
course, is that when the philosopher grasps the top, it stops spinning, that is, it 
ceases to function as a top and becomes a “silly piece of wood.”10 More generally, 
the tale questions whether one can ever grasp a particular, or whether by “grasp-
ing” it one simultaneously isolates it and hence loses it.
Literary modernism tries not to isolate the individuals upon whom it focuses 
but rather to keep them moving, and in this way simultaneously to illustrate 
the social vista that emerges in and through such individuals. In response to a 
modern world that seems increasingly fragmented and fragmentary, a point of 
view that presents a particular perspective is considered a more illuminating and 
ultimately more truthful form of representation. Pirandello illustrates this in Six 
Characters in Search of an Author. The play’s clichéd characters are more uni-
versal, because they are eternal and unchanging, whereas the actors, who are 
individual and sometimes inconsistent, are more true. Literary modernism sug-
gests that particular perspectives and individual subjectivities provide both an 
apt sense of experience in modernity and a propitious way to access the modern 
world. In general terms, literary modernism can be said to approach or investi-
gate the universal through the particular. 
Kafka’s works, I would argue, go further. They not only seek to access the 
broader, more universal social world through individual thinking and experi-
ences; they also depict the ubiquitous nature of social and institutional power, its 
reach and its vagaries. Moreover, Kafka’s works suggest that we can never know 
how far and how deeply power and convention permeate us, or the ways and the 
extent to which they constitute and affect us. In “Unhappiness” (“Unglücklich-
sein”), a child-ghost blows into the protagonist’s room and converses with him. 
Soon, however, the protagonist has had enough of the fractious ghost and leaves 
the room. He then encounters a neighbor who does not believe in ghosts. The 
9 Franz Kafka, “The Top,” trans. Tania and James Stern, in The Complete Stories, 444.
10 Kafka, “The Top,” 444.
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protagonist says that he does not believe in ghosts either, but that he cannot see 
how his not believing will help him. The neighbor explains that if one does not 
believe in ghosts then one need not “be afraid any more if a ghost really turns 
up.”11 The protagonist responds that such a fear is only a secondary fear: “The 
real fear is fear of the cause of the apparition. And that fear sticks.”12 Kafka’s 
humorous, imaginative, and expressively rich story concludes with the protag-
onist becoming suddenly panicked that the neighbor will steal his ghost. The 
ghost could represent the protagonist’s loneliness or fear of loneliness – a fear 
that could be experienced by anyone. For if the ghost can be stolen by the neigh-
bor, the protagonist’s “fear of the cause of the apparition” may not be a particular 
fear, but one potentially shared by others. To the contrary, the ghost could repre-
sent the protagonist’s intimate personal anxieties (including sexual ones); thus, 
his becoming incensed at the possibility that his ghost might be taken from him 
could be understood (psychoanalytically) insofar as some neurotics cling to their 
neuroses. What is important, in my view, is that the conclusion remains ambigu-
ous: universal fears may have induced the presence of the conversing apparition; 
or, the protagonist may have highly particular, idiosyncratic fears that lead to his 
being visited by a talking ghost. 
Kafka’s works go further than modernist works that approach the universal 
through the particular, further than works that focus on the particular to disclose 
the disintegration of the universal, and even further than works that contrast the 
two. Many of Kafka’s texts question whether and to what extent one can even 
distinguish universal from particular. This is an explicit theme in the story “Con-
versation with a Supplicant” (“Gespräch mit dem Beter”), which also appears as 
part of “Description of a Struggle” (“Beschreibung eines Kampfes”). At one point 
in the story, the supplicant relates to the narrator his overhearing a conversation 
between his mother and another woman: 
“When as a child I opened my eyes after a brief afternoon nap, still not quite sure I was alive, 
I heard my mother on the balcony asking in a natural tone of voice: ‘What are you doing 
my dear? Isn’t it hot?’ From the garden a woman answered: ‘Me, I’m having my tea on the 
lawn.’ They spoke casually and not very distinctly, as though this woman had expected the 
question and my mother the answer.”13 
11 Franz Kafka, “Unhappiness,” in The Metamorphosis and Other Stories, trans. Joyce Crick, Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford 2009, 15–18, 18.
12 Kafka, “Unhappiness,” 18.
13 Franz Kafka, “Description of a Struggle,” trans. Tania and James Stern, in The Complete Sto-
ries, 9–51, 34.
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This particular yet completely ordinary conversation baffles the supplicant.14 At 
this point, fairly late in the story, the supplicant’s response may not seem espe-
cially surprising, for he has already indicated that he experiences many ordinary 
things as insubstantial. But the narrator, too, seems to consider the conversa-
tion “a most remarkable incident,” stating that he cannot “make head or tale 
of it”15 yet also noting that he does not believe the incident is true. By the end 
of the story, however, the narrator seems to have grown weary of the garrulous 
supplicant, and seeks to disengage himself from their conversation by retracting 
his earlier comments. He tells the supplicant that he does not, in fact, find the 
story of the conversation so remarkable, that he has heard many such stories and 
has even participated in some, and that it was “quite an ordinary occurrence.”16 
The supplicant appears unconvinced by the retraction, however, referring to the 
narrator’s earlier statement as a “confession.” Kafka’s “Conversation with a Sup-
plicant” implies that what seems universal and ordinary may actually be particu-
lar and peculiar – or at least that one should not easily presume to differentiate 
them. Kafka’s works go beyond the quest to illuminate the universal (including 
its disintegration) through the particular, suggesting that they may, in fact, be 
indistinguishable. 
2  Hegel, Kafka, Derrida 
And so long as you say “one” instead of “I,” there’s nothing in it and one can easily tell the 
story. 
– Kafka, “Wedding Preparations in the Country”17
I put on my gloves, sighed for no good reason, as one is inclined to do at night beside a river.
– Kafka, “Description of a Struggle”18
14 Vivian Liska analyzes the importance of this passage, including its staggering significance for 
Ilse Aichinger and probable influence on Aichinger’s story “Doubt about Balconies.” See Vivian 
Liska, When Kafka Says We: Uncommon Communities in German-Jewish Literature, Indiana Uni-
versity Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 2009, 193–199.
15 Kafka, “Description of a Struggle,” 34.
16 Kafka, “Description of a Struggle,” 36.
17 Franz Kafka, “Wedding Preparations in the Country” (“Hochzeitsvorbereitungen auf dem 
Lande”), trans. Ernst Kaiser and Eithne Wilkins, in The Complete Stories, 52–76, 53.
18 Kafka, “Description of a Struggle,” 14.
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Do you think you’re the only one who can shut doors? [spoken by the ghost]
– Kafka, “Unhappiness”19
The longer one hesitates before the door, the more estranged one becomes. 
– Kafka, “Home-Coming”20
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit explores the conceptual and historical oscillation 
between the universal and the particular. The opposition of subject and object, of 
universal and particular, is introduced into the broader socio-historical context 
in the chapter on “Spirit.” Unsurprisingly, Hegel opens his discussion of societal 
Spirit by turning to ancient Greece. Somewhat surprisingly, Hegel draws not upon 
the many and influential ancient Greek philosophical works, but upon a work of 
literature: Sophocles’s Antigone. Therein Hegel sees a concern not unfamiliar to 
modernism: the fragmentation of an apparently harmonious whole – although 
in this case, the schism involves only two parts: state and family, or man and 
woman, or human and divine. In the tragedy, Antigone comes into conflict with 
Creon, king of Thebes, by burying her brother Polynices. This brother had been a 
traitor to the polis, and consequently Creon decreed that his body not be buried; 
Antigone buries him nevertheless and is condemned by Creon. 
For Hegel, what is significant in the tragedy is that Antigone and Creon each 
believe her- or himself to be acting ethically and, more important, to be acting on 
the basis of a higher, universal law. Antigone states that, as a woman, her duty is 
to the family and hence to her brother; in short, according to immemorial custom, 
it is the duty of women to perform funeral rites and bury the dead. Creon believes 
it his duty as ruler to punish anyone who betrays the polis, even if this entails pro-
scribing burial rites; also, he believes it is his further duty to condemn anyone who 
disobeys his prohibition. On the face of it, Antigone represents something smaller 
and more particular (the family, the sphere of individual, biological relationships 
and attachments), whereas Creon represents something larger and more univer-
sal (the state, the realm of wider social commitment and political action). But the 
family, by performing religious rites for the dead, insists upon both the value of 
the deceased to the community and the meaning of the deceased’s existence and 
memory. In this way, the family ethically enacts a law – namely, divine law – that 
is higher than the law of the state. The family is particular in relation to the more 
universal law of the state; divine law, however, is ultimately higher and more uni-
19 Kafka, “Unhappiness,” 16.
20 Franz Kafka, “Home-Coming” (“Heimkehr”), trans. Tania and James Stern, in The Complete 
Stories, 445–446, 446.
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versal than state law. Moreover, there are many states, as Hegel notes; Thebes is 
only one, which renders Creon’s decree a particularity. To summarize: Antigone 
represents the particularity of the family and familial relations, but she also rep-
resents the universality of divine law; Creon represents the more universal state 
law, which is nevertheless the law of only a single state and therefore particular. 
In Hegel’s reading of Antigone, universal and particular can be said to oscillate.
The possibility that what seems universal may actually be particular and vice 
versa is wittily presented in Kafka’s short work “Poseidon.” Kafka depicts Posei-
don, God of the Sea, as a discontented administrator who spends his days in his 
palace at the bottom of the ocean, sitting at his desk and reviewing accounts. 
What most annoys Poseidon is the wholly inaccurate image people have of him 
supposedly “dashing over the waves with his trident.”21 In fact, Poseidon has 
barely seen the oceans; he is counting on a quiet moment just before the end of 
the world to “make a quick little tour.”22 Kafka amusingly portrays Poseidon as 
a universal administrator chained to his desk; whenever Poseidon is able to take 
leave and go somewhere, he visits his brother Jupiter (usually returning in a rage). 
On the one hand, Kafka’s Poseidon seems little different from a high-level bureau-
crat of today who has never travelled to the places where his international insti-
tution does business, or from a colonial administrator of Kafka’s time who has 
never seen the territories he controls. Poseidon also differs little from a sibling 
who continues to frequent a more powerful, more respected sibling even though 
the visits are enraging. Thus, Poseidon loses his singularity as God of the Sea 
and becomes the universal bureaucrat and family member. On the other hand, 
however, Kafka’s Poseidon also becomes more particular, more like an actual 
individual, insofar as he is overwhelmed with paperwork, occasionally visits his 
family (where there are constant tensions), and intends to travel at some future, 
unspecified date. The universal image of Poseidon riding the waves, trident in 
hand – the classical image familiar from sculpture, painting, and literature – is 
shown to be general and idealized. In the end, Kafka’s Poseidon, the busy admin-
istrator, is both more universal and more particular than the Greek God of the Sea.
Kafka’s “A Starvation Artist” (“Ein Hungerkünstler”) and “Eleven Sons” 
(“Elf Söhne”) can also each be interpreted in terms of ambiguity and oscillation 
between universal and particular. “A Starvation Artist” is a story of self-depri-
vation, which is itself a universal phenomenon found in countless cultures and 
21 Franz Kafka, “Poseidon,” in Kafka’s Selected Stories: New Translations, Backgrounds and Con-




throughout various historical periods; yet the starvation artist seems singular in 
his ability to fast for lethal lengths of time. He is so dedicated to his art that he 
objects when his manager forces him, after forty days, to cease fasting. At the 
story’s conclusion, when the starvation artist has finally managed to fast for well 
over forty days, he reveals the real reason he ceased eating: it was simply because 
“I could not find the food I liked.”23 The artist seems to be confessing that he is far 
less talented than he had suggested, that he is hardly the artist he had seemed, 
and that his unique fasting ability does not render him so singular. He is simply 
like everyone else who eats the food they like. But surely almost any food would 
taste good to someone starving; thus, the starvation artist’s inability to find a food 
he liked is truly singular. Preferring to eat what one likes is universal; not being 
able, even when starving, to settle for any other food is quite singular. 
Similarly, Kafka’s “Eleven Sons” depicts either a completely universal ten-
dency or a very particular, singular disposition. In this story, a parent, appar-
ently the father, describes his sons, one by one. Even when this father begins by 
lauding a particular son, he ends up finding fault with him. Each son is rendered 
as a particular, an individual (the descriptions are not repetitive), but each is ulti-
mately portrayed as flawed. This tendency to find fault in others, regardless of 
their positive qualities, may be universal, and the tendency of fathers to be criti-
cal of their sons may be fairly common. The story’s title, however, evokes the bib-
lical Jacob and his remaining eleven sons after his favourite, Joseph, has (as his 
other sons allege) been killed by a wild animal. Jacob may be inclined to find fault 
with his surviving sons, because he (consciously or unconsciously) faults them 
for not having protected Joseph, or possibly because he (consciously or uncon-
sciously) wonders if something about their story is amiss. “Eleven Sons” could be 
illustrating a universal phenomenon or evoking an exceedingly particular event.
This returns us to Antigone. As noted, both Antigone and Creon believe they 
are acting on the basis of higher universal laws. Each believes that her or his 
own personal inclination plays no role in decisions and subsequent actions. Yet 
Creon’s punishment of Antigone is excessively harsh. Although rulers are sup-
posed to condemn traitors and to expect that their decrees will be obeyed, Creon’s 
behaviour is despotic. And although Antigone claims to be acting only based on 
her familial obligation and duty as a woman, her sister, Ismene, acts differently 
(initially, at least), a juxtaposition that makes Antigone’s behaviour seem per-
emptory. Creon’s disproportionate retribution and Antigone’s intractable self-will 
each disclose particularities. They both claim to be acting according to higher, 
universal laws; nonetheless, each is more singular than either would admit. 
23 Franz Kafka, “A Starvation Artist,” in Kafka’s Selected Stories 86–94, 94.
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A Kafkan figure who similarly does not want to contend with his singularity in 
the face of universal laws is the “man from the country” in the parable “Before the 
Law” (“Vor dem Gesetz”). Therein, a man from the country comes seeking admit-
tance to the law. The door to the law stands open, but the doorkeeper refuses to 
grant the man permission to enter, although he concedes that permission may be 
granted at some future time. The doorkeeper further informs the man that if he 
passes through the open door, he will encounter another doorkeeper, and then 
another, each more powerful than the last. The man from the country spends 
years waiting; he pleads with the doorkeeper and even tries to bribe him, to no 
avail. Near the end of the parable, as the man is dying, he seems to see a radiance 
streaming from the doorway. He forms a final question for the doorkeeper, inquir-
ing how it is that, although everyone strives for the law, in all these years no one 
except him has ever asked for admittance. The doorkeeper responds that no one 
else could gain admittance, since this door was intended only for him (the man 
from the country), and that he (the doorkeeper) will now go and shut it. 
Derrida interprets Kafka’s parable as suggesting that although the law may 
be universal, everyone encounters it in her or his own particular way. Derrida 
succinctly states that the law is “always an idiom.”24 Because the man from the 
country is a particular individual, he has his own particular entrance into the law 
(although the law in itself is not something he can ever reach, as Derrida makes 
clear). In other words, when the singular collides with the universal, it does so 
only in a particular way. 
In “Before the Law,” as in Antigone, universal and particular can be said to 
fluctuate. The man from the country is patently singular, having his own door to 
the law and indeed his own doorkeeper. At the same time, this man is universal. 
He is all of us. We have all been “from the country” insofar as we have felt “inur-
bane” in the face of intimidating laws into which we sought entrance. Moreover, 
we have all, at some time (as children or as “from the country,” for example) felt 
that we did not understand the law, could not grasp it – as if the law could be 
grasped. But the law, like the philosopher’s top, is not something that can be 
grasped. It must be interpreted. Derrida states: “Perhaps man is the man from the 
country as long as he cannot read” or assumes that the law is to be read rather 
than “deciphered.”25 Derrida later notes that “the ‘man’ is both Man and anybody, 
the anonymous subject of the law”26: that is, insofar as the man chooses to wait 
24 Jacques Derrida, “Before the Law,” trans. Avital Ronell and Christine Roulston, in Acts of 
Literature, ed. Derek Attridge, Routledge, New York 1992, 181–220, 210.
25 Derrida, “Before the Law,” 197.
26 Derrida, “Before the Law,” 202.
248   Lorraine Markotic
before the law, before the open door as if it was not his own particular entrance, 
he is this anonymous subject, anybody, a universal. At the same time, however, 
the door is for him only, a particular individual. 
The doorkeeper may hardly seem particular. We do not know where he is 
from (is he also a man from the country, or is he from this or some other city?), 
and he is one doorkeeper among many. But when the doorkeeper mentions the 
other doorkeepers, comparing himself to them, he makes clear that each door-
keeper is distinct. Moreover, we learn details of the doorkeeper’s appearance and 
of his clothing – the man from the country, however, is never described. We even 
learn that doorkeeper has fleas in his fur collar. During the long years of waiting, 
the man from the country focuses more and more on this particular doorkeeper, 
until he “forgets the other doorkeepers.”27 Any representative of the law is bound 
to become more and more singular, the more time one spends with such a rep-
resentative. Kafka’s story is, I would argue, as much about the doorkeeper as 
about the man, and Derrida is correct to refer to “two protagonists.”28 Indeed, 
the parable begins solely with the doorkeeper: “Before the law stands a door-
keeper”29; it ends with the doorkeeper stating that he will go and shut the door. 
While the man from the country waited to enter the universal law, the doorkeeper 
attended to the particular man. Like the man from the country, the doorkeeper is 
both universal and particular. 
Derrida’s essay “Before the Law” (“Devant la loi”), about Kafka’s parable 
“Before the Law,” addresses (among many things) the question of the singularity 
of literature. According to Derrida, literature, insofar as it is literature, can be 
demarcated and defined (named) but also inherently challenges demarcations 
and definitions. Literature is not identical with itself. Literature, Derrida argues, 
unlike “a text of philosophy, science, or history, a text of knowledge or informa-
tion,”30 is willing to abandon a name to a state of “not knowing” – as in Kafka’s 
“Before the Law,” where one knows “neither who nor what is the law.”31 Yet what 
is most important, I would argue, what is unique to literature, what literature is 
most significantly willing not to know, is whether and to what extent it is about a 
universal or a particular. In literature, as Kafka’s text demonstrates, universal and 
particular cannot even be deciphered – only construed. 
27 Franz Kafka, “Before the Law,” in Kafka’s Selected Stories, 68–69, 68.
28 Derrida, “Before the Law,” 200.
29 Derrida, “Before the Law,” 200.
30 Derrida, “Before the Law,” 207.
31 Derrida, “Before the Law,” 207.
 Modernism’s Particulars, Oscillating Universals, and Josefine’s Singular Singing   249
Philosophy trades in universals. In Hegel (or Plato), philosophy attends to 
particulars, but they are eventually dialectically sublated into universals. Unlike 
the law, which, as Derrida notes, is not supposed to have a history or require a 
narrative, philosophy sometimes expresses itself in dialogues or stories – as in 
Plato or Existentialism or even Hegel’s Bildungsroman of the unfolding of Spirit. 
But philosophical narratives are expected to convey something universal, or 
something about the universal, or even the universal importance of the particu-
lar. Philosophy is not supposed to muddle the distinction. This is what literature 
sometimes does and, I would argue, this is what Kafka frequently undertakes. 
The last story Kafka wrote, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People” (“Josefine, 
die Sängerin oder Das Volk der Mäuse”), can be interpreted as studiously mud-
dling the distinctions between universal and particular. 
3  The Singularity of Josefine’s Universal Singing
Even the unusual must have its limits. 
– Kafka, “Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor”32 
In “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” Josefine squeaks or whistles in a 
way characteristic of the mouse people. She produces sounds universally made; 
and yet her squeaking or “singing” is captivating. The narrator (who seems to 
be male) begins his account by relating that anyone who has not heard Josefine 
“does not know the power of song” and that “there is no one who is not carried 
away by her singing.”33 This occurs despite the fact that the mouse people are 
not drawn to music; indeed, they favour “peace and quiet”34 – they prefer calm 
silence. And as Kafka notes in “The Silence of the Sirens” (“Das Schweigen der 
Sirenen”), silence can be a more terrible weapon than song. Since the mouse 
people are unmusical, it would seem that Josefine’s singing is so beautiful that it 
is difficult to resist, that what rings from her throat has never before been heard, 
is something only Josefine, “this one individual […] and no one else,”35 enables 
people to hear. This would be the most obvious explanation, states the narrator; 
but he repudiates it. Were this explanation indeed true, then in the face of Jose-
fine’s music one would have the feeling of encountering something extraordi-
32 Franz Kafka, “Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor” (“Blumfeld, ein älterer Junggeselle”), trans. 
Tania and James Stern, in The Complete Stories, 183–205, 189.
33 Franz Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” in Kafka’s Selected Stories, 94–108.
34 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 94.
35 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 95.
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nary, yet Josefine’s singing is, he alleges, quite ordinary. Indeed, her singing may 
not even be singing but rather mere squeaking – the squeaking in which almost 
everyone engages as they go about their daily work. The narrator denies that the 
sounds Josefine emits are exceptional; consequently, he seeks to account for the 
effects of her singing, for the crowds it draws, and for its singular achievement – 
despite its universal quality. 
He raises the possibility that Josefine’s talent lies in her performance, for she 
is above all a performer. In order to understand her art, perhaps one must not 
only hear her but also see her.36 One may remain critical at a distance, he states, 
but as soon as one is immediately close to her, one is forced to acknowledge that 
what Josefine does “really is not just squeaking.”37 But the narrator cannot point 
to anything singular about Josefine’s performances. She does not actually do any-
thing outstanding. What is striking is simply that she performs. She stands up 
and squeaks or sings, inducing her audience to be amazed by what they should 
not necessarily find amazing – since they all make the same sort of sounds them-
selves. 
Neither does Josefine’s personal charisma seem to hold the key. The narra-
tor often depicts her in quite unflattering terms. And although he should not be 
trusted, of course, and although Josefine has devoted followers, their devotion 
to her has clear limits. When she demands exemption from other duties, to com-
pensate for the demands of her art, no one supports her. No matter what tact 
she takes, her demand for release from work is flatly refused. Clearly, Josefine’s 
influence is limited.
Finally, the narrator adduces that Josefine brings people together and lets 
them dream, temporarily free themselves “from the bonds of daily life.”38 Her 
concerts permit people to suspend their worries and collect themselves before 
facing the unending struggles of their lives. The narrator explains that regard-
less of what one thinks of Josefine’s “nothing of a voice,” of her “nothing of an 
achievement,”39 her singing seeps through the silence and envelops her audi-
ence. Through Josefine, the mouse people experience a feeling of community. Her 
singing is a distraction that encourages them to relax and forget themselves, and 
to do so together. What the narrator seems to be suggesting is that Josefine is an 
empty signifier, a placeholder – one that fulfills a crucial function. The power of 
36 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 96.
37 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 96.
38 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 103.
39 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 100.
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Josefine’s singing would seem to lie in its singular effects, which have nothing to 
do with her actual, universal squeaking. 
But if Josefine is only a placeholder, then someone or something would take 
her place when she disappears. This is a point I would like to stress. In “A Star-
vation Artist,” the public’s interest in starvation artists declines, and the artist is 
eventually replaced by a panther. Josefine, however, is not replaced. She simply 
disappears and, according to the narrator, will soon be forgotten. If Josefine’s 
squeaking or singing is compelling solely because of the role it fills, however, 
then someone or something else would subsequently fill this role. If her singing 
were completely ordinary, significant only because of its effect, then surely some-
thing else would emerge to produce the same or a similar effect. This does not 
occur, however, which suggests that there is, indeed, something singular in Jose-
fine’s singing. 
As noted, Josefine fights to be excused from work, owing to her singing and 
the effort it requires, but this concession is consistently denied her. As a last 
resort, she disappears and goes into hiding. The narrator explains that such a 
strategy cannot work, for the people, “despite appearances to the contrary, can 
only bestow gifts and never receive them, not even from Josefine.”40 This remark 
is exceedingly important. It implies that Josefine may have a gift to offer, even 
if nobody is willing to receive it. And while the German word “Geschenk” does 
not have the twofold meaning of the English word “gift,” which can mean both 
“present” and “talent,” the German word for talent, “Gabe,” contains the idea 
of something being given. Thus, while the narrator denies that there is anything 
extraordinary in Josefine’s singing, he simultaneously suggests that she does 
indeed have a gift, a particular talent, to give. 
Before I further develop this idea of Josefine’s gift, I would like briefly to turn 
to Derrida’s discussion of the gift at the beginning of Given Time: I. Counterfeit 
Money [Donner le temps 1. La fausse monnaie]. Derrida begins this book by insist-
ing upon the “impossibility” of the gift. He argues that a gift, in order to remain 
a gift, must avoid economic exchange. The very concept of the gift, he insists, 
must “defy reciprocity or symmetry.”41 The gift must not circulate, must not be 
exchanged, must remain “aneconomic.” This becomes apparent, Derrida points 
out, if the receiver immediately reciprocates with something similar; in such a 
case, there can hardly be said to have been a gift. 
40 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 107.
41 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago and London 1992.
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It is also difficult to think of there having been a gift if the receiver feels that he 
or she has thereby contracted a debt, if the receiver consequently feels somehow 
obligated to the giver. Hence, one could say that it is necessary that the receiver 
“not recognize the gift as gift.”42 When the receiver recognizes the gift, acknowl-
edges it as a gift, he or she “gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a 
symbolic equivalent.”43 In other words, Derrida argues, merely by recognizing the 
gift as a gift, as being freely given, one gives back to the giver a kind of symbolic 
currency, which, in a sense, annuls the gift. Moreover, it is not only the receiver 
but also the giver who must not recognize the gift. Derrida notes that a giver who 
merely intends to give a gift begins “to pay himself with a symbolic recognition, to 
praise himself, to approve of himself, to gratify himself, to congratulate himself, 
to give back to himself symbolically the value of what he thinks he has given or 
what he is preparing to give.”44 Even an anonymous gift, therefore, would not 
escape the economic relationship insofar as the giver would feel affirmed through 
the act of giving. This is the “impossibility or the double bind of the gift.”45 Both 
receiver and giver must forget the gift in an absolute, instantaneous forgetting.46 
The concluding words of “Josefine, the Singer” relate that Josefine will soon 
be forgotten. Josefine’s singing, if it is indeed singing and not mere squeaking, if 
it is indeed a talent, if it is indeed a gift to the people, will not be absolutely and 
instantaneously forgotten – as is required of Derrida’s gift – rather, it will only 
soon be forgotten. But Kafka’s story, I would argue, nevertheless, suggests a con-
ception of the gift far more radical than that contained in Derrida’s aneconomic, 
impossible gift. For even if Derrida’s givers and receivers must experience a sort of 
absolute, instantaneous amnesia, Derrida retains a distinction between giver and 
receiver. Such a distinction is unsettled in “Josefine, the Singer.” Indeed, Kafka’s 
story suggests that perhaps the gift truly retains its status as gift only when one 
cannot be certain who is giving and who is receiving. 
The narrator opens his account by stating that Josefine has a love for music, 
a love she alone knows how to convey – convey to a people who are fundamen-
tally unmusical. Without Josefine, explains the narrator, music will vanish. This 
suggests both that Josefine is singular in her ability to communicate her love of 
music, and that she is not actually able to communicate it, since what she com-
42 Derrida, Given Time, 13.
43 Derrida, Given Time, 13.
44 Derrida, Given Time, 14.
45 Derrida, Given Time, 16.
46 Derrida insists that this forgetting is more extreme than the psychoanalytic notion of repres-
sion, for displacing an event into the unconscious is, of course, a way of preserving the event. 
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municates will not last. The gift she has to give, even if it is only her love for 
music and not her actual singing, is something that she will take with her when 
she leaves. It is not clear that Josefine has given the people a gift. It may in fact 
be the case that it is the people, in allowing Josefine’s love of music to infect 
them (though not permanently) who have given a gift to Josefine. This is what 
the narrator maintains. He also relates that the people assume a protective atti-
tude towards Josefine; they care for her “the way a father looks after a child who 
stretches out her little hand.”47 This image clearly suggests that it is Josefine who 
seeks something from the people. She is their ward, the one who needs their pro-
tection, although of course nobody “dares to speak of such things to Josefine”; 
and yet she believes that she is the one doing the protecting, and even presumes 
that her singing goes so far as to rescue the people “from grim political or eco-
nomic situations” and that “if it does not banish misfortune” it at least gives 
the people “the strength to endure it.”48 Whenever the people receive bad news, 
Josefine “rises up and cranes her neck and strives to oversee her flock like the 
shepherd before the storm.”49 The narrator, unsurprisingly, denies that Josefine is 
anything like a shepherd with a flock; he rejects the idea that she saves the people 
or even gives them strength. Josefine believes that she protects and fortifies the 
people; the narrator avers that it is the people who protect and humour her. Who 
is protector and who is protectee is uncertain. Who is giving and who is receiving 
remains unresolved. 
Even the fact that Josefine is denied any exemption from work could be 
regarded either as evidence of the ordinariness, the universality, of her squeak-
ing, or as evidence of the extraordinariness, the singularity, of her singing. The 
narrator claims that the dismissal of Josefine’s demand plainly demonstrates 
that the people realize she is not doing anything special. For the people are fully 
aware that Josefine would not cease to work if her demand to be excused from 
it were granted; Josefine is no shirker. What Josefine “strives for is simply the 
public acknowledgement of her art, an acknowledgement that is unambiguous, 
that will last for all time, rising far above everything known to this day.”50 That 
such acknowledgement is steadfastly and universally refused is regarded by the 
narrator as definitive proof that Josefine’s singing is not singular. But if Josefine’s 
concerts are really quite ordinary, and if, as the narrator alleges, she has become 
known as a singer merely because of supporters who elevate her and her squeak-
47 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 99.
48 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 99.
49 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 99.
50 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 104.
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ing above everyone else, then these supporters would likely seek corroboration 
for their support for Josefine and would back her demand for exemption precisely 
as a “public acknowledgement.” Hence, the fact that the people as a whole cat-
egorically refuse Josefine any exemptions could be taken as evidence that her 
status and fame is the result not of brazen, uncritical fans but of some actual 
talent. In other words, the blanket refusal to grant Josefine any exemption can be 
interpreted either as evidence for her having gift or as evidence against it. 
At one point, the narrator argues that the very fact that people listen to Jose-
fine should be understood to demonstrate that she is not really worth listening 
to. It is often the case, he explains, that when the people assemble and Jose-
fine squeaks or sings, the audience is actually preoccupied with more serious 
matters – matters so serious, he says, that if ever a “true virtuoso of song” were 
present at such a moment he or she would not be tolerated and the people would 
“unanimously reject the absurdity of such a performance.”51 In other words, the 
narrator is asserting that “the very listening to [Josefine] is an argument against 
her song.”52 Gradually however, his remorseless and inexorable insistence that 
Josefine does nothing beyond the ordinary leads one to wonder whether the gen-
tleman doth protest too much. At the story’s conclusion, the reader still does not 
know whether Josefine is taking or receiving. It is impossible to untangle her sin-
gular singing from universal squeaking.
Secondary sources have generally considered Josefine to be representative 
of various forms of artists and the story to be concerned with the role of artists.53 
Yet it should be remembered that squeaking is the universal language of the 
mouse people, to such an extent that not only do many squeak their entire lives 
without noticing, but that squeaking is “a typical manifestation of life.”54 Thus, 
this squeaking could represent the speaking of humans, and Josefine someone 
who gives speeches. Humans speak as they go about their lives, but few imagine 
that if they were to stand and speak that others would bother to listen. Doubt-
lessly, Kafka’s story can be interpreted as portraying artists who may or may not 
be underappreciated in their society; yet it can also be interpreted in light of 
human speechmaking. Clearly, Josefine is not a professional politician, not least 
as she is never exempted from other work because of her singing/squeaking. The 
narrator relates that people have lost their lives at Josefine’s gatherings, and that 
51 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 100.
52 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 101.
53 For a fascinating discussion of the story in relation to the social, cultural and ideological im-
portance of music, see Nicola Gess’s “The Politics of Listening,” Kafka’s Selected Stories, 275–288.
54 Kafka, “Josefine, the Singer or the Mouse People,” 95.
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her squeaking may even be what attracts the enemy. Perhaps she is an agitator. 
Given the pervasiveness of agitators during Kafka’s lifetime, it is interesting that 
the story does not clarify whether Josefine is giving something to her audience or 
receiving something from it. 
But Josefine does not have to represent a firebrand. She may simply be 
someone who gives “talks” and whose talking, in the narrator’s view, differs little 
from what everyone else does. She may also be a writer who gives readings. The 
narrator begins his account by stating that it seems to him that Josefine “barely 
exceeds the bounds of ordinary squeaking.”55 In his view, she is someone who 
has nothing new to say, nothing out of the ordinary to convey. Perhaps Josefine 
utters platitudes or clichés. Of course, we should not necessary trust the narra-
tor. Indeed, Josefine may be expressing a new form of thinking or a new form 
of writing, such as literary modernism, that the narrator considers ordinary and 
unremarkable. 
Philosophy frequently goes astray insofar as it generalizes from socio-his-
torical particulars as if they were universals, naively presuming that these (soci-
ological) truths are universal, philosophical ones. Literary works, in contrast, 
frequently depict eccentric, idiosyncratic, or unusual particulars; even the most 
bizarre characters or situations can be seen to disclose a universal – including 
its disintegration or illusory status. Where Kafka’s works go further is in their 
insistence that we cannot necessarily disengage universal and particular, cannot 
know how, or how much, universal forces constitute us and the particulars of 
our world. Kafka’s works insist that we cannot establish the universals for which 
philosophy strives and which literature must construe; neither can we isolate its 
constitutive and constituent particulars. In this way, above all, Kafka’s writings 
are philosophical; in this way they evince their universal quality. 
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Galili Shahar
The Alarm Clock: The Times of Gregor Samsa
1  The Alarms of Time, the Universal
Franz Kafka’s story “The Metamorphosis” (“Die Verwandlung”) is measured in 
time. We hear the alarm clock ticking on the chest in Gregor Samsa’s room, the 
clock that measures the times of the story  – mechanical time, the time of the 
family, the time of labor, the time of studies, the musical time, the time of the 
Messiah. All these definitions of time – its transformations and derivatives, even 
timeness itself, perhaps, die Zeitlichkeit, the being of time, its ecstasies, the awak-
ening of time itself – are written, imprinted, upon Gregor Samsa’s body. 
It is both the fear of time and the anxieties of not-being-in-time into which 
Gregor Samsa awakes one morning out of “uneasy dreams.” “One morning” he 
found himself transformed in his bed into an insect.1 On the same morning, this 
“one morning,” in this time, which is “any time,” universal time, the time which 
repeats itself, the time-structure of repetition, the time of the alarm clock, Samsa 
awakes. And yet it is morning time, an early hour, the beginning of the day  – 
beginning itself, one could argue – an opening, an hour of creation (a terrible 
creation) from which he is reborn, thrown into the world in a new, horrifying 
body – the body of a creature. 
This is the Zeitraum, the time-space of Gregor Samsa; it is the “empty, homo-
geneous” realm of time, the time of everyday life, being marked by the clock. 
The clock is a device, an apparatus of universal time. The universal, that which 
belongs to all, is being represented (gezeigt) in the abstraction, in the repetition, 
in the sameness of the hour – the time segment of the clock. The representation 
and the conception (the holding-together) of the universal thus depends on the 
technical conditions of time, the homogeneity of its segments, their sameness 
and global validity, being repeated everywhere. Thinking on/of the universal, we 
argue, should be thus associated with the technical measurement of time, with 
the “general” work of clock, but also with its alarms – with its calls and raptures.
In this realm of universal time, “one morning,” Samsa is reborn: he reap-
pears as a wound – the wound of time. For his reappearance, his transformation 
into an insect, is the Ereignis, that is, an event, a singular moment of revelation, 
1 Franz Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, ed. 
Nahum N. Glatzer, Schocken Books, New York 1983, 89–139, 89.
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an appearance before our eyes. More should be said about the grammar of this 
event, the awaking before our eyes of something unusual, foreign, singular in the 
midst of universal time (the time of the alarm clock). The empty space of time, the 
everyday, signified in this “one morning,” is also the moment in which an event 
transpires.
2  The Work, the Apparatus
Yet the distortions and irregularities of this body  – Gregor Samsa, a human, a 
creature – call for discussion in terms of his/its spaces – the space of family and 
the minor space of the bourgeois. Here is Samsa’s room: four walls, a closed door, 
the enclosure of his being. One should discuss the boundaries and the margins 
of this home, the place where Samsa lives, is wounded, and dies. One should 
explore Samsa’s places, the spaces of climbing and of crawling, the thresholds of 
his realm of being, the paths of withdrawal and the paths of escape.2 For Samsa 
dies at-home (heimlich) in its deep, uncanny (un-heimlich) meaning. 
This discussion, however, is about time, and the time of this story is meas-
ured by the ticking alarm clock in Samsa’s room. The clock signifies mechan-
ical time – the time of the machine that directs and governs the human being 
and marks his schedule, the “timetable”  – the time of work. The clock is one 
of these machines – the apparatuses, instruments, devices, and tools that Kafka 
studied during his years as a clerk at the Workmen’s Accident Insurance Insti-
tute in Prague. In the office and during his official travels to visit factories, work-
shops, and mines, Kafka learned the secret of the machine, the dialectic of pro-
duction and destruction, the legal and social complexities of the insurance laws, 
and how all these influenced the damaged being of the worker. Kafka, in other 
words, stood before the gates of the law. As a scholar and inspector he explored 
the intricacies of legal writing and the labyrinths of the law. He met cripples and 
wounded workers, victims of work accidents, and refugees of the Great War. 
Without Kafka’s experience in these areas of labor and the law, and without his 
experience in interpreting the writings of the law, one cannot imagine the com-
plexity of his literary creation. Kafka’s official writings about machines, acci-
dents, safety measures, and inspection methods for factories should be read as 
additional prologue to his literature. His fictional work is imprinted with strong 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature [Kafka: Pour une littérature 
mineure], trans. Dana Polan, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1986, 16–17. 
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awareness of the destructive power of machines3; likewise, it offers various reflec-
tions on the distortions that the human condition suffers in the technical age – 
the story “In the Penal Colony” (“In der Strafkolonie”) being perhaps the best 
example. Kafka’s literature documents the damage caused in a world governed by 
technological visions and applications. “This remarkable piece of apparatus” of 
the Penal Colony,4 like the train, the writing machine, and the telegraph, creates 
strange and destructive movements, environments of alienation, and meaning-
less zones of life and death. 
In his early story “The Metamorphosis,” however, Kafka contends with a 
minor apparatus, a small mechanical device – a cogwheel, a coil, and a bell – the 
alarm clock that measures, denotes, and announces the hour. 
3  The Creature, the Language  
(Under the Clock’s Sign)
The clock of Kafka’s story is a modern device. Various clocks had been produced 
and used in antiquity, and as early as the fourteenth century time was being 
measured by mechanical devices. But in the nineteenth century, the century of 
industry, the century of the train and the steam engine, clocks assumed control 
over the time of being.5 Clocks measured the times of work and travel. The time 
cycles of nature, the seasons, and the phases of the sun retreated and withdrew 
forever before the new governor. The clock came to govern all realms of being: the 
town squares, the factories, the train stations, the city halls, the livings rooms, the 
studios, and the bedrooms. The clock delineates a new measure, a new rhythm, 
homogeneous and monotonic for the order of all things. It defines a new standard 
3 Wolf Kittler, “Schreibmaschinen, Sprechmaschinen. Effekte technischer Medien im Werk 
Franz Kafkas” (“Writing Maching, Speaking Machines. Effects of Technical Media in the Works 
of Franz Kafka”), in Franz Kafka: Schriftverkehr [Franz Kafka: Correspondence], eds. Wolf Kittler 
and Gerhard Neumann, Rombach Verlag, Freiburg 1990, 75–163.
4 Franz Kafka, “In the Penal Colony,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, 
140–167, 140.
5 Ulla Merle, “Tempo! Tempo! Die Industrialisierung der Zeit im 19.  Jahrhundert” [Tempo! 
Tempo! The Industrialization of Time in the 19th Century”), in Uhrzeiten: die Geschichte der Uhr 
und ihres Gebrauches [The Hours of the Day: The History of the Clock and Its Use], eds. Igor A. 
Jenzen and Reinhard Glasemann, Historisches Museum Frankfurt, Frankfurt/M. 1989, 161–217. 
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regulated movement, one of creation and production, and enables a new collec-
tive, universal consciousness of existence.6 
The clock of the nineteenth century was the main carrier of production and 
travel, trade, and consumption. The hour itself became more economic than it 
had been previously: clocks measured shorter and more precise segments of time. 
Time itself, now measured in minutes and seconds, was delineated more finely 
and accurately than ever. One need not accept the thesis of capitalistic time struc-
ture (“time is money”)7 in order to agree that since the nineteenth century clocks 
have signified the economics of being. Life is now measured, planned, designed, 
and produced by the universal time of the clock. Like the train, the steam engine, 
and the telegraph, clocks reconstruct time and space into new dimensions. Being 
itself turns into a monotonic rhythm. 
This drama – the drama of techne, the drama of mechanical time, and the 
rise of new dimensions of being-in-time, a new order of things measured by the 
clock – is imprinted in the world of Gregor Samsa. He lies in his bed, awoken from 
uneasy dreams, struggling with the weight of his new body and feeling a pain 
he had never previously experienced. He feels sad, and the view of raindrops 
beating on the window “makes him quite melancholy.”8 Samsa complains now 
about his Beruf – his occupation, his call (more should be said about this German 
word) of being ein Reisender, a commercial traveler, an agent who suffers the 
trials and tribulations of constant travel, including worrying about train connec-
tions, eating bad meals, and entering into casual contact with other travelers who 
never become intimate friends. Samsa is a subject of these time machines that 
measure and define his being. For the train itself belongs to this world, the world 
of mechanical time. These are the great clocks hanging above the entrance halls 
of railway stations as if they were portraits of the new sovereign. In the age of the 
train, movement itself is faster yet also more precise and detailed. The universal 
time of the clock is well differentiated: the day is segregated, set apart into hours 
and minutes. Time itself, however, is never different. What is being measured is 
the same. The clock signifies the sameness of all things. 
This time-space, the universal, mechanical time of travel and labor, is where 
Gregor Samsa is living. The alarm clock ticking in his bedroom thus hints at 
6 Gerhard Dohrn-van Rossum, History of the Hour: Clocks and Modern Temporal Orders [Die 
Geschichte der Stunde. Uhren und moderne Zeitordnungen], trans. Thomas Dunlap, The Universi-
ty of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1996, 1–16.
7 Noam Yuran, What Money Wants: An Economy of Desire, Stanford University Press, Stanford 
2014. 
8 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 89.
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the time schedule of industry and trade, and represents the rational, abstract, 
global dimension of time. The rhythm of these empty hours is imprinted upon 
his body – the body of an agent, a traveler, a worker, an employee, who every 
morning, this “one morning” too, is awoken and thrown into a world of rapid 
movements, mechanical gestures, and superficial human contacts. This is the 
world of the train. Like the clock that divides time into equal metered segments, 
the train breaks and tears the space, the landscapes, into spatial fragments. Like 
the alarm clock that jolts the world and hurls people from their homes – hurry! 
hurry! – into the streets and to their offices, to endless movements, so too does 
the train impose rapid movement on its subjects, the travelers.
Kafka notes the effects of the movement of the train on our observation of the 
world, the way things appear to us (das Ereignis, or “the event”). He writes in his 
diary:
Goethe’s observations on his travels different from today’s because made from a mail-coach, 
and with the slow changes of the region, develop more simply and can be followed much 
more easily even by one who does not know those parts of the country. A calm, so-to-speak 
pastoral form of thinking sets in. Since the country offers itself unscathed in its indigenous 
character to the passengers in a wagon, and since highways too divide the country much 
more naturally than the railway lines to which they perhaps stand in the same relationship 
as do rivers to canals, so too the observer need do no violence to the landscape and he can 
see systematically without great effort.9 
In the train era (the technical era) the landscape, the country, and space itself 
are viewed differently than in Goethe’s time, when the mail coach was the main 
mode of travel. The new movement no longer enables a “pastoral form of think-
ing”; rather, the world is pictured and written as a violent mode of experience, 
ein Erlebnis, or even, one could argue, a shock. The famous traumatic neurosis, as 
we know, is partly related to train travel around the turn of the twentieth century. 
Should one attribute Gregor Samsa’s distortions to these travels?
But we are still in Samsa’s room, and he is still lying in bed. He has to wake 
up, for his train is leaving at five o’clock in the morning, and – listen! – the alarm 
clock is ticking:
He looked at the alarm clock ticking on the chest. Heavenly father! He thought. It was half-
past six o’clock and the hands were quietly moving on, it was even past the half-hour, it was 
getting on toward a quarter to seven. Had the alarm clock not gone off? From the bed one 
9 Franz Kafka, diary entry of 29 September 1911, trans. Joseph Kresh, in Diaries 1910–1923 [Tage-
bucher 1910–1923], ed. Max Brod, Schocken Books, New York 1976, 56.
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could see that it had been properly set for four o’clock; of course it must have gone off. Yes, 
but was it possible to sleep quietly through that ear-splitting noise?10 
The invention of the mechanical alarm clock has various claimants, some reach-
ing to the seventeenth century. More famous, however, is the one attributed to 
Levi Hutchins, a watchmaker who lived in the eighteenth century in the town of 
Concorde, New Hampshire. It is said that his clock was set to ring at one defined 
hour – four o’clock in the morning.11 And in Kafka’s story? From his bed Gregor 
Samsa looks at the clock ticking, sees that the alarm was indeed set for four 
o’clock, and thinks to himself that the clock must have gone off properly. The 
alarm clock on Samsa’s chest indicates the time of Hutchins’s clock – the time of 
invention. However, Samsa did not awaken, although the clock must have gone 
off at four o’clock, and its noise is supposed to be ear-splitting. Yet Samsa is still in 
bed and it is already half-past six – indeed, it is moving toward a quarter to seven! 
Gregor Samsa is late for work, his train having left nearly two hours ago.
The delay, the clock failures, and Gregor Samsa’s time inabilities should also 
be understood in ironic terms as a gesture of resistance. Samsa refuses to wake 
up, yet he employs the most childish means to stay in bed for another hour and 
a half. 
But “the alarm clock had just struck quarter to seven,” and with this “Schlag,” 
or hit, at that moment, at that hour, a cautious tap is heard on the door behind 
the head of his bed: “Gregor, es ist dreiviertel sieben [Gregor, it’s quarter to sev-
en].”12 It is the gentle voice of his mother calling Gregor from behind the door. 
Gregor cannot answer, however, except in his new voice, a horrible twittering – 
the voice of a poor animal. This is the vocal drama taking place in Samsa’s room, 
the mechanical sound of the alarm clock, the ticking of its hands, the noise of 
the bell. Against this we hear the gentle voice of his mother from behind the 
door, and, in-between, the voice of Gregor himself, a creaturely voice – the tweet-
ing, the cheeping. In the realm of the time-machine, in its shadows, the human 
10 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 90.
11 There is no reference to the invention of the alarm clock in Hutchins’s autobiography, which 
includes an account of his clock-making business during his lifetime. A hint, however, is ob-
tained from his son in the addendum of the book: “One of my father’s maxims was, ‘Early to bed 
and early to rise.’ Long before sunrise, in summer, he was accustomed to be at work in one of his 
fields; few men could keep up with him in using the hoe, and his work was not only done quickly 
but well done. In winter he arose at four o’clock.” See Levi Hutchins, The Autobiography of Levi 
Hutchins. With a Preface, Notes and Addenda by his Youngest Son (Private Edition), The Riverside 
Press, Cambridge 1865, 168.
12 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 91.
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speaks its creaturely condition – the being of an animal. The clock in Samsa’s 
room thus not only signifies the mechanization of human existence and the cre-
ation of the automaton, but also announces the re-turn-of-the-body. This body, 
creaturely, repulsive, and wounded, hints at certain qualities of resistance. The 
voices, the noises of Samsa, which remain unnoticed, can be heard as gestures of 
revolt performed on the stage of a family drama. 
But there are other, different voices written, (un-)heard, in Kafka’s story: the 
cry of the mother when she experiences her son’s new appearance, the voice of 
Gregor’s sister, the calls of the chief clerk, and the voices of his father, whose 
cries and noises no longer sound like the voice of a single father. It is perhaps 
the voice of being-a-father, the sound of the patriarchal order itself, that is being 
heard – and crushed – in Kafka’s story. And, after the father pushes his son back 
to his room with a strong hit of a stick, as he, Gregor, is wounded and bleeding 
freely, and the door is slammed behind him – the rest, we hear, is silence.13 In 
Kafka’s “Metamorphosis,” one should hear these voices, the voices of the crea-
turely body, as being interwoven with the sound of the alarm clock. These are the 
sounds that exist before the words – and the sounds that return after the silence. 
Furthermore: Is not the remnant of the Satyr, the mythical body of the Greek 
tragedy, half-goat, half-man, whose dance and music signify the birth of tragedy, 
now being reflected in the physicality of the literary creature in Kafka’s story? The 
return of the creature in Kafka’s story signifies a different, archaic time, a slow 
time that cannot be measured by clocks. Gregor Samsa, however, no longer fills 
the power and the potential of the creature, namely, the mode of resistance. In 
his story we find only the leftovers of a strong being, the miserable remnants of a 
creature. We recall: Samsa is not a wild animal but an insect. 
More should be said about the voices in Kafka’s story that echo the vocal 
images of the Jewish body, the unmusical body, the body of the author himself.14 
The unmusical, this figure of thought, signifies in Kafka’s world the dissonances 
and disharmonies of existence, the disorders of desire. And yet the unmusical 
also recalls a certain sensibility, a way of listening, an attention to the distor-
tion of being. Samsa’s unmusical voices can thus be compared with those of the 
singer Josefine, from Kafka’s final story, “Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk” 
(“Josefine, die Sängerin oder Das Volk der Mäuse”), who does not sing but whis-
tles, and her folk melody is that of the mouse people. Here too a trace can be 
found of the language of the mouse, the Mauscheln language, the pejorative name 
13 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 104–105.
14 Sander Gilmann, “Franz Kafka’s Musical Diet,” in Journal of Modern Jewish Studies 4 (2005): 
295–296. 
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for the Jewish dialect in Germany, which was considered an irregular, distorted 
body-language. Kafka’s remark, in a letter to Max Brod15 about Mauscheln is well-
known: he tells Brod first about his disease, tuberculosis, which he names the 
Lungenwunde, the lung-wound, thereby relating the sense of disgust he feels in its 
treatments; he then turns Karl Kraus’s work, which he compares with Mauscheln, 
a Jewish language built on minor gestures, noises and cries. But it is not Kraus 
alone but rather German-Jewish literature itself that Kafka imagines as a work 
of Mauscheln – an improper creaturely writing. The Jewish writer is identified in 
Kafka’s letter with a poor creature hung between heaven and earth. His back legs 
are stuck in the Judaism of his fathers, while his front legs search, in vain, for new 
ground. Out of this impossible situation Jewish writing becomes possible, albeit 
desperate. 
Is this writing, the writing of Mauscheln, the creaturely writing of a German 
Jew, imprinted in Gregor Samsa? This is a possible reading, of course.16 This time, 
however, we follow a different thread of interpretation, a different time-line, the 
time of the alarm clock. On this path I will consider the use of the clock as a met-
ronome that measures the story’s rhythm and defines its odd musicality. What 
is perhaps measured according to this rhythm, the beat, the ticking of the alarm 
clock, is the violin playing of Gregor’s sister that is performed in the living room. 
Only Gregor likes his sister’s playing, as if it were “the unknown nourishment 
he craved.” And so he wonders, “is he an animal, that music has such an effect 
upon him?”17 Is musical sensibility perhaps the last sign of humanity that still 
lives in his body, or is it in fact the real signature of a creaturely being – painful 
and doomed? We recall that it is the power of music, his sister’s performance, that 
draws him from his room to his last spurt of crawling before he is forced to return 
to his chamber. There, wounded and hungry, he dies, as the tower clock strikes 
three in the morning.18 
Again it is the clock that measures and re-calls the fate of Gregor Samsa. The 
tower clock that signifies the universal (public) time19 now echoes the last breath 
of Kafka’s creature. Samsa, who was reborn in the time realm of the alarm clock, 
dies under the sign of the tower clock, three hours after midnight. Just as he came 
15 Franz Kafka, Briefe 1902–1924 [Letters 1902–1924], Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frank-
furt/M. 1995, 335.
16 Walter H. Sokel, “Kafka as a Jew,” in New Literary History 30.4 (1999): 837–853.
17 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 130.
18 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 135.
19 The tower clocks that were placed in the town squares in Europe from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century replaced the church bells as signifiers of public time. See Merle, “Tempo! 
Tempo! Die Industrialisierung der Zeit im 19. Jahrhundert,” 182–198.
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into the world “one morning” (eines Morgens), so does he leave it at another 
morning hour. But at this “one morning,” the hour of his birth and death, some-
thing principle yet singular is revealed, namely, the event of being. It is morning 
time, daybreak time, the time between dark and light, night and day, when Samsa 
appears and disappears. And this is also the time of the story itself that is written 
in-between the times, in the difference. This is the time paradox of Kafka’s story: 
in-between the empty, homogeneous, familiar hours, out of the repetitions of 
standard, universal time, in the rapture of an endless return, something new, dif-
ferent, and unfamiliar appears – the horrible body of Kafka’s literature. 
4  Studying, The Time of Childhood 
Yet there is a different, additional time that writes itself in Samsa’s room – the 
time of studies (Studium) engraved on his writing desk, his Schreibtisch. Lying 
on this desk, there are, as we read at the beginning of the story, a few textile 
samples.20 These are the fabrics, the textiles  / the texts  – the drafts of Kafka’s 
first stories, perhaps? – found on the writing desk of the pitiful protagonist. It is 
mentioned that Gregor Samsa uses these textiles during his commercial travels; 
they are examples of his vocation. The writing desk, however, the desk of studies, 
was used by Samsa during his years as a student at the academy for business and 
before that, when he was a student at secondary school and also even earlier, 
when he was a pupil in elementary school.21 The removal of the writing desk from 
Samsa’s room thus signifies the orientation of writing, the direction of studies, in 
which time moves back, re-turns in the other direction, to the years of childhood. 
Studies (and gestures of writing) are intertwined in a complex manner with these 
zones of childhood and realms of memory, although these realms themselves are 
already lost in oblivion. Indeed, Kafka’s protagonists are often figures of forgetful-
ness. Yet what is this time-concept of studies, the time being imprinted in these 
textiles, the “texts” that were left on Samsa’s desk? Are they also measured by 
the clock? Does the empty, circular time of the alarm clock govern also the world 
of studies, or does a different, archaic direction in time produce inversions of 
time, delay, and fragmentation? And perhaps there is no time, no “before” and 
no “after,” no past and no future in these textiles, the examples of “writing” that 
sit on his desk. Possibly the objects on Samsa’s desk are objects of exchange. This 
20 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 89. 
21 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 118.
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strange concept of time that is reflected in this writing-desk of Gregor Samsa, the 
time of condensing (Verdichtung), the time of all times being verdichted, poeti-
cally condensed, is time of the script. 
In Samsa’s room one finds a few broken, fragmented signs of the being of 
a student, a subject lost in the realm of studies, the world of writing, the uni-
verse of textiles/texts and scripts. The students in Kafka’s world, according to a 
well-known reading,22 are doomed to empty, happy travel, or eine fröhliche leere 
Fahrt,23 in which they sense freedom from the law of time. Samsa, however, aban-
dons his studies and now this miserable creature no longer enjoys this demonic 
degree of freedom. His travels, we read, are not free and empty; rather, they 
belong to the realm of duty and vocation; they promise not escape but repetition. 
Samsa’s travels are charged with Schuld, a sense of guilt. 
And the Schuld is measured by the alarm clock that rings and announces 
both the duties and costs of time. Man, who is a subject in the realm of time, 
autonomous but occupied, is captured forever in duties, in being-guilt. Escape 
from these circles of mechanical time, the mechanism of being-thrown-in-the-
world (Geworfenheit), is a rare possibility, one that few of Kafka’s protagonists 
enjoy and that is no longer possible for Gregor Samsa. 
For good reason the story tells about Schulden  – the family’s debts that 
Gregor took upon himself after his father’s ruin.24 But after the terrible transfor-
mation he has experienced and the loss of his job, Gregor feels how the family’s 
debt has turned into guilt. This is how he perceives the wound on his back, a 
wound caused by one of the apples his father threw at him in his final attempt to 
escape his room.25 Thus Gregor must bear not only debt in its commercial sense 
but also duty and guilt in their theological sense – of having fallen. Gregor Samsa 
belongs to the community of sons who live and die in this realm, governed by 
ruined, damaged fathers who in their own falls lead their sons to self-destruction. 
A similar fate is that of Georg Bendemann’s being sentenced to death by his father 
in Kafka’s story “The Judgement” (“Das Urteil”). Each son is condemned in the 
name of the father and carries the generational burden. In Kafka’s unfinished 
22 Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death” (“Franz Kafka: Zur 
zehnten Wiederkehr seines Todestages”), in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry 
Zohn, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York 1968, 111–140; Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: Zur 
Wiederkehr seines Todestages,” in Benjamin über Kafka. Texte, Briefzeugnisse, Aufzeichnungen 
[Benjamin on Kafka: Texts, Letters and Notes], Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1981, 9–38.
23 Franz Kafka, Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer [The Great Wall of China], Fischer Taschen-
buch Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 1994, 181.
24 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 90.
25 Kafka, “The Metamorphosis,” 121–122.
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novels this pattern turns cosmic: in short, what the son carries on his back  – 
namely, his guilt – is in fact the universe itself. 
5  Not-Yet
The alarm clock ticking on the chest in Gregor Samsa’s room signifies profane 
time, the time of living and working on earth. Samsa lives in this time-space; he 
feels its surface, having being condemned to crawl on the ground. In this sense 
he endures the trial; the hard judgment of the fall shapes the human condition – 
finitude and labor. The being-on-earth that is measured by the alarm clock could 
not be fully understood without these theological assumptions of the weight of 
Schuld, or debt and guilt, in the design of human subjectivity. How does Kafka 
contend with these theological assumptions? In his stories the father falls and 
arises, the son escapes and returns; the women, subjects of desire, are doubled 
too. It is rather an inversion of the theological assumptions, a difficult irony, in 
which tradition itself seems to be rewritten against its own path. Samsa’s alarm 
clock also counts these inverted hours – for time seems to go wrong and finally 
collapses into circles of repetitions. 
Did the clock ring? What was it announcing? Or were its hours broken and 
lost in delays and oblivion? At the beginning of the story the alarm clock does not 
allow the counting of any special hour, for everything seems to be equally meas-
ured into standard, homogenous segments of universal time. In this time-space, 
in this “one morning,” in the timeness of the profane order, in the empty zones of 
the clock, there is no place for singularity and differences.
And yet, we recall, the alarm clock in Samsa’s room signifies one original 
hour, namely, four o’clock in the morning, the time of beginning, the hour at 
which all things are called to creation, to return to this world. This hour is meas-
ured, recalled with a terrible noise; yet it has passed uneventfully… Gregor Samsa 
did not awake.
We are thus dealing with this special, singular hour, the time of lost promises 
and of periods of delay, the time in which Kafka’s literary body is being written. It 
is the time of the story itself that should be understood according to these inver-
sions, not only the period in which Kafka’s story was written – those longs weeks 
of the winter of 1912, the weeks of his desperate exchange of letters with Felice 
Bauer – but also the time gaps enveloped in the text itself. The literary writing 
depends on these inversions, suspensions, and distortions of time structures. 
The poetical moment is of this nature. It embodies a resistance: the resistance 
to being on time. Meaning, in its literary sense, is reproduced in suspension. 
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Meaning itself is always and still on its way, and the way is that of the reader, 
who, like the man from the village standing before the law, always arrives too 
early or too late. Being before the law is that of coming beforehand, of arriving too 
early. Yet at the same time his arrival is already late, for he will never be admitted: 
the entrance, his hour, is past forever. The man from the village arrives not-in-
time, and this, we recall, was the guard’s answer at the gate of the law in Kafka’s 
story: entrance to the law is allowed, but “not yet” (jetzt aber nicht).26 This is 
the time digression, the perversion of time that signifies the debt, the guilt, the 
blessing, and the curse that many of these villagers in Kafka’s stories suffer. The 
country doctor himself is a subject of these time distortions. He is removed from 
his home at the speed of lightening, and here he stands at night at the gates of a 
distant village. However, when he wishes to return home, being thrown on to the 
country road, he lives forever in a different, tremendously slow time. The country 
doctor’s journey comes to a standstill. Who should save him from this journey? 
The clock of Kafka’s story, the rhythm of his tale, takes place at the extremes. 
And there, where time is accelerated to a standstill, something is being revealed – 
the literary matter itself. The alarm clock ticking in Samsa’s bedroom signifies the 
time labyrinths of Kafka’s prose. This is how Gregor Samsa is being awakened 
into the world – he awakens by the sign of the clock. But this awaking, the ecstasy 
of time, brings time itself to its end. 
Thus, in the ticking of the alarm clock, one hears the mechanism, the rep-
etition of work, travel, and trade; one listens to the rhythm of studies and to 
the timings of childhood and the periods of memory and oblivion. We hear the 
ecstasy, the noise and the silence of time itself – the time of debts, the time of 
guilt, the time of judgment, the time that escapes or re-turns to a standstill. In 
these extremes, in inversions of time, being re-presented in the world of Gregor 
Samsa, literature reveals itself, I argue. It speaks with suspensions and delays of 
meaning, in being too early, in being too late, in being “not yet” (jetzt aber nicht), 
but never being on time. 
26 Franz Kafka, “Vor dem Gesetz” (“Before the Law”), in Ein Landarzt und andere Drucke zu 
Lebzeiten [A Country Doctor and Other Texts Printed in His Lifetime], Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 
Frankfurt/M. 1994, 211–212.
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6  The Time of the Messiah 
And in this time that collapses, the time that is wrong, the time of being late, the 
time that passed before it was, Kafka’s protagonists, and perhaps also his readers, 
feel this rare impression of singular time that the Talmud relates to the Messiah 
himself, who sits before the gate and waits to be called into the world – for his 
time never arrives; his time has already passed. 
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Section 5: After Kafka

Shimon Sandbank
Reading Kafka: A Personal Story
The story I would like to unfold here is personal, though I hope its implications 
are more than that. It is the story of a winding course, of twists and turns; it is 
a story that is not linear. I always remember T.S. Eliot’s wise words: “About any 
one so great as Shakespeare, it is probable that we can never be right; and if we 
can never be right, it is better that we should from time to time change our way 
of being wrong.”1 Kafka, I feel, is great enough for these words to apply to him 
as well, great enough for us never to be right about him. This is the story of my 
changing ways of being wrong about him. Yet, being a story, it has a structure, 
and this structure is circular. It ends at the point where it began, or perhaps not 
exactly at the same point, for its end cannot but bear the marks of the winding 
course it has travelled.
The story begins nearly fifty years ago, when I was commissioned by 
Schocken Publishing House of Tel-Aviv to prepare a Hebrew translation of Kafka’s 
The Castle [Das Schloss]. I was delighted but also awestruck; until then I had done 
mainly minor translations, and this new commission posed a formidable chal-
lenge: to translate a great novel by a major modern novelist, perhaps the greatest 
of them all. 
I cannot remember how it felt to cope with such a task. As a beginner, both 
in the field of translation and as university teacher, I went about it with much 
gusto, perhaps without even carefully reading the novel, and certainly without 
reading much criticism of it. I remember, however, that in working on the transla-
tion and thus being keenly engaged with Kafka’s language, what struck me, right 
from the start, was a recurrent stylistic idiosyncrasy: his way of retreating time 
and again from what he had just stated. Time and again I found him repudiating, 
or at least casting doubt on, what he had just affirmed. I wondered if he was basi-
cally unsure of what he had to say. He seemed to be using more than one means 
to express this uncertainty. Often, a sentence would qualify, modify, and finally 
negate what a previous sentence had stated. For example: “And so that all should 
know what it was all about, the fight and the victory were repeated once again, or 
perhaps not repeated at all, but only took place now. The fight did not last long 
[…] Was it a fight at all?”2 Such lines seemed to retract what had immediately 
1 T.S. Eliot, “Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca,” in Selected Essays, Harcourt, Brace, and 
Company, New York 1932, 107–120, 107. 
2 Franz Kafka, The Castle, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, Secker & Warburg, London 1953, 321–322.
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preceded them: in this example, the battle has taken place and is being repeated; 
then: it is taking place only now; followed by: it does not take long; and finally: is 
it even a battle? The battle, thus, was both a battle and not a battle.
Similarly, a parenthetical clause would negate a word in the main clause, 
but the word would then be used again, regardless of the negating clause. For 
instance: “The receiver gave out a buzz […] It was as if the hum of countless chil-
dren’s voices – but this hum was not a hum, the echo rather of voices singing at 
an infinite distance, – as if the hum blended by sheer impossibility into one high 
but resonant sound.”3 The receiver, that is, gave out a hum; then: it was not a 
hum; then: the hum blended. More strikingly, an adjective would negate the noun 
it described, as in the following: “These contradictions had engendered in him 
the belief that though for the moment K. was wretched and looked down on, yet 
in an almost unimaginably distant future he would excel everybody.”4 The adjec-
tival phrase “almost unimaginably distant” subtly (because it is done so casually) 
undermines the noun it should be describing: a future “almost unimaginably 
distant” is hardly a future. Another example: “[…] this last, tiny, vanishing, yes 
actually inexistent hope, is your only one.”5 Here the series of adjectives gradu-
ally, almost imperceptibly, shifts from description (“last”) to denial of existence 
(“inexistent”), thereby both affirming and denying hope.
Another relevant device I quickly recognized was the constant use of words 
of uncertainty, such as “perhaps” and “it seems.” German is rich in such adverbs, 
and Kafka seemed to use them all: freilich (“admittedly”), allerdings (“though”), 
natürlich (“naturally”), übrigens (“incidentally”), trotzdem (“nevertheless”), aber 
(“but”), eigentlich (“actually”), doch (“anyway”), eher (“rather”), oder vielleicht 
(“or else”), von andere Seite her (“on the other hand”), etc. Another typical char-
acteristic I encountered was the use of hypothetical instead of existential sen-
tences, or logical implication rather than statement of fact. The most famous case 
in Kafka is from another novel: the first sentence of The Trial [Der Process] reads, 
“Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K. [Jemand musste Josef K. ver-
leumdet haben].”6 That is, someone must have been telling lies – yet had anyone 
actually done so? The question is left open, a form of non-committal which I came 
across repeatedly in my translation. The avoidance of fact in the first sentence 
of The Trial was an anticipation of the indeterminacy that seemed to govern the 
3 Kafka, The Castle, 33 (translation slightly modified).
4 Kafka, The Castle, 187 (translation slightly modified; emphasis added).
5 Kafka, The Castle, 143 (translation modified; emphasis added). 
6 Franz Kafka, The Trial, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, Penguin, Harmondsworth 1972, 7 (em-
phasis added).
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novel as a whole: had someone indeed been telling lies about Josef K.? Is Josef K. 
guilty – or is he not?
When I arrived at the famous episode in the eighteenth chapter of The Castle, 
where K., unannounced, enters secretary Bürgel’s room, what I had come to call 
Kafka’s “cancellation technique” seemed to reach its peak. Bürgel’s subsequent 
speech concerns the possibility given to an applicant to exploit the “nocturnal 
weakness” of the secretaries to his own advantage. Bürgel discusses this possibil-
ity, which “almost never occurs,”7 in a kind of long interplay of affirmations and 
negations that can be schematized as follows:
(a) The possibility consists in the applicant’s coming unannounced in the middle of the 
night: that is, there is a possibility.
(b) But the organization is so foolproof that the applicant receives his summons even 
before he knows of the whole matter, and thus he can no longer come unannounced: 
that is, there is no possibility.
(c) But this refers only to the competent secretary; it remains possible to surprise others in 
the night: so there is a possibility.
d) But this would annoy the competent secretary; and would fail also because of the 
incompetent secretaries’ lack of time: in short, there is no possibility.
This continues for another dozen or so fluctuations between possibility and 
non-possibility, to the final paradox: “[…] there are […] opportunities that are, in a 
manner of speaking, too great to be made use of, there are things that fail through 
nothing other than themselves.”8 If up to now affirmation has been followed by 
negation, or been co-existent with negation, then affirmation now engenders 
negation: possibility, when “too great,” must produce its own negation; it must 
fail through nothing other than itself.
Over time, having begun to teach Kafka and think about him beyond The 
Castle, I came to realize that the same habit of thought, or, rather, habit of doubt-
ing his thought, applied to his macro-structures no less than to his micro-struc-
tures, to the overall form of his novels no less than to his sentences and para-
graphs. I saw that not only in The Castle but even more so in Amerika and The 
Trial, the overall narrative structure is one of advance and retreat: each encounter 
that should have advanced the protagonist’s course results in its own cancella-
tion and comes to nothing. Take Josef K.: in the course of The Trial he tries his 
luck with the court attendant and the attendant’s wife; with his uncle; with the 
lawyer Huld; with Leni; with the painter Titorelli and with the merchant Block; 
7 Kafka, The Castle, 322.
8 Kafka, The Castle, 330 (translation slightly modified).
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and with the priest in the cathedral. All these encounters end in failure. In the 
final encounter, with the priest, who teaches him that “you don’t need to accept 
everything as true, you only have to accept it as necessary,”9 Josef K. perhaps 
comes nearest to the truth of the story; but here too it is a truth that eliminates 
itself: the truth of the story is that it is not necessary to accept it as true…
Reading now what I wrote about this stylistic phenomenon in a number of 
articles and in my Hebrew book Derech Ha’Hissus [The Way of Wavering], I find 
that I more or less consistently avoided touching upon the implications of this 
stylistic feature for Kafka’s general meaning, for the world represented in his 
work. I specifically avoided all metaphysical implications. If Kafka’s universe is 
one of impossibility, as shown in his language, then this did not imply, I thought, 
that Kafka posited a transcendent world of infinite possibility in recompense.
The Kafka text which I found particularly relevant to this point was “Pro-
metheus,” a text which brilliantly destroys, in half a page and through four ver-
sions of the story, the meaning that can be attributed to the myth of Prometheus. 
Kafka’s text first presents, in a single sentence, the story’s traditional theological 
interpretation, that of crime and punishment: Prometheus betrays the secrets of 
the gods to men and is therefore clamped to a rock, where eagles feed on his 
liver. In Kafka’s second version, the theological certainty begins to crumble: Pro-
metheus escapes the pain, by pressing himself into the rock and becoming one 
with it. Finally, complete withdrawal from meaning takes place: first, everything 
is forgotten by everybody; then, more decisively, “everyone grows weary of the 
meaningless affair.”10 The text concludes: “There remained the inexplicable mass 
of rock. The legend tried to explain the inexplicable. As it came out of a substra-
tum of truth it had in turn to end in the inexplicable.”11 
This reduction of myth to the “inexplicable mass of rock” meant, I thought, 
that one should not try to explain what is inexplicable. I remembered Wittgen-
stein’s dictum: “whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.” One 
could speak about Kafka’s semantics, but one had to be silent about his overall 
meaning. To use Roman Ingarden’s terms, only the stratum of meaning units was 
discussable, not the stratum of represented objects. 
Later, I found helpful Wolfgang Iser’s discussions of Beckett’s prose. In his 
books The Act of Reading and Prospecting Iser discusses the effect on the reader 
of Beckett’s sentence structure, which resembles Kafka’s but is far more radical 
9 Kafka, The Castle, 243.
10 Franz Kafka, “Prometheus,” trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, in The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum 
N. Glatzer, Schocken Books, New York, 1976, 432 (emphasis added).
11 Kafka, “Prometheus,” 432.
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in its negativity. Iser writes: “Beckett has devised a sentence structure in which 
each statement is followed by a negation, which itself is a statement eliciting 
further negations in an unending process that leads the reader to search for the 
key, which becomes more and more elusive.”12 As I understand Iser, this search 
for the “elusive key” is twofold. On one hand, “the reader is forced continually 
to cancel the meanings he has formed”13; on the other hand, it “[shows] us that 
something is being withheld and […] [challenges] us to discover what it is.”14 In 
other words, the reader of Beckett’s prose, though continually expected to give 
up the meanings he has formed, is nevertheless reluctant to forego his search 
for a final meaning. In my own case, the need to cancel – again and again – the 
meanings I had formed in reading Kafka had led me to give up the search for a 
final meaning in his work. I remained convinced that a final meaning was inac-
cessible, but I felt that it was contrary to one’s intuition to reduce Kafka to style, 
or to the stratum of meaning units. The central secret, what Iser declared was 
“withheld” from me, “challenged me to discover what it is.”
If the first station on my way was largely linguistic, the second was an attempt 
to move away from language and towards overall meaning. And since language 
was characterized by negation and incomprehensibility, meaning too was bound 
to centre on the incomprehensible or transcendent. And the archetype of the 
transcendent was God. I therefore found the theological approach, whose leading 
representative was Max Brod, most tenable. In his Postscript to the first edition of 
The Castle Brod had famously claimed that The Trial and The Castle present two 
forms of God’s revelation – Judgment and Grace. This seemed to me most persua-
sive: for was not Josef K., in The Trial, judged by an unknown power? and did not 
K., in The Castle, pursue unknown Grace?
Yet soon enough I realized that Brod’s type of “positive theology” was incom-
patible with the indeterminacy that I had all along found in Kafka. Kafka’s neg-
ativity could not be reconciled with Brod’s positive categories, for it called for 
a negative version of theology. Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, though 
they ridiculed Brod and strongly rejected his approach to Kafka, in fact shared his 
engagement with transcendence, but – a crucial “but” – in a negative version. 
For Scholem, as Stéphane Mosès notes, Kafka’s work, “[offered] the image of a 
world bereft of meaning, empty of all divine presence, but where hollow traces 
still [existed] of the escaped transcendence: unanswered questions, unsolved 
12 Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1987, 131.
13 Iser, The Act of Reading, 223.
14 Wolfgang Iser, Prospecting: From Reader Response to Literary Anthropology, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore 1989, 141.
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enigmas, whose negativity [indicated] the power exerted over us by the shadow of 
the dead God.”15 This was much closer to the Kafka I experienced: transcendence 
was there, but it was an “escaped transcendence,” while the world itself was left 
bereft of meaning. Brod’s Judgment and Grace made K.’s fate deceptively mean-
ingful, whereas Scholem and Benjamin, I felt, though differing on certain central 
points, preserved the meaninglessness of Kafka’s “mass of rock.”
Benjamin’s juxtaposition of Aggadah and Halakhah, inspired by the Hebrew 
poet Ch.N. Bialik’s essay of that name, which Scholem had translated, was for 
me an eye-opening image for the relationship between the escaped transcend-
ence and its elusive traces. Kafka’s parables, explains Benjamin, have “a similar 
relationship to doctrine as the Haggadah does to the Halakhah. They are not par-
ables, and yet they do not want to be taken at their face value; they lend them-
selves to quotations and can be told for purposes of clarification. But do we have 
the doctrine which Kafka’s parables interpret[…]? It does not exist; all we can say 
is that here and there we have an allusion to it.”16 
In my book After Kafka17 I tried to show that this radical gap between parable 
and doctrine, or fiction and theme, had influenced major modern writers – Sartre, 
Beckett, Borges, and Ionesco, among others – but that they had all been unable, 
or unwilling, to write the radically sceptical type of fiction that was Kafka’s great 
contribution to modern literature. Like Kafka, they created fables to storm the 
walls of a meaningless existence, around which they let words (as in Beckett) 
or objects (as in Ionesco) proliferate desperately. Unlike Kafka, however, they 
stopped short of a final withdrawal from hope. 
I continued to read and to puzzle and perhaps to seek an escape from the 
transcendence that had become an idée fixe in Kafka studies. I think this is why 
the next station on my way was diametrically opposed to the line I have been 
describing. This was almost a Copernican revolution – transcendence replaced 
by immanence. The theorists who were responsible for this revolution, Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, meant for their book Kafka: Toward a Minor Liter-
ature to present a Kafka “freed from his interpreters”18 – at least, I would add, 
15 Stéphane Mosès, The Angel of History, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2009, 151.
16 Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka: On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death” (“Franz Kafka: Zur 
zehnten Wiederkehr seines Todestages”), in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry 
Zohn, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York 1968, 111–140, 122.
17 Shimon Sandbank, After Kafka: The Influence of Kafka’s Fiction, Georgia University Press, 
Athens 1989.
18 Réda Bensmaïa, Foreword, in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Lit-
erature [Kafka: Pour une litterature mineure], trans. Dana Polan, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis 1986, xxi.
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freed from his interpreters’ favourite categories – transcendence and subjective 
guilt, above all.
I will not go into the details of the theory which accompanies their interpreta-
tion of The Trial. This theory of what they label “minor literature” is irrelevant to 
the personal story I am telling. What was important for me was their upside-down 
reading of The Trial. Let me quote a few lines: 
[…] even if the law remains unrecognizable, this is not because it is hidden by its transcend-
ence, but simply because it is always denuded of any interiority: it is always in the office 
next door, or behind the door […] (in the first chapter […] everything happens in the “room 
next door”) […] it is not the law that is stated because of the demands of a hidden transcend-
ence; it is almost the exact opposite: it is the statement, the enunciation, that constructs the 
law in the name of an immanent power of the one who enounces it – the law is confused 
with that which the guardian utters, and the writings precede the law, rather than being the 
necessary and derived expression of it.19 
Deleuze and Guattari are here subverting what until then had been the accepted 
picture of Kafka’s world. The law, they argue, is not a hidden transcendent power 
whose representatives – judges, secretaries, policemen, painters, priests, etc. – 
follow its orders and express it. The law, on the contrary, is immanent to human 
society; it is a force of life or desire that operates the social machine from within. 
The law, far from being the embodiment of a transcendent Law, is a product of 
all those judges, secretaries, etc., and it is they that project a fictitious image of 
a trial. In short, “If everything, everyone, is part of justice, if everyone is an aux-
iliary of justice, from the priest to the little girls, this is not because of the tran-
scendence of the law but because of the immanence of desire.”20 
Deleuze and Guattari have hardly been the only political interpreters of 
Kafka. Indeed, themes of totalitarianism, political evil, perverted law, bureau-
cracy, exile, even prophetic anticipation of the fate of Hitler’s victims were diag-
nosed early on by Kafka’s critics, and remain to this day the popular connotations 
of the adjective “Kafkaesque.” My own preoccupation with Kafka’s language, 
which had made me deeply convinced that Kafka could not be reduced to any 
overall meaning, had also left me indifferent to such political and sociological 
interpretations. This is why Deleuze and Guattari’s approach was such a sudden 
eye-opener for me. It seemed to throw a shocking light on myriad details of the 
petty, dirty, treacherous world of the novels; in doing so, it ejected all transcend-
19 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, 45 (emphasis added).
20 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, 50.
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ence from Kafka’s horizon, thereby placing the mystery squarely in the midst of 
human society, perhaps even in the office next door. 
But this was not the case for long. For me, Deleuze and Guattari’s immanence 
of the law came to seem completely incompatible with its absolute unreachability 
in texts like the parable “Before the Law” (“Vor dem Gesetz”) or The Castle. Soon 
enough Deleuze and Guattari were replaced in my story by Jacques Derrida. I now 
see that it must have been my original experience of Kafka, of his cancelling, or 
deconstructing, himself, that made Derrida’s deconstructive method so congenial 
for me. Although his essay on Kafka’s “Before the Law” is over twenty-five years 
old, Derrida is, to date, the last station in my story. With him the story comes full 
circle – but with a difference.
It comes full circle because deconstruction seemed especially close to what I 
had felt from the beginning to be Kafka’s own technique, what I had called “can-
cellation technique.” To deconstruct a discourse, as Jonathan Culler explains, is 
“to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppo-
sitions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that 
produce the supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise.”21 This 
undermining of meaning, the “différance” of meaning, as Derrida terms it, is 
endless and renders all stable, self-identical knowledge impossible.
I noted that this seemed close to Kafka’s technique; but deferral of meaning, 
as Derrida means it, is governed by language itself, by the play of its significa-
tion. In Kafka, however, deferral of meaning is a conscious product of a subjective 
consciousness, of a constant “presence” of an ever-doubting author. It is Kafka’s 
language, not language as such, that continues doubting and negating its own 
assumptions and arguments. Kafka’s meanings, I felt, are undermined not by lan-
guage but by Kafka.
As I discovered later, a much-discussed critique of Derrida by Paul de Man 
centered precisely on this point. De Man, in Insight and Blindness, argues against 
Derrida’s reading of Rousseau and claims that the latter, because he deconstructs 
himself, does not need to be deconstructed. In de Man’s view, according to Irene 
E. Harvey, Rousseau’s strength “comes from the fact that he not only knew what 
he was doing but also indeed exhibited the undecidability that characterizes tex-
tuality in general.”22 J. Hillis Miller, in his essay “Deconstructing the Deconstruc-
tors,” applies this to deconstruction as a whole: “ Great works of literature are 
21 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1983, 86.
22 Irene E. Harvey, “Doubling the Space of Existence: Exemplarity in Derrida – the Case of Rous-
seau,” in Deconstruction and Philosophy, ed. John Sallis, University Of Chicago Press, Chicago 
1987, 60–70, 63.
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likely to be ahead of their critics. They are there already. They have anticipated 
explicitly any deconstruction the critic can achieve.” The critic’s task therefore, 
he adds, is “to identify an act of deconstruction which has always already, in each 
case differently, been performed by the text on itself.”23 
This, I realized, is precisely what Kafka’s texts do: they do not need to be 
deconstructed, because they deconstruct themselves and because they explic-
itly anticipate any deconstruction that Derrida – were he to apply his method to 
Kafka – could achieve.
Were Derrida to apply his method to Kafka: but did he? Derrida’s well-known 
lecture on Kafka, entitled, like its object, “Before the Law,” is not an especially 
good example of his method. Derrida does not deconstruct Kafka’s parable the 
way he deconstructs Rousseau, for instance. Nor does he identify blind spots 
and contradictions which would undermine Kafka’s supposed meaning. Instead, 
Derrida allegorizes the man from the country, who stands before the gate of 
the law and does not enter it, into the reader standing before a literary text and 
finding it inaccessible. As Derrida interprets it, the many guards who follow the 
first gatekeeper stand for the many deferrals of meaning, or deconstructions, 
which the reader is called upon to bear. “Before the Law” thus becomes “Before 
the Text,” a manifesto of deconstruction, as opposed to an instance of it.
As such, Derrida’s lecture strikes me as a highly sophisticated elaboration of 
a sentence which Kafka himself includes in the dialogue between Josef K. and the 
priest, following the parable in the ninth chapter of The Trial. Derrida limits his 
discussion only to the parable, as published by Kafka before he had embedded 
it in The Trial. But in the course of that Talmudic dialogue, the priest says: “I am 
only showing you the various opinions concerning that point. You must not pay 
too much attention to them. The scriptures are unalterable and the comments 
often enough merely express the commentator’s despair.”24 The priest, true 
enough, does not interpret “man from the country versus the Law” as “reader 
versus text,” but he urges the reader Josef K. to realize that the text concerned – 
that is, the parable “Before the Law”  – is inaccessible and uninterpretable. 
Derrida only inserts the priest’s deconstructive counsel into his interpretation of 
the parable itself. 
Derrida’s own opinion, thus, is no more than an expression of despair over 
Kafka’s infinitely open parable. As with Kafka’s “Prometheus,” the dialogue 
between Josef K. and the priest ends with despair of reaching the truth: “it is not 
23 J. Hillis Miller, “Deconstructing the Deconstructors,” in Diacritics 5:2 (1975): 24–31, 31.
24 Kafka, The Trial, 239–240 (translation slightly modified).
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necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary.”25 All 
we have, finally, is an endless deferral of the truth. In Benjamin’s unforgettable 
words: “In the stories which Kafka left us, narrative art regains the significance it 
had in the mouth of Scheherazade: to postpone the future.”26 
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Kata Gellen 
Kafka, Pro and Contra: Günther Anders’s 
Holocaust Book
How Jewish was Franz Kafka? How Jewish was his writing? There are no explicit 
references to Jews or Judaism anywhere in his fictional work, yet so many of the 
characters, situations, and existential scenarios he depicts seem to allegorize 
modern Jewish experience. Moreover, there is substantial biographical evidence 
that Kafka was exposed to Jewish thought and religious practice and that he sus-
tained active interest in such topics as Yiddish, Hebrew, Chasidism, and Zionism. 
This quandary has been central to much Kafka scholarship, from his earliest 
critics – including Max Brod, Margarete Susman, and Walter Benjamin – to con-
temporary biographers, writers, and literary critics.1 Recent scholarship – such as 
that of Vivian Liska, Dan Miron, and David Suchoff – has resisted the previously 
dominant tendency to quantify Kafka’s Jewishness, so as to account more subtly 
for the precise ways in which his writing can be thought of as Jewish.2
The philosopher, writer, and activist Günther Anders (1902–1992) was an early 
contributor to the discourse on Jewish Kafka: he presented a lecture on Kafka in 
Paris in 1934, and produced two written versions of this study between 1946 and 
1952. Nevertheless, in the introduction to a 1984 collection of his essays in which 
the Kafka essay was republished, Anders made clear that he considered literary 
criticism, and even literature itself, a luxury in which he and his contemporaries 
could barely afford to indulge. Indeed, Anders had spent much of his postwar 
career writing against nuclear proliferation and the dangers of technological 
modernity, though he did not publish his major treatise on the atomic threat until 
1 Paul Reitter’s review essay offers a good overview of recent criticism, academic and otherwise, 
on this topic. See Paul Reitter, “Misreading Kafka,” in Jewish Review of Books (Fall 2010): http://
jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/172/misreading-kafka/.
2 Excellent examples include Vivian Liska, When Kafka Says We. Uncommon Communities in 
German-Jewish Literature, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2009; Dan Miron, From Conti-
nuity to Contiguity: Toward a New Jewish Literary Thinking, Stanford University Press, Stanford 
2010; and David Suchoff, Kafka’s Jewish Languages: The Hidden Openness of Tradition, Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2012. 
I would like to thank Vivian Liska for her kind invitation to participate in this volume, as well as 
my friends and colleagues Marc Caplan, Doreen Densky, and Ann-Kathrin Pollmann, whose as-
tute comments on drafts of this essay were of inestimable value. 
284   Kata Gellen 
1956.3 How, then, can one explain his own persistent attention to Kafka, espe-
cially in the late 1940s and early 1950s?
It merits noting the forcefulness with which Anders made his claim about the 
superfluousness of literature in the face of the Holocaust and nuclear catastro-
phe, twin manifestations of the twentieth century’s technocratic “machine 
world,” against which Anders militated. For him, these human tragedies render 
literary study not only frivolous and impractical, but morally dubious. Of his orig-
inal 1934 lecture, which he had given in exile, Anders later reflected:
That’s how Kafkaesque our situation back then was. And one could think that it must have 
actually been “difficile” for the likes of us not to write about Kafka. However he who is 
forced to live a Kafkaesque life does not read Kafka and does not write about Kafka. Even 
K. would not, under these circumstances, have read Kafka. We had more urgent matters to 
attend to.4 
Anders dismisses the idea of a simple connection between the experiences Kafka 
depicts (marginalization, powerlessness, suffering) and the motivation to study 
his literary works. Without denying that Jewish exiles in the 1930s might have 
found points of identification with Kafka’s characters, Anders argues that this 
alone could not have motivated them. As for his own exilic work on Kafka, he 
claims that the French academy sought a lecture on Kafka and that he needed 
money: Kafka was thus “useful” as a source of income.5 This, Anders suggests, 
and not the plight of Josef K. or Gregor Samsa, is real existential angst. 
Nevertheless, Anders continued to engage with Kafka quite intensively during 
his years in New York (1936–1950), though he distanced himself from the schol-
arly academic discourse on the writer. He writes about this period in the 1984 
introduction, and notes, rather dismissively, that there was at the time already an 
overabundance of scholarship – over 11,000 works – on Kafka.
I have not read a single one of these 11,000 secondary texts – […] because I would find it 
inappropriate to dawdle away our time sifting through wagons of German literary philology 
in this age of ours, where the main concern is to combat the onset of certain catastrophe.6
3 This work was published as Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Band I: Über die Seele im Zeitalter 
der zweiten industriellen Revolution [The Outdatedness of Human Beings. Volume 1. On the Soul in 
the Era of the Second Industrial Revolution], C. H. Beck, Munich 1956.
4 Günther Anders, “Einleitung” (“Introduction”), in Mensch ohne Welt. Schriften zur Kunst und 
Literatur [Human Being Without World: Writings on Art and Literature], C. H. Beck, Munich 1984, 
XI–XLIV, XXXIII. See also XXXVIII. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own.
5 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXIII–IV.
6 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXVIII.
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When standing before the greatest ethical and political crisis of the modern age, 
one did not waste time reading (much less writing) esoteric tombs on Kafka – or 
at least one should not have. And yet during these years this is precisely what 
Anders did, more than once. I explain this apparent contradiction by arguing 
that, for Anders, writing about Kafka was a means to another end. This is true not 
only in the mundane sense that Anders himself acknowledges – earning a bit of 
money when resources were scarce – but in the deeper sense that writing about 
Kafka was a means for Anders to channel thoughts about both the coordinated 
mass annihilation of European Jewry and postwar German society’s insincere 
relationship to its crimes. Anders’s Kafka book is his reckoning with the Holo-
caust.
The hidden thesis of Anders’s 1951 book, Kafka, Pro und Contra. Die Pro-
ceß-Unterlagen [Kafka, Pro and Contra: The Trial Documents],7 takes the form 
of a moral judgment. Anders believes that Kafka, often taken as the exemplar 
of Jewish suffering, in fact absolves Germans of their responsibility for this suf-
fering. Thus, critics who think that Kafka somehow predicted the plight of the 
Jews under Nazi rule and exemplified the condition of the victimized Jew have 
inverted the true meaning and implications of his writing. Their arguments are 
not only historically untenable on the grounds that they render Kafka into a 
prophet of doom; they are also a misreading of power relations in Kafka’s work. 
Anders makes the somewhat radical claim that Kafka, who is generally thought to 
have given voice to the weak, the oppressed, and the victimized, is actually doing 
major psychological and moral work to liberate a generation of Nazi sympathiz-
ers from their guilt. According to Anders, Kafka offers them a painless distraction 
from their crimes, in the form of a morally neutral and spiritually edifying “Kun-
stbewunderung,”8 or appreciation of artistic mastery. While Anders is ostensi-
bly critiquing Kafka’s readers and not the author himself, my analysis will show 
that Anders in fact holds Kafka responsible for a moral and religious system that 
enables this kind of facile absolution.
Anders’s claims about postwar Kafka reception are inextricable from his 
ideas about Kafka’s supposedly universal (but actually Christian) perspective 
and his conviction that Kafka represents the position of oppressor rather than 
oppressed. By attributing this viewpoint to Kafka, Anders can argue that Kafka’s 
works become available for postwar Germans to absolve themselves of a guilt they 
7 The book was translated into English simply as Franz Kafka. See Günther Anders, Franz Kafka, 
trans. A. Steer and A. K. Thorlby, Bowes & Bowes, London 1960. Since Anders’s ambivalence 
toward Kafka is a crucial aspect of my argument, I refer to this work as Kafka, Pro and Contra.
8 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXIX.
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possess but do not properly feel or acknowledge. Anders wishes to hold Kafka 
morally responsible for this. Anders claims that Kafka in some sense stands for 
(which is not to say stands with) the “winner,” and that this allegiance ultimately 
enables the unholy marriage between a suffering Jew and criminal Germans. 
Without denying that Kafka also appeals to Jews struggling to understand twenti-
eth-century Jewish experience, Anders claims that Kafka, who presented a world 
in which guilt and punishment are uncoupled, also allows Germans to sidestep 
their collective guilt for Nazi crimes. According to Anders, this is not a distortion 
or misreading of Kafka, though it might be a misappropriation, perhaps even an 
ethically unsound reading. Kafka’s German readers do not betray him; rather, 
Kafka betrays the weakling or “loser” at the center of his literary universe, and 
Anders feels compelled to identify this act of treason and to pronounce judgment, 
to be pro or contra. Indeed, his book is laden with anger, resentment, and griev-
ance, much of which is directed against Kafka and reflects a discernible vengeful-
ness. It is not only Anders’s final judgment, but also this intensity of undigested 
and unresolved affect that make his Kafka study legible as a Holocaust book. 
Thus Anders’s account of Kafka tells us less about Jewish suffering than about 
German guilt during and after the Nazi era.
1  Franz Kafka: Universal and Particular
The complex history of Anders’s work Kafka, Pro and Contra has been further 
colored by Anders’s own somewhat polemical and mythologizing statements 
about it. Anders delivered a lecture on Kafka at the Institut d’Études Germaniques 
in 1934, during his Parisian exile. Among the (future) luminaries in attendance 
were Walter Benjamin, who wrote his essay on Kafka the same year in Paris, and 
Hannah Arendt, who was married to Anders at the time. Ten years later, now 
an émigré in New York, Anders revised the lecture for Commentary, a magazine 
recently founded and published by the American Jewish Committee. The essay 
appeared, in English translation, as “Kafka: Ritual Without Religion: The Modern 
Intellectual’s Shamefaced Atheism,” in the December 1949 issue.9 Anders had 
written a prefatory note in New York in 1946, which was published by the German 
press C. H. Beck, in 1951, alongside a significantly expanded German version of 
9 See Günther Anders, “Kafka: Ritual Without Religion: The Modern Intellectual’s Shamefaced 
Atheism,” in Commentary (December 1949): 560–569. As Anders explains in the 1984 introduc-
tion to Mensch ohne Welt, excerpts from the first part had also been published in the West Ger-
man literary magazine Die Neue Rundschau in April 1947. See Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXVI.
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the essay. The essay was republished, with a new introduction, in Anders’s 1984 
collection Mensch ohne Welt: Schriften zur Kunst und Literatur (also published by 
Beck). 
Though the text of the original lecture has been lost, the extant versions and 
prefaces suggest that the central tension in the argument remained the same 
over five decades. On the one hand, Anders wants to treat Kafka as an abstract 
thinker – of metaphysics, aesthetics, and religion; on the other hand, he insists 
on the Jewishness of Kafka’s writing and experience, which signify their cultural 
and social specificity. Anders’s Kafka is caught between the universal and the par-
ticular, a point illustrated and exemplified by the fact that Anders’s central (uni-
versalizing) thesis about Kafka’s “religiosity without religion”10 co-exists with a 
series of (particularizing) Jewish readings of Kafka’s works. Anders resolves this 
apparent contradiction by arguing that while Judaism has no role, so to speak, 
in Kafka’s “theology” – which he identifies as a typically modern “shamefaced 
atheism” – it is nonetheless an important aspect of Kafka’s cultural and social 
experience, and thus essential to the interpretation of individual literary works 
by Kafka. To rephrase this in somewhat schematic terms, in Kafka the problem 
of group belonging (identity, affiliation, exclusion, alienation) is Jewish, whereas 
the theological problem (guilt, redemption, punishment, sacrifice) is not.
This “division of labor” is both convenient and plausible, and Anders’s read-
ings of Kafka’s works largely bear it out. He argues that Kafka’s view of guilt is 
decidedly non-Jewish, since it is based in a conception of original sin and redemp-
tion. According to Anders, this is a Christian notion of guilt that is assumed to be 
universal, and it is what allows Kafka to be a modern homo religiosus: someone 
for whom the absence of God results in a nonetheless rigid commitment to ritual, 
officialdom, protocol, and punctiliousness, albeit bereft of any higher purpose or 
meaning. Anders argues that nineteenth-century secularism and atheism amount 
to a “history of shame-faced atheism,” by which he means a rejection of spe-
cific religions but a continuation of their ethos, “religiosity without religion,”11 
exemplified by such writers as Nietzsche and Kafka. For Anders, the topics that 
fall under the rubric of “religiosity without religion” – which include reflections 
on public life, bureaucracy, the impenetrability of the law, inexorable guilt, and 
10 Günther Anders, Kafka, Pro und Contra. Die Prozeß-Unterlagen, C. H. Beck, Munich 1963 
[1951]: 76 (my translation). At times I will quote from the English-language essay that preceded 
both the German publication (from 1949) and the book’s English translation (from 1960), though 
the latter, as its translators note, is more an adaptation than a translation (see Anders, Franz 
Kafka, 7). Here, and in some other instances, I provide my own translations.
11 Anders, Kafka, Pro und Contra, 71, 76.
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punishment without cause – have nothing to do with Jewishness. Rather, they 
relate to a secular universalist theology that derives from Christian thought and 
tradition, and they are inflected neither by Kafka’s experience as a Jew nor by his 
ideas about Judaism.
Where, then, does Kafka’s Jewishness lie? For Anders, there are two major 
Jewish questions in Kafka; these questions are pervasive and significant, yet not 
“religious”:
few statements can be advanced about Kafka with more certainty than the statement that 
his religiosity has no direct connection with the Jewish religion. Wherever he dealt with 
the Jewish question, he either formulated the position of the Jew in the world or that of the 
de-Judaized Jew confronting the “Jewish Jew.”12 
These two aspects of contemporary Jewish experience  – the Jew’s ineluctable 
status as outsider and the post-Enlightenment encounter between traditional and 
modern Jews – are central to Anders’s “Jewish readings” of Kafka. For instance, 
Anders argues that Kafka’s story “Der Riesenmaulwurf” (“The Giant Mole”) 
stages a textual battle between the “orthodox [E]astern European Jew and the cul-
tured Jew who only tenuously belongs to Judaism.”13 Anders convincingly draws 
out the condescension and misguidedness of the Western secular narrator’s 
apologetic defense of the pious teacher’s earnest and unpretentious academic 
treatise. This brief reading evinces a nuanced understanding of Kafka’s ambiva-
lence towards various aspects of Jewish social existence (assimilation, Yiddish, 
Zionism). Anders is clearly alert both to the prejudices and misconceptions that 
Kafka thematizes and to those to which Kafka himself falls victim. 
If the reading of “The Giant Mole” exemplifies the second main Jewish topos in 
Kafka’s work (“the de-Judaized Jew confronting the ‘Jewish Jew’”), then Anders’s 
reading of the fragment “Forschungen eines Hundes” (“Investigation of a Dog”) 
illustrates the first (the inescapability of non-belonging as a Jew), though the two 
topoi in fact converge in his analysis. Anders sees Kafka himself as the narra-
tor: caught between “the bourgeois European Jews from whom he descends” and 
the “the [E]astern Jews, who really did live as a nation [Volk],” he is a “pariah 
twice over, caught between two groups of Jews, neither of which can ever be ‘his 
people.’”14 This “double dog-life” offers insight into competing models of Jewish 
12 Anders, “Kafka: Ritual Without Religion,” 568 (text slightly modified). This passage, taken 
from the English version of the essay that preceded the book’s German publication, is simply 
omitted from the book’s English translation, along with many other important passages.
13 Anders, Franz Kafka, 93.
14 Anders, Franz Kafka, 19.
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existence, but actual affiliation with neither. The dog’s narration amounts to an 
explanatory lamentation on the “ambiguity of non-belonging,”15 which Anders 
associates primarily though not exclusively with Kafka’s own Jewish experience.
These are insightful readings,16 yet also highly particularizing: they imply 
that the significance of Jewishness in Kafka’s works derives from experience 
rather than concepts, that it represents a reaction to a specific lived situation 
rather than a theological position, and that it is historically contingent rather 
than timeless. There is Jewishness in Kafka’s works, but no Judaism. He is a homo 
religiosus, Anders claims: he belongs to a Western Christian-cum-secular tradi-
tion of “shamefaced atheism,” and even views and experiences Judaism from this 
perspective. Kafka, in short, is a Jewish outsider and an outsider to Judaism. 
Whether Anders’s “division of labor” implies a normative judgment is unclear. 
Is there an intellectual hierarchy at work here, in which Kafka’s Jewishness must 
remain of local interest whereas his religiosity is granted universal significance? 
Is Anders attempting to “save” Kafka from mere particularism and “elevate” him 
to a position of universal importance – i.e., to rescue him from his own Jewish-
ness? It would not be surprising if some of these sentiments and intentions were 
at play, given the intellectual milieu in which Anders was writing. In the follow-
ing section, I present an overview of this scene and its stakes, and then return 
to Anders’s Kafka study to show how it both engages with and transcends this 
debate about the status of Kafka’s writing. For Anders, Kafka’s Jewish particular-
ism is not something from which Kafka needs to be “saved,” since, per Anders’s 
analysis, it can co-exist with his Christian theology – though this particularism 
does reflect a fundamental detachment from Jewish sensibility that Anders finds 
alienating and potentially treacherous.
15 Anders, Kafka, Pro und Contra, 18–19.
16 Somewhat less plausibly, Anders’s comments on Kafka’s “Josefine, die Sängerin oder das 
Volk der Mäuse” (“Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse People”) are meant to prove his explicit 
(though encoded) rejection of Jewish theology. Josephine is read as a religious leader who cannot 
in fact hold the attention of the people and who will fade into history: the Jewish people will live 
on (i.e., their social existence matters), but the Jewish religion is irrelevant. As Anders puts it, 
“How little Kafka conceived of his writings in the spirit of Jewish theology is evident from the 
beautiful […] story Josephine, in which he clearly represents [the] Jewish religion as an incident 
in the history of the Jewish people” (see Anders, Franz Kafka, 92). 
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2  Seeing the World Through Christian Eyes: 
Anders’s Critique of Kafka
In June 1947, William Phillips, co-founder of the Partisan Review, published a 
review article, in the newly launched magazine Commentary, of a translation of 
Kafka stories and a volume of critical essays on Kafka.17 Phillips’s remarks about 
the essay collection constitute a scathing critique of their particularism. For Phil-
lips, Kafka’s great achievement is his capacity “to maintain a kind of permanent 
crisis, which loads each particular experience with the sum of all experience.”18 
The error of nearly all the essays in the volume, he argues, is that they “ride some 
personal notion or some half-baked thesis”:
[T]he theoreticians present us with a variety of “interpretations,” all plugging some extreme 
view of Kafka’s work and all canceling each other out. Perhaps the oldest distortion is Max 
Brod’s attempt – in a kind of Zionist Emersonianism – to squeeze a Jewish oversoul out of 
Kafka. Less sectarian and more fashionable, however, is the Protestant non-denominational 
view taken by a number of critics who have transferred Kafka into a pure theologian. On the 
secular side, there are a number of “social” approaches, some of which argue that Kafka’s 
fiction was basically a protest against the injustices of modern society, while others berate 
Kafka for his reactionary and “escapist” attitudes.19
Phillips continues in this vein: all these efforts to appropriate Kafka for a particu-
lar religion, cause, or ideology misconstrue the main strength of Kafka’s writing, 
which is to reflect the universal in the particular. According to Phillips, the search 
for alternative particular encodings in Kafka’s works renders them provincial and 
flat.
Two months later, in the August 1947 issue, the Viennese writer Friedrich 
Torberg published a sharp critique of Phillips’s review. Torberg was living in New 
York at the time, working as a translator, journalist, and critic. His mentor, Max 
Brod, who also wrote a response to Anders’s book, had been integral to the pub-
lication of Torberg’s first novel. Torberg did not hold back in his retort to Phillips: 
There seems to be in this country a general critical tendency to discard Brod’s insistence on 
Kafka’s Jewishness as a kind of sectarian queerness, and it seems particularly outspoken 
17 Hannah Arendt was also a member of the “New York Intellectuals” and had written for Com-
mentary within its first year of publication. Anders and Arendt, both students of Martin Heideg-
ger, were married from 1929 to 1937. 
18 William Phillips, “The Great Wall of China, by Franz Kafka; and The Kafka Problem, edited by 
Angel Flores,” in Commentary (June 1947): 594–596, 595.
19 Phillips, “The Great Wall of China,” 596.
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among Jewish critics – obviously as part and parcel of that glorious Jewish attitude which 
refuses to look at a problem, be it ever so Jewish, from a “merely” Jewish standpoint. This 
Jewish standpoint, if rightly understood, might easily be the most reliable graduator of any 
spiritual or cultural situation, and there is nothing “mere” to it but, on the contrary, quite 
a catholicity.20 
Torberg’s statement is, first, a provocative accusation of Jewish self-hatred: he 
regards Phillips’s insistence that Jewish writers transcend Jewish issues as a 
charge of Jewish particularism. Torberg’s critique is moreover a remarkable inter-
vention in the Kafka debate: he argues not only that it is unnecessary to choose 
between the particular and the universal when it comes to Kafka, but that it may 
well be that Kafka’s Jewishness – that aspect of his person and writing which is 
taken to be most local, personal, contingent, and particular – is in fact the best 
measure of his universalism (what Torberg cleverly refers to as his “catholicity”). 
Torberg adds, “As a matter of fact, I believe that if something is ‘good for the Jews,’ 
it is usually good for all others, too; but then, it could be that this is just a personal 
notion and a half-baked thesis of mine.”21 Rather than set aside Kafka’s Judaism 
and thereby attempt to stand above or outside of it – as if this were the only way to 
grasp his universality – Torberg insists that Jewish concerns are in fact universal 
concerns. Thus, by identifying with Kafka’s “Jewish standpoint,” one can grasp 
the universalism of his writing. 
Torberg’s rhetoric and positioning are crucial to understanding Anders’s con-
flicted relationship to Kafka: the overt concern with particularism versus univer-
sality; the question of perspective, i.e., seeing and judging matters “as a Jew” or 
“universally”; the thinly veiled accusations of self-hatred and treason. Indeed, 
this miniature postwar New York Kafka debate provides the context for Anders’s 
central claim about Kafka, to which I have alluded: namely, that Kafka views 
Judaism from a Christian perspective. Thus, Anders writes:
It is quite misleading to interpret Kafka as carrying on the tradition of Jewish faith or the-
ology. But at the same time it is partly as a result of his Jewishness, through the fact of his 
being a Jew, and as a Jew socially an outsider, that he comes to feel “sinful” and “in need of 
salvation.” He judges his position as a Jew from a Christian perspective. He is not a Jewish 
theologian but a Christianizing theologian of Jewish existence.22 
20 Friedrich Torberg, “Kafka the Jew,” in Commentary (August 1947): http://www.commentary-
magazine.com/article/kafka-the-jew/.
21 Torberg, “Kafka the Jew.”
22 Anders, Franz Kafka 91–92; translation slightly modified.
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Anders’s “particularizing” readings of Kafka – he detects aspects of modern 
Jewish experience encoded in Kafka’s stories – are in fact central to his under-
standing of Kafka as a universal homo religiosus. Anders does not think that 
Kafka’s Jewishness can simply be set aside in order to discover the universal 
aspects of his thinking and writing. Nor does he believe that there is any Jewish 
theology in Kafka’s religiosity (the “shamefaced atheism”), which for Anders is 
the source of Kafka’s universalism. He asserts, instead, that Kafka stands outside 
of Judaism, and that this standing outside is at once the archetypical expression 
of Kafka’s Jewishness and what precludes him from truly adhering to Judaism. 
Moreover, this positioning is what gives Kafka a decidedly Christian view of 
Judaism. This relates to Torberg’s notion of Kafka’s Jewishness constituting his 
universalism (or catholicity), but Anders is far more skeptical than Torberg about 
how neatly Judaism, Christianity, and universalism fit together in Kafka’s oeuvre. 
What exactly does Anders mean when he states that Kafka looks at his being 
a Jew with Christian eyes? He argues that this is more than just a preoccupation 
with guilt, redemption, punishment, and sacrifice. Indeed, Kafka sees the Jew’s 
outsiderhood through a Christian lens, i.e., Kafka reads a socio-cultural condi-
tion theologically. For Kafka, according to Anders, the “expulsion from Paradise” 
is an “eternal condition” from which we cannot be redeemed in this world, and 
this produces a “frozen striving for redemption.”23 Anders considers this notion 
decidedly Christian for at least two reasons: first, because the existential situa-
tion of unshakeable guilt reflects an internalization of the idea of original sin; 
and second, because Kafka’s insistence on non-belonging to the Jewish people 
is fundamentally non-Judaic. For instance, Anders invokes Abraham’s cove-
nant on behalf of the Jewish people to suggest that Judaism is founded on an 
idea of (Jewish) inclusivity, such that, theologically speaking, the Jewish religion 
emphasizes the belonging and inclusion of Jews, not the exclusion of non-Jews.24 
Without disputing Kafka’s feelings of outsiderhood as a fact of social experience, 
Anders contends that Kafka Christianizes this condition by expressing the need 
to be redeemed from a state of permanent exclusion.25
Significantly, it is precisely those aspects of Kafka’s writing that supposedly 
reflect a Christian perspective that Anders painstakingly distanced himself from 
in his own personal efforts at Jewish self-fashioning. In his 1978 essay “Mein 
Judentum” (“My Judaism”) Anders identifies the essence of his identification as 
a Jew in his rejection of the doctrine of original sin and the imperative to correct 
23 Anders, “Kafka: Ritual Without Religion,” 567.
24 Anders, “Kafka: Ritual Without Religion,” 568.
25 See Anders, Kafka, Pro und Contra, 93–94.
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the Christian misunderstanding of Jewish chosenness. Two passages from this 
essay are particularly revealing. The first is an anecdote from his schoolboy days, 
in which Anders answers the question of when he first felt himself to be Jewish. 
Asked by another child about redemption and sin, the young Anders already 
then refuses to accept the state of affairs that the Christian child takes as given – 
namely, that we are all born into sin, that we are awaiting redemption, and that 
Christ is the redeemer. He states quite explicitly that “being a Jew” (“ein Jude 
sein”) took on a certain significance at this point: it meant a firm rejection of the 
guilt internalized by Christians and imposed by them onto Jews.26 Anders thus 
asserts that even he, whose Jewish upbringing was significantly less traditional 
and observant than Kafka’s, feels an innate disconnect from the doctrine of orig-
inal sin. His unwillingness to internalize inescapable guilt and participate in a 
“frozen striving for redemption” is the foundation of Anders’s self-understand-
ing as a Jew, whereas Kafka’s whole oeuvre struggles with guilt and redemption. 
Anders’s own Judaism is rooted in a few essential beliefs and convictions that are 
contradicted by Kafka’s writing.
The second aspect of Anders’s self-description as a Jew that sheds light on his 
critique of Kafka concerns his understanding of Jewish election, which also relates 
to the matter of inclusion and exclusion.27 He explains that much anti-Semitism 
derives from misunderstandings of this idea, which in facts stems from a rather 
commonplace and uncontroversial passage in the Bible: the Jews were “chosen” 
in the sense that they had a “unique reciprocal covenant” with their God; they 
could worship no other God, and God could “choose” no other people. Yet there 
were other groups who had their own gods, perhaps with the same covenant 
as the Jews; this is the concept of henotheism, according to which a monothe-
istic group does not necessarily deny the existence of other deities that might 
be worshipped by other groups. During this “‘henotheisitic’ epoch of Judaism,” 
monotheism did not mean that there was only one God in an absolute sense, but 
rather that each people had its own “tribal god” and was potentially “chosen” by 
that God. The problem, Anders explains, arose when other groups, i.e., non-Jews, 
adopted the Old Testament and transformed the God of the Jews into the God of 
all people. This led non-Jews to believe that the Jews were asserting an arrogant 
26 Günther Anders, “Mein Judentum,” in Das Günther Anders Lesebuch [The Günther Anders 
Reader], ed. Bernhard Lassahn, Diogenes, Zurich 1984, 234–251, 235–236.
27 My claim is that there are two theological ideas – one relating to original sin, the other relat-
ing to Jewish election – that are crucial for Anders’s own Judaism and for his critique of Kafka. 
There are additional social, historical, and cultural dimensions of his Jewishness that he de-
scribes in “My Judaism.” 
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and exclusionary claim that only they were the chosen people of the one true 
God, a misevaluation which fostered centuries of resentment and hatred. Thus, 
according to Anders, the problem of Jewish election exists only for non-Jews who 
misunderstand the henotheistic period as simply monotheistic and who miscon-
strue Jewish claims to chosenness as universal rather than private. Anders feels a 
“Jewish duty” to clarify this misunderstanding about Jewish election to his Chris-
tian readers.28
Anders’s well-intentioned but unorthodox interpretation of Jewish election 
appears to stem from distaste for the concept of chosenness. His explanation 
reflects a left-wing universalism that relativizes this idea. And yet it also invokes 
and advances the rhetoric of inside and outside, and treats his Jewish perspective 
as privileged. For Anders, it is natural – and forgivable – that his Christian readers 
would misconstrue the idea of Jewish election; as a Jew, he is uniquely poised 
and morally compelled to clarify the matter.29 Anders thus reaffirms, this time 
through his own ability and need to see the world from a Jewish perspective, the 
outsider position of the Jew. Indeed, he thoroughly embraces and participates in 
this brand of Jewish outsiderhood: the Jew stands outside, according to Anders, 
but he stands outside together with other Jews, and this confers certain benefits 
and enables certain insights. The privilege of this outsider position is what allows 
and obligates Anders to help bring about religious harmony and understanding. 
In Anders’s view, Kafka is fundamentally alienated from Judaism: he adopts 
a Christian perspective on original sin and Jewish chosenness. This is what makes 
him a “double pariah” not only in the sense that Anders explicitly intends  – 
belonging fully to neither Eastern nor Western Jewry  – but also in the sense 
that he experiences exclusion as a Jew (Eastern and Western), and then again 
on account of his Christianizing perspective.30 This actually makes him a triple 
pariah, though Anders does not himself state this. To claim that Kafka looks at 
his being a Jew with Christian eyes is a highly personal charge: Kafka accepts 
original sin and the endless striving for redemption, the rejection of which lies 
at the heart of Anders’s own definition of his Judaism.31 Though he empathizes 
28 This is a paraphrase of Anders’s argument (see Anders, “Mein Judentum,” 245–246).
29 Anders, “Mein Judentum,” 245–246.
30 Anders, Kafka, Pro und Contra, 18.
31 Anders’s argument seems theologically flawed. After all, the endless striving for redemption 
belongs more to Judaism than Christianity, where the savior has already come and saved the 
souls of his followers. Anders seems aware of this objection, and responds with a preemptive but 
unsubstantiated claim: “The paradox of Jewish messianism (which might be said always to have 
rejected any Messiah appearing in the real world as a false Messiah) has nothing in common with 
the paradox of Kafka’s ideal of redemption, devoid as it is of a definite goal” (see Anders, Franz 
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with Kafka’s Jewish suffering, he cannot accept Kafka’s fundamentally non-Ju-
daic worldview. Indeed, this is so insidious that it kindles suspicions of treason. 
Anders is not simply confused, alienated, and disappointed by Kafka; he feels, as 
a Jewish writer and thinker, a deep sense of betrayal. 
3  Writing for the Perpetrators: Anders Sharpens 
His Critique 
Though Anders’s ambivalence toward Kafka had been openly declared by 1951 
via the title of his book about Kafka, it became most explicit in the Kafka section 
of the 1984 introduction to his essay collection Mensch ohne Welt, the tone and 
content of which oscillate between reverence and dismissal. Anders states that 
while re-reading Kafka’s works in preparation for the publication of his essay in 
Commentary, he had been caught between “Bewunderung und Abneigung,” or 
“admiration and aversion.” He explains that, on the one hand, he felt that he 
had established a quite accurate reading of Kafka’s religiosity, a reading “whose 
sharp and polemical tone and content stood out in the generally fashionable, 
pseudo-religious as well as pseudo-political, murmurings about Kafka.”32 (To 
support this assessment, Anders mentions several important thinkers, including 
Ernst Bloch and Georg Lukács, who had praised his essay.33) On the other hand, 
he realized that the human catastrophes of the time – including the Holocaust 
and the bombing of Hiroshima – had rendered literary study, and even literature 
itself, a luxury. Anders’s ambivalence plays out not only on the level of Kafka 
criticism, or literary criticism in general, and its relationship to moral and politi-
cal crisis, but also in his own “personal” relationship to Kafka. Indeed, it is here 
that Anders identifies the matter of original sin as having stood at the core of his 
resistance to Kafka: 
Since the (very belated) moment I realized that without the concept of original sin all of 
European culture would have been impossible, I have been outraged by the injustice of this 
concept. I have always rejected as presumptuous the meaningless and worthless demand 
that I, without awareness of sin or guilt of any kind (let alone an inherited one), should feel 
guilty, even savor the feeling of guilt – which many took as further proof of my guilt. He who 
Kafka, 91). Even if this were a valid interpretation of Jewish messianism, Kafka’s striving without 
a goal is unlike Christian striving, the point of which is the return of Christ.
32 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXVI.
33 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXVI–VII. 
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defends himself as non-guilty, insists even on his innocence, supposedly makes himself 
more guilty, for example of “self-righteousness.” To me, as opposed to Kafka, this was all 
absolutely unacceptable. To confess guilt, to go so far as to take pleasure in the confession 
of guilt – I was profoundly resistant to this while writing my Kafka essay.34
Anders is not merely skeptical of the authors of those 11,000-plus books on Kafka. 
He is, at some level, angry with – or at least disapproving of – Kafka himself for 
having provided fodder for this industry. Echoes of the story about the school-
boy from “Mein Judentum” resonate in the preceding quotation: Anders suspects 
that Kafka would have readily submitted to the Christian boy’s accusations and 
assumed the guilt ascribed to him. For Anders, such an action amounts to a kind 
of Jewish treason – felt all the more acutely because Kafka not only accepts Chris-
tian guilt, but takes pleasure in it.
Traces of Anders’s feeling of betrayal are present in the versions first pub-
lished in English, in 1949, and in German, in 1951; however, it is most explicit in 
the 1984 introduction. Here Anders argues that Kafka does not in fact write for 
the weak, the victimized, the disenfranchised, the underdog, the Jew – the “loser 
sons,” as the literary scholar and cultural critic Avital Ronell has memorably 
called them – but for the winners, the authorities, the fathers, the Christians, the 
postwar Germans – the “Eichmannsöhne und -enkel” (“the sons and grandsons 
of Eichmann”), to use a phrase Anders employs in “Mein Judentum” and else-
where.35 Anders’s response to Kafka’s supposed treason is decidedly vengeful: it 
involves not only a gesture of disavowal and expropriation, but also a literary and 
ethical subversion that strikes at the heart of Kafka’s writing. By claiming that 
Kafka falls on the side of winners rather than losers, Anders reverses the power 
dynamic that seems to undergird Kafka’s moral universe, thereby rendering him 
a far less sympathetic writer than he is generally taken to be. While other Kafka 
critics of the day  – existentialists, atheists, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Czechs, 
etc. – were desperately trying to claim Kafka as theirs, Anders seemed eager to 
disavow him.
My reading is closely tied to Max Brod’s critique of Anders’s essay. Brod 
asserts that Anders misconstrues this power dynamic in Kafka, in that Anders 
mistakenly thinks that Kafka validates rather than criticizes those who exert 
authority, ascribe guilt, and exact punishment. By ignoring “that which is pos-
itive and active in [Kafka] that exists alongside the negative”  – in particular 
Kafka’s capacity for belief in a higher power  – and missing Kafka’s irony, the 
34 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXIII.
35 Anders, “Mein Judentum,” 235.
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point of which is to expose and reject these arbitrary abuses of power, Anders, 
according to Brod, comes to the absurd conclusion that “Kafka was an anticipa-
tory fascist.”36 This conclusion would be absurd, were it an accurate description 
of Anders’s position. It seems unlikely that Anders believed that Kafka displays 
a proto-fascist ideology. (It is similarly doubtful that Brod sincerely thought this 
about Anders.) However, Anders does declare Kafka guilty of a kind of treason – 
against the Jew, the weakling, the loser – which lends some credence to Brod’s 
admittedly exaggerated charges. Without ascribing to Kafka the invidious posi-
tion that Brod claims it does, Anders’s characterization of Kafka’s failed or absent 
Judaism undermines the attitudes toward power and submission generally asso-
ciated with Kafka’s writings. 
The following passage from Kafka, Pro and Contra effectively illustrates 
Anders’s critique: 
In his own complicated but consistent way, then, Kafka is a realist; he shows what the world 
looks like from the outside. […] The possibility that the newcomer might be right in suspect-
ing that customs are in fact decrees, that the rationalist might in fact have an insight into 
truth, is an idea which Kafka never expresses. For him the newcomer is always wrong, on 
principle, for in a way Kafka sees the problem of the alien, the newcomer, the Jew, through 
the eyes of those who do not accept the alien.37 
Anders is attempting to paraphrase the perspective that Kafka represents, not 
the belief that underlies this perspective, which is neither Anders’s nor Kafka’s. 
Brod misreads Anders: he thinks Anders is claiming that Kafka agrees with this 
perspective, and thus thinks that Anders attributes deep malice and even fascist 
inclination to Kafka. However, Anders is not claiming that the stranger is wrong 
to question authority, or that Kafka believes this: after all, the only one who pos-
sesses the “truth,” even in Anders’s account, is the stranger. But he is saying 
that Kafka only ever represents this position – the one according to which “the 
alien, the newcomer, the Jew” never finds acceptance or validation. According to 
Anders, Kafka writes the story of the loser, but from the perspective of the winner.
Anders’s reading does not quite attribute fascist attitudes to Kafka, and yet 
it is accusatory. Brod discerned this without having found the proper expression 
for it. If Kafka truly represents the perspective of the winner, even in a story about 
the plight of a loser, where does this leave the loser? If Kafka fails to give voice 
to the views and beliefs of the weakling, even if the reader senses that this weak-
36 Max Brod, “Ermordung einer Puppe namen Franz Kafka” (“Murder of a Puppet Named Franz 
Kafka”), in Über Franz Kafka [On Franz Kafka], Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1985: 375–387, 382, and 385. 
37 Anders, Franz Kafka, 28 (italics added to reflect the original).
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ling is indeed the bearer of truth, then it would seem that Kafka has abandoned 
the very ones who most need him. To depict every situation “through the eyes of 
those who do not accept the alien” is to forsake all the aliens who seem to occupy 
the moral center of his stories and garner the reader’s attention, sympathy, and 
support. This is the charge Anders levels against Kafka: not proto-fascism, but 
abandonment – of the weaklings, the sons, the servants, the Jews. As he notes in 
the 1984 introduction, “if in this work I persuaded myself that I had discovered an 
enemy in Kafka, this was because every inclination to servility and assimilation 
rubbed me the wrong way.”38 This is the closest Anders comes to a confession: 
he thinks that Kafka champions – or at least takes some degree of pleasure in – 
weakness and submission, and Anders finds this intellectually and morally repel-
lant. He is determined to show that there are dire and dramatic consequences to 
Kafka’s “Christian worldview” – not just for Kafka, but for his readers and above 
all for his “loser sons,” who are left with nothing. It is supposed to hurt to think 
that Kafka has forsaken his weaklings, his strangers, his Jews. This, it should be 
noted, is why Brod is so upset in his rejoinder to Anders’s essay.
According to Anders, Kafka adopts a Christian perspective on Jewish matters. 
This move by Kafka not only estranges Anders, but also results in a shift of nar-
rative and figural allegiance away from the loser: the winner is validated, not 
in the sense that he is on the side of truth and right, but in the sense that the 
story belongs to him. Thus, Kafka’s fiction presents heroes, not anti-heroes; the 
weak are left with nothing, not even narrative perspective. The final, arguably 
most extreme step in Anders’s critique occurs in the final paragraph of the Kafka 
section of the 1984 introduction, which, as noted, teems with hostility and arro-
gance towards literary critics and even Kafka himself. Anders attempts to explain 
the postwar German resurgence of interest in Kafka in a way that indirectly but 
undoubtedly blames Kafka for making himself available to a society of guilty 
Germans who have consistently failed to take responsibility for their complicity 
in Nazi crimes: 
The interest that Jews have taken in Kafka’s representation of Jewish existence is of course 
completely legitimate. In contrast, what requires explanation is the fervent curiosity that 
broke out among Germans after 1950. Those who were guilty of and complicit in the exces-
sive crimes of the Hitler regime, who knew very well what they had done and yet were not 
only not charged with or punished for anything, but rather, with few exceptions, continued 
to live in a self-satisfied and smug manner – they were presumably thankful to have been 
supplied with an antipodal figure.39
38 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXII.
39 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXIX.
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Anders suggests there was a perfect fit between postwar Germans – who were 
aware of their guilt but were neither charged nor punished for their crimes – and 
a character like Josef K., in Der Proceß [The Trial], who is not guilty but is never-
theless accused and convicted of unknown crimes. Such characters, according 
to Anders, provide a kind of moral-psychological absolution for guilty Germans: 
“The deification of Kafka once again erased the fact that his family of millions had 
been killed. And if he is made famous, then primarily not as a writer, but rather 
as someone who provides a figure that, though not guilty, nevertheless gets pun-
ished.”40 For Anders, Kafka’s “counter-figure” offers a convenient escape from 
causal thinking about guilt and punishment, which is precisely what postwar 
Germans were seeking, given that their guilt had gone unpunished. By prais-
ing and deifying Kafka – not for his literary talent, but for creating this figure of 
moral absence – they find a means to erase their own crimes. Kafka thus enables 
postwar Germans to acknowledge their guilt without having to face any conse-
quences for it, such as suffering or loss. This is the precise opposite of how things 
work in Kafka’s fictions, where there are consequences regardless of culpability, 
but in both situations guilt and punishment are uncoupled and exist in an unpre-
dictable relationship. 
Anders concludes the Kafka section of the 1984 introduction – his last word, 
so to speak, on the author – by claiming that this moral-psychological “Kafka epi-
demic” (the “Kafka-Seuche,” as he terms it) was most pronounced not necessar-
ily among the most ideologically committed and criminal Nazis, but among the 
far more numerous group of fellow travelers. This epidemic, he notes, “arguably 
broke out in particular among those Germans who had participated halfheartedly 
and who wished to prove – also to themselves – that they could accept, at least 
in the form of literature, the guilt ascribed to them by the victors, and thereby 
work through their remorse in the form of artistic admiration.”41 According to 
Anders, Kafka upsets the moral order, enabling everyday Germans to cover over 
their crimes against the Jewish people with literary appreciation. He enables a 
generation of complicit Germans to sidestep their guilt by offering up “artistic 
appreciation” (“Kunstbewunderung”) as a valueless substitute for and distrac-
tion from ethical behavior. (Incidentally, this reading sheds light on Anders’s sus-
piciousness of German literary study, or Germanistik.)
Anders thus performs a radical reversal of the received wisdom about Kafka. 
Rather than give voice to the weakling, the victim, the Jew, Kafka actually offers a 
generation of Nazi fellow travelers a free pass, liberating them from their guilt not 
40 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXIX. Emphasis in original.
41 Anders, “Einleitung,” XXXIX.
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through actual atonement but through a quick aesthetic fix. Kafka is thus deified 
not because he is a suffering Jew (though presumably this adds a useful note of 
piety and solemnity to the Nazi sympathizers’ interest in him), but because he pre-
sents a world in which punishment is uncoupled from crime. If there are people 
who suffer the consequences of transgression without having transgressed, so 
the thinking goes, then there must be people who transgress without suffering 
any consequences. By depicting a situation of moral chaos, Kafka makes himself 
available to soothe the collective conscience of the “sons and grandsons of Eich-
mann” that populate postwar Germany and facilitate their false and facile efforts 
to come to terms with the past.
The arguments about Kafka’s appeal to a postwar German audience are thus 
closely tied to Anders’s claims about Kafka’s supposedly universal but actually 
Christian perspective on guilt and his idea that Kafka tells the story of the loser 
from the perspective of the winner. His Christian “winner” perspective makes 
him appealing to and worthy of admiration among Germans, especially guilty 
ones. It is only because Kafka embraces a Christian worldview that he can be such 
a feel-good source of wonder to guilty Germans, which means not that Kafka is 
responsible for or had somehow predicted the Holocaust, but that he is part of 
the reason why postwar Germans continue to shirk responsibility for it. Thus, 
by identifying the heart of Anders’s critique in his claim about Kafka’s Jewish 
treason, we begin to understand Anders’s peculiar conclusion that Kafka helps 
complicit postwar Germans forget their guilt, or gives them license to ignore it.
4 Conclusion: On Not Forgiving Kafka
There is much to object to in Anders’s critique of Kafka. As a psychologistic 
reading of literature, it is not especially convincing: can matters of personal con-
science and responsibility really be projected onto fictional characters in the way 
that Anders assumes, and will such projection achieve for the reader the kind of 
moral cleansing that Anders suggests? It is far from clear that literature works 
this way for any individual reader, much less for a (national) body of readers. As 
an ethical reading, Anders’s critique likewise misses the mark: as Brod notes, the 
fact that Kafka presents a world in which guilt and punishment are unlinked does 
not mean that he approves of such a world or is a moral nihilist. Kafka presents a 
modern existential condition; he does not validate it, and his fictions in fact leave 
much room for moral deliberation. Moreover, as concerns literary form, Anders’s 
reading seems simplistic: a detailed analysis of Kafka’s rhetoric and narrative 
strategies would reveal that he never really chooses sides, and thus he cannot 
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be accused of betraying his weaklings, servants, and Jews. He channels winners 
and losers, Jews and Christians, fathers and sons, often in close succession or 
even simultaneously. Kafka represents the world not simply from multiple per-
spectives, but from perspectives embedded within other perspectives; similarly, 
he never levels absolute judgment, be it pro or contra. It is senseless to argue that 
he writes from one position and against another, for Kafka’s work often evidences 
multiple shifts in perspective, reversals in voice, and acts of ventriloquism. 
This is true even within some of the short texts.42 Finally, the emotional charge 
of Anders’s commentary arouses suspicion: can someone so clearly driven by 
anger, resentment, and a sense of betrayal really be trusted to read Kafka fairly?43 
Anders seems eager  – even fixated  – to punish Kafka for having betrayed the 
principle belief at the heart of Anders’s own identification as a Jew, namely, the 
rejection of original sin. But why should Kafka have felt Jewish in precisely the 
same way as Anders? Indeed, Kafka surely could never have written an essay enti-
tled “My Judaism” (or, for that matter, “My Jewishness”), given his ambivalence 
and exasperation over these issues. It is only because Anders identifies so closely 
with Kafka that he can feel so betrayed when it turns out that Kafka’s sense of Jew-
ishness lies elsewhere than his own. Anders’s deeply personal and idiosyncratic 
vendetta against Kafka casts suspicion on his interpretive motives.
And yet there is also an important point that speaks for Anders’s critique: 
it posits a meaningful connection between Kafka and the Holocaust without 
subscribing to the “Kafka-as-oracle-of-doom position,” as the literary critic Paul 
Reitter has termed it.44 Rather than claim that suffering and loss in Kafka have pre-
42 See, for example, Avital Ronell on the “corruption” of perspective in Kafka’s Brief an den 
Vater [Letter to the Father], in Avital Ronell, Loser Sons: Politics and Authority, University of Illi-
nois Press, Urbana 2012, 118.
43 Ronell serves as a counter-model to Anders, for she discerns precisely the same problem in 
Kafka (a siding with authority, a delight in submission), yet her response is earnest and straight-
forward. Ronell cites the “noble and fruitful feeling” that accompanies Kafka’s sense of domina-
tion by the father and notes that she is uneasy about this “miniscule supplement of profit when 
accounting for the losses” (Ronell, Loser Sons, 127):
 the way Kafka aligns disruptive allegations within the frame of description makes one slow 
down and crawl under newly oppressive spaces. I would not be forced to crouch and strain 
in this way if our letter writer had not included-excluded the parenthetical bit about the 
noble feeling and fruitfulness, perverting an otherwise perfectly tranquil-seeming seman-
tic field, shaking it up so as to expose uneven valences and intrusive tropes of encounter. 
(Ronell, Loser Sons, 128)
 Ronell registers with dismay and distaste the very thing that Anders registers with thinly con-
cealed anger and resentment, namely the pleasure Kafka takes in being a “loser.”
44 Reitter, “Misreading Kafka.”
302   Kata Gellen 
dictive value, which always implies, implausibly, that he had somehow divined 
future catastrophes and that the Holocaust could be predicted, Anders suggests 
that literary expression can have a psychological use value for Kafka’s postwar 
German readers. He does not analyze Kafka’s works in order to explain an event 
that Kafka could not have anticipated. This alone puts Anders a step ahead of 
most readings that suggest a link between Kafka and the Holocaust. Rather, he 
looks at a contemporary phenomenon  – the resurgence of interest in Kafka in 
postwar Germany – and tries to explain it as a matter of reception. According to 
Anders, suffering and loss in Kafka do not enable us to see the future; instead, 
they help us understand how a later generation of readers might have reacted 
to the reality that their undeniable guilt had gone unpunished. Even if this is a 
misreading of Kafka for the reasons outlined above, it is nonetheless a productive 
and revealing one vis-à-vis the society that Anders is critiquing.
First, regardless of whether Kafka can actually perform this work of collective 
postwar German absolution, the diagnosis itself is important and largely accu-
rate. Kafka may not provide the solution to the moral problems of German guilt, 
but Anders has correctly identified the issue. He warns against substituting aes-
thetics for ethics; such substitution is why he worries that Kafka, in upsetting the 
moral order according to which guilt and punishment exist in a predictable causal 
relationship, has opened the door for Kunstbewunderung to fill the void of ethics. 
Anders seems keenly aware of the ease with which postwar Germans could let 
ideals of culture, art, and education stand for (and in the way of) a sincere reck-
oning with their moral failings. Indeed, he suspects that this is precisely what 
has motivated their exaggerated interest in Kafka. Let us not be fooled by super-
ficial or self-serving philo-semitism, he seems to say. Let us not believe that a 
widespread social pathology has been cured simply because postwar Germans 
have elevated a Jew to the status of a literary god – a Jew, by the way, who can be 
deified thusly only because he himself died before he could become a victim of 
the Nazis. Regardless of whether Anders is correct about why postwar Germans 
read Kafka (and assuming, contra Anders, that Kafka is indeed free of any culpa-
bility for this possible misappropriation), he is right to admonish them for any 
possible attempt to transfigure literary appreciation into moral defense. 
Second, Anders perceptively draws attention to the problem of mass com-
plicity under the Nazis, a topic which Hannah Arendt had already written about 
in 194545 and which would be a cornerstone of Anders’s only other work on 
Nazi crimes and the Holocaust. In the latter work – an open letter to the son of 
45 Hannah Arendt, “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” in Essays in Understanding, 
1930–1954, ed. Jerome Kahn, Schocken Books, New York 1994, 121–132. 
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Adolf Eichmann, entitled Wir Eichmannsöhne: Offener Brief an Klaus Eichmann 
[We Sons of Eichmann: Open Letter to Klaus Eichmann], from 196446  – Anders 
acknowledges the centrality of Arendt’s concept of organized guilt to his think-
ing about postwar Germany. Arendt had developed this concept as a means to 
describe a totalizing politics in which everyone is guilty but no one can be held 
accountable. However, whereas Arendt’s theory is descriptive, Anders’s is pre-
scriptive: he believes in the possibility for personal moral behavior despite the 
assembly-line character of modern life, in which individuals perform localized 
tasks and shirk responsibility for the end results of the “totalizing machine” – 
results that include such catastrophes as the Holocaust and the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.47 The mental abdication of responsibility leads Anders 
to dub postwar Germany and Austria an “Eichmann world” (“Eichmannwelt”) 
inhabited by “Eichmann sons” (“Eichmannsöhne”).48 Understanding the central 
claims about responsibility and moral action that Anders advances in the open 
letter sheds light on his critique of Kafka from thirteen years earlier, even before 
that critique had been fully elaborated in the 1984 introduction to Mensch ohne 
Welt. Moreover, it helps show that Anders’s Kafka book had always – or at least 
since 195149 – been an attempt to expose and explain postwar German society’s 
failure to take responsibility for its Nazi past. It is a Holocaust book not because it 
accounts for the source of Nazi atrocities, but because it accounts for and reflects 
upon their disturbing afterlife. Anders’s Kafka, Pro and Contra is thus an impor-
tant intervention in the debates about responsibility and culpability under the 
46 Günther Anders, Wir Eichmannsöhne. Offener Brief an Klaus Eichmann, C. H. Beck, Munich 
2002.
47 Anders, Wir Eichmannsöhne, 81–82.
48 Anders, Wir Eichmannsöhne, 58. See also Ann-Kathrin Pollmann, “Ein offener Brief an Eich-
manns Söhne. Günther Anders schreibt Klaus Eichmann” (“An Open Letter to Eichmann’s Sons. 
Günther Anders Writes Klaus Eichmann”), in Interessen um Eichmann: israelische Justiz, deutsche 
Strafverfolgung und alte Kameradschaften [Concerning Eichmann: Israeli Justice, German Law En-
forcement and Old Comraderies], ed. Werner Renz. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 2012, 241–258. 
As Pollmann argues, for Anders postwar Germany is an “Eichmann world” (“Eichmannwelt”), a 
society thoroughly in the grips of the legacy of National Socialism. Anders addresses and takes 
up the fates of “significant individuals” – e.g., Eichmann’s son, or the pilot of the airplane from 
which the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima – who enable an articulation of broad com-
plicity in mass annihilation. Anders does not simply condemn this “Eichmann world,” but seeks 
to show how the catastrophes of World War II created new kinds of guilt and demanded new 
measures for atonement.
49 It is possible that this dimension of the text also goes further back, but nothing definitive 
is known about the content of the 1934 lecture. Ann-Kathrin Pollmann has searched in vain for 
lecture notes or a transcript.
304   Kata Gellen 
Nazis, especially as it presents an early diagnosis of widespread moral failing that 
survived the defeat of the Third Reich.
In a curious way, it is the Holocaust that saves Anders’s Kafka book. As sug-
gested earlier, his readings, though astute and quite intelligent at times, are none-
theless psychologically unconvincing, morally simplistic, insufficiently attentive 
to literary form and rhetoric, and too laden with affect to be considered neutral 
or objective criticism. We should read Anders less for his literary insights than 
for his account of postwar Germany’s lingering Nazi problem; for him, the enthu-
siastic reception of Kafka is merely a symptom of this problem. Anders does not 
blame Kafka for the Nazi genocide against the Jews, nor does he praise Kafka 
for having some sort of prescient vision of this horror. Instead, he evaluates the 
guilt of a society of “Eichmen” (“Eichmänner”) and blames Kafka for unwittingly 
helping them to assuage this guilt.
By reading Anders’s Kafka study as a book on the afterlife of the Holocaust 
in postwar Germany one comes to understand why his critique of Kafka grows 
sharper, not milder, over time. From 1951 to 1984, Anders seems to have become 
angrier and more resentful toward Kafka and to have formulated the charge of 
betrayal in increasingly direct and harsh terms. This development makes sense 
only if his book is meant not simply as a reading of Kafka but as an explana-
tion of a postwar German pathology that Kafka’s writing allegedly exacerbates. 
If the evasion of moral responsibility for Nazi crimes was acute in 1951, it was 
even worse in 1984. The longer Kafka enables this evasion, the more guilty he 
becomes of betraying his Jewishness. This is why Anders articulates the dis-
turbing implications of his original assessment of Kafka so explicitly in the final 
publication of the essay. It is also why Anders cannot simply forgive Kafka. Time 
does not heal this wound. Indeed, the effects of Kafka’s ostensible treason – that 
he takes a Christian view on the world and that he tells the story of the loser 
from the perspective of the winner – become more pronounced and far-reaching 
over time. This also explains why Anders’s reading of Kafka remained essentially 
unchanged from 1934 to 1984, even as his sense of its power as a tool of societal 
diagnosis further solidified.
Even if Anders would agree that Kafka, sixty years after his death in 1924, 
cannot possibly be blamed for the misuse of his writings by morally compromised 
Nazi collaborators in the decades after World War II, he would probably be unwill-
ing to pardon him for his supposed acts of betrayal on ethical grounds. Anders 
holds that people must be held responsible not only for their actions and words, 
but also for the consequences of these actions and words. This is the essence of 
the practical ethics he puts forth in We Sons of Eichmann and elsewhere. Moral 
behavior, in his view, involves projecting beyond one’s particular place in the 
world and addressing one’s role in the totalizing “world machine.” This requires 
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acts of imagination through which we will finally learn to assume responsibil-
ity for our behavior and choices.50 Thus, to excuse Kafka for inadvertently facili-
tating a process of facile self-absolution for guilty Germans would constitute an 
abdication of moral responsibility. 
And yet it is not the case that Anders’s belief system affords no possibility for 
forgiveness. A central point of his letter to Klaus Eichmann – a letter which fell 
upon deaf ears – is that Anders is willing to forgive him for having consistently 
supported his father, but only on a double condition: Klaus Eichmann must pub-
licly renounce this position now that his father has been condemned and hanged, 
and he must join the fight against nuclear proliferation. This is not Christian for-
giveness; rather, it is a forgiveness that hangs together with Anders’s moral prag-
matism: forgiving someone, since it involves sanctioning or at least overlooking 
immoral behavior, can be justified only when past wrongdoings can be redressed 
via future good deeds  – a kind of practical, this-worldly repentance. It is only 
the living, one must assume, who can be forgiven, since they remain capable of 
reforming themselves for moral action and preventing future catastrophe. Klaus 
Eichmann did not accept Anders’s suggestion for repentance. Kafka, however, 
was never even offered the chance. He died before he could prove himself worthy 
of forgiveness for an offense for which only Anders thought to condemn him.
Ironically, Anders transforms Kafka from a prophet into an agent of historical 
delusion, from someone who sees into someone who prevents others from seeing. 
Nonetheless, in the process Kafka also shifts once again from the particular to the 
universal. His Jewishness is not merely of local interest, relevant only for Jews, 
but something that relates to a large segment of postwar German society. Anders 
is speaking from both sides of his mouth: he is deriding and dismissing liter-
ary study as a senseless luxury, yet is also explaining the extremely damaging 
effects of a certain phenomenon in literary reception. He wishes to expose Kafka’s 
supposed universalism as actually Christian and to reveal Kafka’s betrayal of his 
fellow Jews, and yet he makes a remarkably convincing case for using Kafka as 
a cipher by which to understand the general phenomenon of postwar German 
guilt, and maybe even the universal problem of literature and critique.
50 Anders, Wir Eichmannsöhne, 34–35.
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Birgit R. Erdle
Dis/Placing Thought: Franz Kafka and 
Hannah Arendt
1  The Grounds of Reality
The position in which thought finds itself after 1945 forces Hannah Arendt to 
leave the realm of philosophy and turn to literature. Only there does she encoun-
ter the question preoccupying her. In her “Preface: The Gap Between Past and 
Future,” which precedes the essays of her 1961 volume Between Past and Future, 
the moment in which she moves into a reading of Kafka is rooted in an experi-
ence that refers to the relation between thought and reality: “reality has become 
opaque for the light of thought.”1 For Arendt, the present Now in which she writes 
and thinks is marked by the fact that thinking and reality are no longer linked 
with one another. Thought does not withstand the shock of reality. Therefore, 
thinking – “no longer bound to incident as the circle remains bound to its focus” – 
risks “either […] becom[ing] altogether meaningless” or relying on truths that 
have been passed down, “old verities which have lost all concrete relevance.”2 
Through the quote from René Char’s Feuillets à Hypnos [Leaves of Hypnos] that 
introduces her essay  – “Notre héritage n’est précédé d’aucun testament  – ‘our 
inheritance was left to us by no testament’”3 – Arendt’s reflections on the diver-
gence of thinking and reality are temporally and logically connected back to the 
time of the resistance and to the realization of the abyss into which the grounds 
of reality, der Boden der Tatsachen, have changed, as she writes in an earlier text.
So it is the wish to describe this particular situation in exact terms that leads 
Arendt to Kafka. She reads Kafka’s text – an account from the series of the “He” 
pieces from 19204 – as a “parable.” In this term, she follows the word’s etymo-
logical traces of meaning (para, next to, and ballein, to throw) and describes the 
text as a kind of missile of rays, which sheds light on the hidden inner structure 
of occurrences. It is precisely in this image that she sees the singularity of Kafka’s 
1 Hannah Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” in Between Past and Future. 
Eight Exercises in Political Thought, Penguin Books, New York 2006, 3–16, 6.
2 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 6.
3 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 3.
4 Franz Kafka, Tagebücher [Diaries], eds. Hans-Gerd Koch, Michael Müller and Malcolm Pasley, 
Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt/M. 2002, 851–852.
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literature. These rays of light, “thrown alongside and around the incident […] 
do not illuminate its outward appearance but possess the power of X rays to lay 
bare its inner structure that, in our case, consists of the hidden processes of the 
mind.”5 
Kafka’s text constructs a thought-image in which a man, “he,” is caught 
between two antagonistic forces: “The scene is a battleground on which the 
forces of the past and the future clash with each other; between them we find 
the man whom Kafka calls ‘he,’ who, if he wants to stand his ground at all, must 
give battle to both forces.”6 Arendt emphasizes that the time currents of the past 
and the future collide as antagonistic forces only because “he” is already there: 
“the fact that there is a fight at all seems due to the presence of the man.”7 The 
term “presence” here emerges in its spatial connotation. Arendt’s commentary 
moves back and forth between “the human being” and the “he,” the pronoun 
that occurs in Kafka’s text; this oscillation thereby signals how the contradiction 
between the universal and the singular in her reading is at once opened up and 
settled. “Seen from the viewpoint of man,” she notes, time is not a continuum; 
rather, it is precisely “at the point where ‘he’ stands,”8 broken or cracked open. In 
the course of Arendt’s reading, her formulation of “the point where ‘he’ stands” – 
in which the place available to “him” has shrunk to an extreme minimum, to a 
point on a line – translates itself into the “standpoint,” addressing the capacity 
of judgment: “‘his’ standpoint is not the present as we usually understand it but 
rather a gap in time which ‘his’ constant fighting, ‘his’ making a stand against 
past and future keeps in existence.”9 Thus, Arendt’s interpretation introduces the 
figure of speech of the “ground under one’s feet” [Boden unter den Füßen] and 
links it to a reflection on temporality by reading it as an “insertion in time”: “Only 
because man is inserted into time and only to the extent that he stands his ground 
does the flow of indifferent time break up into tenses.”10 For Arendt, it is precisely 
this insertion, this point of rupture in the indifferent flow of time, that marks the 
beginning of a beginning, as she writes with recourse to Augustinus.
Kafka’s “he,” in its third-person singular form, appears as a pronoun that 
designates a person who can jump out of the line of battle only in dreams. In this 
sense, one can claim that the form of grammatical speech in Kafka’s text enacts 
5 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 6–7.
6 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 10.
7 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 10.
8 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 10.
9 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 10.
10 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 10. 
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the tension, or perhaps even the conflict, between the singular and the universal: 
the “he” in Kafka at once opens and limits generalization; it does not mediate 
between the singular and the universal. Arendt, however, wishes to develop a 
generally valid metaphor for the activity of thinking via her insertion of and com-
mentary on Kafka’s text. She searches for a metaphor that allows her to think the 
activity of thinking in such a way that it is bound to and remains anchored in the 
present – “rooted in the present.”11 Thus, she is concerned with a thinking that 
remains embedded in “human time”12 and does not surrender to “the old dream 
which Western metaphysics has dreamed from Parmenides to Hegel of a timeless, 
spaceless, suprasensuous realm as the proper region of thought.”13 Arendt brings 
the jump of which Kafka’s “he” “at least” dreams, namely, that “some time in an 
unguarded moment – and this would require a night darker than any night has 
ever been yet – he will jump out of the fighting line,”14 into accord with the jump 
that thought makes from human time into the timeless sphere of metaphysics, as 
passed on in the Western history of philosophy.
For Arendt, Kafka’s “he” has barely enough room to stand, because Kafka 
clings to the traditional image that presents time as a straight line.15 She replaces 
the figure of the line with a parallelogram. According to her argument, this form 
comes into being due to the mere fact that the “he” is imprisoned in the flow of 
time: “The insertion of man, as he breaks up the continuum, cannot but cause 
the forces to deflect, however lightly, from their original direction.”16 This tiny 
deflection of powers allows something spatial, an angle, to appear, and so the 
geometric metaphor changes: the line becomes a plane. Or in Arendt’s words: the 
interval, the gap where “he” stands, becomes something like a parallelogram of 
forces. Yet what is decisive for the genesis of this metaphor of the activity of think-
ing, which Arendt gleans from her reading of Kafka, is that now the point where 
the forces collide becomes the origin of a third figure: namely, a diagonal line. 
Exactly inverting the two forces that meet in the point, this diagonal force would 
be limited from its point of origin but infinite with regard to its end. The move-
ment of thinking expressed in this image would thus have a determined direction 
through past and future, yet at the same time it would not be completable. Arendt 
11 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 12.
12 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 11.
13 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 11.
14 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 7.
15 See Arendt’s notes and comments on different conceptions of temporality in her Denktage-
buch. 1950–1973 [Thinking Diary. 1950–1973], eds. Ursula Ludz and Ingeborg Nordmann, Piper, 
Münich and Zürich 2002.
16 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 11.
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describes the figure constituted in this way as a “small non-time-space in the very 
heart of time,”17 which cannot be passed on but must be constantly reinvented. 
According to this thought-image, then, it is the activity of thinking itself that 
forges a narrow path of non-time in the time-space of the mortal human.
Thus, we see that the attempt to open the battlefield outlined by Kafka char-
acterizes the direction that Arendt’s reading of Kafka takes. However, citing an 
insertion from Kafka’s text, Arendt emphasizes that “this is only theoretically 
so”18 – so […] aber nur teoretisch ist.19 According to Arendt, it is more likely that 
“he” – unable to find the diagonal – perishes from fatigue, “aware only of the 
existence of this gap in time which, as long as he lives, is the ground on which 
he must stand, though it seems to be a battlefield and not a home.”20 Moreo-
ver, Arendt clarifies that her aim is to confront “the contemporary conditions 
of thought” with the help of a metaphor. She emphasizes that her claims apply 
only to mental phenomena, in other words, to thought in time, and cannot be 
transposed to historical or biographical time. But fragments from the ruinous 
landscape of biographical and historical time can be touched and sheltered by 
thought and memory and saved into the (previously noted) “small non-time-
space in the very heart of time.” 
2 Survival and the Temporality of Thought
In her reading of Kafka’s text, Arendt is concerned with the interconnection of 
thought and experience. She thus faces an epistemological question: namely, 
interrogating the possibility of the recognition – and more generally the acknowl-
edgment – of facts,21 a question that Arendt confronted not only due to her own 
experience of persecution, but also because of the knowledge she possessed after 
1943, and, later, because of her work for the committee for Jewish Cultural Recon-
struction, an organization founded in 1947. Arendt repeatedly cites the recourse 
to terms, categories, and patterns of explanation that have been handed down, 
17 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 13.
18 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 12.
19 Kafka, Tagebücher, 852.
20 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 12.
21 See Nicolas Berg, Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker. Erforschung und Erinnerung 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003), 471; edited and shortened English version: Nicolas Berg, The Hol-
ocaust and the West German Historians: Historical Interpretation and Autobiographical Memory, 
ed. and trans. Joel Golb, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 2015.
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including those of philosophy and historiography, as ways that allow us to evade 
this actuality. How we may understand the figure of speech of the “ground under 
one’s feet,” which belongs to the register of long-established idiomatic formu-
lations, as a palimpsest in Arendt’s reading of Kafka, emerges when we consult 
one of Arendt’s earlier texts, the “Dedication to Karl Jaspers” (“Zueignung an Karl 
Jaspers”), written in 1947. There, she speaks of the grounds of reality [dem “Boden 
der Tatsachen, wie er sich mir darstellt”]22 and remarks: “In Auschwitz, the factual 
territory opened up an abyss into which everyone is drawn who attempts after the 
fact to stand on that territory.”23 Thus, if one must leave the grounds of reality so 
as not to disappear into the gaping abyss and not to accept “the world created 
by those facts as necessary and indestructible,”24 then how can thought never-
theless expose itself to this actuality, that is, not turn away from it, not negate it? 
Arendt’s conception of the “world” at this point suggests that she is concerned 
with a universal referentiality of thought. Indeed, for Arendt, as we have seen 
from her reading of Kafka in “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” the 
universal is not situated beyond time. Yet one may note a universalizing gesture 
in the “Dedication to Karl Jaspers,” a gesture that passes through the term of the 
“singular.” If the grounds of reality have become an abyss, then the space that 
one enters to gain distance from this abyss is, in Arendt’s view, an empty space. 
In this empty space, she remarks, there would be neither people nor nations, and 
thus no national belonging, but only “individuals.”25 In Arendt’s argument, these 
individuals [Einzelne26] are translated into “survivors”27 [Überlebende28], in order 
to lead to the term “human beings”29 [Menschen30].
22 Hannah Arendt,“Zueignung an Karl Jaspers,” in Sechs Essays [Six Essays], Lambert Schnei-
der, Heidelberg 1948, 5–10, 6. In the English translation, the passage reads, “I speak here only 
of factual matters as I see them.” See Hannah Arendt, “Dedication to Karl Jaspers,” in Essays 
in Understanding, 1930–1954, ed. Jerome Kohn, trans. Robert and Rita Kimber, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, New York 1994, 212–216, 213. 
23 Arendt, “Dedication to Karl Jaspers,” 215. In the original German, the passage reads, “In 
Auschwitz hat sich der Boden der Tatsachen in einen Abgrund verwandelt, in den jeder hineinge-
zogen wird, der nachträglich versucht, sich auf ihn zu stellen.” Arendt, “Zueignung an Karl Jas-
pers,” 9.
24 Arendt, “Dedication to Karl Jaspers,” 213. 
25 Arendt, “Dedication to Karl Jaspers,” 215.
26 Arendt,“Zueignung an Karl Jaspers,” 9.
27 Arendt, “Dedication to Karl Jaspers,” 215.
28 Arendt,“Zueignung an Karl Jaspers,” 10.
29 Arendt, “Dedication to Karl Jaspers,” 216.
30 Arendt,“Zueignung an Karl Jaspers,” 10.
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But the figure of speech of the “ground under one’s feet,” bound to the 
reading of Kafka’s “he,” also migrates into a text written much later, namely, 
“Where Are We When We Think?” the fourth chapter of Arendt’s posthumously 
published volume The Life of the Mind. In this chapter, it is not only the reflec-
tion on the requirements of thought after the Shoah that is at stake; rather, the 
question bound with this problematic has broadened into one about the tempo-
rality of thought. In other words, it is a matter of discovering “where the think-
ing ego is located in time and whether its relentless activity can be temporally 
determined.”31 The context of the argument in which Arendt’s reading of Kafka is 
now embedded has come uncoupled from the question about the inheritance, the 
testament, the legacy, conveyed in her essay “The Gap Between Past and Future” 
through the citation from René Char’s Feuillets à Hypnos. Arendt refers to Kafka’s 
text as a poetic analysis, thereby highlighting the knowledge of literature and of 
the literary process that constitutes such knowledge: “he” “analyzes poetically 
our ‘inner state’ in regard to time, of which we are aware when we have with-
drawn from the appearances.”32 Even if the impossible task of understanding 
what occurred is not foregrounded here, the situation of the “he,” who is caught 
between the forces of the past and future and must battle both “if he wants to 
stand his ground at all,”33 is described in almost the same words as in the essay 
written nearly a decade earlier. As is the case in the earlier essay, Arendt’s way 
of reading the Kafka text describes the present as a “battleground.” And she 
adds, “This battleground for Kafka is the metaphor for man’s home on earth.”34 
If a universalizing gesture is undeniable in this formulation, which transforms 
Kafka’s “he” into an “Everyman,” then Arendt’s commentary in the following 
sentences again restricts this generalization, by adapting the pronominal form: 
“seen from the viewpoint of man, at each single moment inserted and caught in 
the middle between his past and his future, both aimed at the one who is creat-
ing his present, the battleground is an in-between, an extended Now on which 
he spends his life.”35 Thus, Arendt’s rhetoric vacillates between, on one hand, 
generalization – “the insertion of a fighting presence,”36 in which “he” has sud-
denly disappeared from the scene – and, on the other hand, concretization: “Only 
insofar as he thinks […] does man – a ‘He,’ as Kafka so rightly calls him, and not 
31 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind. 1: Thinking. 2: Willing, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, San 
Diego, New York, and London 1978, 202.
32 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 202.
33 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 203.
34 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 205.
35 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 205.
36 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 208.
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a ‘somebody’ – in the full actuality of his concrete being, live in this gap between 
past and future.”37 
In the recurring reading of Kafka’s text that Arendt offers in The Life of the 
Mind, the category of the “temporality of thought” mediates as question between 
the singular and the universal. The movement of thought that Arendt initiates 
here positions Kafka’s thought-image in line with the respective philosophical 
concepts of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Kant, yet it still attributes to Kafka’s text 
a specific reference (“the fable’s realism”38) to reality. This may stem from the 
radical way in which Kafka’s language displays both the desperate situation of 
the “He” and resists translation into general terms. The experience of losing all 
ground, which Arendt expresses in her “Dedication to Karl Jaspers” and which 
characterizes her reading of Kafka in “Preface: The Gap Between Past and 
Future,” is re-written in the chapter “Where Are We When We Think?” in such a 
way as to foreground other questions and motives: namely, the question of books’ 
survival,39 the project of dismantling metaphysics and the inherited categories of 
philosophy,40 and the turn towards a fragmented past, from which perhaps only 
pieces can be saved.41 If what is at stake in Arendt’s question about the place of 
the thinking I in time is the term of a form of thought that remains embedded in 
“human time,”42 removed from the old dream “which Western metaphysics has 
dreamed,” then the desperate position of the “he” in Kafka’s text, as Vivian Liska 
emphasizes, would hardly be solvable by repeating this old dream.43 According to 
Liska’s interpretation, Kafka’s desperation consists in the fact “that, beyond the 
realm of the theoretical, he is defeated and stifled by both,” by past and future: 
37 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 210.
38 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 203.
39 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 210.
40 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 212.
41 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 212. At this point in Arendt’s text, the structure of literary quotes 
inserted into the discursive language of her philosophical argumentation thickens. In addition 
to a fragment from Shakespeare’s The Tempest (I, 2), which recurs throughout her writings, she 
cites a passage from W.H. Auden’s 1937 poem “As I Walked Out One Evening,” which takes up 
again the connection to the dead: “‘O plunge your hands in water, / Plunge them in up to the 
wrist; / Stare, stare in the basin / And wonder what you’ve missed.//‘The glacier knocks in the 
cupboard, / The desert sighs in the bed, / And the crack in the tea-cup opens / A lane to the land 
of the dead…’” Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 212–213.
42 Arendt, “Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future,” 11.
43 Vivian Liska, “The Gap between Hannah Arendt and Franz Kafka,” in arcadia. Internation-
ale Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft  / International Journal of Literary Studies 38.2 (2003): 
329–333, 332.
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“What he is searching for, what would truly redeem him, seems to happen some-
where else entirely – somewhere else than in theory.”44 
3  Kafka’s “He” and “We”: Beyond the Dualism of 
the Singular and the Universal
One of Kafka’s diary entries from 1910 shows how discussion of the “he” in Kafka’s 
literature both plays out the tension between the singular and the universal and 
translates the static aspect of this dualism into a flexible, dynamic structure. The 
“ground under one’s feet,” the figure of speech that underlies the notion of the 
present as battlefield, as Arendt develops it in her interpretation of the Kafka text 
of 1920, is explicitly evoked in the diary entry: “he has only as much ground as his 
two feet take up, only as much of a hold as his two hands encompass, so much the 
less, therefore, than the trapeze artist in a variety show, who still has a safety net 
hung up for him below.”45 The space in the world accorded to this single subject 
refers to his body by corresponding precisely with its measurements.
Thus, Kafka here takes up the figure of speech of the “ground under one’s 
feet” in such a way that the space allotted “him” has shrunk to the dimensions 
of “his” feet. The deictic form that occurs in the second sentence of the diary 
entry already makes clear, however, that this does not describe a general “human 
condition: “But forgetting is not the right word here. The memory of this man has 
suffered as little as his imagination.”46 A complex system of relations between 
“he,” “we,” “man,” and “human” begins in the following sentence, a system that 
discloses the relation between the designated individual and the collective: “But 
they just cannot move mountains; the man stands once and for all outside our 
people, outside our humanity.”47 Moreover, a reflection on figures of temporality 
44 Liska, “The Gap between Hannah Arendt and Franz Kafka,” 331.
45 Franz Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, ed. Max Brod, trans. Joseph Kresh, Secker 
& Warburg, London 1948, 26–27. The German original reads, “er hat nur soviel Boden als seine 
zwei Füße brauchen, nur soviel Halt als seine zwei Hände bedecken, also um soviel weniger als 
der Trapezkünstler im Varieté, für den sie unten noch ein Fangnetz aufgehängt haben.” Kafka, 
Tagebücher, 118.
46 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 26. (“Aber Vergessen ist hier kein richtiges Wort. 
Das Gedächtnis dieses Mannes hat ebensowenig gelitten als seine Einbildungskraft.” Kafka, 
Tagebücher, 118.) 
47 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 26. (“Das Gedächtnis dieses Mannes hat eben-
sowenig gelitten als seine Einbildungskraft. Aber Berge können sie eben nicht versetzen; der 
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develops from the opposition of the singular subject, who stands “outside our 
people,” “outside our humanity,” on one hand, and “[us] others,” on the other. 
Outside – this term also refers to the exclusion from past and future. As we have 
seen, the text refuses the possibility of deducing the radical and irrevocable posi-
tion of this outside from the two categories of forgetting and of memory, and it does 
so already in the first sentence (“But forgetting is not the right word here”). So it 
is not a problem of forgetting that leads to the fact that this one nameless person 
has neither a future nor a past, that he owns “only the moment,” “the everlasting 
moment of torment which is followed by no glimpse of a moment of recovery” 
[der immer fortgesetzte Augenblick der Plage, dem kein Funken eines Augenblicks 
der Erhöhung folgt].48 The temporality that takes shape in this passage is one of 
continued moments; the duality and dynamic of the relation between continuity 
and moment has collapsed in the scene described.
The text opposes the individual, whom it introduces as “this man,” to a col-
lective we, from whose perspective and with whose voice it argues or recounts. 
Where the one who stands outside finds footing on the plane only to the degree 
that the plane corresponds with the undersides of his feet and hands, those who 
belong to the collective we are held by their past and future: “We others, we, 
indeed, are held in our past and future” [Uns andere uns hält ja unsere Vergan-
genheit und Zukunft].49 But this hold is not described as a static prop. Rather, it is 
presented in the image of a floating balance, which relates size and weight – size 
of the future and weight of the past – to one another: “We pass almost all our 
leisure and how much of our work in letting them bob up and down in balance. 
Whatever advantage the future has in size, the past compensates for in weight, 
and at their end the two are indeed no longer distinguishable.”50 
Past and future have turned unnoticeably from a mooring into a burden. To 
keep them in balance apparently requires much time, attention, and strength. At 
their ends, past and future are indistinguishable – “earliest youth later becomes 
Mann steht nun einmal außerhalb unseres Volkes, außerhalb unserer Menschheit.” Kafka, 
Tagebücher, 118.)
48 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 26; Kafka, Tagebücher, 118. The obvious differ-
ence in meaning that exists here between the word “recovery” (Erholung) in the English trans-
lation of the diary entry of 1948 and the word “Erhöhung” (exaltation) in the German-language 
critical edition of 2002 can perhaps be traced to a misreading of the original manuscript version.
49 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 27; Kafka, Tagebücher, 118.
50 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 27. (“[F]ast allen unseren Müßiggang und wie 
viel von unserem Beruf verbringen wir damit, sie im Gleichgewicht auf und abschweben zu las-
sen. Was die Zukunft an Umfang voraus hat, ersetzt die Vergangenheit an Gewicht und an ihrem 
Ende sind ja die beiden nicht mehr zu unterscheiden.” Kafka, Tagebücher, 118.) 
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distinct, as the future is, and the end of the future is really already experienced 
in all our sighs, and thus becomes the past.”51 Therefore, the idea that past and 
future can be differentiated does not hold, and it is exactly this impossibility that 
prevents either from assuming the shape of a circle that closes. Yet it is not this 
little gap which is decisive in developing the imagery over the course of the text 
but rather the relation between center and periphery. “So this circle along whose 
rim we move almost closes. Well, this circle indeed belongs to us, but belongs to 
us only so long as we keep to it.”52 Instantly, within one sentence, both power 
relations and spatial relations have turned nearly into their opposite. The subjects 
and the “we” referred to in the text occupy not the center of the circle but its rim, 
and what promised to provide support, upon which one could rely, to which one 
could hold, has revealed itself to be something that must be held in turn – a task 
nearly impossible to fulfill, or one that seems, at any rate, excruciatingly difficult. 
In the next phrase, the perspective – that is to say, the spatial relations – again 
change completely because of a tiny misstep: “if we move to the side just once, 
in any chance forgetting of self, in some distraction, some fright, some astonish-
ment, some fatigue, we have already lost it [the circle] into space.”53 The image of 
losing the circle, which is actually a rim, into space – an almost unavoidable loss 
if one lives and thinks – outlines the real place of the subject or subjects.
This image of the relationship between past and future, which the text devel-
ops here as a thought-figure of time, is a geometrical image. Similarly to the “He” 
text from 1920, it presents a status report, a structural image, a linear ruling, 
in which the graphic, circle, point, line, plane emerge. This geometrical image 
stands in opposition to that metaphor of time designating a condition beyond or 
before this loss, namely, the metaphor of the “tide of the times”: “until now we 
had our noses stuck into the tide of the times, now we step back, former swim-
mers, present walkers, and are lost.”54 The historical metaphor of the “tide of 
51 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 27. (“[F]rüheste Jugend wird später hell wie die 
Zukunft ist und das Ende der Zukunft ist mit allen unsern Seufzern eigentlich schon erfahren 
und Vergangenheit.” Kafka, Tagebücher, 118–119.)
52 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 27. (“So schließt sich fast dieser Kreis, an dessen 
Rand wir entlanggehn. Nun dieser Kreis gehört uns ja, gehört uns aber nur solange als wir ihn 
halten.” Kafka, Tagebücher, 119.) 
53 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 27. (“[R]ücken wir nur einmal zur Seite, in ir-
gendeiner Selbstvergessenheit, in einer Zerstreuung einem Schrecken, einem Erstaunen, einer 
Ermüdung, schon haben wir ihn in den Raum hinein verloren.” Kafka, Tagebücher, 119.)
54 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 27. (“[W]ir hatten bisher unsere Nase im Strom 
der Zeiten stecken, jetzt treten wir zurück, gewesene Schwimmer, gegenwärtige Spaziergänger 
und sind verloren.” Kafka, Tagebücher, 119.)
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the times,” of swimming “with the tide” or “against it,” was entirely common in 
Kafka’s discursive environment. In the figure of the “former swimmers,” Kafka 
literalizes the metaphor; he exposes its figurative center.
Yet the sentence concluding this text brings into play another category, 
namely, that of the law: “We are outside the law, no one knows it and yet every-
one treats us accordingly.”55 Caused by a tiny oversight or by a moment of awe or 
fright, a constellation has been produced by the end of the text, a constellation 
similar to the one at the beginning of the account but not identical: a position 
outside – but now in regards to the law, that is to say, the sphere of the law and/
or religious teachings, and not, as in the beginning, in relation to “our people” or 
“our humanity.”
In contrast to the beginning of the account (“But forgetting is not the right 
word here. […] the man stands once and for all outside”), this loss of the circle is 
not without prerequisites; rather, it emerges from a process that is tied back to the 
world of the social, of leisure time and profession. If, at the beginning of the tale, 
an opposition between the nameless individual and a collective speaking in the 
first-person plural (“our people,” “our humanity”) is decisive, then at the end it 
is the opposition of this “we,” “lost” and unprotected by the law, and a collective 
that consists of “everyone.” “Everyone”: on one hand, the features of mass man 
or of the average man are delineated there; on the other hand, this means every 
individual, without exception. 
We could read the conversion of the constellation and positions as an allu-
sion to the reality that any identification with an ethnic group (majority or minor-
ity) as well as any identification with a universal humanity offers no protection 
against the threat of falling into an outside of the law. Kafka shows the time of this 
being lost as present. “Present walkers”: Kafka presents them at once as iconic 
figures of modernity and as lost beings, no longer supported by past and future, 
no longer belonging to the flow of history, no longer protected by the law. So one 
could say that Kafka’s diary entries address two forms of the present: first, the 
continuous grammatical present tense in which the “we” speaks; and second, 
the present of the now, which forms on the surface of the first by producing a 
past at the same time (“now we step back, former swimmers, present walkers, 
and are lost”). This now corresponds with the extended Now, as Arendt terms it in 
her reading of Kafka (referring to “the one who is creating his present, the battle-
55 Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, 1910–1913, 27. (“Wir sind außerhalb des Gesetzes, keiner 
weiß es und doch behandelt uns jeder danach.” Kafka, Tagebücher, 119.)
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ground is an in-between, an extended Now on which he spends his life”56) – but 
at the same time, as we see, it is starkly different.
At this point, where literature and philosophy encounter one another anew, 
the following question arises: can we read the tension or the opposition between 
the singular and the universal, negotiated in Kafka’s two texts and in Arendt’s 
commentary, as a conflict between, on one hand, what is singular in Jewish expe-
rience and, on the other, what is universal in any reflection on the place of think-
ing and writing? Kafka’s “he” in the diary entry from 1910, who owns nothing 
but the instant (“he has only the moment”), corresponds entirely with a passage 
from a letter that Kafka wrote to Milena Jesenská in November 1920: “to exag-
gerate, not one second of calm has been granted me; nothing has been granted 
me, everything must be earned, not only the present and future, but the past as 
well – something which is, perhaps, given every human being – this too must be 
earned, and this probably entails the hardest work of all.”57 Similar to the passage 
from this letter, in the 1910 account Kafka thematizes how the individual of whom 
he speaks here is refused the present of any time, of the future, the present, and 
past time. We could interpret the correspondence of the two formulations – one 
from Kafka’s journal; the other from his correspondence – as evincing the specific 
situation of Western Jewish time. This time is measured in seconds. 
Kafka’s description of events in the public space of Prague in November 1920 
testifies to how this conception of time is bound up with the issue of enmity: “I’ve 
been spending every afternoon outside on the streets, wallowing in anti-Semitic 
hate.”58 The experience of threat and the signs of the crisis or weakness of public 
space, worsened by war and processes of nationalization, illuminate after the fact 
the vulnerability that manifests itself in this diary entry of 1910.
Another diary entry, from the same year, similarly pulls the place of writing 
into the constellation evoked by the account. The expression “hold on,” fest-
halten, institutes a link between the scene described in the text and the following 
56 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 205.
57 Franz Kafka, Letters to Milena, trans. Philip Boehm, Schocken Books, New York 1990, 217. 
(“[…] das bedeutet, übertrieben ausgedrückt, daß mir keine ruhige Sekunde geschenkt ist, […] 
alles muß erworben werden, nicht nur die Gegenwart und Zukunft, auch noch die Vergangenheit, 
etwas das doch jeder Mensch vielleicht mitbekommen hat, auch das muß erworben werden, das 
ist vielleicht die schwerste Arbeit.” Franz Kafka, Briefe an Milena. Erweiterte und neu geordnete 
Ausgabe, eds. Jürgen Born and Michael Müller, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1986, 294.)
58 Kafka, Letters to Milena, 212–213. (“Die ganzen Nachmittage bin ich jetzt auf den Gassen und 
bade im Judenhaß.” Kafka, Briefe an Milena, 288. See also page 295 and the letter of 30 May 1920 
(page 26), in which Kafka speaks about the precarious position of the Jews and the threat and 
intimidations against them.)
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sentence: “December 16. I won’t give up the diary again. I must hold on here, it is 
the only place I can.”59 The dating inscribes a mark in time, which is held in place 
by the strategic conception of the diaries, in which the diary pages become an 
open experimental space for writing.
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